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ABSTRACT^
The following thesis discusses some uses of the term 'cause* 
with a view to elucidating some 'causal* problems and conflicting 
assertions about 'causes' found among philosophers®
Some commonsense uses are first examined (as those met earliest 
by any philosopher), and then the term» s treatment by a representative 
selection of philosophers® The positions of Aristotle, Hume, and 
Kant are discussed in some detail, those of the others more briefly* 
Many philosophers have believed themselves referring to a non­
verbal relation in using the term 'cause'; some supposing this 
relation necessary® These opinions stand condemned if words cannot 
express information about anything but symbols; and the view of 
'causation' as a relation both non-verbal and necessary is false if 
necessity is properly predicable of verbal connections alone® The 
main discussion is therefore prefaced by a brief examination of these 
general questions; this concludes that words can refer to something 
other than symbols and that there are some non-verbal entailments so 
that the claims made for the term 'cause» by plain men and philosophers 
may be considered on their own merits®
Two main contentions about ' causes' are found claiming attention;
(a) everything is caused in the sense of being somehow explicable 
(a view shared by plain men, Aristotelians, and other rationalists);
(b) every event is 'caused* in the sense of being preceded by another 
which it follows necessarily (the subject of most post-Humean 
discussions of 'causation')#
2.
That everything is somehow explicable is found incapable of 
proof or disproof but to appear endemic to human thought so that 
it is doubtful whether anyone has been entitled to deny it.
Necessary connection between events is found conceivable and 
often consistent with the facts, though incapable of proof; and, 
indeed, as Ewing contends, (1) sometimes (namely in the reasoning 
process) it seems undeniable® But that each event follows 
necessarily ffin another is found incapable of proof, nor is the 
available evidence found to support this conclusion unanimously.
(1) Of. his contribution to the Symposium on Mechanical and 
Teleological Causation in the Supplementary proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 1935 (Vol Xlv)
\
3^V  INTRODUCTION®
(1) philosophy and language - The aim and method of this enquiry®
(a) The relevance of the question; 'How has the term "cause" 
been used?'
It will, I suppose, be generally agreed that the task of the 
philosopher is not simply an empirical enquiry into the use of words# 
It is true that, of recent years, many thinkers have held that 
philosophy is concerned solely with linguistic problems, but these 
thinkers certainly do not intend to identify the roles of the 
philosopher and philologist® They define philosophy as the study 
of the formal principles in accordance with which language may be 
constructed and manipulated*
Yet even the most extreme formalist cannot be completely 
indifferent to the empirical question unless he wishes to confine 
himself to purely private speculations® If he is to say anything 
about the assertions of other thinkers, he must observe how they 
have, in fact, used terras* Even in the classic of pure formalism 
'Logical Syntax of Language' Camap shows an interest in the way 
words have been used# He wishes to illustrate his thesis that the 
contentions of philosophers assert nothing but rules about the use 
of language, and in order to do this he must show how the philosophers 
formulating them have used language# Thus in order to show that the 
conflicting contentions concerning primitive data are nothing but 
different rules for the use of words, he must notice the way in which 
thinkers have used the term 'primitive data*® (1)#
4c
#ien anyone asks such a question as 'i#at is philosophy?' 
or 'T/hat is causation?' he is interested in the way such words 
are, and have been, used* He may be convinced that he is not 
asking a question about the use of words, but a little reflection 
would show him that the answer to the question 'How has the tern 
'philosophy' (or 'causation') been used?' is relevant and indeed 
indispensable to any answer to the former questions, which would 
satisfy him* I remember as a child being shown over the University 
College at Bangor and, on seeing a stained glass window representing 
philosophy, asking just this question 'What is philosophy?»* It is 
clear to me that whatever might or might not have satisfied my 
curiosity, it would not have been satisfied until I had learned how 
the term 'philosophy' was used* Had someone provided me with a 
highly original definition it would not have satisfied me or 
answered ray question, no matter what good reasons he might have put 
forward for adopting it* I was not interested in establishing a 
rule for the use of the terra, however ingenious or well founded, I 
was concerned to understand other pepple when they formulated 
sentences containing the terra and this I could not do without 
learning how they used it* (what is involved in discovering how 
a term A is used, and whether more than this is required in order 
to answer adequately the question 'What is A?^ will be discussed 
below) *
5.
Plato asked explicitly 'What is justice?' but most philosophers 
do not ask such questions explicitly# instead they 'discuss 
justice (causation etc#); that is to say they formulate sentences 
containing the term 'justice' ('Causation' or whatever it may be) as 
subject and/or sentences from which sentences containing that term 
as subject are derivable in accordance with the transformation rules 
of the language they are using# It is evident that in so doing 
they are assuming an answer to the question 'y/hat is justice?' at 
least insofar as this involves a decision to use that term in 
accordance with some consistent rule#
Further whenever a philosopher 'discusses justice* he intends 
the sentences he formulates to be relevant to the 'discussion of 
justice' by other thinkers# But this means that he must either 
adopt the usage of those others or else make explicit his deviation 
from it# In either case he must have answered the question 'What 
is justice?' insofar as this involves answering the question 'How 
h%8 this term been used by X, y and z?* It is true that one 
philosopher's discussion of justice' need not be relevant to that of 
any other; it would be possible to use the term in a purely private 
way so that one's 'discussion of the subject' was entirely irrelevant 
to that of everyone else# A person who adopted such a procedure 
might, in the course of his 'discussion', make remarks which were 
both justified formally in terras of the linguistic rules he had 
adopted, and 'true in the ordinary sense of the term#
6.
I might, for instance, define 'justice* as synonymous with 
» archaeologyJ using the latter term as is customary among the 
English# Then I could 'discuss justice* consistently and further, 
so long as my * knowledge of archaeology* was adequate, I could, in 
the course of this discussion, make 'true assertions' in the 
ordinary sense of this phrase* I might, for example, with both 
truth and logical justification, make such statements as the 
following: *I am interested in justice* ; 'our knowledge of
justice is based on the results of careful excavations'; 'Sir 
Leonard Woolley has greatly contributed to our knowledge of justice* ;
It is simply an historical fact (one not unnatural, man being a 
gregarious animal) that whenever a philosopher has used terms which 
he knows others to have used also, he intends and supposes the 
sentences he formulates containing them to have some relevance to 
at least some of the sentences formulated by at least some of those 
others which either contain that terra or are deducible from sentences 
which do# very scant acquaintance with the works of philo sphere 
reveals that many of them formulate sentences which are irrelevant 
to those formulated by many others yet containing a common term; 
many sentences containing the term ' cause* formulated by modem 
thinkers are completely irrelevant to numerous sentences in which 
Aristotle uses it* This is not peculiar to philosophy, however;
Latin sentences containing the terra 'mare* are often completely 
irrelevant to English sentences in which it occurs, just as Elizabethan 
English sentences containing the terms 'presently*, 'silly', 'awful'
7.
may be completely irrelevant to modem English sentences in which 
they occur. Yet Latin sentences containing the term 'mare* are 
relevant to each other and so are Elizabethan English sentences 
containing the term 'awful*. Similarly no philosopher acquainted 
with only the Aristotelian use of the terra * cause' for example, 
has formulated sentences in which that tern occurs which are 
irrelevant to all the sentences in which Aristotle has used it.
Some of the thinkers in this position criticised and rejected the 
Aristotelian usage, but criticism and rejection of a thinker's usage 
can hardly be regarded as irrelevant to it. To assert that 
•causation is a relation not of necessary connexion but of regular 
sequence* is no more irrelevant to the statements of those who have 
defined * causation* in terms of 'necessary connexion* than is the 
sentence 'No it is raining* irrelevant to the statement 'it is a 
fine evening*. In this connection it is interesting to note that 
when a philosopher has adopted a new usage of common term, this 
usage is generally closely correlated to the old; generally the 
new usage either constitutes a sub-section of the old one or is 
such that the old one forms a natural sub-section of it. Thus for 
example, Descartes explicitly rejected the usage of the term 'motion* 
current among his Scholastic contemporaries (2) Yet the usage which 
he introduced was no more revolutionary than a subsection of the old; 
he had decided to apply the term to only one type of change instead 
of applying it to change in general as did the Scholastics*
8o
Similarly, though Aristotle uses the term 'cause* veiy differently 
from the post-Cartesian rationalist, yet both agree that the term 
is translatable in some contexts with the term 'explanation*; 
they differ only in that Aristotle is prepared to substitute 
'cause* for * explanation* in more contexts than is the post- 
Cartesian.
It is unfortunately true that thinkers have not always been 
aware of a difference in usage between themselves and those to whose 
remarks they have supposed their own relevant. This again is no 
peculiarity of philosophers : north and sotth country English folk
may find themselves talking equally at cross purposes while using 
terms common to them both such as 'pie*, 'cake* and 'loaf*. This 
argues no more than their failure to fulfil one of the conditions 
necessary to the achievement of their purpose; it does not prove 
that condition less necessary. For they simply do not succeed in 
making their ranarks relevant to those of each other as they intend. 
They would prove understanding A’s usage unnecessary to speaking 
relevantly to his assertions only if they succeeded in doing the 
latter without having such understanding. instead they fail in 
relevance precisely insofar as they misunderstand each the other* s 
usage.
My intentions in writing this thesis do not differ from the 
common ones. In using and considering the term 'cause* i am 
interested in the sentences which others have formulated which 
either contain it or are deducible (according to their usage) from
9o
others that do; and, in discussing this term, I wish to say 
something relevant to these sentences.
I shall indeed be more particularly interested in the ways 
in which the term has been used than have been many philosophers. 
The ease with which two people may talk at cross purposes while 
using common terms has but just been remarked; it seams therefore 
essential, in examining the various assertions containing or 
relevant to any term, to consider the uses of that term. Where 
those assertions are the subject of dispute, or consist in the 
acceptance or rejection of the views of another, it is necessary 
to understand the usages of all parties concerned; for if A says 
in effect that B is talking nonsense, he and B may be talking at 
cross-purposes and this one cannot know unless one understands the 
usage which each is employing. V/hen therefore, there is a term 
which has been and continues to be the subject of numerous conflict­
ing statements, it is of primary importance to know how that term 
has been used in these various statements if anything relevant to 
them is to be said. Such a term is * cause*, and I intend to 
examine its various uses in the hope of elucidating the evaluation 
of some conflicting assertions containing, and relevant to, it 
which have been made. The long history of the term (or its 
synonyms), and the alterations in its usage which have evolved in 
the course of that history were noted above. A study of the major 
historical uses of the term together with the sources and courses
10.
of the principal among these alterations cannot but contribute 
to this end, particularly as philosophers in using the term 
generally suppose their remarks relevant to some at least of the 
major historical 'discussions' or 'theories* concerning 'cause'.
In the following pages I intend to concentrate on the evolution 
of the term, seeking similarities, differences and other relations 
between the various usages. Nevertheless I shall not be concerned 
exclusively with how the term has been used, for I wish my remarks 
to be relevant to those of others who have used the term not simply 
in the sense of describing how they have done so but also in the 
sense of saying something relevant to the admissability of 
statements about 'cause» made and implied by these others.
Ile
(b) The problem of Meaning.
It would be- agreed, I think, that many v/ould deny that a 
question of the type 'What is philosophy?» is simply an enquiry 
into the use of words, though, as was seen above (3) they could 
not well deny that its answer involved the results of such an 
enquiry. Those who hold this view would likewise maintain that, 
in order to » discuss causation* so that one's remarks are both 
useful and relevant to those of others 'on the same subject', 
more is needed than * knowledge of the way in which those others use 
the term'. This contention rests largely, if not entirely, on a 
particular definition of the phrase 'knowledge of another's use of 
a term*. Anyone defining 'knowledge of A ’s use of a term' in some 
such manner as 'knowledge of the way in which A uses a term to 
express a particular meaning'^or 'knowledge of the meaning to express 
which A uses a term', in all probability^ regards such knowledge 
as a sufficient condition of a useful discussion concerning A's 
sentences containing a given terra or implying those that do. The 
view in question amounts, for instance, to the denial that one 
could say anything relevant to Aristotle's discussion of 'causation' 
that was either interesting or useful, if one knev; only that in 
certain contexts, specified entirely in terms of words and their 
formal correlations, he treated 'explanation* and 'cause* as 
interchangeable terras#
I remarked (4) that ray motive in asking 'what is philosophy?' 
had been to 'understand* sentences in which that term occurred*
12#
Those who maintain the view outlined above hold two beliefs:
(a) that in order to say anything useful about A*s 'discussion 
of causation* it is necessary to 'understand' the sentences in 
which he uses the term * cause* (those deducible from these and 
those of his sentences from which others containing the terra or 
its synonyms are deducible); and (b) that in order to 'understand* 
these, knowledge of verbal definitions is not enough.
The first of these beliefs would be generally accepted: the
extreme formalist denies the second only; that is to say he agrees 
that one must 'understand* A's sentences before one can * discuss' 
them adequately, but maintains that 'understanding' them consists 
simply in knowing the formal rules governing their use and that of 
the terms they contain# The anti-formalist on the other hand, 
contends that any term of which it is appropriate to say *i under­
stand' has ' '^^aning* in the shape of a non-formal oharacterisitc, 
involving or containing a reference of some sort to something other 
than itself which may be non-verbal altogether#
It is evident that it is impossible to discuss any term or 
evaluate any sentence adequately unless one first answers the 
question whether or not any term may have meaning in this non-formal 
sense# I shall, therefore, examine this question as briefly as 
possible# As necessarily brief, ray discussion cannot claim to be 
exhaustive; I hope merely to indicate the grounds of which ray views 
are based#
13.
It must be remembered that whereas a negative answer to the 
question 'May a term have "meaning" in the non-formal sense also 
answers the question whether any particular term has 'meaning' in 
this sense, an affirmative answer to the first question does not 
do so; for there would be no contradicition in supposing that 
though it was possible for a term to have meaning in this sense 
in fact there was none which had, or that though some possessed 
it there were others that did not. Therefore, even though it may 
be found that a term may have 'meaning* in this sense, and even 
that some terms do, it is still possible that 'cause' does not. 
Consideration of the general question is relevant, and indeed in­
dispensable ^ to the discussion of any particular term not because 
its answer will necessarily show whether that term has non-formal 
'meaning' (though this may show that it has not) but because from 
the answer to this question it is possible to discover whether 
there is any point in asking with respect to any particular term. 
'Has it "meaning" in the non-formal sense?*
It would be admitted by both the formalists and their opponents 
that the criterion by which we judge a person's * understanding* of 
a term in accordance with the usage of any language, is his ability 
to use that term according to the rules prescribed for that 
language. (The anti-formalist would, of course maintain that 
* understanding * a term, though this involves ability to use it 
correctly i.e* according to the rules of the language concerned, 
does not consist in this, or at the most that it does not consist
14.
in this alone). An examination of the conditions necessary to 
the 'correct* use of terms will, therefore, help to show what is 
involved in * understanding * them.
There is no doubt that we can leam to use many terms correct­
ly by means of verbal definitions# This is best illustrated by 
the process of learning a foreign language (at least when it is 
learned in the old fashioned way). A complete language, (i.e. 
all the terms correlated according to a single set of linguistic 
rules, and their correlations) may be learned solely by the study 
of the formal rules contained in grammars and dictionaries. A 
little reflection will show, however, that it is not possible to 
leam all the correct uses of all the terms of any conversation 
language in this way. Verbal definiations enable us to do no more 
than substitute one word, or set of words, for another, according 
to prescribed rules* it is undeniable that most of the time we 
are using language we are doing this, and that sometimes at least 
we are doing no more. It is further true that within these 
languages there is no sentence incapable of being replaced by 
another according to the formal rules of the language containing it; 
thus the 'meaning* of one sentence may always be expressed, to some 
extent at least, by another. It is equally evident that it is 
impossible to express the 'meaning* of a term or set of terms with­
out %sing5language of some sort, since expressing anything simply 
consists in using symbols in a certain way. Further, if the 
'meaning* of words is to be expressed in the language to which they
15o
belong it can ordinarily be expressed only by more words since the 
word languages normally consist of words alone# Since it is clearly 
impossible to record or communicate the meaning of terms without 
expressing it by means of symbols, it is not surprising that when 
anyone wishes to record or communicate the 'meaning* of words he 
uses other words# Moreover, so convenient is the use of words that 
we normally think in terms of them whether we are wishing to record 
or communicate our thought or not; indeed it seems clear that the 
use of language is indispensable to the more complex thought 
processes at least. Thus in any discussion it is impossible to get 
away from words and the process of substituting one set of wrds for 
another. (5)*
Yet this does not canpriae all the uses of terms prescribed by
the conversation languages# A ^ Verbal définitimn serves to teach us
that the term 'red* may be substituted for 'rouge*, the phrase
*This is red* for *o*est rouge*, when one is translating from French
)h hzc\c[s-es
into English# They also t^aoh us that within the English language 
it is correct to substitute ’not green' for 'red* but that we may 
not substitute *red* for ’not green^ or ’green*# But according to
conventions which everyone who speaks English recognises, there are 
occasions when it is correct to use the term 'red* and the phrase 
’This is red* which consist neither in translating terms occurring 
either in English or any other language nor in the repetition of 
something learned by heart (as when the blind man says correctly but, 
as we should say, without justification *The pillar box is red')#
16.
Similarly, there are occasions when he is neither translating 
nor repeating by heart, vhen it is correct for the Frenchman to 
use the term 'rouge* and the sentences *C®est rouge*. »Jl n*est 
pas vert*# And there are innumerable terms in English, French, 
and all the other conversation languages of -which this is true#
Such usage can be neither established nor learned by means of 
purely formal rules which, by definition, are concerned solely 
with conditions for the translation or substitution of one symbol, 
or set of symbols, by another# In order that such a usage may be 
established or learned, it is essential that there should be some­
thing besides lingusistic rules in the situation which may be na de 
its criterion# This of course is not to say that there must be any 
intrinsic connection between this criterion and the term whose usage 
it is made to condition# In order to use the term *red* consistently 
on occasions other than those when one is translating it or repeat­
ing something by heart, it is necessaiy only to distinguish a 
particular type of phenomenon which is not a linguistic convention 
nor determined by one and to leam to use that terra in reference to 
it, in accordance with a given rule.
The foregoing paragraph seems to me to formulate a convincing 
refutation of the formalist who would maintain that there is nothing 
relevant to 'meaning*^ nor to the construction of even the conversation 
languages,other than formal rules of sentence formation and trans­
formation# And so, I think, it would appear to most people; 
professor Ayer, for example, likewise argues (6) that the formalist 
position is fallacious on the ground that transformation rules
17#
cannot teach us in what situations (apart from that of trans­
lation) a sentence may be used^and that such uses are intrinsic 
to the conversation languages. Yet no doubt the formalist would 
remain unconvinced, maintaining doggedly that in making such 
statements we are asserting no more than the way various terms and 
phrases may be correlated consistently with purely formal con­
ventions of the English language* i#e« that the sentence 
'Formation and transformation rules are inadequate to teach all 
the known uses of terms' is derivable, according to the formation 
and transformation rules of the English languages, from 'There is 
an use of terms, correct according to the conventions of the 
conversation languages, which is other than translations or 
repetition by heart’. He would certainly be correct in saying that 
this assertion is part of, or involved in, my contention; for, as 
has been observed above, (7) it is obviously impossible to discuss 
anything without deriving one set of terms from another according 
to the formal rules of the language one is using# Yet to maintain 
that this is all the argument can be said to assert, is completely 
unjustified#
A philosopher would be justified in refraining from regarding 
a particular set of J5ymbols as asserting more than a linguistic 
rule only if one of the following conditions were fulfilled;
(a) if no set of symbols asserted more than such a rule;Q)if the 
particular set in question were so limited.
18
Were the first of these conditions fulfilled, however, it 
would be impossible to assert that this were so or to defend this 
contention# For a linguistic rule could do no more than forbid 
our using symbols to express anything but such a rule on the purely 
arbitrary ground that we had already decided not to do so; it could 
not render our using symbols thus^unconditionally unjustifiable. 
Condition (a) therefore would be more than a linguistic convention 
and hence its fulfillment would exclude the possibility of its own 
assertion and defence^ for both of which symbols are needed#
A philosopher, therefore, is guilty of self-contradiction if 
he asserts that no set of symbols states more than a linguistic rule, 
if in saying so he intends to assert not merely that those who 
contradict him are wrong relatively to some convention but that they 
are asserting something inadmissible under any conditions. For if 
nothing but conventions are concerned there is nothing to prevent 
anyone adopting whichever he pleases so long as he makes it explicit 
and adheres to it consistently. Thus the first of the two conditions 
enumerated above cannot serve to justify a philosopher in denying 
that any or every set of symbols asserts nothing but linguistic 
rules, it can only justify him in restricting himself purely 
arbitrarily to the discussion of linguistic rules alone. There 
seems no reason for accepting this limitation however; it seems 
evident to me at least that J have all my life succeeded in using 
symbols to assert things other than linguistics rules. Moreover 
since no philosopher has in fact accepted this limitation, all
. 19
having treated some set. of symbols as stating something other than 
such a rule, there seems no reason to suppose I have been mistaken 
in this. (8)
There is, therefore, no prime facie reason for supposing any 
sentence to state only a linguistic rule; it would consequently 
be unjustifiable to dismiss any assertion as purely linguistic 
unless provided with evidence for this in that sentence itself, 
its context or use. So far as the sentences under discussion are 
concerned, the evidence all points in the contrary direction. Not 
only is there nothing in them, their context and usage to suggest 
this limitation, but consideration of the argument, and the 
experiences of formulating it and being convinced by it strongly 
suggest the complete opposite. In the first place the argument 
carries conviction as no mere manipulation of the expressions of 
a purely formal language, such as those constructed by carnap, does. 
For the conviction it carries is no mere assurance that I have 
acted according to the rules, which I m%y obtain equally in playing 
a game or constructing a watch. Of course this conviction includes 
such an assurance, since without observing the rules of logic and 
syntax correctly I could not obtain a justifiable conclusion; but 
it also contains an assurance which is other than this belief#
For when I assert the conclusion that criteria other than formed 
rules are used in the construction of conversation languages, the 
conviction uppermost in my mind, that which I am trying to express^ 
concerns not verbal rules but the character of something else which
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has entered into my experience* F urther it is not words alone 
which produce this conviction, though doubtless i could not 
obtain it without them# Were I provided with a translation of 
the argument in a language with which I was unfamiliar, merely 
being told sufficient of its transformation rules to realise the 
conclusion formally derivable from the premises, it would not 
produce this conviction in me though it would do so were I aware 
of its translation into a language I ’understood»# indispensable 
to this conviction is the character, of certain of my experiences^ 
«né in whose absence the verbal argument would fail to convince 
no matter in #iat language it was formulated, just as, in the 
absence of a certain experience, no acquaintance with verbal rules 
could produce the conviction which J am trying to express when I 
say ’I see a red patch’»
It has been contended that words are indispensable to all 
mental processes and that therefore it is impossible to appeal 
to experience as something distinct from the words used to describe 
it# This is a not unnatural conclusion from the close connection 
between thought and language noted above (9). It is a conclusion, 
moreover, strengthened by the fact that in appealing to experience 
philosophers generally consider phenomena we all learned to name 
in early childhood and of vdiich, in consequence, we find it 
difficult to think apart from their names (or their names apart 
from them).
Yet I can refute this contention by a very simple experiment 
which I have just performed# This experiment is possible for me.
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as it is not for everyone, because of my inability to rem^ber the 
names of the musical notes. I have just stepped over to the piano 
and, without looking at the keyboard, struck a number of notes at 
random* Although I could not name them I had no difficulty in 
recognising the distinctive character of each (though I could never 
describe it whether I used the appropriate name or not^ readily 
distinguishing one note from another. Mary Wilson writing in 
Analysis (lo) seems to suggest that without the proper linguistic 
equipment it is impossible to recognise differences between one note 
and another. 1 think however, that she is here confusing inability 
to describe difference of pitch intelligibly with inability to 
discern it* clearly I could not say truly ’These sounds differ in 
pitch* until i had learned to use the term ’pitch* correctly but this 
is not to say that I could not detect the difference which I so 
describe until I had learned to name it*.. Rather would this eem to 
be putting the cart before the horse since how could I leam to name 
a difference until I could detect it?
I remarked above that the experiment by means of which I was 
convinced of the formalist’s error was made possible by my lack of 
a precise musical memory; it would not, therefore,convince universally. 
Hence it will be useful to point out that the same conclusion is 
demonstrated by a very comnon phenomenon. Each year thousands of 
children (not to mention adults) ignorant of both standard notation 
and tonic sol-fa leam to sing, hum, and whistle numerous tunes 
»by ear*. It is evident that a person could not distinguish one 
tune from another, let alone consciously memorise and reproduce each
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correctly, unless he were able to discern the distinctive character 
of the individual notes of which they are constituted, distinguish­
ing one from another, since the distinctive character of a tune 
depends on those of the notes it contains, together with their 
relations to each other* it is true that when a person ’ 1 earns 
a tune by ear* he generally memorises not one particular set of 
notes but the mutual relations of its constituent notes. A 
person knowing some musical terminology would say that he memorises 
the order which the notes of the scale must have if they are to 
form this tune, but that hh forgets the key in vhich he heard it 
sung or played. Now this is a very interesting phenomenon since 
it is clear that such an ability is ccsnpletely independent of any 
explicit knowledge of scales and keys# pour year olds who couldn’t 
tell what a scale was, who wouldn’t even recognise one as such if 
they heard it, are yet able to ’leam the tunes’ of nursery rhymes 
in this way simply from hearing them sung* I know i was able to 
* leam tunes’ in this way long before I had ever met a scale or 
would have known one had I done so# This phenomenon is far more 
serious to the foimalist than the mere ability to discern the 
distinctive character of separate notes unnamed# por though 
forced to acknowledge this ability he might still console himself 
with the conviction that the discernment of relations among 
phenomena depended on language and the construction of artificial 
conventions# The musical scale might well seem, at first sight, an 
ideal case in point* per since we assert relations of notes only 
in terms of scales which are artifical constructs (more than one
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such standard being possible), it might well seem that notes have 
no inherent relations to one another but that we can relate them 
only by deciding on a certain standard order for them in relation 
to which all other musical arrangements are distinguished and 
designated* It might be thought that when we speak of the mutual 
relations among the notes we are really speaking of nothing but 
a conventional method of describing them in terras of such a 
standard order* It is true that such an artificial convention is 
required if the relations between notes are to be described, but 
that these relations consist in nothing more is refuted by every 
four year old who leams to sing nursery rhymes by hearing them 
sung by others#
The denial of our ability to discern anything independently 
of language must rest, I think, on a confusion between what I have 
called simply • discernment*, and a much more complicated process 
involving memory and knowledge of verbal conventions* This 
confusion is not surprising siix)e the majority of our ’perceptual 
experiences* are of the latter type* ’Discernment* is found alone 
only in experience of the type described above, vhich, though 
numerous, are rare relatively to the total number of ’perceptual 
experiences’ of a normal adult* The majority of these involve 
judgments of the type ’This is red’, ’This is A  sharp*. Now it 
is evident that such a judgment involves knowledge of a certain 
rule for using words# But this in no way conflicts with the fact 
that among the criteria, given which I judge the appropriateness
24
of the term ’red* according to this rule, is something distinct 
from, and independent of, verbal rules* Indeed examination of 
the type of situation in which I judge *This is red’ with confi­
dence, convinces me that in so doing I am discerning a certain 
element in my experience distinct from, and independent of, verbal 
rules, judging that this is similar to others I have experienced 
in the past, and that I have learned to apply that term to my 
experiences solely in virtue of that character in which I judge 
my present experience to resemble those past ones* That is to 
say, on analysis, the verbal rule which I must know to make such 
judgments, is revealed as a rule for the correlation of words with 
sane thing other than words and verbal^ rules, and therefore to know 
this rule I must be able to discern this something independently of 
language#
The formalist’s contention that words are indispensable to all 
mental processes, to all perceptual experiences %s we know them, is 
thus seen to be erroneous* At the same time, however, it has been 
shown that he is correct, and moreover performing a useful service 
in pointing out something too easily and too often overlooked*, when 
he maintains that language is indispensable to perceptual experiences 
of the type involving judgments such as ’This is red’* It is, 
therefore, the more unfortunate that the value of his analysis should 
be decreased by his failure to realise that there is a condition of 
these judgments distinct from leuiguage* This is doubly unfor­
tunate since other thinkers may well be provoked into denying the
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truth along with the error in his conclusions*
Very many would agree that the ’meaningulness* of given terms in 
certain situations involves some reference to the non-verbal, but 
there has probably been no greater disagreement than over that in 
which ’meaning* consists* professor Ayer (11) has pointed out 
the fallacies in the more naive definitions* it is true he is 
discussing sentences and not single words in this connection, but 
fallacies similar in principle to those he points out, are equally 
possible in discussing the ’meaning* of words* Corresponding to 
the fallacy of defining the ’meaning’ of a sentence as a fact (a 
definition which would make false sentences meaningless and is 
thus nonsensica]^ is that of defining the ’meaning’ of words in 
terms of existants* This is an easy mistake to make if one 
concentrates one’s attention on observation sentences* When I 
say spontaneously and with justice ’This pillarbox is red’ I am 
saying something about an existent, it is therefore a natural con­
clusion that words ’mean’ existants, their relations or qualities, 
that for instance ’pillar-box’ ’means’ a material object, ’red’ 
a quality of material objects and so on* This view is refuted by 
the meaningfulness of the names of imaginary objects and those that 
have ceased to exist such as ’^unicorn’ and ’dodo’. I may indeed 
write a meaningful sentence which attributes a purely fictitious 
character to a purely fictitious object; e*g* ’A dragon is a winged 
and scaly reptile breathing red and green fire* ; ’A winged unicorn 
is a star-eater’*
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The other definition of meaning criticised by professor Ayer 
is that which asserts a sentence’s meaning to be a proposition#
He objects that he can find no definition of ’proposition* apart 
from ’what a sentence means^ and that the peculiar way in which 
propositions must exist, is never explained. The corresponding 
definition of words is that in terms of concepts or ideas, and 
against this equivalent objections may be raised. This again is 
an understandable definition^ since we naturally conclude that 
words ’mean* what we ’understand’ in using them correctly; and what 
is this^it will be asked^but the idea or conception they stand for.^  
It is, indeed, true that meaningful v/ords do stand for ideas or 
concepts, the error lies in supposing that an account of meaning can 
be given in terms of these alone.
professor Ayer dismisses the general question ’what do sen­
tences mean?’ as pointless and misleading since it is unanswerable, 
there being no meaning common to all sentences; and doubtless he 
would treat the question ’ What do words mean?’ likewise. Now it 
is true that if the question ’What do words mean?’ is regarded 
as analogous to ’What does ’’pillar-box” mean?’ it admits of no 
answer. Yet this is not to say that no enquiry about the meaning 
of words in general admits of an answer, it merely asserts that a 
certain formula is misleading when it is used to express an enquiry 
about ’meaning’ in general. There is a very real question as to 
what is involved in the meaningfulness of a word or sentence; for 
were it not possible to ask and answer this^it would be impossible 
to decide whether or not a term or sentence is ’meaningful’, and
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this is a decision which is made as often as words are used, which 
is to say constantly. T shall try to answer this question; but 
owing to the ambiguity of questions of the form ’What do words mean?’ 
I shall formulate the question I intend to'try and answer as ’What 
makes a sentence meaningful?’ or alternatively ’What are the 
conditions given which we ascribe’’’meaning” to a term?*
It has been seen that the correct use^and hence the understand­
ing of a terra ^ in some contexts depends on the existence of a 
criterion other than a verbal rule. This is to say that there are 
occasions when the existence of something other than itself is 
relevant to the ’meaning’ of a term. Furthermore the existence of 
experiences of a given type,either contemporaneously with or prior 
to^one’s use of certain terms seems necessary if one is to attach 
♦meaning’ to them. Thus it would not generally be said that a 
man blind from birth ’understood the meaning’ of the terra ’red’ 
even though he used it correctly in transalting from twenty other 
languages into English or repeated correctly, as formulae learned 
by heart, ’English pillarboxes are red’; ’Red is one of the primary 
colours’; ’When tomatoes are red they are ripe’. Indeed even were 
he instructed correctly that if he pointed in a given direction at a 
certain time and repeated the formula ’This is red’, he would be 
making a true assertion, and he used the formula so; he would still 
not be regarded as^understanding*the meaning of the term ’red’.
And^in case this might be regarded as an unfounded prejudice of 
the sighted^it may be useful to repeat here an assertion I once
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heard made by a man blind fron birth. He was engaged in con­
versation with an artist and maintained that he found it im­
possible to conceive how three-dimensional objects could be 
represented in a two dimensional medium, since this was something 
fundamentally dissimilar from any of his experiences. Here was a 
disinterested avowal (disinterested since he was not at that time 
concerned to support any particular theory of meaning) of great 
importance. For here was a man with a rare and crucial basis of 
comparison, since consistently with the established usage, there 
were some English terms he could correlate with certain ex­
periences, others which he could correlate with none. And although 
as his ability to use them intelligibly in discussion witnessed, he 
understood the formal rules governing the use of these latter, he 
testified that these for him lacked ’meaning* in the sense in which 
those he was able to correlate with his experience, possessed it.
All this might suggest that the ’meaning’ of words is definable 
in terns of experience. But an experience is after all only a type 
of existent and the definition of ’meaning’ in terms of experience 
is open to all the objections against the wider definition in terms 
of existence. Not only are terms ’meaningful’ in the immediate 
absence of any experience to which they might be applicable-e.g., 
’Ripe tomatoes are red’ remains ’meaningful’ even at a time and 
place where there is nothing to vdiich the term ’ripe tomato’ is 
applicable; even if, at that precise moment, nothing exists to 
which the term is applicable, it and the sentence containing it are
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are • m e a n i n g f u l b u t  furthermore terms may be ’meaningful’ when 
there has never existed any experience to which they would be 
applicable; e.g. unicorn, star-eater.
After careful consideration of the criteria by which terms 
are judged to be ’meaningful’, I have come to the conclusion that 
although ’meaning’ can be defined in terms of neither existants in 
general nor experiences in particular, yet neither can it be 
accounted for without reference to both. In order that ’meaning’ 
should be attached to a terra two things seem to be required;
1) an ability to conceive a given type of object (quality of, or 
relation among, objects) as a possible existent; 2) a decision to 
apply a given terra to anything of this character should it ever be 
met with. Por a term is said to have ’meaning’ only when it has 
been decided that it should be applied to a certain type of thing 
should such ever exist; and a person is said to ’understand’ it only 
when he knows the type of thing to which it would be proper to apply 
it (according to the rules of the language concerned) should such an 
one ever enter his experience. Thus a person is said to understand 
the term ’red’ only when he knows the type of quality in virtue of 
which it would be correct to describe an existent by that term; he 
is said to understand the terra ’pillar-box’ if, and only if, he 
understands the conditions which an object would have to fulfil 
before this name might be applied to it in accordance with the 
conventions of the English language.
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It thus becomes apparent why, and to what extent, experience 
is relevant to ’meaning’ and ’understanding’. My blind friend’s 
experience testified to the impossibility of conceiving something 
fundamentally dissimilar to any of one’s experiences. But since 
one can attach ’meaning’ to a term only by conceiving a possible 
Existent to which it is made applicable, then in attaching ’meaning’ 
or ’understanding’, one is limited within the range of possibilities 
bearing some relation to one’s experience. it is, on the other hand, 
apparent that there is no difficulty in attaching meaning to terms 
applicable to bothing within one’s experience, or even to nothing 
existing at all, if the elements of the postulated hypothetical 
existants, have been met within one’s ov/n experience. Thus ’unicorn* 
and ’star-eater’, are perfectly intelligible tavne to me since they 
are definable in terms of words applicable to existents of a type I 
have frequently met. I have, for instance met horses, white objects, 
narrow objects, horns, golden objects and cone-shaped objects; the 
words ’white animal like a horse except for a narrow golden cone- 
shaped horn in the centre of its forehead’ are therefore capable of 
expressing for me a possible character for an existent.
This account of ’ meaning J so far as I can discover, is the 
only one that can satisfactorily allow for, and explain, the ’meaning­
fulness’ of general assertions. These cannot be accounted for if 
the ’meaning’ of words is defined simply in terms of existants since, 
as has been seen, they may remain ’meaningful’ even when there is no 
existent to which the constituent terms are applicable (even indeed 
if there never has been and never will be). Yet on the other hand.
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formal rules alone utterly fail to account for them and our 
interpretation of them*
There is one peculiarity of such assertions which makes them 
completely inexplicable on any view of meaning save in terms of 
hypothetical reference to existants: sometimes they may be regarded
as expressing statements about existants, sometimes not. For 
instance, so long as there exists something to which the term ’ripe 
tomato’ is applicable, the sentence ’Ripe tomatoes are red* is 
saying something about an existent, but if there should be nothing 
anywhere to which that term applies, then the sentence says nothing 
of any existent.
Once the process of attaching meaning to terras is recognised 
to be the adoption of a rule for applying words to existants of a 
specific type, should any such ever appear, the distinctive character 
of general assertions and their ’meaningfulness’ becomes readily 
comprehensible. It can then be seen that every such assertion 
states, (in addition to a formal transformation rule) a serai-formal 
verbal convention in the shape of the conditions which the wtiter 
requires in an existent before he will apply a given term to it*
To say, for instance, ’Ripe tomatoes are red’, is to assert that one 
will apply the name ’ripe tomato’ only to those fruit of a given 
kind having the specific quality in virtue of which we are 
accustomed to apply the term ’red’ to objects. But a general 
assertion may also state something more; it may further assert 
that should anything having character A exist, it will also possess 
character B; specifying in addition, if it is precise, whether this
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correlation is invariable or subject to certain conditions. Thus 
in saying ’Ripe tomatoes are red* I intend to assert that if and 
when there exists a fruit of a certain type, which further possesses 
the quality I call ’red#, it also has the characteristics I call 
being sweet to the taste and digestible to eat»
V/hen philosophers make general statements of the type; *A 
cause resembles its effect’; ’A cause precedes its effect*; ’A 
cause is followed necessarily by its effect* ; »*A cause is followed
regularly by its effect*; they normally intend to make at least 
two distinct assertions, sometimes three* In the first place they 
are affirming a formal rule of substitution or verbal definition» 
Secondly they intend to lay down a condition, in the absence of 
which they would refuse to apply the term ’cause* to any'existent 
or existing state of affairs. Many thinkers intend to say ne more 
than this when they make such assertions since they regard them­
selves in so doing as stating the sole definitive character of a 
’cause; that is to say they would be prepared to apply the term 
•cause’ to an existent in virtue of the one character they assert 
alone. Thus Kant was prepared to apply the terra ’cause* to an 
existent in virtue of a necessary (in the sense of invariable) 
connection with its successor alone, while Russell and many other 
modem philosophers are (or have been at one time or another) 
prepared to apply the term ’cause’ to an existent in virtue of its 
regular or heretofore unvaried connection with its successor»
There are (and have been) thinkers, however, prepared to apply the 
term ’cause’ to existants only in virtue of more than one
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characteristic,: thus thinkers have decided to apply the term
’cause® only to events connected with their successors both as 
producer and invariable antecedent, while those thinkers who 
asserted that a ’cause’ resembled its ’effect’ were generally 
thinking in terras of one object capable of producing another so 
that they were prepared to apply the terra to an object related 
to another both by resemblance and as producer. When such an 
one made an assertion of the type; ’A cause resembles its effect*, 
he was asserting, in addition to the formal and serai-formal rules 
of definition,a correlation of characters such as that which I 
assert when I say ’Ripe tomatoes are red’; he was asserting, that 
is to say, that if and when any existent is related to another 
as its producer, it also resembles it#
It is evident from their discussions that those who make 
general assertions about ’cause’ of the types listed above, have 
two additional convictions. They suppose in the first place that 
there are existants to which the term ’cause’ is applicable accord­
ing to the convenions they have laid down, and further they 
suppose certain specified existants to fulfil these conditions.
They therefore suppose that in making such general ’causal’ 
assertions, they are saying something about existants, just as I 
do in saying ’Ripe tomatoes are red’ when there are existants to 
which the term ’ripe tomato’ is applicable#
Most of the ’discussions about cause’ are concerned with these 
latter convictions. For when one philosopher rejects another’s 
definition of ’cause’ he generally does so on the ground that there
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is no existent to which the term, so defined, is applicable.
Thus those who have rejected the definition of ’cause* in terms 
of ’necessary connection’ and (production’ have always supported 
their contention with the argument that they find evidence of no 
existent to which the terra,so defined, is applicable. More 
particularly, philosophers have criticised one another with respect 
to the specific types of existent to which they have judged the 
term ’cause’ applicable, according to their conventions, on the 
ground that such a conclusion can rest only on an inadequate 
analysis of the existants in question. For example, Hume denies 
the existence of ’causes’ defined in terms of ’necessary connection’ 
and ’production* among external sensory phenomena, because he can 
find nothing among these to which the terra, so defined, is applic­
able. It will appear below that philosophers have not always had 
the same type of existent in mind when they have’discussed cause*^ 
and that the types of existent which they considered in this 
connection greatly affected the definitions of ’cause’ they proposed. 
The primary interest of those who have ’discussed cause* has 
generally been the existants they have met in their own experience 
and those they have felt good reason to postulate beyond it.
Thus Hume" is interested in whether or not^ certain relations are 
discoverable among a certain type of existent, and so also is 
Russell in his discussions of cause, Leibniz in his denial of 
transeunt causality, and Kant in his account of the causal relation 
as a mental construct. Those who have been troubled with no 
’causal problem’ have equally been corcemed to give an account of
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some of the existents of which they have, or suppose themselves 
to have, evidence, in formulating ’causal* assertions; thus 
Aristotle, in formulating his theory of the ’four causes* supposes 
he is analysing relations he has discovered among existants 
I have said (12) that I shall deal primarily with the 
question as to how the term ’cause’ has been used, considering 
for the most part, its use by various influential thinkers* It 
is by now apparent that this involves not merely an account of the 
formal conventions in accordance with which they have used the 
term, but also what I have called the semi-formal ones* Since 
what they are primarily concerned to say is something applicable 
to actuàl existents, it is necessary to ask to what type of existent 
each would be entitled to apply the term ’cause’ according to the 
conventions he adopts* This question, indeed, will require more 
attention than the former since a philosopher’s verbal conventions 
are generally evident enough* Further, since it is impossible to 
discuss an usage of any term adequately without giving some account 
of its source, j shall try to give some account of how and why the 
various philosophers came to define ’cause* as they did*
Finally, since it is difficult, and contrary to all natural 
inclination, to consider the sentences formulated by any one without 
attempting to evaluate them I shall, as I remarked above (13) 
endeavour to say something relevant to the admissability or other­
wise of the causal assertions I consider# And as the philosphers 
who formulated them supposed themselves to be saying something 
about the character of existents in so doing, it will be impossible
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for me to attempt an approach at their evaluation without doing 
likewise* There are four possible conclusions to such an 
programme. It might be found; 1) that there was no existent to 
which the term ’cause* was applicable in accordance with any of 
the known conventions though that one should exist is not 
intrinsically impossible; 2) that there were existents to which 
the term was applicable according to one or more, but not all, of 
the known conventions; 3) that there was no known convention in 
accordance wdth which the term was inapplicable to any existent; 4) 
that one or more of the conventions laid down conditions incapable 
of realisation in any existent©
At one time Russell was of the opinion that ’the term cause 
should be extruded from the philosophical vocabulary* (14) This 
is a conclusion which might be reached whether or not it was judged 
that there were^or could be.existents to which the term were 
applicable* If there could be no such existent clearly the term 
should be discarded since its use establishes a false conviction; 
and should there be in fact no existent to which the term is 
applicable, though there might be, we should stop applying it to 
existents as we do, though we could not altogether dispense with 
it or its synonyms since one must have an appropriate terra in order 
to deny the existence of a certain type of thing# On the other 
hand, even though there were existents to which the term is 
applicable according to one or more of the customary conventions, 
it might still be desirable to discard it in order to avoid the
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confusion created by a variety of conflicting definitions, 
adopting new terms to fulfil its functions. Alternatively 
this latter course might be found to create greater confusion 
than it dispelled.
It is thus apparent that there are numerous subjects of 
discussion involved in the study I have undertaken; nor can 
one person hope to deal conclusively with them all. I hope,
however, that I may at least help to elucidate them. If I can 
discover but some of the relevant questions to ask concerning 
them my work will not have been in vain, since so many 
philosophical confusions and deadlocks have arisen as a result 
of asking the wrong questions or formulating the right ones 
in a misleading manner.
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(ii) Bntailment and Deduction»
Aristotle was the first to formulate conventions in accordance with 
which one set of symbols is derivable from others. He was not, of 
course, the first to recognise the possibility of manipulating symbols 
consistently with a substitution rule; the first person to do this was 
he who first formulated an argument resting on the assumption of 
entailment. (l can think of no argument which does not rest on this 
assumption, for even if one argues inductively to the probability that 
all A’s are B from the consistency of this conclusion with the available 
evidence, one is thereby assuming a conclusion’s consistency with the 
available evidence to entail the probability of its truth). Aristotle, 
however, was the first to analyse such a substitution process and to 
formulate the conditions necessary to its consistency. The (at least 
implicit) recognition of the possibility of processes of this type is 
one thing in which all philosophers have been forced to agree.
The man in the street, Aristotle, and very many other philospphers 
are further agreed in a far more daring conclusion* For they suppose 
both that intrinsic connections may be found which are independent of 
linguistic conventions, and that linguistic substitution rules may be 
so correlated with these that they may be expressed by the manipulation 
of terms in accordance with those rules. Thos holding this view thus 
suppose not only that separate sets of symbols are capable of asserting 
truly something concerning existents which is other than a rule for 
manipulating symbols, but that by deriving one sentence from another 
in accordance with a verbal convention it is possible to show the 
dependence of the truth of one assertion on that of others.
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In this connection the analysis of ’meaning* given above should 
be remembered» Por just as it is not customary to attach ’meaning’ 
to a term simply by correlating it with an actual existent, instead 
a rule being constructed to the effect that the term should be applied 
to existents of a given type should there ever be any such; so those 
who regard verbal manipulation in the manner outlined above do not 
suppose its purpose limited to expressing the relation of one piece 
of actually true information to another. Rather do they suppose 
formal substitution rules capable of defining a process which can 
express that if A and B should both be true then C must be also.
And it is in virtue of such a general hypothesis that a verbal 
deduction is judged relevant to the truth of any assertion given that 
of others*
If a philosopher uses linguistic substitution rules intending 
thereby not simply to amuse himself by manipulating a calculus, but 
supposes himself in this capable of reaching or defending a conclusion 
which may be relevant to existents and viiich asserts more than a verbal 
rule; he in effect supposes linguistic manipulation capable of this 
function.
Any philosopher who does not think this assumption justified, if 
he is consistent, is thus limited to stating merely those results of 
analysis of the observed whose defence requires no appeal to entailment 
of any kind. He is thus debarred even from induction insofar as this 
relies on it.
Not only have many philosophers supposed ’causation’ a non- 
linguistic entailment; but most have in effect assumed at least so much
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entailment among existents as to justify their supposing conclusions 
concerning them, which assert more than linguistic rules of their 
implications, may be supported by deductive arguments. Before 
examining either the claims for ’causation* as entailment or the 
arguments with which philosophers have defended this or other views 
of * causation*, it is therefore necessary to discuss briefly whether 
or not entailment is conceivable or discoverable outside the bounds 
of purely linguistic convention, and whether linguistic implications 
can be instrumental in defending conclusions asserting more than such 
conventions and their results*m Here again my discussion, as 
necessarily brief, cannot claim to be exhaustive; but merely to 
indicate the lines on which I would try to defend my views.
It is at once evident that I have, in the preceding pages, 
assuraed a certain degree of verbal manipulation instrumental in 
defending views concerning existents other than symbols. And I know 
of no philosopher who has not regarded it capable of defending 
conclusions concerning some existents. In this connection it vd.ll be 
well to remember a possible confusion which may arise from the adoption 
of Carnap’s usage in applying the term ’pseudo-object - sentence’ to 
those sentences which though claiming to assert something of existents 
other than words, in fact refer only to words. This usage is apt to 
obscure the fact, pointed out by Carnap himself, (15) that what he calls 
’logical sentences* (i.e. those dealing solely with symbols and their 
correlations) are also ’object sentences’ since they make assertions 
about v/ords, the objects of logic. For when a distinction is made 
between ’oj^ject-sentences’ and sentences about words, it is easy to
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forget that these latter are as much concerned with existents 
as the former; that written symbols are physical objects and 
the utterance and manipulation of words, occurrences. it may
therefore be overlooked that discussions and demonstrations 
concerned with the characters of symbols and with principles 
in accordance with which they may be, or have been, manipulated 
are as relevant to existents as ire those which claim to prove 
something concerning sense data or chairs and tables.
It should be apparent that it is impossible to discuss the 
objective application of verbal manipulation without assuming 
it to be true; any doubt on this subject may be promptly dis­
pelled by an attempt to formulate such a discussion. It is, 
therefore, incapable of either valid proof or valid disproof by 
means of verbal arguments. It may, however, be useful to consider 
some views relevant to this assumption which have been maintained, 
as also to examine some of its applications and, in particular to 
consider the possibility and conditions of non-verbal entailment.
It has been maintained that ’implication* is a relation 
discoverable among symbols alone. If a thinker decides to apply 
this term solely to the derivability of one set of symbols from 
another, then clearly he must say this. Further, since the term 
is generally used in this sense today, the adoption of this usage 
is to be recommended in order that confusion may be avoided. This 
decision, however, does not render the discussion of non-verbal 
entailment unnecessary, for it leaves unanswered the question 
whether or not the character which thinkers have sought to ascribe
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to existents other than sentences in asserting that they ’entail* 
one another, is in fact discoverable in any of them.
It might be supposed that in considering this question, I am 
concerned with nothing other than the central problem of causality 
as it has appeared to thinkers since Hume, and that in discussing 
it here I am blatantly departing from the order of discussion I 
have myself laid down. It will therefore be well to contradict 
this at once, particularly as it reflects a confusion which 
invalidates much of what has been said on the subject. The major 
♦causal’ dispute since Hume has raged around the question whether 
or not there is a relation of necessary connection b et we en the 
existents commonly said to be 'causally* connected; and more 
generally, whether a relation of necessary connection of the type 
ascribed to ’causes’ and ’effects’ is possible among existents.
Now the relation of necessary connection with which modem ’causal* 
discussion is concerned^is one obtaining between events; one in 
virtue of which it may be concluded with certainty that, given a 
specific type of event A, one of the type B must occur. There seems 
no reason to suppose that if^ecessary connection other than that
depending on linguistic rules is possible at all it must be of this 
type alone. It cannot, therefore, be assumed that the answers to 
the question ’Are relations of necessary connection^ independent of 
verbal convention^possible among existants?’ and ’is a necessary 
causal connection possible?’ are identical. Neither can it be 
assumed that the denial" of the existence of necessary causal 
relations is a denial of the existence of any necessary connections
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independent of verbal rule. If no type of necessary connection 
other than that dependent on linguistic convention is possible 
then clearly no necessary causal connection is possible, and if 
no connection of the first type exists none of the latter exists 
either; but the converse does not hold. There is no contradic­
tion in supposing that, though there are no necessary connections 
of the type commonly called ’causalf there are some which are 
independent of verbal rule.
Today very many thinkers affirm that no fact can be necessary, 
that necessity simply may not be ascribed to existents in any sense. 
This is a misleading assertion since those who make it are con­
vinced of the possibility of implication dependent on verbal rule, 
and this, as has been seen is as much concerned with existents as 
any relation between events, or their qualities, could be. It is 
of course a relation of a very different kind from those generally 
attributed to non-linguistic existents, and no doubt it is this 
difference which such thinkers are chiefly concerned to point out. 
But this difference does not make linguistic implication any less 
concerned with existents, nor justify an use of language suggesting 
that this is so. The philosophers mentioned above must therefore 
be understood solely as denying necessity to all relations other 
than those dependent on linguistic convention; and they lay them­
selves open to criticism insofar as they fail to make this explicit.
It is clear that if linguistic implication is the only type of 
necessary connection possible, the postulation of any other is 
mistaken. Although, however, this view of necessary connection is
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very widely and strongly held, I have been able to find absolutely 
no ground for it at all* I strongly suspect that the thinkers 
holding it suppose their position established by Hume. This 
illustion is assisted (and apparently shared) by Hume himself, 
who affirms unequivocally that he finds no relation of necessary, 
connection among his impressions* It would be out of place to 
discuss his argument here, but it must be pointed out that in 
discussing and maintaining this he in fact directs his attention 
solely to those events which may be called ’causes’ and ’effects’ 
according to his usage, and that therefore his analysis can prove 
only that no necessary relations exist between these.
The current attitude is well expressed by Professor Vfaismann 
in the series of articles entitled ’Synthetic Analytic’ appearing 
in Analysis (l6) In the course of these he examines some experiences, 
other than linguistic manipulation, in which we seem to discover 
necessity; these experiences he says are very puzzling since in 
them we seem to find the inevitability in virtue of which we are 
wont to ascribe necessity, yet at the same time it is argued that 
this cannot be so since they are ’facts’ and so cannot possess 
necessity* Now a thinker is perfectly at liberty to define ’fact’ 
so that nothing necessary may be so-called; but the attitude that 
would dogmatically deny necessity to anything other than verbal 
manipulation, with the assertion that as such it simply could not 
possess it, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, would 
seem to resemble nothing so much as that of the Aristotelians who 
refused to look through Galileo’s telescope maintaining that, whether
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they could be seen or not, Jupiter could possess no moons 
since this -was contrary to the teaching of Aristotle# This, 
of course, is not to deny that necessity may be mistakenly 
attributed; clearly any claim to, or superficial appearance of, 
necessity would require careful examination# It is merely the 
refusal to admit the possibility of necessity, or evidence for it, 
under these circiomstances, which is here in question# Waismann 
gives as the ground for this attitude the conviction that the 
criterion of ’facthood* is verifiability, and that the possibility 
of verifiability involves the possibility of disproof# If this is 
so, clearly every ’fact* must be capable of being other than it is, 
that is to say, it must be contingent. Throughout this argument 
runs the ambiguity concerning the term *fact* noted above and the 
consequent failur^to remember that words and verbal manipulations 
are themselves existants# Further the user of this argument fails 
to notice that in order for it to prove what he wishes it to, the 
character of verifiability must entail that of contingency apart 
from the correlation of words used to describe them, i#e. that it 
assumes possession of this one character entails possession of 
another#
Apart from this basic objection, common, as has been seen, to 
all demonstrations seeking to prove or disprove non-linguistic 
necessary connection, it seems evident that the major premise of 
the argument is completely unjustified and must rest on a confusion# 
For there seems no reason to suppose that what is experientially 
testable must be capable of being other than it is; if it were
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inherently impossible for pillar boxes to be any colour other than 
red, surely this would not prevent us from discovering that they 
are red in precisely the same manner in which we discover it today. 
Surely the possibility of an alternative is required, not in that 
discovered, but in the experimental conditions for its discovery. 
There seems no reason to suppose I could not see a pillar box was 
red even though it could not be otherwise; but I could not discover 
it to be red by the simple experiment of looking at it^unless i 
were able to perceive not onl.y red but other colours as well. If 
my eyes acted as coloured spectacles so that everything appeared 
red whether it was or not, I should not be able to discover by 
experiment whether any thing were red or not.
Furthermore, the minor premise is at the least, sufficiently
ambiguous to be misleading. Reiohenbach has pointed out the
inad-ihqgSEgy of verifiability as a criterion of meaningfulness (17);
much of what he says in the course of this discussion is relevant
to the definition of 'fact* in terms of verifiability. If by
t
verifiable is meant verifiable within the conditions of human 
observation^ then many of the postulated facts of science and 
commonsense must be rejected. Even if verifiability is made 
merely the criterion of a justifiable postulation of possible 
existence, the difficulty still remains. If I were not justified 
in postulating as existent anything whose existence is untestable 
by human means then I could have no justification in supposing the 
other side of the moon to exist, nor the great heat which I 
attribute to the sun. Jf such a criterion is not to exclude many
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known facts and condemn many recognised assertions of science, 
it must be made much wider; it must take the form »If anything 
exists some condition must be possible under which it would be 
perceptible to some possible existentJ Such a definition is
not only circular, since it must assume that for which it claims 
to be providing a criterion^^namely that which justifies the 
postulation of x as a possible existent; but is, in effect, none 
other than a restatement of the traditional criterion of logical 
or intrinsic possibility. To call it a verifiability criterion 
suggesting, as this does, that it is something different, would 
thus be extremely misleading. Further the above definition 
would require it to fulfil a function never demanded of it by 
the traditional rationalist, one of which it is incapable. For 
if direct humanly possible verifiability is too narrow a criterion 
for the practical purpose of accepting or rejecting x as a possible 
existent, that of.conceivable verifiability is far too wide since 
it takes no account of the limiations laid down by what actually 
exists, consistency with which is a condition of co-existence with 
it. The only practical verifiability criterion which could be 
adopted is that in fact adopted by the scientist, that which admits 
X as a possible existent if it is either directly observable urd er 
human conditions, or inferrible from that which is. This is by no 
means a simple criterion, hov/ever, since before it may be applied 
with justification it is necessary to enquire under what conditions 
the unobservable is inferrible from the observable. Many 
philosophers have denied that a valid process of inference from the
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observed to the unobserved is possible at all. One would not 
therefore be justified in accepting such a criterion v/ithout 
examining these problems very carefully and satisfying himself 
that such inference is admissible. Thus although empirical 
testability seems to be an indispensable condition of the 
acceptability of any hypothesis, this is seen to be by no means 
so simple and straightforward a contention as might at first sight 
appear. Hence any argument resting on it as a premise can be 
justified only if this is elucidated and itself justified.
It will be useful at this point, to examine experience to see 
whether in fact, any necessary connections may be found in it; 
examining a few phenomena in which they seem to appear.
A friend of mine once related how she was involved in a fierce 
argument as to v^ether a certain note which had been played was A 
sharp or B flat and how both disputants suddenly realised with • 
amusement that A sharp and B flat are *thè same note*. Is there 
not a * must *, a necessity, here? can A sharp fail to be also B 
flat, or B flat fail to be a  sharp? It might be objected that we 
have here simply a duplicity of names, that we have decided to give 
two alternative names to a certain sound and that therefore whenever 
we are justified in using one we are justified in using the other. 
This account is plainly inadequate since the two names in question 
are not synonyms ;. the term *A sharp* indicating a certain relation 
between the note named and A , *B flat* indicating another relation 
between it and Bo With more plausibility it might be urged that 
we have simply learned to relate the notes in terms of an arbitrary
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order which we have constructed, that there is no relation 
between A, A sharp, and B save that of succession in this standard 
order, and that therefore there is here no necessity save that 
dependent on an artificial conve^ion. This conclusion, however, 
is refuted by the evidence, noted above (18) provided by the four 
year old's capacity for detecting the relations between musical 
notes independently of any knowledge of such a standard order. 
Certainly these relations can be described only in terms of such 
an order, but they are there to be described and are not produced 
by the description. Were, for instance, the notes named differently 
but the standa.rd order adopted nominally the same (i.e. A sharp 
still being situated between A and b though the sounds called A 
sharp, A and B were different from those we so name) then to say 
that A sharp was situated between A and B would not be to assert 
the same relation as would those words understood according to the 
classical western usage.
The following seems therefore the only possible account of this 
phenomenon consistent with all the available evidence. The order 
given the notes in accordance with western notation, has been 
constructed in virtue of relations inherent in the notes themselves, 
being as it were an implicit order waiting to be discovered rather 
than an artificial construct. And it is in virtue of its intrinsic 
character and theirs that the sound we call severally A sharp or 
B flat is related as it is to A and B respectively;and, so far as 
I can see, having that character, it cannot fail to be so related. 
Further A and B are such that no note could be related to B in the
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manner we call being a s«nitone below it^without at the same time 
being related to A in the manner we call being a semitone above it; 
t&at IDS tp say the sounds called A and B respectively are of such 
a nature that the character which a sound requires if it is to have 
the relation to A which we call being a semitone above it, is that 
which inevitably gives it the relation to B we call being a semitone 
below it*
Here then are phenomena, sense date, whose natures are such 
that certain relations between them are inevitable; phenomena 
whose being of a certain character renders it impossible for them 
to fail to be related in a given manner* But is not this precisely 
what those who maintain non-verbal entailment assert, that there 
are (or may be) existants of such an intrinsic character that this 
or that cannot fail to be true of them or others* It appears then 
that such entailment is not only possible but actuàlly discoverable 
among phenomena* Nor is this instance unique; precisely the same is 
true of the relations between different shades of the same colour*
Here again we order them in a certain manner describing these 
relations solely in terras of that order; and again that order is 
constructed in virtue of those relations, and it is in virtue of 
their intrinsic natures that one shade may be correctly described 
as darker or lighter than another according to the conventions of 
the English language. Moreover each shade is of such a nature 
that a different relation of degree holds between it and each of 
the others respectively; only one such relation being possible 
between itself and any given one of these, the existence of this
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relation being inevitable in virtue of their respective characters.
But these are not the only types of phenomena in which 
necessity is discoverable; it may also be found in any variegated 
visual field, be this vrhat is called 'a view of a landscape*,
*a view of a building's interior*, the sight of a picture*,
’the content of a dream or an optical illusion*, ’the sight of 
the disposition of the pieces on a chessboard*^ or ai%y other 
possible type whatsoever. A sense-field of the latter type will 
perhaps serve most cleqrly to illustrate this. I have only to 
experience the sight of pieces disposed on a chessboard to perceive 
that the mutual relations of the coloured shapes I attribute to the 
’pieces* are inevitable once given their several relations to the 
set of visual sense I attribute to the ’board*. It might perhaps 
be objected that here there is no true entailment since there is no 
true differentiation; that the positions of the pieces may be 
described either in terms of their separate relations to the board, 
or of their mutual correlations, each set of relations representing 
solely a different manner of describing the same thing. Now it is 
perfectly true that the two sets of relations do serve as alternative 
methods of describing the same thing, but this does not make those 
two sets of relations one, rather does the possibility of regarding 
them as alternative means of describing the same thing rest upon 
their difference. It would certainly seem to require no more than 
inspection of the phenomenon to discover that while the position of 
the black queen might be described in terms of either its relation 
to the board or its relations to the other pieces on the board; its
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being related to the board in one way is something completely 
different from its being related to the other pieces in other 
ways, there is clearly here not only a difference of relations 
but also a difference between the terms related thus variously.
The necessity involved is clearly provisional; there is no 
reason to suppose that any of the pieces could not stand in any 
of the 6k relations to the pattern of the chessboard possible within 
it. What is apparent from simply experiencing the phenomenon is 
that, given a number of pieces each of which having a certain 
distinctive relation to the pattern of the board, they cannot but 
be mutually related in one specific way and none other; that is to 
say, mere inspection of the phenomenon reveals that the occurrence 
of one set of relations makes the contemporary occurrence of 
another specific set inevitable.
There is a common assumption about ’experience* or ’the world* 
(whichever term is preferred) which it will be useful to consider 
here since it postulates a condition given which non-verbal entail­
ment would be discoverable among existants. I shall not here 
discuss its Justification; that would be premature since it involves 
the postulation of the uniformity of nature or some equivalent 
principle of the constancy of experience, a question which will be 
more appropriately discussed below. (19) I shall examine it here 
solely with a view to revealing the conditions of non-verbal 
entailment it states; whether it is in fact ever fulfilled or not 
being entirely irrelevant to this*
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It is commonly held that there are existants which persist 
through some length of time, having specific relations to each 
other which remain constant so long as those so related exist. 
Cities, lakes, mountains, and continents are commonly regarded 
as existents of this type. Should it be indeed true that 
Clasgow, Carlisle, and London are existants persisting through 
time and standing in a constant spatial relation one to the other, 
then it is clear that given some further conditions, there would 
be an inevitability about certain events. Granted that I am 
likewise a persistent existent, though a mobile one; then it is 
clear that if, setting off from Glasgow. I travelled continuously 
along a given slightly curving line from a given point on a 
straight line running through the heart of Glasgow* I could not 
fail to arrive first at Carlisle and then at London* Similarly, 
if I left London travelling back along that same line, I could not 
fail to arrive first at Carlisle and then at Glasgow. Not only 
could I not fail to reach both Carlisle and Glasgow if I travelled 
thus from London, but I could not fail to reach them in one order 
only: it would be quite impossible for me to arrive first at
Glasgow and then at Carlisle. It is evident that it is the 
postulated relations between London, Carlisle, and Glasgow which 
would render the occurrence and order of these events inevitable 
under the specified conditions. The persistence of their terms 
and the constancy of the relations themselves are indeed necessary 
conditions of this result as indeed is my persistence and continued 
motion in a certain direction; but though these latter conditions 
were fulfilled, the relations alone being different, then instead
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of my moving continuously in this direction inevitably resulting 
in my arrival first at Carlisle and then at Glasgow, its 
possibility would be ccsnpletely excluded*
This hypothesis is doubly interesting* In the first place 
it reveals the possibility of conditions which would determine the 
character and order of future events (that is to say, would render 
the occurrence of events of a given character and in a given order 
inevitable) ; revealing the character of one type of condition 
which would fulfil this function* Secondly it is, in effect, 
ascribing a certain specific and persistent structure to one part 
of the universe, its consideration therefore reveals the importance 
of structure. clearly it is impossible to ymkk. in a given 
direction from London, in the universe of commonsense, without 
reaching Carlisle and Glasgow (in that order) precisely because 
that section of the universe is constructed in such a way that 
one cannot fail to attain that result if one fulfils that condition. 
It is thus evident that if any persistent structure is attributable 
t© the universe or to any part of it (or, if you will, to experience) 
the^ given certain further conditions, the character and order of 
some future events will be determined. One of Kant’s contentions 
is thus seen to be justified; (it will be seen below (2q) that 
the second and more daring of the two basic premises on v^ich his 
theory of causality rests is unjustifiable, but this to anticipate).
In conclusion I shall examine the conditions which would have 
to be fulfilled if a typical verbal implication were to serve to 
express a non-verbal entailment* For convenience, I shall take
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as my example a deduction of the syllogistic type, and this for 
two reasons. In the first place this is the form of deduction 
most commonly used on the assumption that it serves to make explicit, 
demonstrate, or argue from, such entailment. Secondly, it is a 
form of deduction so widely discussed that it requires relatively 
little introduction and explanation. For simplicity’s sake I shall 
take as my example a syllogism in barbara. (21)
It has been supposed by traditional logicians that an argument 
of the form:
All M is P 
All S is M 
therefore All S is p
is capable of expressing the entailment of the truth of one piece 
of information concerning something apart from an arbitrary con­
vention and its implications, fiStm that of two others. This is 
the implicit assumption of all who use arguments of this form as 
a means of reaching or justifying conclusions they regard in this 
light : and these include both plain men and philosophers. (To
describe the syllogism as capable of expressing the entailment of 
A ’s truth by that of B and C is not, of course, to deny that a 
syllogism having false premises and conclusion may be valid in form).
In order that this assumption might be justified not only 
would premise and conclusion (consistently with the same usage) have 
each to express information of this type, but the information 
asserted by the premises must be such that if it were true that 
asserted by the conclusion could not fail to be true either. To 
discover whether this may be so I shall examine a sample valid
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syllogism as follows. First I shall consider separately the 
sentences forming premises and conelusion, asking what they are 
ordinarily intended to assert; then I shall ask whether, and in 
what way, the truth of the premises is relevant to that of the 
conclusion.
Before doing this, however, I must say a few words about the 
use of the terra ' truth’ in this context. ’ Truth’ has been the 
subject of as much philosophical debate as ’causation’, and I do 
not wish to add to an inevitably lengthy thesis by involving myself 
in those disoussions here. But T cannot, without considerable 
practical inconvenience, refrain from using the terra altogether and 
am thus forced, in order to avoid misunderstanding, to make explicit 
my meaning when I do so. For convenience J shall adopt what appears 
to be the commonsense usage (an usage in effect implying some form 
of the correspondence theory), since this is the most familiar and 
that usually adopted by philosophers whatever their theories on the 
subject. And T shall try to make this explicit by stating the 
conditions under which I should describe different types of assertion 
as ’true’. This task is complicated by sentences of the same form 
being sometimes variously interpreted by different philosophers, as 
for instance those ordinarily described as having reference to 
’physical objects’ are differently interpreted by phenomenalists 
and those maintaining a representative theory of perception. Such 
a sentence might thus be regarded as asserting something true on the 
one interpretation and something false on the other.
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When a sentence of the form »A exists’ or ’There is an A*, is 
regarded as asserting that, given certain conditions, certain 
experiences will occur and/or that certain experiences will have 
ocouDTred if certain conditions have obtained* I shall describe it 
as true if I suppose those experiences will occur and/or will have 
occurred under the specified conditions® And if the sentence is 
supposed to assert this to be only probable ~ shall say it is true 
if I suppose it reasonable to expect those experiences to occur 
and to have done so" under those conditions, even though one cannot 
be certain of this.
If, however, the subject term of a sentence of the form ’A 
exists’ or ’There is an X (i.e. a something) such that X is A* i« 
supposed to designate a sence datura or continuant (to borrow 
Johnson’s terra), I shall regard it as asserting something true if 
I suppose there is an existent such that, according to the con­
ventions it exemplifies, I could apply to it the title ’A** Thus 
having decided to apply the terra ’toothache to a certain kind of 
pain, I should unhesitatingly assert the truth of ’A toothache 
exists’ or ’There is a toothache’, were a pain of that type present 
to my experience. (clearly I cannot enter here into either the 
analysis of such sentences or the problems involved in treating 
existence as a predicate. I can only remark that, while Kant 
seems clearly justified in denying that the statement that a given 
number of thalers exist makes a distinctive assertion about the 
character of being that number of thalers, yet sentences such as
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’There are blue sense data’ or ’There are men-eating tigers’ 
(understood on the commonsense interpretation) seem clearly 
capable of making some sort of distinctive statement which may 
be true in the sense outlined above).
Many of the statements used by both plain men and philo­
sophers are of the form ’A is B*# (22) Sentences of this form 
always assert a convention governing the substitution of terms.
When such an one is treated as asserting no more, I shall regard 
it as asserting something '(true’ if it is indeed consistent with 
the substitution rules of the language or calculus to which the 
person using it intends to refer*
Generally, however, as was suggested above (23) when sentences 
of this type are formulated they are supposed to have some 
relevance to actual or possible existants.
When these are intended to assert an invariable correlation
between experiences of given types or certain qualities or
relations discoverable in experiences, given certain conditions; 
tkctn
I shall regard vb as true if i suppose those correlations to hold • 
under those conditions. And again, if I supposed sentence to 
assert the invariability of those correlations as only probable i 
should regard it as true if I supposed it reasonable to expect them 
to hold, though not absolutely certain that they would.
When the subject term of a sentence of the form ’A is B’ is
supposed to designate an actual sense datum or continuant (or
actual sense data or continuants of a given type) T shall regard
it
thorn as asserting something true only if there is something
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exhibiting the quality or relation the predicate is intended to 
ascribe. Thus % shall say j am asserting something true when 
I say ’The brown patch is to the left of the green one’ if I am 
experiencing a visual field in which coloured patches of the types 
I have decided to call ’brown* and ’green’ occur such that a 
’b r o W  one stands to a ^ green in the relation I have decided to 
describe as ’being to the left of’, When sentences of this form 
are intended to assert generalisation I shall call them true only 
if I suppose there are existants to which both the subject and 
predicate terms are applicable according to the conventions used 
by their authors while there is none to which (according to those 
same conventions) the subject but not the predicate term is 
applicable. Thus I shall say I am asserting truly ’All the blue 
patches in ray visual field are round’ if j am experiencing a visual 
field in which every coloured patch of the type I have decided to 
call ’blue’ exhibits the shape I have decided to call ’round’.
It has been observed that generalisation may be inteided to 
record not merely correlations which have happened to have 
occurred constantly, but also some which cannot fail to occur, 
’Lions are carnivorous’, for example may be intended to assert that 
whenever, and if ever there exists an animal of a certain specific 
type it will always be found to feed naturally on flesh. Often* 
indeed, such sentences have been intended to assert that to be an 
existent of a given tjpe is to be such as inevitably to be of a 
specified character^ or to stand in a certain relation to some other 
existent (either unconditionally or under specified conditions.)
6o,
Clearly it is irrelevant to assertions of these two latter types 
whether there exists anything to which the subject tern is 
applicable. i should call an assertion of the first type ’true’ 
were T convinced that if anything existed of the type specified 
by the subject terra, this would always exhibit the quality or 
relation to which the predicate is intended to apply. One of the 
second type I should regard as ’true’ were I convinced that 
exhibiting the quality of relation the predicate is intended to 
assert is intrinsic to being an existent of the type specified 
by the subject term (absolutely or under given conditions, as 
the assertion was conditional or not).
For convenience I shall follow the common practice, and when 
not specifically concerned with possible differences of inter­
pretation I shall treat as generally accepted as ’true*, assertions 
such as that '^cows are ruminants^ or that Edinburgh is north of 
London; since they are generally treated as asserting hupotheses 
about experience which are ordinarily accepted as justified, and 
for practical purposes they need be regarded as asserting no more.
j
To return now to the syllogism and its relation to non- 
linguistic .entailment; I shall take as my example;-
Every green figure in this pattern is preceded by a red one,
Every triangle in this pattern is green, 
therefore
Every triangle in this pattern is preceded by a red figure.
As has been already observed (24) it is impossible to discuss 
anything without using symbols, and deriving sets of them one from.
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Thus any discussion of a syllogism either as a whole or by separate 
consideration of the sentences forming its premises and con­
clusion, will inevitably consist itself in deriving sets of symbols
one from another. It will therefore be difficult to distinguish 
thereby between the symbols and their correlations and what (apart 
from verbal correlations) they purport to express. It is,, 
therefore, difficult thus to substantiate any conclusion concerning 
the relevance of the verbal implication to any non-linguistic
entailment. It is far less difficult, however, to discover this
for oneself, particularly when, as in the present instance each 
of the sentences making up the syllo^iSïnis intended to express a 
situation containing elements which have been, or can be, directly 
experienced. For then it is easy enough to imagine each of the 
situations the individual sentences purport to express and thus 
to perceive whether and how these are related one to the other.
I can only try to describe this experiment and its results and 
hope that those who wish to judge my conclusions in the matter will 
test them by making the experiment themselves.
It is not difficult to imagine a situation given which the 
sentence ’Every green figure in this pattern is preceded by a red 
one’ would ordinarily be said to be true. It is a visual ex­
perience in which an arrangement of coloured shapes is seen,every 
shape of the familiar colour we ordinarily call ’green' being 
preceded by one of that which we ordinarily call ’red* (precede 
being here understood in the sense in which it is true to say 
’a precedes b ’ when referring to the symbols a b written thus).
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It is equally easy to imagine the situation which would generally 
be regarded as rendering true the sentence ’Every triangle in 
this pattern is green* when the occurrence of the phrase ’this 
pattern’ in this and the former sentence is intended to indicate 
that both refer to, and are verified by, an identical situation. 
One has now to imagine, within the arrangement of visual data 
pictured before, shapes of the type commonly called ’triangular* 
each of which is of the colour commonly called ’green’. One 
has only to make this experiment in imagination, forgetting all 
words and their correlations, to discover that one cannot do so 
without imagining the situation which would be said to verify the 
sentence ’Every triangle in this pattern is preceded by a red 
figure*. For this exercise in imagination reveals that the 
situation which would be said to verify the premises of our 
syllogism is so constructed that it cannot fail to be such as 
to be said to verify that foming its conclusion. It is at once 
evident that the situation postulated by the conclusion is that 
postulated by the two premises; it cannot therefore be said to 
be entailed as something distinct from and additional to this.
But this does not argue absence of entailment. The entailment 
involved is evidently internal to a single situation. The 
feature of the situation expressed by saying ’Every triangle is 
preceded by a red figure’ is quite distinct from those expressed by 
saying ’Every green figure is preceded by a red one’ and ’Every 
triangle is green*. The entailment lies quite evidently in the 
impossibility of its exhibiting the two latter features without
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exhibiting the fomer; the inescapable fact that in order to 
exhibit the two latter features the situation must be so con­
structed that it exhibits the former.
If a particular syllogism reflected a non-linguistic en­
tailment purely by coincidence, this would not justify the 
traditional view of a syllogism as a means of reaching and 
justifying conclusions concerned with more than verbal rules.
The syllogism was of importance in the eyes of Aristotle and 
subsequent logicians precisely because they supposed its form 
capable of expressing a general principle of non-verbal entail­
ment.
When considering a general principle concerning a non-verbal 
feature of existants it is less easy to escape from words th%n 
when considering a particular non-verbal situation. For one can 
neither imagine a general principle nor conceive it as such, with­
out the use of symbols. Consideration of the example just 
examined, however, shows how imagining or perceiving a particular 
non-verbal entailment, independently of symbols^may reveal general 
principles underlying it. It was seen that one had but to imagine 
a situation exhibiting certain features asserted by the sentences 
in question, to perceive their inter-relation. Inevitably any 
situation so pictured is individual, but it does not require the use 
of symbols to reveal to the person imagining it that what he 
imagines in it are features of such and such specific characters. 
Thus a child or savage playing with coloured shapes may, before 
learning to apply any symbol to it, redognise triangularity as a
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specific character which some share and which distinguishes 
them from others^ just as one may recognise the characteristic 
sliapes of the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle without ever thinking 
of apply3.ng symbols to them. Nor does he need symbols to dis­
cover that the relation he perceives in the imagined situation 
is one between those features insofar as they are specific.
So, for instance, j may see, merely by looking at them, v/ithout 
so much as having any symbols in my mind, let alone manipulating 
them, that two pieces of a jigsaw puzzle are so shaped that they 
cannot but interlock. Thus direct observation of the imagined 
situation, divorced from symbols, leads directly to the con­
clusion expressed verbally by the sentence ’Whenever a pattern 
is such that every triangle in it is green and every green figure 
in it preceded by a red one, then every triangle in it is 
preceded by a ]:'ed figure.
Similarly, it seems clear that underlying the above example 
and similar types of entailment is the general principle that if 
everything exemplifying a given characteristic X also exhibits 
another y, and any individual, species or group exemplifies X; 
then this latter must exhibit Y*
It might perhaps be objected that this 'general principle’ 
formulates not a type of entailment but simply two different ways 
of saying the same thing, the sentences ’All X is Y'and 'If anything 
is X it is y’ being equivalent. But this is not so, being 
merely suggested by the difficulty of using completely general
65o
terms clearly. The minor premise and conclusion do not assert 
a hypothetical generalisation, but each makes a categorical 
assertion about a given individual, species or group (actual 
or possible) asserting something distinct from that stated by 
the major, moreover the two former may each state something quite 
distinct from the other unless the m#jor is true. Thus, for 
example, that all men are mortal is distinct from both Socrates 
being a man and his being mortal ; while to assert his humanity 
is not to assert his mortality unless it is true that all men 
are mortal. And that to assert the minor is to assert the 
conclusion if the major is true is precisely the essence of the 
entailment.
It is indeed true, as suggested above,(25) that the conclusion 
states only something asserted by both poremises together so that 
it is in fact superfluous to affirm the conclusion after having 
asserted the premises unless one merely wishes to make explicit 
what they state in conjunction. But, as suggested in the 
previous paragraph, the importance of the syllogism lies just in 
its expressing that to assert both the premises truly is in 
effect to assert truly the conclusion, and hence that to assert 
both premises is to assert the conclusion.
If, starting from the general principle expressed by the 
syllosism, one tries to justify it, one has but to perform the 
experiment of trying to construct in imagination a situation 
which contravenes it to discover that here is an impossibility 
that goes deeper than verbal contradiction; one that lies in
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the actual conditions of constructinn, or if you will, in the 
characters of the elements one is trying to combine.
As with the processes syllogistic logic recognises as valid, 
so with those v/hich it rejects* this rejection rests on the 
conviction that (according to ordinary usage) it is impossible to 
formulate a rule, in accordance with which,from sentences of given 
forms another can be derived such that if the former express true 
assertions so must the latter. And the justification of this is 
again discoverable by an experiment of imagination or observation.
Take, for instance, the argument ;
All the triangles are green 
Every third figure is green 
therefore Every third figure is a triangle.
It is quite possible to imagine, or construct, a set of circumstances 
which verifies both premises without verifying the conclusion.
And, moreover, consideration of such a set of circumstances makes 
it clear that this is not accidental, but that the mere-common 
possession of a characteristic by two types of existent does not 
prevent their differing fundamentally in any other respect.
The question whether the syllogism can be a means of dis­
covering new information has been discussed ad nauseam; there is, 
therefore, no need to enter fully into it here. It is, indeed, 
sufficiently clear that unless the truth of the major premise can 
be established independently of that of the minor, it can be known 
only subsequently to the conclusion. Thus if i can discover that 
all men are mortal only by so examining every man, or, per
t
impossibile^the death of every man that I leam of Socrates
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mortality in the process; then clearly I cannot discover this 
latter as new knowledge by combining the information that all 
men are mortal with the knowledge of Socrates hi^anity.
It is possible, however, that one might discover the truth 
of 8 major premise without discovering that of the minor con­
joined with it in a valid syllogism. V/ere this so, conjunction 
of knowledge of the truth of one of these premises with that of 
the truth of the other could give information which one might 
otherwise lack. I might, for instance, discover being human 
of its nature entailed being mortal. Could I do so I might well 
discover it without knowing whether Socrates were man, angel, 
statue, or fictitious character* Were this so, subsequent dis­
covery of his humanity would give me the additional knowledge of 
his mortality; knowledge moreover which I might not have 
attained without knowing both that all men were mortal and tliat 
he was a man. Or, again, I might discover, by complete 
enumeration, that all the occupants of a certain room were blue­
eyed, without knowing anything more about them. If I then leamt 
that one of them was X ’s büother (or the author of y) , the addition 
of this to my previous findings vjould give me the further knowledge 
that X’s brother (or the author of y) was blue-eyed.
Remarks similar to those applied above f8 6) to the syllogism 
regarded as expressing non-linguistic entailment, apply to the 
question of its role as a ne ans of reaching knowledge. To know 
the truth of both premises is to know that of the conclusion so 
that, in this sense, the latter is nothing new. Yet the syllogism
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is capable of exemplifying, or expressing, a real progress 
towards knowledge, the essence of which consists in discovering 
in the conjunction of two distinct pieces of knowledge, informa- 
tion which could be gained from neither alone*
\Vhether or no a syllogism is capable of exemplifying or 
expressing a process towards knowledge in any given instance, 
ray previous discussion should have served to make it clear 
that it will always be capable of making explicit, conditions 
given which it is legitimate to postulate a given conclusion as 
true. Hence, when the truth of the premises is accepted, it 
will always serve to justify belief in that of the conclusion.
Both these are undeniably useful functions; plain men and 
philosophers both need at times, to be reminded, or to remind 
themselves, of the implications of their beliefs; and to be 
capable of justifying them.
Moreover the syllogism’s ability to fulfil these functions 
serves, I think, to vindicate most uses of syllogistic reasoning 
by philosophers. For there seems no doubt that they generally 
use it, not as a means of attaining beliefs, but in order either 
to justify them or to d«iionstrate their implications.
In view of the foregoing discussion, whether j accept his 
views or not, i shall not condemn a philosopher out of hand 
because he postulates an entailment view of 'causation'; but shall 
treat his position as at least capable of significant discussion 
on its own merits. Nor shall I dismiss as inevitably vain, an 
argument’s claim to express, and appeal to, an entailment in-
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I/ïdependent of linguistic convention; but here again I shall 
treat the claim as of a type capable of justification, and so 
shall discuss its justice on this assumption*
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QHAFTER 1.
M  EXAîOTATION OP SOME COMvIGNSENSE USES OP THE TERM 
_______________ CAUSE.____________________________
( i) Introductory Remarks.
Since the conmonsense uses of the term ’cause are inevitably 
the first to which the philosopher is introduced, and those which 
he adopts perforce in a large proportion of his speech and writing; 
it is to be expected that they will influence his professional use 
and discussion of the term to some extent. Furthermore most 
philosophers have supposed there was some affinity between their 
’ discussion of causation* and those sentences used by plain men which 
either contain, the term * cause* or are translatable into others that 
do. They have imagined themselves to be giving the correct analysis 
of such statements ( or the key to it), or the true account of the 
situations to which they purport to refer. Some account of the 
commonsense usage therefore seems an indispensable preface to a 
discussion of that term as it has appeared in the discussions of 
philosophers.
I shall, accordingly, give as varied a selection of commons ense 
sentences containing the term as is possible; examining each singly 
with a view to diwcovering what * cause* is intended to convey in each. 
This, if successful.,will reveal whether to the use of the common term 
there corresponds some basic similarity between the assertions. If 
it is possible to discover some characteristic (qualitative or 
relational) which the plain man assumes to be present in each of a 
Y/ide variety of instances to Y/hich he applies the term * cause*, it 
may be safely assumed t{^t it is in virtue of this assimption that
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he applies the terra. For, if anyone applies the term * cause* 
wherever he supposes a given characteristic or relation to subsist 
and nov/here else; he is, in effect, defining * cause* in terms of 
that characteristic or relation.
In order to avoid the danger of prejudice or preconceived 
ideas leading me to proffer an unrepresentative set of examples 
I decided not to invent nçr own, instead selecting as varied a 
collection as I could discover in a number of newspapers. It 
is true that selection, no less than invention, may be prejudiced;
I hope, however, that by reading at random through very varied 
mterial, loolcing not for situations or contexts of a specified 
type but only for a single word, I have reduced the danger of this 
to a minimum. Therefore, although I should not like to claim 
eidiaustiveness for my selection, I venture to hope that it is 
sufficiently comprehensive not to be misleading.
Before I beging to discuss the commons ense uses of the term 
* cause*, however, a few explanatoiy remarks are required.
(a) The definition of * commonsense conception*.
In the first place, it is necessary to note a possible source 
of confusion in discussing commonsense conceptions, Goraraonsense 
is generally opposed to philosphy as the unreflective to the 
reflective; and this, broadly speaking, is correct: in comparison
with philosophy coimonsense is unreflective. But it is important 
to remember that the unreflectiveness of commonsense is only 
relative. The foregoing discussion of * meaning * should have made 
it clear that even such s±mgle and common assertions as *This is red*, 
as ordinarily understood, involve comparison and memory judgments.
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And I should say, from experience, that the plain man who never 
reflects (in an elementary way), apart from fulfilling these basic 
conditions of the application of language to actual objective 
situations, is very rare* Thus even were it possible (which seems 
unlikely) for a philosopher to give a wholly unreflective report of 
the given, he would not be proffering the commonsense view of it.
The definition of ’commonsense conception* is complicated by 
the plain man*s acceptance of trust, of views attainable by those 
reflections only which abstract so far from immédiate experience 
that they cannot be regarded as within the sphere of commonsense at 
all unless the distinction between commonsense on the one hand, and 
philosophy, theology, and science on the other, is sacrificed; a 
course which it would be hard to justify. Thus the universe of a 
plain man may contain angels, electrons, electric currents, and 
radio waves. Nor can such ’imported* notions be entirely 
eliminated from an account of commonsense views; the plain man’s 
acceptance, and treatment, of them presumably bears some relation 
to, and is to some extent a reflection of, others of his conceptions* 
Sometimes, indeed, it is difficult to judge whether, or to whdkth 
extent, conceptions are what one might call * natural to commonsense* 
or moulded by the results of *extra-comraonsense reflection*. Is, 
for instance, the plain man’s conception of himself as a voluntary 
agent entirely uninfluenced by the conclusions reached by 
philosophers and theologians?
In the following pages, therefore, I shall treat the term 
* commonsense conception* as applicable to notions which seem to be.
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or to have become, integral to the outlook of those wlio have made 
no specialised study of philosphy, science, or theology (which, 
of course, does not exclude their being integral to that of anyone 
who has made such a study), and which are therefore held by many 
without any specialised thinking*
(b) The ccromonsense conception of experience.
In order to understand the plain man’s causal assertions it is 
necessary to understand the context in which he supposes than 
applicable; to do this is to understand his conception of 
experience*
The plain man, like many philosophers and scientists, is con­
vinced of the existence of an universe composed of continuants i.e. 
persistent entities which are not mere collocations of transitory 
sense data or events* And he holds these continuants to possess
persistent qualities. He generally supposes these entitles to be
of at least two types; (a) physical objects all of which have some 
spatio-temporal position and characteristics and none of which can 
think and choose, and of such he supposes himself to speak when he 
makes assertions analogous to ’I see a chair’, *I climbed a 
mountain’; (b) entities possessing both the characteristics of 
mere physical objects and the ability to think and choose, and of 
these he supposes ’himself’ to be one. (He often supposes the 
thinking choosing element in himself can exist independently of 
the physical, and postulates the existence of God and angels, thus 
supposing the possibility of a third type of entity - namely a 
thinking choosing being with no physical (i.e. spatial)
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characteristics, and in regard to God may even be prepared to 
accept the denial of temporal characteristics. V/hether any of 
these beliefs is,strictly speaking^natural to commonsense it is 
probably impossible to say now; though anthropology might be able 
to throw some light on the subject* Their acceptance by plain 
men, however, illustrates the readiness of the latter to postulate 
continuants which have persistent characteristics and which act.)
Everyone (philosophers and plain m^^^grees that in ordinary 
conversational English *J see a chair’ is correctly asserted when 
a set of visual sense-data of a certain characteristic type are 
experienced while at the same time other sets of sense data, visual, 
auditory, tactual, and kinaesthetic, may reasonably be expected 
given specified conditions* The plain man, however, is further 
convinced that in sensing these data when he can truly say ’% see 
a chair*, he is directly experiencing a continuant; and it is 
this continuant that he intends to apply the name ’ chair* • More­
over, in the specific characters of the sense-data constituting 
such an experience he supposes himself to be experiencing qualities 
attributable to the continuant itself. It is generally assumed 
by philosophers that the attitude of the plain man is that which 
they entitle * naive realism’. This conclusion is supported by 
his application of idential adjectives to sense liata and physical 
objects; thus he asserts equally ’I see a red patch’ and ’I see 
a red pillar box*, while evidently intending in the latter sentence 
to attidbute a quality to a persistent physical object. I Imve 
been forced to the conclusion, however, that this argues no more
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than verbal incoherence, naive realism being completely incon­
sistent with commonsense practice.
It is the commonsense attitude to vfhat philosophers have 
called ’tactual shape’ which testifies most strongly to the common- • 
sense rejection of naive realism. The basic importance attached 
to the sense of touch as providing evidence of the shapes of physical 
objects is unquestionable. The blind, and normal persons when in 
the dark or blindfold, unhesitantly ascribe shapes to objects on 
tactual evidence alone. Moreover, if the evidence of sight and 
touch conflict as to the shape of a given object, the plain man 
always prefers that of touch. If, for instance, one shows a child 
a stick standing in water, and hence appearing bent, and he suspects 
the illusion; he will perform the experiment of running his hand 
along the stick and on this evidence alone will confidently affirm 
it to be ’really straight*. One has but to analyse the experience 
of attributing shape in virtue of tactual and kinaesthetic sense 
data, however, to realise that it is never those date which is 
ascribed to the physical object whose shape they are regarded as 
evidencing, but only characteristics consistent with their being 
obtainable. That this is the plain man* s opinion is confirmed 
by commonsense usage in which terms ascribing shape, e.g. ’round’,
’ square’, etc., are, applied neither to the totality of tactual and 
kinaesthetic data on the basis of which they are applied to 
physical objectsf nor to individuals or subsets within the totality*
It might be objected that if this is so then the attribution
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of shape must depend on inference and infants must be supposed 
capable of quite complex reasoning. But this is not so. If 
the thought of a baby drawing inferences is objectionable to 
anyone, there is no reason why he should not postulate, like 
Hume, an irrational human trait or instinct which consists in 
attributing a given shape to a persistent object v/hen the 
appropriate evidence is presented.
philosophers generally seem to suppose that plain men believe 
sensible colours to be persistent qualities of physical objects.
This is certainly suggested by the commonsense practice, noted 
above, of applying the same adjective to sensible colour and 
physical object. The plain man’s use of sentences such as ’The 
pillar box is red’ , is of course relatively unreflective; but I • 
am not at all sure that, if pressed, he would insist that sensible 
colours persist#unperceived* It is indeed difficult to conceive 
what any one can mean by this latter assertion. .
If he does not suppose colours to persist unperdeived^ then 
the plain man cannot be supposed to be identifying sense data with 
qualities of physical objects. For when he applies a colour adject­
ive to a physical object he supposes himself saying something v/hich 
is true independently of the conditions requisite for experiencing 
sense data. yhen, for instance, he says ’This table is brown* he 
does not intend this as a shorthand form of ’This table is brown so 
long, and only so long as some norraally sighted person looks at it 
from certain positions is a good light’; but supposes himself to 
be ascribing to the table a quality which it possesses whether it 
is, or can be, perceived or not.
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But even if it is maintained that when plain men assert ’This 
table is broTO’, they are postulating the persistence, unper­
ceived, of sensible browness; naive realism cannot justly be 
ascribed to them* For they often make statements such as ’The 
table is really brown, but looks black’, ’The curtains are really 
blue, but look purple’4; statements which express a plain refusal 
to regard a seen colour as a persistent quality of the physical 
object they designate as its source or stimulus. if, therefore, 
one holds the plain man to suppose sensible colours persistent 
qualities of physical objects, one must admit him to recognise 
that he often sees colours which are not themselves qualities of 
physical objects; but which he nevertheless sees, under certain 
conditions alone, whenever he looks in the direction of a physical 
object.
There seem, therefore, to be only two accounts of physical 
objects’ relations to sense data, which are consistent with 
commonsense practice. These are; (a) to apply a specified 
adjective correctly to a physical object is to assert truly that 
when it is correlated with a percipient in a certain manner, given 
conditions obtaining, he will have a specific type of sensory 
experience; (b) to apply a specific descriptive adjective to 
a physical object correctly is to ascribe to it justly a persistent 
quality in virtue of which a percipient, correlated with it in a 
certain manner under given conditions, will have a specific type 
of sensory experience. (The second of these accounts is, of course, 
consistent with the view that what is perceived thus may sometimes
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be a quality of the object itself and sometimes a more or 
less distorted appearance of such a quality),
I think there is no doubt that the man in the street would prefer 
the latter of these alternatives since he seems to be sufe that 
when he applies adjectives to physical objects he is ascribing 
characteristics to them*
The man in the street also applies adjectives to people, 
which he regards as describing them not as physical objects but 
insofar as they have minds. Thus he may call Jones honest, 
conscientious, unscrupulous, or selfishy and he may describe 
mankind in general as rational or free. In doing so, hew ever, 
he does not always intend to ascribe to minds qualities which 
determine their correlations with other entities since he supposes 
that man^insofar as he possesses a mind (or mental characteristics)^ 
has freedom of choice. Thus when he describes anyone as ’honest* 
or ’unscrupuloushe intends to assert simply that he generally 
acts in a certain manner not that he must inevitably act in any 
specific way under given conditions. On the other hand, in 
applying some adjectives to minds he appears to ascribe to them 
persistent qualities determining, not indeed their correlations 
with other continuants, but their manner of acting or becoming 
correlated. Thus when he describes man as rational and free he 
appears to intend to ascribe to him persistent qualities in virtue 
of which he can reason, choose, and determine his actions accord­
ingly.
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T The belief in an universe composed of continuants has not 
passed unquestioned by philosophers. Among modeivithinkers, 
Berkeley first seriously questioned the belief in persistent 
physical objects in the ordinary sense, Hume going yet further 
in questioning the belief in a persistent mind. Since the belief 
has been questioned not only in the past but also in many con­
temporary analysis of perception, its truth cannot be taken for 
granted in any serious discussion* Something must therefore be 
said about it before discussing commonsense ’causal assertions’, 
since the plain man normally intends any assertion about ex­
perience to refer to continuants either directly or indirectly*
But here, once more, is a problem which has been discussed so 
often and in such detail that I cannot hope to deal with it ad­
equately in the space T can reasonably devote to it in this thesis. 
I shall therefore merely summarise the main points relevant to its 
discussion, noting some of their implications*
(1) There is no intrinsic objection to the commonsense viewjfor 
there is no inherent impossibility in the existence of a continuant 
exhibiting persistent characterisitcs, and affecting, or being 
affected by, another (this latter will be made more explicit and 
further justified in what follows) whether in stimulating per­
ceptions or having them stimulated or no. It is certainly con­
tradictory to suppose anything to persist and alter in the same 
respect, but as Johnson’s analysis (1) reveals, this contradiction 
is not implicit in an account of change in terms of continuants.
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(2) The commonsense view as I have outlined it^is perfectly 
consistent with the evidence of experience* This is not true 
of naive realism which philosophers usually seem to attribute 
to commonsense; but as % have already argued, this is not the 
view of the plain man.
(3) On the other hand, however, it is maintained that the 
evidence of experience is equally consistent with the phenomenalist 
account of it in terms of categorical and hypothetical assertions 
about particular experiences alonej if this is so it may well be 
objected that the postulation of continuants is unwarrantable since 
not only can experience be accounted for without this but it can 
be accounted for solely in terms of what it is capable of present­
ing directly. For even though one admit, with price (2) that an 
account of experience in terms of phenomenalism, no less than one 
in terms of continuants, must postulate invérifiable hypotheses* 
one cannot justly deny that phenomenalism has the advantage in that 
none of the assertions implied by its hypotheses is intrinsically 
unverifiable within the limits of human experience; since the 
impossibility of verifying such an hyothesis as it supposes 
asserted by sentences analogous to ’This is a chair*, ’lions are 
carnivorous’, ’he is dishonest’t lies in their truth implying 
that of an infinite number of assertions (in addition to the 
existence among these of subsets whose members are not humanly 
verifiable in any case).
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(4). Further, as professor Ayer has pointed out (3) one 
cannot defend an account of experience in terras of continuants 
by recourse to the traditional argument that sense data must 
have some cause and only continuants will fill the bill, unless
one can justify the assertion that sense data must hs.ve some cause - 
a contention which would have to face many objections today*
(5) A phenomenalist account of experience, if it is to be 
consistent, is inevitably very complex. For commonsense the 
sentence ’This is a chair’ asserts the existence, in a given 
spatio-temporal position of a something of a fairly easily 
specifiable character.^ a something whose behaviour in a variety of 
circumstances is readily enumerated; and it implies an infinity 
of other assertions about possible experiences, e.g. that if any 
person with normal sight stood in a certain position, there being 
present a given degree of illumination, he would see a brown patch 
of a specified shape. But for the phenomenalist not only can it 
be regarded as asserting only these hypotheses, but the hypotheses 
themselves become much more complex since they must be interpreted 
solely in terns of hypothetical assertions about sense data. That 
is to say he must regard ’This is a chair* as asserting simply an 
infinity of hypotheses such as the following: if a discontinuous 
sense data series occurs wuch that in ordinary language it would be 
described as ’the Experience of one person* and this series has 
contained visual sense data up to the present, then if in that 
series there occur sense data which would in ordinary language be 
described in given circumstances as *the experience of walking down
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the hall outside opening and coming through that door into this
room and looking in a certain direction* , and neither the series
as a whole nor the occurrence of visual data within it ceased
immediately (either temporarily or permanently); then a sense-
datura of a given type - namely a brown patch of a given shape -
would occur. The foregoing is indeed an abbreviation; since to
the consistent phenomenalist that which makes a sense data series
'one person* s experience* and *the experience of walking down a
soltL
certain hall and through a given door* are also to be conceived^ 
in terras of the truth of hypothetical assertions about sense data.
If therefore one is of Copernicus* opinion that the simpler of two 
hypotheses is to be preferred, one will be forced to accept an 
account of experience in terras of continuants.
(6) It is, indeed, impossible to formulate a precise 
phenomenalist account of either experience in general or of any 
particular experience usually described in terms of physical objects, 
For, as H.R#Price and professor Ayer have made clear (4) no 
physical object sentence is translatable by a finite set of 
assertions about sense data. This is sufficient to condemn 
phenomenalism in the eyes of some; but I do not think it can justly 
be so regarded. As professor Ayer has pointed out (5) it does not 
make it any the less true that * to say something about a material 
thing is always to say something about sense-data*, it means only 
’that one*s references to material things are vague in their 
application to phenomena and that the series of sense-data that 
they may be understood to specify are composed of infinite sets of 
terms*. And-sinee if the objection is to have any force the
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the objector must be able to understand what is meant by an 
infinite series although he can never experience one. But if 
it is possible to understand what is meant by infinity, then it 
is possible to conceive what would be involved in the truth of an 
hypothesis implying that of an infinite number of assertions of a 
given type. The postulation of such an hypothesis would thus be 
justifiable were there sufficient grounds for accepting it.
(7) Although the phenomenalist postulates nothing of a type 
intrinsically incapable of direct verification, he yet makes very 
large assumptions. For he accepts generalisations of both science 
and commonsense such as that arsenic poisons, fire burns, wood may 
be chopped and burnt, etc. And in doing so he is not making 
simple generalisations about every existent of a given type under 
certain readily verifiable conditions e.g. that whenever a pink 
triangular sense datum occurs simultaneously with one describable 
as the sound middle 0, it is succeeded by a blue circular sense 
datum - or more complex laws of the same type. Instead he is 
assuming a multitude of laws each aff$r#dng that if an infinite 
number of hypothetical assertions about sense data are true, then 
sense data of given t^ p^es will occur under certain conditions 
(also specified by the truth of innumerable hypothetical statanenk s 
about sense data). Thus in holding that arsenic causes death, he 
assumes that whenever sense data occur, which are such that he 
would describe them as a person’s taking arsenic none occurring 
such that he would describe them as his taking an emetic, others 
describable as observing a corp%se in a given state would occur
86.
'in another's experience* under given circumstances; a person's 
taking arsenic or an ematic or observing a corpse in a given 
state, each consisting in the truth of innumerable hypothetical 
assertions concerning sense data as well as that of one or more 
categorical statements about them.
Since the phenomenalist ordinarily denies any intrinsic 
connection between sense data, and has no ground for supposing 
any, he has no prima facie reason for postulating such laws. And 
since moreover each postulates the truth of an infinite number 
of assertionSyhe can never hope to obtain evidence in itself 
adequate to justify the attribution of any significant degree of 
probability to them. I think a phenomenalist justified in 
arguing that it is reasonable to accept hypotheses consistent with 
the evidence available, even though this is always inevitably 
inadequate to confer a significant degree of probability on them, 
for the only other alternative is to postulate an hypothesis 
inconsistent with the evidence (since to refuse to formulate an 
hypothesis is in effect to say that any may be true - which is 
itself an hypothesis). He would then be in a position, given 
that his hypothesis consistent with the evidence, to prefer 
his account of experience to any in terms of continuants on the 
ground that the latter does, while the former does not, postulate 
something intrinsically unverifiable by us. But he is certainly 
not justified in ascribing certainty, or even a high degree of 
probability to his conclusions. He can merely claim to postulate 
what any reasonable person must, though admitting it might well
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prove false.
(8) Many philosophers, of whom price (6) is a notable 
example, have argued that in 'experiencing physical objects' 
we are directly aware, not merely of actual sense data and the 
expectation that others of specific types are obtainable under 
^iven conditions, but of spatio-temporal existants which persist 
and possess 'causal characteristics'. I have no doubt that plain 
men would agree with them; it is certainly what anyone supposes 
himself aware of in^perceiving physical objects' before he 
starts analysing the experience philosophically. (And, of course, 
he may, like^rice, continue to suppose so after such analysis).
It is possible, however, that such awareness might be illusory; 
both plain men and philosophers are indeed prepared to admit that 
a person may be mistaken when, on a given occasion, he supposes 
himself aware of a continuant.
(9) Price goes further than this, arguing that the very 
notion of 'anything having causal characteristics', which is integral 
to any adequate account of experience, presupposes the ecistenoe
of a continuant as subject of these characteristics.(7) His 
argument, however, seems clearly circular since it assumes that the 
phenomena ordinarily described as 'things having causal 
characteristics' can be accounte d for solely in terms of continuants 
and their characters, which is precisely the point the phenomenalist 
would dispute. For the latter supposes the ascription of 'causal 
characteristics' like any other assertion concerning 'physical 
objects', acceptable only insofar as it postulates hypothetical
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(and, when one is properly attributing 'causal characteristics 
to 'this', categorical) assertions about sense data. That it 
postulates so much is indubitable; that it çould or should 
postulate no more certainly cannot be disproved by mere denial.
(lo) If phenomenalism is true, many wishes and emotions, 
ordinarily thought readily comprehensible, are inexplicable.
Why, for instance, should experiences ordinarily described as 
'wishes for her son's welfare and concern for his safety' occur 
in the sense data series ordinarily called 'Mrs Brown's experience', 
if 'the welfare and safety of her son' consist in no more than the 
truth of certain hypothetical assertions about sense data. The 
phenomenalist could consistently maintain that oh his interpretation 
there is no reason why these experiences or any other should be 
supposed explicable. And he could further point out that since 
on his theory 'Mrs Bro^vn's experience^ is simply a series of 
essentially distinct sense data the interpretation of any part of 
it as dictated by motive in the everyday sense of the terms is 
clearly out of place and unwarranted. Furthermore one is not 
entitled to assert that this type of experience must be explicable, 
unless one can justify that assertion in the face of possible 
sources of objection such as argument s against universal causality.
It is undeniable, however, that to most people a phenomenalist 
account of such experiences is blatantly inconsistent with their 
observed character. This belief could conceivably be mistaken; 
but it is clearly incumbent on any phenomenalist to show that this 
is so.
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(11) There is one element in experience which seems to me 
indisputably incompatible with phenomenalism, namely the aware­
ness of experience as successive. It seems palpably false to 
describe the experience we call 'hearing a piece of mpsic' simply 
as a succession of auditory sense data; it seems indubitably an 
awareness of one sound as following another. But an awareness of 
sense data as succeeding one another in time presupposes the 
existence of something coexistent with each of them, and hence 
persisting through time; which is capable of perceiving, remember­
ing, and correlating the perceived with the remembered, it seems 
to me therefore that even though 'physical objects' could be shown 
to be conceivable in terms of the truth of hypothetical assertions 
concerning sense data, experience is such as to demand the 
postulation of continuants analogous to 'minds' or 'percipients' 
as ordinarily conceived (or at the least, one such).
(12) It also seems impossible to conceive distinguishing 
a sense data series as 'one person's experience' in terms of 
phenomenalism. Certainly it would be theoretically possible to 
enumerate the sense data which went to make up my experience.
But memory - the recall of past awareness of sense data-seems to 
play an integral role in my acknowledging sense data to have 
formed part of my experience* For even though I sometimes accept 
the assertion that it contained given sense data on other grounds 
than that of direct memory of awareness of these sense data,memories 
form part of the total evidence without which I should not accept 
that assertion. Moreover such an assertion seems to be understood.
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partly at least, by reference to the experience of memory; for 
I suppose that if it is true that ( experienced a given sense 
datum under certain conditions, T might have remenbered it, that 
I probably did remernber it at some time in the past, and ini^t 
possibly do so again in the future,
(1 3) The foregoing should have made it clear that while 
some 'causal assertions' assume the existence of continuants, some 
traditional defences of the postulation of continuants rest on
t t * p
'causal assertions', Nevertheless physical object and causal 
assertions are not all so inextricably linked that it is possible 
to formulate no argument which is not circular, about either 
'causes' or 'physical objedts'. Thus, for instance, it is 
possible to discuss whether it is reasonable to assume the validity
of laws involving the truth of an infinite number of hypothetical
assertions about sense data, without assuming the existence of 
continuants* SiTfiilarly it is not necessary to make that assumption 
in order to discuss whether every occurrence of a sense datum must
be preceded by that of another or whether $t must always stand in
a given relation either to another sense datura or to something else; 
And, it has been seen that one may similarly argue for or against 
phenomenalism without appealing: to causal assertions.
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(ii) Some uses of the term 'cause' in everyday speech.
The term 'cause* is very common in everyday speech*
Indeed do we ever converse long without using it? The morning 
papers and the radio news bulletins contain accounts of a serious 
rail accident, and this not unnaturally provides a topic of general 
conversation: what is the tenor of such conversation but a dis­
cussion of the 'causes' of the accident? Similarly if talk turns 
to an economic or political crisis, it resolves itself largely 
into a discussion of 'causes' and 'effects'. A friend looks ill 
or visibly distressed, what is ray concern but for the 'cause* of his 
trouble? he meets with an accident or financial loss, and my 
question is the same* A neighbour travels to Scotland, a states­
man travels to Washington or Moscow; and immediately there are 
questions, speculations, and assertions about the 'cause* of this 
move* My cabbages or carnations are blighted, or a cake fails to 
turn out as it should; and again I demand the ' cause'.
Newspapers provide, numerous and varied examples of the common­
sense use of ' cause' ; and it is from them that I have taken the 
selection of sentences containing the word which I am examining 
in detail* The majority of ray examples are headlines, but three 
are sentences occurring in the body of articles* In each instance 
the context made the meaning clear^ the sense in which the headlines 
were intended being made explicit in the accompanying paragraphs 
they were intended to summarise.
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The following are the examples 1 have chosen; 'Cigarette 
end may have caused market blaze', 'bmall insect causes big 
trouble*, 'Safety lecture causes accident', 'Devaluation of the 
pound causes trouble in shipyards', 'Rain causes many craches*, 
'Professor Manley told me afterwards that the cause of the 
increased temperature might lie in some type of variation in the 
atmosphere or the behaviour of ocean water', '^^e high temperature 
caused the lines to expand with the result that they twisted out 
of shape thus derailing the express', 'Brumas causes traffic 
enquiry', 'Cause of nurses death unknown*, 'Lack of boys' clubs 
is one cause of juvenile delinquency', 'It is a profound truth 
that someone to love and someone to love him is a vitamin without 
which no individual can develop aright. And there (in its absence) 
you have the chief cause of juvenile delinquency'.
It will be noticed that the term 'cause' is here used both as 
noun and verb. I think experience sufficiently testifies that 
when the plain man asserts 'A causes (caused, is causing, or will 
cause) B' , he intends to assert that it has (had, is having, or 
will have) a relation to B in virtue of which it can be correctly 
described as 'cause' of B'. In the following discussion I shall 
adopt this usage, employing the term as noun or verb as seems 
convenient.
One cannot read the above selection of sentences without being 
immediately struck by one important difference between most of them 
and the sentences which modern philosophers ordinarily consider 
when discussing ' causation'. When a philosopher 'discusses 
causation' today he normally examines only general assertions such
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as 'Arsenic causes death*, 'Mosquitos cause malaria*, 'Bacteria 
cause putrefaction'. (8) All but two of my examples, however, 
do not assert generalisations but merely offer explanations of 
particular events* 'cigarette end may have caused market blaze' 
for instance, is not asserting a generalisation about fires and 
cigarette ends (though as will be seen below when the plain man 
thinks it justified he assumes the truth of such generalisations), 
but postulating a probable explanation of a particular fire all the 
circumstances of which are not repeated (rior expected to be) when­
ever lighted cigarette ends fall or fires occur* This difference 
of emphasis between plain men and philosophers is readily under­
standable* The plain man is naturally interested primarily in 
this fire or that car crash, generalisations being important to 
him only insofar as they help to throw light on these particulars* 
For his life is made up of particular events and he is concerned 
only to learn to understand and deal with them as they arise. The 
philosopher, on the other hand is concerned with the assumptions 
underlying assertions both of plain men and philospphers ; he is 
forced to recognise that little can be said about particulars with­
out appeal to generalisations and therefore rightly regards 
examination of the latter as of paramount importance. (9)
The fore-going selection of examples is also notable in its 
variety* The terra 'cause* is applied indifferently to continuant, 
event, a group of specifically similar continuants, groups of 
specifically different events which the plain man regards as con­
stituting states of a continuant and an environment respectively.
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an unknown X> and the absence of some condition* Further, even 
when the ' causes* postulated fall within the same category their 
relations to their 'effects* are not regarded by plain men as 
completely analogous* To commonsense the headline proclaiming 
•Brumas causes traffic enquiry* is assigning him a very different 
role from that attributed to totet&e fly by the headline 'Small 
insect causes big trouble* *
There is more uniformity among the'effects* however, all but 
one of which would be regarded by commonsense merely as the 
occurrence of an event or a group of events* One of them, namely 
the generally warmer climate which the professor was attributing 
to Britain and postulating as an effect, would be regarded by the 
plain man rather as a general state of a continuant (or at least its 
having given states during certain periods of time).
None of the 'effects' postulated in the examples would be re­
garded as a continuant by commonsense. I think this reflects not 
a refusal in plain men to regard continuants as * caused*, but merely 
the fact that the 'effects* which it is most often useful for him 
to consider are events. If, for instance, the plain man develops 
a boil he may well ask his doctor its 'cause*, in so doing wanting 
an explanation not merely of an event, or number of events, but of 
what he regards as the continued existence through time of something 
having spatial dimensions* Similarly a tovm dweller who has newly 
acquired a garden may ask the 'cause' of the small mounds which he 
suddenly finds disfiguring his lawn; intending in so doing to
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demand an explanation of the existence of spatiotemporal con­
tinuants* Again a hospital, school, or concert hall is often 
referred to as the result of a person’s action, just as a fire 
is sometimes described as the result of a cigarette end’s being 
dropped. But the plain man’s descriptions of continuants as 
’caused* do not normally involve any conceptions different from 
those involved in his describing events as * caused’• For 
commonsense supposes the coming into existence of a continuant 
normally consists in a series of events ending at the moment when 
the continuant can first properly be said to exist. And, moreover, 
it supposes the letter’s persistence through time to be dependent 
on conditions analogous to those on which it supposes the occur­
ence of an event series to depend*
(a) The gommons ense View of 6a usai %vent Sequence.
In four of the examples cited above the term ’cause’ is applied 
to a continuant or group of continuants; namely, to an inanimate 
object, a number of insects, a man, and an animal. Nor can there 
be any doubt that in three of these the title is so bestowed in 
virtue of an event or events attributed to the history of the 
continuant (or continuants) concerned* A cigarette end which had 
been properly stubbed out or which though dropped alight, had 
fallen into a puddle where it was extinguished or on to a paving 
stone where it burned itself out hamlessly, would not be called 
the ’cause’ of the fire. Nor would the ’small insect» (tsetse 
fly) have been called ’cause* of the big trouble’ {dislocation of
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cattle farming in parts of Africa) had it never had contact 
direct or indirect with cattle* Similarly the safety lecturer 
would not have been called ’cause’ of the accident had he not 
acted in a certain way*
It appears from the accompanying paragraph that in 
postulating a cigarette end as ’cause’ of the fire the writer 
intended to assert that he supposed the blaze to be the culmination 
of a series of events of which the first was the dropping of the 
lighted cigarette end on straw or shavings, and the intermediar­
ies a continuous series of ever increasing ignitions. Similarly 
tsetse fly are called ’cause’ of the ’big trouble’ which is the 
dislocation of cattle farming, because their biting cattle is 
regarded as the origin of a continuous series consisting in 
physical changes in the animals bitten and subsequent decisions 
and activities on the part of their owners, which are describable 
as a dislocation both of their lives and of the district’s 
agriculture. The man is likewise called ’ cause’ of the accident 
because something he did while driving a car is thought the 
initiator of a series, consisting in events ascribable to the 
car’s history, culminating in the collision.
In order therefore to understand and evaluate assertions 
analogous to those expressed by these three headlines^it is 
necessary to discover how the plain man requires an event series 
to link continuant and event before he is prepared to call the 
former ’cause’ of the latter.
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His selectiveness makes it clear that he does not regard 
the relations linking initiating and culminating event as purely 
temporal. Did he do so he would have no reason for designating 
the dropping of a cigarette end rather than the simultaneous 
striking of the town hall clock as originating the series leading 
to the fire. Nor would he have any grounds for supposing the 
connecting link between the fire and its 'cause* to consist in 
the series constituted by the dropping of a lighted cigarette 
end, and the subsequent successive ignitions of straws a,b,c etc., 
stalls x,y,z., rather than that composed of the striking of the 
town hall clock, the barking of a dog in the next street, the 
hoot of a motor horn, the whistle of a distant train, the launching 
of a ship fifty miles away, an earthquake five thousand miles 
away, and a child crying out in his sleep. And he shows further 
selectiveness in regarding the cigarette* s fall and no earlier 
e:^ ent in the history of cigarette, the person dropping it, or any 
other continuant, as initiating the series linking the fire to a 
continuant as its * cause’*
What then besides temporal succession does the plain man 
require of an event series before he consents to regard it as 
the connecting link between continuant and event entitling him to 
call the former ’cause* of the latter? and what leads him to 
specify one particular event as initiating such a connecting 
series?
Consideration of the series regarded as connecting the fire 
with the cigarette end might well suggest that plain men regard
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spatial continuity as a condition of causal sequence since the 
cigarette end is regarded as igniting only that v/ith which it 
is in contact and so is each continuant held to be ignited in 
the process. And, indeed a similar spatial continuity is 
postulated in all physical causal sequence. But an examination 
of the interpretation which commons ense gives to the assertion 
that tsetse fly ’ cause’ farmers to act in a certain way reveals 
the plain man ready to postulate as ’causal* an event sequence 
to which he does not attribute spatial continuity. For when he 
calls tsetse fly the * cause* of Brown’s abandoning farming, or 
ceasing to farm a particular area, he means to postulate an event 
series connecting the actions of the insects with those of Brown; 
some of the events regarded as indispensable to this being 
thoughts and decisions occurring in Brown’s history, which latter 
events the plain man does not regard as having any spacial 
characteristics at all. He would, for instance, think it 
nonsensical to describe frown’s decision as being, or appearing 
to be, to the right or left of either another thought or decision 
or a physical phenomenon. Nor does he suppose assertions a bout 
Brown’s thoughts and decisions merely a way of describing 
spatially related phenomena in Brown’s brain.
Nor can the required link consist in, or rest on, the 
attribution of each event in the connecting series to the same 
continuant* In none of the examples under discussion are all 
the events in the connecting series, including its originator 
and culmination, attributed to the same continuant. The events
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thought to link cigarette end and fire are attributed 
variously to cigarette end, straw or shavings, a succession 
of stalls, and finally the market as a whole; those linking 
•small insect* with ’big trouble’, to insects, cattle farmers, 
their families and property; those linking safety lecturer 
and accident, to the lecturer, and his car (the culmimting 
event being attributable to them both as well as to the other 
car and its occupants, or if the term event be confined to 
relatively simple occurrences the series may be said to end in 
a complex of events attributable respectively to each car and 
each of their occupants). Moreover, the plain man does not 
always regard an event series attributable to one continuant 
as ’causal’. if, for instance, a plain man first smells the 
scent of a rose, immediately afterwards hearing a bird sing 
then successively coughing, hearing the sound of a lawn mower, 
seeing a cat walk across the lawn; he does not suppose this 
series to form either the whole or a part of one linking him 
with an event as its ’cause’. Nor, on the other hand would 
he refuse to regard an event series as ^ causal* because its 
members were all attributable to one continuant. He might 
for instance assert that Smith ’caused’ his own death by drinking 
poison, thus intending to assert him to be ’cause’ of the final 
event in his history as a living man in virtue of an earlier 
event in his own history linked with the final one by inter­
mediate events all of which also occur in that history. In 
the language of philosophers, the plain man supposes a causal
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sequence may be either transeunt or immanent.
To most mo d e m  philosophers a ’causal* sequence of events is 
one of a type which may reasonably be supposed to have occurred 
in the past whenever certain conditions have obtained, and whose 
recurrence in the future whenever they obtain^ it in the 
present state of our knowledge} more reasonable than not to 
expect. And for some it is a sequence of a type which inevit­
ably occurs under given conditions.
The plain man would agree that the sequence of events 
connecting a cigarette end with a fire as its ’cause’, is of a 
type which may reasonably be expected to occur under giiven 
conditions. And I think he would go so far as to suppose that 
if a lighted cigarette end is dropped under the requisite 
circumstances, a fire will inevitably follow. Certainly if 
anyone suggests that a fire might not follow even though the 
cigarette end’s fall and all the other conditions were fulfilled, 
his normal reaction is to say not that this is very unlikely, but 
that it is impossible.
AS the above paragraph indicates, the plain man does not 
suppose the cigarette end’s fall must have been followed by 
the fire unconditionally. It has been seen that he supposes 
a cigarette end’s fall would not have initiated the series 
culminating in the fire had it not both been alight and fallen 
on dry straw, shavings, or what he regards as similarly in­
flammable material. Abd his keeping firefighting equipment 
where there is what he regards as inflammable material, testifies
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that he further supposes such a series, once started, inay yet 
he intercepted. Moreover he acknowledges that the series may 
fail to follow the cigarette end* s fall owing to a persistent 
condition: he may for instance say the straw was too damp to
ignite; and he is prepared to accept the scientist’s word that 
if oxygen had not been, and remained, present the series could 
not have occurred. But he supposes both all occurrences of, 
and all deviations from, the series v/liich follow the fall of 
lighted cigarette ends, matches etc*, to be consistent with lav/s 
of regular correlation exemplified throughout the universe’s 
temporal and spatial extent. He supposes, for example, that 
the conplete series never fails to follow the initiating event 
unless conditions of given types obtain (these conditions may 
of course consist in either the presence or absence of something; 
e.g., he supposes either the presence of danpness or the absence 
of oxygen may prevent the series following the cigarette end* s 
fall) ; and that whenever one of these conditions obtain the 
sequence either fails to occur at all or is not completed. He 
even supposes that there is a precise correlation between 
different deviations from the series and conditions of given 
types: e.g. that the application of a small quantity of water
or sand intercepts the series at an early stage whereas at a 
later point only the application of a much greater quantity 
does so.
The plain man, however, does not ascribe a like necessity 
to every event series he regards capable of relating continuant
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and event as ’cause’ and ’effect’. Tliat which he regards as 
linking thus tsetse fly and the dislocation of farming is one 
of which he would^most probably deny it. He certainly supposes 
a series of changes in an animal culminating in its death in­
evitably follov/s its being bitten by a tsetse fly (certain 
conditions obtaining). And he further holds that if a farmer 
makes a given decision (if for instance he decides to move) and 
specific conditions hold, then events of a certain type will occur. 
But he also believes that, in the whole series linking tsetse fly 
with a farmer’s actions there is at least one event of which it is 
false to say that it is of a type which always must occur under 
given conditions. For he supposes a decision is essentially an 
event which either may or may not occur under certain conditions.
He does, indeed, suppose the indeterminateness of a decision to 
have limits; for he does not suppose anyone can decide to do what 
he supposes completely impossible© It is therefore possible that 
in saying tsetse fly had ’ caused’ a dislocation of farming the 
plain man might intend to assert that their ravages had rendered 
cattle farming completely inpossible in the district and so 
created conditions in which farmers there inevitably decided on 
some course of action involving giving up cattle farming in that 
area, although the precise nature of that decision was not in­
evitable* If the plain man intends to assert this in calling 
tsetse fly ’cause* of a dislocation of farming, then he regards the 
occurrence of the first term in the connecting series as render­
ing that of the last inevitable; since although he does not
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suppose the precise nature of the decision inevitable^he does 
suppose this to be true of that element in it which renders 
the culmination of the series so. Nevertheless he still does 
not regard the series as wholly analogous to that linking 
cigarette end and fire since he supposes the cliaracter of each 
member of the latter to be determined completely by the con­
ditions relevant to it. But the plain man may well not v/ish 
to attribute even so much necessity to the series linking insect 
and dislocation of farming* For he generally supposes there is 
a fairly v/ide variation of degrees of risk or difficulty v/ithin 
which a person may or may not decide on a certain action. He 
holds, for instance, that under certain circumstances a farmer 
could decide either to give up farming in a certain area or try 
to combat the ravages of insects decimating his stock. In 
calling tsetse fly cause of the dislocation of a district’s 
agriculture he might therefore mean to assert that in a situation 
created by these insects^either of these decisions m s  possible; 
but that most farmers liad made the former. The content of the 
article headed by the assertion in question indicated that this 
was indeed the interpretation put on it in the present instance. 
If this were so it was postulating an event series linking 
continuant and event as ’cause’ and ’effect’, at least one member 
of which was thought not to be inevitable.
Furthermore, even when the plain man thinks it very unlikely 
that Brown v/ill decide on a given course of action under certain 
conditions, he will not admit it to be reasonable to expect his
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not doing so, with anything approaching the degree of confidence 
placed in the inplementation of causal laws by those v/ho suppose 
this but highly probable. And I think it true that a philosopher 
so regarding ’ causal laws’^ v/ould be far more astonished at finding 
arsenic failing to cause death under the usual conditions than 
would the plain man if he heard that Brovm (who otherwise seemed 
sane enough) had decided to try to continue farming as before even 
though financial ruin seemed certain for him if he did so.
The plain man’s specification of an event series as linking 
a continuant and event as ’cause’ aind ’effect* cannot therefore 
be regarded as resting on the assumption of either its necessity 
or the probable invariability of the occurrence of like series 
under like circumstandes, On what then can it rest?
Is there anything the plain man holds to be true of all the 
continuant ’causes’ discussed above? I think there is. His 
reactions to situations analogous to those describable in terms of 
the headlines in question reveal that he supposes each of the 
’causes’ indispensable to the occurrence of the ’effect’ ascribed 
to it. When, for instance, a plain man supposes a fire to liave 
been caused by the fall of a cigarette end^he often condemns the 
person who dropped it with remarks lilce;’Thanks to the fool who 
carelessly dropped his cigarette end we now have no market’ - a 
most unreasonable cliarge unless he believes the fire would not 
have occurred had the cigarette end not been dropped. Similarly 
when he supposes a certain type of insect to be ’cause’ of cattle
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plague,he does his best to see that such insects are destroyed 
and prevented from breeding believing that by so doing he v/ill 
prevent an outbreak of the plague. And his hopes are clearly 
vain if he supposes the sickness might occur independently of 
those insects© Again,if Jones is thought the * cause* of an 
accident, he may be taken to court and fined or have his licence 
endorsed^ a most unjust proceeding unless it is held that the
accident would not have occurred had it not been for him. And
plain men exhibit many reactions to the belief that Jones ’caused* 
the accident Y/hich reveal the same opinion. They may make remarks 
like ’Brown would still have been alive if it hadn’t been for
Jones’; they may feel Brown’s v/idoY/ is justified in feeling
resentment against Jones; Jones himself may want to offer her some 
compensâti on.
When the plain man calls an A ’ cause’ of a B he does not mean 
to assert unconditionally that no B can occur independently of an 
A, nor even to affirm unconditionally that no B could have occurred 
then and there independently of A, Y/hen Jones calls a cigarette 
end the ’ cause’ of the blaze in the market last Tuesday^ he is not 
intending to assert that no fire occurs unless a lighted cigarette 
end falls on dry strav/ or shavings. He has no doubt that the 
market might have blazed then iiad an incendiary bomb been dropped 
or an electric current short circuited in the vicinity. In calling 
a cigarette end ’cause’ of last Tuesday’s fire he intends to deny 
there was then the explosion of an incendiar^ r bomb or short
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circuiting of an electric current in the vicinity; Nor anything 
else, besides the cigarette’s fall, which together with the other 
conditions obtaining at the time would ha.ve made a subsequent blaze 
possible. I do not think this necessarily commits the plain man 
to belief in the plurality of ’ causes*, hov/ever. His distinctions 
are not sufficiently precise to provide him with adequate grounds 
for either accepting or rejecting this view. Nor do I see any 
reason why, were it suggested to him, he should reject the possibil­
ity that, were both analysed with sufficient precision, ’effects’ 
of one given type would alv/ays be found due to the same type of 
’cquse’. That he would not be averse to this suggestion is 
indicated by his ready recognition that death from arsencial poison­
ing is very different from death from heart disease^and this again 
from death due to a bullet through the brain. The procedure of 
the coroner’s court is clearly based on the assumption that if the 
character of an ’effect’ is specified with sufficient precision that 
of its ’ cause’ may be inferred equally precisely. And L.S.Stebbing’s 
view of the attitude of the coroner’s cour as ’a refinement of the 
commonsense notion of cause’ which ’would be quite useless to 
commons ense’ (lO) seems to me v/holly unjustified by the facts. Did 
Miss 8tebbing really suppose the plain man indifferent to the 
distinction betv/een death from arsenical poisoning and death from a 
heart attack? and did she suppose there are no plain men among the 
avid readers of detective stories who think the state of a victim’s 
corpse a clue to the manner of his death and hence to the identity 
of %his murderer?
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Those to whom a ’cause’ is an event inevitably followed 
(under certain conditions) by another of a given type, or to whom 
it is simply one of a type always in fact so followed, normally 
suppose these ’causes’ indispensable to their ’effects’ under 
specific conditions, clearly, however, neither view of the ’cause’s’ 
role demands or justifies belief in its indispensability to its 
’effect’. An universe or pattern is conceivable in which every 
A is followed by a though a B sometimes occurs not only without 
being preceded by an A but without being preceded by anything of 
which it can be said that such an one is invariably followed by 
a B or that no B occurs unless preceded either by such an one or 
something of one or another given types. Thus though a fire was 
inevitable in certain circumstances given the fall of a cigarette 
end, unless a fire never occurred unless preceded by an event 
which is of one or another of a given set of types, there would be 
no justification in asserting the fire’s dependence on the cigarette 
end. For there would then be no reason to suppose the fire would 
not have occurred anyway whatever had preceded.
If a ’cause’ is indispensable to its ’effect’ the latter must 
either be such as to be intrinsically incapable of occurring uider 
given conditions without the former, or else of a type in fact 
never exemplified in the absence of anything similar in type to the 
’cause’. That is to say^  to regard a ’cause’ as indispensable to 
its ’effect’ is to suppose it a necessary condition of the latter 
either intrinsically or in virtue of the general order of the 
universe of experience of which it forms a part. Thus even
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although the plain man does not ascribe inevitability to all events 
he supposes ’caused* by a continuant in virtue of a connecting 
event series, the notion of necessity is intrinsic to his conception 
of ’causation*•
I think the plain man holds not only that no such event will 
occur in the absence of an event series of either one specific 
type, or of one of a given set of specific types, linking it with 
a continuant; but that it is intrinsically incapable of so doing.
For he does not appear to entertain the possibility of an universe 
so ordered that fires, sicknesses, accidents etc., occurred in the 
absence of any of their accustomed antecedents under the conditions 
given which these antecedents are generally regarded indispensable 
to this. The existence of faiiy story and fantasy testify that he 
does not suppose their occurring in the absence of their accustomed 
antecedents inconceivable., But the character of these fantasies 
also testifies that he never imagines this happening in a situation 
completely analogous to those in i^ich he supposes it will not 
happen in fact. Thus he is prepared to imagine a Wonderland in 
which Alice grows larger or smaller with no regard to experienced 
uniformities; but it is a R^ ond erland in Tnhich there are found food 
and drink peculiar to itself, the eating or drinking of which is 
regularly followed by drastic changes in size. And similarly in 
the faiiy storg the giant’s castle may b u m  down without the aid 
of cigarette end, incendiary bomb, etc,, but it would not have done 
so had it not been for the words or actions of a being of a sort 
the plain man does not expect to meet in the everyday world.
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The philosopher who concurs with Hume’s denial that we ever 
observe intrinsic connections between events^ may ask in what could 
the plain man suppose the intrinsic dependence of ’effect’ on 
’cause’ to consist since he can never observe it. Whether or no 
any such dependence is observable, however, a situation capable 
of verifying an assertion of the type ’A is such that it cannot 
exist in the absence of B (or of B ’s having stood in a certain 
relation to it) is readily conceivable. To the plain man, as 
has been seen, a decision is a free choice of a course of action 
which for some reason or other seems desirable. clearly such a 
choice is of its nature incapable of occurring unless; (a) some­
thing exists capable both of recognising a course of action as 
desirable and of either choosing it or not; and (b) a course of 
action capable of appearing desirable to the former is possible.
It might be objected that I am here not describing a possible 
intrinsic dependence, but merely formulating a tautology since 
’A is a free choice’ and ’A is the choice of a desirable course of 
action by one who could make it or not’ are treated as synonymous. 
But A*s freely choosing what appears to him desirable is identical 
with neither the possibility of his choosing it or not, the 
possibility of its appearing desirable to him, nor the combination 
of both. Similarly A*s throwing a snowball his throwing it
or not was possible, is not identical with the possibility of his 
throwing it or not, it seems to me that in recognising that
a complex situation cannot occur in the absence of one of its 
elements, one is not simply observing that it is what it is but
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rather acknowledging what is essential, to its being what it is.
This may perhaps be made clearer by the following examples. If 
the commons ense account of the phenomenon of drinking should be 
correct, and it consist in a continuant-’s consumption of a non­
solid something capable of persisting and exhibiting spatial 
characteristics; then clearly drinking would be intrinsically 
impossible in the absence of any such persistent non-solid some­
thing, Or again, if playing billiards or marbles consists in 
moving small solid continuants about, the playing of these games 
is intrinsically impossible in the absence of such continuants. 
Clearly his belief in its indispensability to its ’effect’ 
is not the plain man’s sole criterion for calling cigarette end 
or tsetse fly ’cause» of fire or dislocation of cattle farming 
respectively. For not only does he suppose each event in the 
series linking these ’causes’ with their ’effects’ equally in- 
 ^ dispensable to the occurrence of the latter; but^ as has been seen^ 
he supposes many other factors (e,g, presence of oxygen and absence 
of the application of water or sand in the case of the fire) equally 
so. To answer the question why the plain man singles out as its 
’cause’ one continuant among the many factors he thinks indispens­
able to any event’s occurrence is, among other things, to answer 
the second of the questions posed earlier; namely what leads him 
to his specification of an evenfas initiating the series. For 
he supposes events prior to the cigarette’s fall and the insects’ 
bites indispensable to fire and dislocation of fanning respectively. 
He supposes the fire would not have occurred last Tuesday mf Brown
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had not dropped a cigarette end there and then; and he supposes 
Brown would not have been there then to drop it if a series of events 
attributable to his heart, lungs, blood etc., had not occurred, nor 
another series constituting his conception and development between 
conception and birth, nor yet others attributable to his parents* 
histories and to those of their parents and so on. And similarly 
with the event series he regards indispensable to the dislocation 
of farming or the accident, of which he calls tsetse fly and safety 
lecturer ’cause* respectively.
The most noticeable feature of the point to v/hich the ’cause’ 
series’ is traced in all these examples^is its practical utility in 
the eyes of commonsense. Thus even though the progress of cattle 
plague, once introduced into the organism, could be halted at any 
point so that the beast so cured recovered completely; to know this 
would clearly be far less useful than knowing a given insect's bite 
indispensable to its inception. For if one knew only how to halt 
the process once begun, it might well recur again and again thus 
rendering cattle farming either impossible or very difficult. On 
the other hand the knowledge that no beast would begin to develop 
the disease unless bitten by a tsetse fl^ would reveal that the 
disease could be completely eliminated by the destruction of that 
type of insect and the prevention of its breeding. Similarly, to 
know that a progressive series of ignitions will not occur under 
given conditions unless a lighted cigarette, match etc., is dropped 
on dry straw or shavings^is clearly much more useful than the
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knowledge hov/ to intercept such a series once started, Jf only 
the latter were known^ a great deal of time would probably be 
wasted in firefighting which need not have been so spent had the 
type of event in the absence of which such series would not have 
started, also been known. In the third example the principle of 
utility is even more evident^ since the plain man supposes the care­
less driving is often the latest member of a series culminating in 
an accident which could have been avoided. And even when this is 
not supposed^it is clearly much more satisfactory for every one if 
accidents are avoided by careful driving on the part of all con­
cerned rather than by very skilful driving, or extreme agility, on 
the part of one of these. Moreover, not only does the plain man 
regard the initiating event as a more useful point to which to trace 
the ’causal series’ than is any of its successors; he also supposes 
that it is only in virtue of knowledge of its role that knowing that 
of earlier indispensable conditions of the ’effect’ proves useful* 
Thus for instance he supposes it useful to trace the series culminat­
ing in the dislocation of cattle farming, back through the events 
composing the life cycle of tsetse fly^ only because he supposes that 
the knowledge will enable him to destroy such insects or stop them 
breeding^thus preventing cattle suffering the fatal bites*
Similarly he is interested in events prior to the fall of a cigarette 
end or the careless driving he supposes indispensable to fire and 
accident respectively^ only insofar as he supposes knowledge of them 
of practical utility in preventing the careless dropping of
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cigarette ends or careless driving^ respectively. Thus if he 
supposes many would not drive carelessly unless they had been 
drinking^ he will try to prevent people drinking when they are 
going to drive. But he would not think it a practical suggestion 
that fires and accidents should be prevented by exterminating the 
human race, since he supposes the existence of members of that 
species a principle reason for the desirability of preventing fires 
and road accidents.
Careful comparison of the initiating events, however, reveals 
that the commonsense belief in the practical utility of learning 
of them is not their only distinctive feature. For each is 
distinguished as the earliest event in a series which commonsense 
regards indispensable to the ’effect* (and anything dependent on it) 
alone. Thus the plain man supposes there are many events of which 
most of those indispensable to Brown’s dropping his cigarette end 
in the market on Tuesday are necessary conditions. He supposes, 
for instance, that his buying butter and cheese and selling 
cabbages there would not have occurred but for the events indispens­
able to his being there; and he further supposes no future events 
in Brown’s history would occur in the absence of thèse indispensable 
to his existing up to that time. Only of the fire and anything 
he supposes dependent on it, such as the calling out of the fire 
brigade, does he believe it would not have occurred had it not been 
for the cigarette end’s fall and the subsequent ignitions.
Similarly he supposes the series starting with the tsetse fly 
bites,indispensable only to the dislocation of farming and any
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subsequent event dependent on it; while he supposes earlier events 
in the tsetse fly life cycle indispensable to many other occurr­
ences, e.g. to there being tsetse fly breeding now in that stagnant 
pool, to tsetse fly breathing, flying etc., here now. In the 
light of what was written earlier this can only mean that for the 
plain man the initiating event is the first term in a series of a 
type which under given circumstances is indispensable only to an 
event like the effect (and to anything dependent on this).
It seems clear however that the plain man does not regard the 
initiating event solely as an indispensable condition of an event 
of one specified type and its dependents. For he does not say 
merely that the cigarette end’s fall made the market blaze possible, 
but that it ’started’ it. Similarly he says, not that tsetse fly 
bites and careless driving made possible dislocation of farming and 
accident respecti^^ely, but that they ’brought them about’.
Commonsense, that is to say, whether or no it regards a ’causal 
series’ as necessary throughout, supposes the initiating event as 
somehow prompting or stimulating the occurrence of the ’effect’.
This view of the initiating event is, indeed, not only com­
prehensible on, but demanded by, the conception of a ’causal series’ 
as inevitable. For clearly if A^s occurrence given certain con­
ditions, entails that of b ; then the incursion of the former into 
a situation where those conditions obtain^ clearly consists in the 
prompting or provocation of the latter by forcing it to happen.
But it is difficult to see how a ’cause’ can prompt without 
necessitating, as commonsense apparently supposes it to do in
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postulating a ’causal series’ one at least of whose members is a 
decision. A ’cause’ or condition regarded as so prompting a 
voluntary action has been described as ’inclining without 
necessitating’^ by which evidently has been meant that it 
stimulated a predisposition to act in a certain way without 
actually rendering such action inevitable. But this is surely 
to say simply that it prompted, not the action, but donditions in 
which it could occur; which is to say that it was inf act no more 
than an indispensable condition of such action. probably this 
is what the plain man means when he treats a ’cause’ as 
’prompting’ voluntary action. But if this is so, his manner of 
speaking is misleading.
The commonsense account of the ’causation’ of voluntary 
action suggests problems which are, indeed, fundamental to the 
Aristotelian account of it* This maintains that a rational being 
freely decides on a given course of action because he recognises 
thi-s to be desirable; to which it may be objected; (a) that if 
he cannot but choose what appears the most desirable of the possible 
alternative his decision is not free; while (b) if he can choose 
what appears to be the less desirable of possible alternatives his 
choice is irrational. There appear to be only two possible accounts 
of voluntary action capable of reconciling the assertion of its 
rationality i^ ith that of its freedom. (1) Contradiction might be 
avoided by maintaining that decision is always rational insofar as 
it is never choice of what seems the less desirable of possible 
alternatives, while at the same time it is free in that it is
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prompted by neither the desirability of a course of action nor 
anything else. To maintain this consistently v/ould be to hold 
that decision occurred only when the respective advantages and 
disadvantages of alternative courses of action offset each other 
so that each seen^d equally attractive at the moment ; thus if 
Tommy has half a crown and he wants both to save it towards 
additions to his model railway and to spend it on sweets, and 
he decides to do the latter; one must, on this view hold the 
imminence of the pleasure of eating the sweets to offset the more 
lasting character of the distant satisfaction of adding to his 
model railway. And saying the prospect of the immediate pleasure 
tempted or prompted him to sacrifice the more distant one, can 
only mean that the immediate pleasure proved as attractive as the 
distant one and hence constituted a genuine alternative for him 
to choose. The main objection to this account lies in the fact 
that we do seem to choose one alternative rather than another 
because we suppose the one more desirable than the other. Nor can 
this be denied with the contention that sometimes a person a cts in 
a certain way not because he wants to but because he suppoes it 
his duty; for a person does not do what he regards as his duty 
unless he supposes it desirable, in the long run at least, for any 
one to do so. (2) If this objection to the above account be 
regarded as fatal to it, the contradiction may still be overcome by 
postulating the free choice further back, maintaining that while a 
normal rational person must decide on the course of action which is
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the most desirable of the alternatives open to him, he is free 
at any moment to desire one course of action more than another*
And this account indëed seems to be supported by the evidence 
of experience.
Thus any consistent account of ’voluntary action* as truly 
free must postulate at some point a choice which is dictated 
neither by reason nor anything else. And the plain man^in 
postulating such free action^must suppose any ’causal series* 
including, or culminating in it, to contain at least one un­
prompted member. Hence although he may consistently regard many 
initiating events as prompting the occurrence of the ’effects’ 
he supposes dependent on them, and probably may regard all of them
as prompting that of at least one event succeeding them in the
causal series (which may well explain his attributing the role of 
prompter to all), he cannot regard them as invariably prompting 
or stimulating the occurrence of the culmination of such series.
If anyone should object that either of the foregoing accounts 
of voluntary action puts the voluntary agent in the position of 
Buridan’s ass since no one could choose one of two alternatives, 
whether actions or desires, unless prompted to one rather than the
other by some motive; then so far as I can see, if he is to be
consistent he has no alternative but to abandon the commonsense 
conviction that voluntary action is really free* But he cannot 
justly dismiss the ccxnmonsense belief on this^ unless he can justify 
his own basic premise against arguments denying the possibility of 
our discovering necessary connections other than those dependent on
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arbitaiy conventions, or those denying on any other ground that 
any event ever occurs without standing in a reatlion to some one 
given type of condition,^ this relation being one in which all such 
events will be found to stand to like conditions.
It has been seen that for commonsense to regard a continuant 
as ’cause* of an event through the intermediacy of an event series, 
is to regard both continuant and series as necessaryy- and indeed 
intrinsically necessary^ conditions of the * effect * event. It 
was remarked, moreover, (with scant attempt at justification) that 
plain men supposed many * causal series* inevitable, given the 
occurrence of their initiating event under certain circumstances.
It will be well, in conclusion, both to defend and elaborate the 
latter assertion, and to say a little more in general concerning 
the commonsense postulation of necessary connection relative to
* causal series*.
I shall first elaborate my assertion that commonsense 
postulates necessary * causal sequence*; and shall then further 
defend both this and the view of the commonsense conception of
* causal dependence* as intrinsically necessary, which I have 
maintained.
Necessary sequence, like necessary dependence, need not be 
intrinsic. Were the universe so arranged (according to a principle 
of pre-established harmony, for instance) that lighted cigarette 
ends never fell on dry straw under certain conditions without an 
ever increasing series of ignitions following; then though there 
was no intrinsic connection between cigarette end* s fall and
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ignitions, it would still be true to say that the latter followed 
the former necessarily. The general attitude of the plain man 
indicates not only that he regards many causal sequences as nec­
essary; but that he supposes these to be so in virtue, not of an 
arbitrary arrangement of the universe, but of intrinsic connection 
between their terms. If one suggest to him that in an universe 
arranged differently dry straw would not ignite on contact with a 
lighted cigarette end under conditions in which this is reasonably 
to be expected in the universe we know, he regards the suggestion 
as nonsensical protesting that straw simply could not fail to 
ignite under the accustomed conditions. And if asked why he 
supposes this is to, his answer indicates that he tliinks straw 
so constituted that, when dry, any burning process in contact with 
it cannot fail to continue through, and consume, it. He may, for 
instance, suggest that this is so because dry straw is easily t o m  
in pieces-evidently intending in so doing to assert noh merely a 
regular correlation between this characteristic and inflammability, 
but rather that straw* s parts being easily separated any external 
encroaciment is readily able to destroy the whole by devouring it 
part by part.
It might perliaps be objected that plain men cannot be held to 
believe in any necessary connections either of sequence or depend­
ence, let alone intrinsic ones; since they are prepared to accept 
the possibility of miracles in the shape of both the appearance of 
* effects* in the absence of the conditions on which they think them 
usually dependent,and of deviations from * causal series* under
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conditions given which they normally expect them to occur. Some 
modem philosophers, knowing few plain men who -believe in the 
possibility of miracles, might dismiss this objection on the ground 
that the postulation of miracles belongs properly to the realm of 
theology not that of commonsense. Since, however, not only have
the majority of plain men down the ages accepted the possibility 
of miracles, but this belief is of very ancient origin, it seems 
to me clearly unjustifiable to attribute to commonsense any view 
inconsistent with it. I therefore felt bound to discuss the 
objection in some detail.
It is an objection which seems to me unfounded*since when a
ho/-
plain man accepts the possibility of miracles he is^postulating
a haphazard deviation from accustomed correlations^but supposing 
that deviations from them can occur given a special condition: e,g* 
that God v/ills a deviation to take place on that occasion. He is 
i^n effect postulating laws of the form, ’Under given conditions the 
fall of a lighted cigarette end or match on dry straw will be 
followed by a general blaze unless God v/ills otherwise*, or ’Under 
given conditions a fire will not occur if a lighted cigarette end 
or match is not dropped on dry straw or shavings unless God wills it’, 
(it) Indeed the fact that v/henever plain men have been convinced 
of a deviation from accustomed correlations not explicable by the 
variation of natural conditions, they have attributed it to some 
miraculous power^testifies to the commonsense belief in necessary 
correlations in the shape of connections inevitably obtaining
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unless some supernatural agency intervenes. If it is maintained 
that we could be justified in postulating no regular correlation 
which did not obtain solely among phenomena which are, at least in 
principle, humanly observable^then of course it must be denied 
that any plain man accepting the possibility of miracles is ever 
justified in postulating regular correlations. But clearly this 
would not exclude his postulating them: Ptolemy postulated laws
of planetary motion which are unacceptable to the modem astronomer 
but this is not to say he postulated no lav/s of planetary motion.
It may perhaps be thought more difficult to reconcile the 
alleged willingness of plain men to accept the possibility of 
miraclesywith the assertion that they suppose the necessary 
connections they postulate to be intrinsic. It may be asked how 
anyone could suppose, for instance, that a fire could be such that 
it might occur given either the fall of a lighted cigarette end or 
the v/illing (or any other agency) of a supernatural being; or how 
one supposing dry straw’s inflammability intrinsic to the loose 
coherence of its parts^ could imagine the fall of a lighted cigarette 
end on dry straw might be miraculously prevented from ’ starting a 
fire’• The earlier of these suppositions could, however, be held 
without contradiction were it supposed tliat any natural ’effect* 
could be made possible by the mil (or other intervention) of a 
given supernatural being alone; any specific type of ’effect’ being 
held to be such that, in the absence of this intervention, it could 
occur only if certain natural conditions obtained. It is then 
analogous to commonsense beliefs about phenomena whose consistency
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is readily acknowledged. One such is the conviction that while 
men and rabbits can dig holes, these latter are such that^ in the 
absence of animal intervention they can appear on the earth’s 
surface only if natural movements occur in parts of the earth or 
other pieces of the universe (e.g. in the fall of meteorites).
The analogy might perhaps be denied on the ground that commonsense 
assumes a precise correlation between the character of a hole and 
that of its ’ cause’. But this would, I think, be irrelevant to 
the analogy^ since if the general contention about holes is true^  it 
is so because to have the character of being a hole is to be 
intrinsically incapable of coming to exist v/ithout the movement of 
earth{ from some source^ which could be true whether or not there 
were a precise correlation between the character of a hole and that 
of its ’cause’. That is to say the assertion about the possibility 
of holes, lilce tliat about the possibility of miracles, if it is true 
is so in virtue of a character common to the type of ^ effect^discussed 
and not in virtue of its being intrinsically dependent on either one 
given type of ’ cause’ or on another.
But if the plain man may consistently admit ’ miraculous effects’ 
there can be no objection to his supposing., for instance, that a 
supernatural agent might prevent a fire follov/ing a cigarette end’s 
fall by strengthening the coherence of straw’s texture during the 
time the cigarette end lay on it alight. This looked at as pure 
theoiy may seem fanciful^ but miracles have undoubtedly been con­
ceived on these principles ; and plain men have been prepared to 
accept accounts of them in terms of such principles. Thus, for
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example, Daniel is described as being saved from the lions because 
an angel shut their mouthsj (IX) and plain men have been pre­
pared to accept the assertion*
I am not suggesting that plain men reconcile a belief in 
miracles with that in intrinsically necessary connections in terms 
of the foregoing* Nor do I put forward the foregoing as an 
adequate philosophical or theological justification of such 
reconciliation* But I do think it adequate to show that a plain 
man’s acceptance of the possibility of miracles need not be re­
garded as tantamount to a denial of necessary, or even intrinsic, 
connection*
It might perhaps be maintained that a plain man’s acceptance 
of the possibility of miracles would contradict the assertion, made 
earlier^ that he need not be regarded as accepting the doctrine of 
the plurality of ’causes* as this is understood by modem 
philosophers; but that his attitude is rather that of the coroner’s 
court which assumes a precise correlation between the characters of 
a ’cause* and its ’effect*. The admission of the possibility of 
’miraculous effects’ is certainly in principle an admission that an 
’effect’ can occur in virtue of either of two types of ’cause*.
But I do not think this contradicts my earlier remarks concerning 
the plurality of ’causes’. For by the plurality of ^ causes'modem 
philosophers mean the postulation of alternative phenomenal con­
ditions given which an ’effect’ either can or must exist* And 
clearly to accept or deny this contention is quite different from 
postulating a possible phenomenal and suprrt-phenomenal ’ cause’ of
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any type of "effect*. It has indeed already been remarked that to 
postulate ’miraculous effects’ could be to postulate ’effects' of 
such a nature that, in the absence of supernatural intervention, 
they could occur only if one specific set of phenomenal conditions 
obtained. Nor do I think a plain man’s belief in the possibility 
of miracles need practically affect his attitude to ooroner^i^ courts 
and detective stories* For a plain man who accepts the possibility 
of miracles ^ does not suppose they occur in the ordinary way^ other­
wise he would not call them miracles or ’wonders’. He may there­
fore quite reasonably assume them not to have done so in any given 
instance, and hence may justly infer a given type of phenomenal 
’cause’ from the specific character of an ’effect**
Whether or not one admit the legitimacy of combining belief 
in the possibility of miracles with inference from one phenomenon 
to another as its ’cause’ or ’effect’, however, one cannot deny that 
the two have been combined without consciousness of contradicition* 
Thus, for instance, Chesterton who wrote in defence of the possibility 
of miracles, also wrote detective stories in viiich he assumed the 
legitimacy of inferring precisely defined phenomenal ’cause’ from 
the occurrence of an ’effect’ of a given type; for example in one 
story he assumed it legitimate to infer that a man stabbed to death 
with a curved knife must have been murdered by a doctor who alone 
would have known how to reach his heart with so unusual an instrument; 
(12) and in another he treats the character and condition of a 
hall as justifying the inference that a man had there fired at hi* 
reflection in a mirroçmistaking it for his enemy. (Ijp Nor i*
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Chesterton’s holding both beliefs a mere oversight, due to his 
forgetting the one while he is appealing to the other. For he 
makes it a moral of several stories (l4) that his Father Brown, 
who is from the start committed to belief in the possibility of 
miracles, is the character who insists on looking for a natural­
istic explanation of a mystery. Nor is the combination of these 
beliefs peculiar to Chesterton who might, with justice, be regarded 
as a not very typical example. Dorothy Sayers and R. A. Knox have also 
written both works testifying to a belief in the possibility of 
miracles, and detective stories assuming the possibility of 
inferring a precisely defined phenomenal ’cause’ from the character 
of a given ’effect’. Whether or no one thinks he should, one 
cannot therefore conclude that a plain man who accepts the 
possibility of miracles, will reject such inference.
In addition to evidence of a combination of beliefs which may 
in fact be held (whether legitimately or not) some of Chesterton’s 
stories suggest^ in t he reasons they make Father Brown give for 
rejecting a supernatural explanation in a given instance^further 
criteriq% to which the believer in miracles may appeal in dis­
counting their possibility in any given situation. These lie in 
the conviction that it is only reasonable to expect their occurence 
when this can be supposed to further the purposes of the super­
natural being responsible for them, and to be consistent with the 
nature ascribed to him#
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The view of an ’effect* as essentially such that, under given 
conditions, it is intrinsically incapable of existing in the 
absence of a specific type of ’cause*, which I have ascribed to 
commonsense, is the inverse of that maintained by Joseph
(l6) “ namely that a ’cause’ is essentially such as to entail the 
occurrence of its ’effect’ under given conditions. I have 
further maintained that commonsense also postulates many ’causes’ 
in the latter sense* It may be objected that in so doing I am 
supposing A ’s being a ’cause’ or ’effect’ is a matter of definition 
to commonsense^ àhd that this is blatantly inconsistent with 
commonsense usage. For instance it may be pointed out that where­
as plain men used to call foul dmells ’cause’ of fever, many of than 
now repeat the scientists’ assertion that it is not the smells but 
the bacteria found where the former seem to emanate, which ’cause* 
these diseases. It will be argued that, were my account of the 
commonsense conception of ’causal sequence’ correct^ plain men would 
have refused to apply the name ’fever’ to a condition which they 
discovered was not dependent on smells; and would have refused the 
title ’foul smell’ to a phenomenon which they learned did not 
entail sickness under given conditions. This line of argument 
has been provoked by those philosophers who have written as though 
they were always indubitably aware of the intrinsic connection 
between ’causes’ and ’effects’ which they postulated. And it is 
clearly a valid criticism of those only who claim both that their 
’causal’ assertions postulate intrinsically necessary connection, 
and that they are necessarily true. For to suppose there can be
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no B independently of an A if A ’causes’ B,is to suppose neither 
that A must ’cause’ B nor that it infact does so. There i* 
therefore no contradiction in saying:’I thought there was an 
intrinsic connection between A and B* but I find I wg,s mistaken’. 
And this I think is the position of a plain man in rejecting a 
’causal’ assertion which he previously accepted.
Certainly the plain man normally assumes the truth of his 
’causal’ assertions; unless he wishes either to deceive or to 
weave fictions for his own amusement or that of others, his 
purpose in making a statement is to communicate to others what 
he thinks true. And indeed he sometimes supposes that he 
perceives an intrinsic connection between ’cause’ and ’effect’.
But there is no indication that he supposes all his ’causal 
assertions necessarily infallible. There is, therefore, no 
reason why he should not at the same time admit some to have been 
mistaken without renaming the previously postulated ’causes’ and 
’effects’. And indeed since his practice indicates both that he 
is prepared to do the latter, and that he supposes ’causal’ 
dependence intrinsically necessary*, there seems no alternative but 
to hold that while he supposes an event is never ’caused’ by a 
continuant save when its dependence on the latter is intrinsically 
necessary, he does not suppose his assertion of such a connection to 
be always necessarily true.
To sura up. The plain man is prepared to call a continuant 
’cause’ of an intervening event series if, and only if, he 
supposes three things; (a) that the initial event in that series
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is part of the continuant’s history: (b) that the ’effect’ event
is such that it could not occur under given circumstances unless 
the event series (or one specifically identical with it) had 
occurred immediately before; (c) that the series is such that 
under the specified conditions it is indispensable only to the 
’effect’ or a similar event, and to anything dependent on this. 
Further he sometimes supposes the occurrence of the series under 
given conditions entails that of the ’effect’; and he usually 
holds that of the initiating event to entail thus that of at least 
the first of its successors. Moreover, although %  he intends 
to postulate intrinsically necessary dependence in thus calling 
a continuant ’cause’ of an event, he does not claim such 
assertions to be necessarily infallible and hence can admit them 
to be mistaken without adopting new names for the erroneously 
postulated ’causes’ and ’effects’.
In the foregoing pages I have merely tried to analyse an 
important commonsense usage, to justify my analysis, and to argue 
that the plain man could/ without contradictionJ hold the views I 
have ascribed to him. I have said nothing as to his justification 
for adopting them at all. Before doing this I shall briefly 
examine the other commonsense uses of the term ’cause’ which I 
noted,after which I shall be better able to discuss the plain ' 
man’s right to notions basic to any of them.
(b) Examination of the remaining examples.
The remainder of ray examples are important in illustrating 
the variety of commonsense usage rather than as introducing new
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notions. For so far as I can see none of them illustrates a 
notion which is not implicit those already discussed, or at 
least in what these are normally intended to assert. Their 
variety alone, however, is significant for ray purpose; w^hick^as 
I indicated at the outset, (1?) is not merely to examine notions 
underlying various causal assertions but to try to find some 
common denominator to which the commonsense uses of the term 
’cause* are reducible.
Each of the causal explanations examined above could have 
been summarised as well by giving the title ’cause’ to what I 
called the initiating event, as by applying it to the continuant 
in whose history it occurred. indeed in the paragraph accompany­
ing the headline ’Cigarette and may have caused market blaze*, a 
cigarette end’s fall is specified as the probable ’cause* of the 
blaze. And his general practice leaves no doubt that the plain 
man would be equally prepared to call the safety lecturer or his 
careless driving ’cause* of the accident, and tsetse^r their 
bites ’cause’ of the dislocation of farming, etc.. The first 
of the remaining examples - ’Devaluation of the pound causes 
trouble in shipyards’ - insofar as it postulates an event complex 
as initiating a series of such complexe^^lich is indispensable 
to its culmination,and to this and anything dependent on it alone, 
summarises a type of ’causal explanation’ fundamentally similar 
to that already discussed. It therefore demands little comment 
save in noting the lesser differences between this explanation 
and those summarised in the earlier examples. These are three;
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(a) the initiating event complex^ unlike that postulated in the 
second example - is heterogeneous; (h) some members of the 
series it initiates, or at least some members of the complexes 
constituting it, are not actual events but merely the possibility 
or impossibility of certain types of events occurring - e.g. the 
possibility or impossibility of the Venetian shipyard workers in 
question buying certain commodities, with their wages; (c) despite 
its formal similarity to ’tsetse fly bites cause trouble*, the 
sentence ’Devaluation of the pound causes trouble* cannot be 
conveniently repladed by one postulating continuants as ’cause*. 
The impossibility of such translation is not due to the plain 
man’s supposing the events composing the initiating complex any 
less attributable to the histories of continuants than tsetse fly 
bites. It rests on t he fact that by ’ devaluation of the pound’ 
he means a heterogeneous collection of events attributable to 
numerous continuants in whose histories are so many and varied 
events that to specify them is not to suggest their relation to 
one event or event complex rather than another#
The next example ’Rain causes many crashes’ introduces a 
greater difference of usage; for here the title ’cause’ is 
applied neither to initiating event nor to continuant to which 
this is attributed, but to a condition on which the ’cqusality* 
of an initiating event depends# For although rain is supposed 
by commonsense to consist in an event complex attributed to a 
number of homogeneous persistent somethings-namely raindrops,
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this complex is not viewed as initiator of a series indispens­
able to crashes as such. Instead it is regarded as indispens­
able to the occurrence of crashes in that, rain^ having fallen 
on a race track, the latter became wet and slippery; i.e. such 
that tyres revolving on it may easily skid. I think the plain 
man supposes that there are circumstances - a given condition of 
a car, speed at which it was travelling, and degree of reckless­
ness or limit of skill of the driver - given which the wetness 
of the track will entail the occurrence of a crash. But he 
certainly does not regard the ’causal connection* between rain 
and car crashes to be necessary in the sense in which he supposes 
that between a lighted cigarette end* s fall and consequent blaze. 
For although he thinks there are conditions given which a 
lighted cigarette end’s fall on dry straw would not be follov/ed 
by a general blaze, he holds that it is never true to call a 
cigarette end’s fall ’cause’ of a fire in the sense of initiat­
ing a series culminating in it unless the fire’s subsequent 
occurrence was inevitable given the cigarette’s fall. But he 
is prepared to call rain ’cause’ of a car crash when he supposes 
its making a road or track surface slippery to have merely 
rendered the crash possible or probable*.i.e. to have been merely 
that ’in the absence of wtiich the crash would never have 
occurred.’
This example is also interesting in that the title ’cause’ 
is applied not only neither to an initiating event nor to a 
continuant in virtue of that event ; but to a condition both
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prior to that event, and unrelated to such an event apart from 
being indispensable to its initiating role. In other words 
it summarises a * causal explanation’ which goes beyond the 
initiating event. It therefore provokes the question why 
’causal explanation’ is not always traced to the initiating event 
and no farther. Ibis is one of the general questions which I 
shall discuss later.
In the sixth example - Professor Manley told me afterwards 
that the cause of the increased temperature might lie in some 
type of variation in the atmosphere or the behaviour of ocean 
water’ - the possible ’causes’ postulated are again event 
complexes. And, like that postulated as ’cause’ in the previous 
example,they are complexes which the plain man regards as con­
stituting a state of a continuantnamely a section of the 
earth. The ’effect’ however differs completely from its 
predecessors in that it is regarded neither as event nor event 
complex (either homogeneous or heterogeneous), but merely a 
persistent chacteristic or a part of the universe; namely its 
temperature always or g enerally being above a certain minimum. 
The plain man would admit a change of temperature to be an event, 
and would doubtless suppose that to assert the postulated effect 
(i.e. temperature within certain limits) is to postulate certain 
such events; but the title ’effect’ is applied not to the events 
but to the limits within which they occur.
133e
This example is also important in that the postulated 
’effect’ is not said to be such as to be dependent on a 
precisely specified ’cause’, but merely that it is such as to 
be dependent on a ’cause’ of a given general type (i.e. events 
in a medium in contact with the section of the earth in question). 
And it is assumed that this ’cause’ is such as to render the 
effect inevitable under given conditions.
The seventh example - ’The high temperature caused the lines 
to expànd with the result that they twisted out of shape de­
railing the express’ - while positing an effect which common­
sense regards as an event or event complex, postulates a ’cause* 
which plain men regard as neither; namely once more the 
temperature of a portion of the earth. Doubtless, the plain 
man would admit readily enough that the lines did not, and indeed 
could not, exp land until the earth, and consequently they, became 
a certain temperature - i.e. until an event occurred. But here, 
as with the application of the title ’effect’ in the previous 
example, the name ’cause’ is applied not to the event of becoming 
a given t^nperature; but to what is regarded as the persistent 
state of being a given temperature. clearly the earth’s being 
in this condition is regarded as entailing the lines, which lie 
on it, being so; and the latter as entailing the occurrence of 
those events in the lines’ history described as their expansion.
Another distinctive feature of this example is that in 
effect two successive ’causal connection’ are asserted; high
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temperature is said to ’cause' the lines’ expansion* and then 
from this latter the lines' twisting out of shape and the 
subsequent derailment of the express are said to result.
In the other examples, the title ’cause* is applied to, or in 
virtue of, the earliest of the factors specified on which the 
latest is supposed to depend; that is to say the title ’effect’ 
is applied to that ultimately to be explained; the title ’cause’ 
to, or in virtue of, the earliest point to which its explanation 
is traced. To be analogous to its predecessors in this the 
seventh example v/ould have had to specify the high temperature 
as ’cause’ of the derailment. This example thus draws attention 
to the fact that the plain man is prepared to describe as a re­
lation between ’cause’ and ’effect’ either the whole or a part 
of an explanation which he is considering.
The eighth example, ’Brumas causes traffic enquiry’, is 
completely different from its predecessors in that it applies 
the title ’cause’ to a condition regarded as indispensable to 
its ’effect’, not simply in virtue of its character (or that of 
an event in its history) in itself but only insofar as this 
renders a course of action desirable. In doing so it is not 
introducing the notion of a condition different from any implied 
by the other examples, for as has been seen both the second and 
fourth examples postulate conditions of this type. The novelty 
lies simply in applying the title ’cause’ to such an one. As 
I have discussed the commonsense view of the role of such con­
ditions I need say no further on that score here. I need only
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remark that the motive-condition is here regarded cause of an 
event (or event complex) which would not have occurred had it 
not been for a series of event complexes, some of the factors in 
which are regarded as necessary and some as voluntary, the 
occurrence of the series being dependent in its turn on Rrumas’ 
presence at Regent’s park rendering a certain course of action^ 
namely going there - desirable to many people. The role of the 
motive ’Cause’ is thus to some extent analogous to that of an 
initiating event insofar as this is regarded as an indispensable 
condition of a subsequent series of events.
’Cause of nurse’s death unknown’, the ninth example, is 
important in evidencing the plain man’s willingness, and indeed 
aptitude, to postulate some ’cause’ of a given event -eaen though 
he is unable to postulate any specific type of condition, which 
he even regards as likely to have fulfilled that role. In each 
of the previous examples it has been seen that, in postulating an 
’effect’, the plain man has been postulating something intrinsically 
incapable of occurring under certain circumstances unless related 
to some one type of condition. Jt was further seen that he may 
use a term such as ’fire’ or ’death’ to designate a general type 
of event whose individual occurrences may differ specifically to 
quite a considerable extent. And it was seen that^ in postulat­
ing an ’effect’ such a general type^ he intended to assert that 
to be ’of this type was to be intrinsically incapable of 
occurring in the absence of a condition of one of a set of 
alternative types; though he often (and perhaps always) assumed
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that,were the ’effect* and the obtaining conditions specified
!
with sufficient precision, the precise character of the ’cause’ 
could be inferred* When therefore he makes an assertion like 
’Cause of nurse’s death unknown’, he is generally asserting 
something to be of a general type and as such intrinsically 
dependent on a condit ion of one of a given s et of types; but 
that he knows too little of the character of effect, prevailing 
conditions, or both^to be able to specify the ’cause* precisely* 
The ninth example is thjis seen to be analogous to the seventh 
in this respect, since the latter asserts an increased temperature 
of part of the earth to depend on one or other of two types of 
condition* And the attitude it reveals is clearly that which 
leads plain men to support the continuation of a hitherto un­
successful search for the ’cause’ of a disease such as cancer*
It may be asked what could be the plain man’s ground for 
such a belief* Admittedly he often knows too little of even the 
general character of a postulated ’effect’ to justify the con­
clusion that it is intrinsically incapable of existing in the 
absence of conditions of one of a set of specific types; or even 
to defend the view that it is int r ins ci ally dependent on a con­
dition of a general type, the possible specific exemplifications 
of which it is impossible to enumerate completely* And the fact 
that there are occasions when he cannot discover the ’cause’ of 
such an ’effect’ shows that the belief could not be justly based 
on inductive grounds* Either, therefore, the coagnonsgMe 
confidence in the existence of ’causes’ where he can discover
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none, is groundless, or it rests on either of the two following 
convictions; (a) that all the ’effects’ specified by common- 
sense can be seen to be intrinsically incapable of existing in­
dependently of anything external to themselves; (b) that notlv- 
ing is inexplicable in the sense that nothing, whether within 
or external to it, is essential to its existence. The first 
of these convictions would, by itself seem to be as palpably un­
justifiable for commonsense as the belief that a given ’effect’s 
intrinsic dependence on a ’ cause’ of a certain geæral type is 
always obser^/able by the plain man* The second, whether 
defensible or not, seems to be held unshakably by plain men and 
is, moreover, often made the explicit ground of a contention that 
something is intrinsically dependent on a condition external to 
itself. Thus, for instance, one frequently hears remarks such 
as ’The fire couldn’t have started itself’. The chair couldn’t 
have moved itself’, which are in effect stating a fire or a 
chair’s movement can be explained only by reference to something 
other than itself,
Thw belief that nothing is inexplicable in this sense seems, 
therefore,to me the most likely source of the plain man’s belief in 
undiscovered ’causes’, as well as being that of his conviction that 
any postulated ’cause’ is indeed intrinsically indispensable to its 
’effect* even though he may be unable to perceive the intrinsic 
connection which he postulates between them. It is, moreover, a 
belief which is very important for any general discussion of 
’causation’, since philosophers and scientists have found it
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as difficult to discard as do plain men^and it is therefore often 
implicit in v/hat they have written either about the ’causation* 
of some particular ’postulated ’effect’ or about ’cf^usation’ in 
general. It will be discussed in the assessment of the common­
sense acceptance of notions fundamental to its ’causal’ 
assertions, which forms the concluding section of this chapter.
The last two examples - ’Lack of boys’ clubs is one cause 
of juvenile delinquency’^ and ’someone to love and someone to 
love him is a vitamin without which no individual can develop 
aright. And there (in its absence) you have the chief cause 
of juvenile delinquency.’ - are distinguished from their 
predecessors in a very important respect, namely in applying 
the title ’cause* to the absence of something. The postulation 
of an ’effect’s dependence on the absence of something introduces 
no new notion. It was seen at the outset that in regarding a 
cigarette end as ’cause’ of a fire the plain man supposes its 
fall’s being followed by the fire to depend on the absence of 
intercepting factors such as the application of water or sand 
etc. The application of the title ’cause’ to such a negative 
condition is, however, very important for the definition of that 
term.
The plain man does not^of course^ever suppose an effect 
dependent on a negative condition alone; when he postulates 
lack of boys’ clubs as ’cause’ of juvenile crime he is supposing 
the latter dependent on a complex of events and other positive 
conditions, from which one specified type of factor - namely
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boys* clubs-r-is absent* He does not even suppose a given type 
of ’effect' necessarily dependent on any complex lacking a factor 
of a given type* He may, for instance, think that in one type 
of situation lack of boys* clubs ’causes' juvenile crime while 
in another it does not. On the other hand he sometimes holds 
absence of a given type of condition may ’cause* a given 'effect* 
under any circumstances* A person’s lacking someone to love 
and someone to love him is evidently regarded like this in the 
last example; and so is lack of iodine in an organism when its 
presence is regarded indispensable to normal development. Yet 
in postulating lack of A either as always or as sometimes ’caus­
ing’ B, the plain man does not suppose he is merely offering a 
translation of a sentence of the form ’Given X, the presence of 
A, Be & C causes V*. For he is intending to sigg^t, out the role 
not of positive factors, but of the absence of something from 
among them, as an indispensable condition of an ’effect’.
As in the second, fourth and eight examples, the 'causes’ 
postulated in the tenth and eleventh are not regarded by common­
sense as entailing their 'effects’, which latter are viewed as 
voluntary actions. Their relation to their 'effects’ is,
however, thought somewhat different from that of the conditions 
of voluntary actions previously discussed. For these are re­
garded as rendering certain actions more or less probable^by 
entailing or constituting something which can be avoided or 
achieved by those actions* But the ’causes’ postulated ih the 
last two examples are generally regarded as rendering a course
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of action more or less probable^by being conditions given which 
anyone may become the sort of person likely to find a given 
type of action desirable: e.g. one who has no harmless outlet
for his energy^ or one who is unhappy and frustrated and so liable 
to want to vent his resentment on other individuals, society 
at large, or even inanimate objects.
(c) Examination of some ambiguities in commonsense usage. 
The plain man has been seen to be prepared to apply the term 
’cause* equally to initiating event, continuant in whose history 
this is supposed to occur, or to another condition prior to the 
initiating event* And he has further been found prepared to 
describe either the whole or a part of an explanation he is 
proffering, as a relation between ’cause’ and ’effect*.
This variety of usage, however does not testify to the 
absence of any common denominatozy to which the plain man’s 
’causes’ are reducible without losing their distinctive ’causal’ 
role. The foregoing paragraph reaffirms what was illustrated 
by the examples just discussed - namely that the plain man applies 
the terra ’cause’ to nothing which he does not regard as in­
dispensable to the ’effect’ he ascribes to it.
Nor does it spell mere caprice. Whether a plain man pos­
tulates one or another type of condition as ’cause’ of a given 
’effect’^ seems to depend on the question he intends his ’causal’ 
assertion to answer. And this in its turn seems often to 
depend on considerations of practical utility, and always on 
the existence of sane motive for interest in its answer.
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Thus when he is satisfied that an accident could have been 
prevented simply if careless driving had not occurred he will not 
seek further than this for its ’c a u s e I f  on the other hand he 
thinks A ’s driving not in itself of a type indispensable to the 
occurrence of an accident, he traces the latter’s Explanation 
further back until he finds a factor such as rain, whose conjunction 
with that driving he supposes to have made the accident possible. 
Similarly when a coroner’s court seeks the ’cause* of X’s death^it 
is looking only for a condition (or conditions) of his death which 
will provide evidence as to whether it was natural, suicide, or 
murder; and if the latter, as to the identity of the murderer as 
well. Again, if he sees no need for a detailed explanation^the 
plain man merely describes that to be finally explained as ’caused’ 
by the earliest factor on which he is asserting it to be dependent; 
whereas if he thinks it necessary to specify the details of the 
connecting process^ he describes the various dependences within it 
as connections between ’cause’ and ’effect’. Thus he simply calls 
a cigarette end ’cause’ of a fire, and tsetse fly ’cause’ of cattle 
plaguy when he supposes at least the general character of their 
connection with those ’effects’ will be understood by his readers 
or hearers; but when he thinks the nature of the link between high 
temperature and an accident might not be so obvious, he specifies 
the intervening ’causal connections’ by which they are linked* Or 
again he may simply postulate ’causal connection’ between the first 
and last links of the chain alone, as a convenient summary of the 
detailed explanation he is introducing or discussing; or, if he is
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a newspaper editor, and first and last links are not of a type 
usually related as ’cause’ and ’effect’, he may simply assert 
their ’causal connection’ in a headline in order to attract 
attention to the more detailed explanation following it. The 
headlines ’Small insect causes big trouble’, and ’Devaluation of 
the pound causes trouble in shipyards’^ seem to reflect the 
influence of this latter motive.
It might^perhaps,be objected that sentences specifying 
severally initiating event, and continuant to which it is ascribed; 
and even more thos specifying severally initiating event, inanimate 
object, and person to whom it may be ascribed (or even, in addition, 
a characteristic in virtue of which it can be ascribed to a con­
tinuant) ; are in effect tautologous. Thus ’a cigarette end 
caused the fire’ might be though merely a shorthand expression of 
’the fall of a cigarette end caused the fire’; and this in its 
turn as- a brief form of ’Someone’s (or Jones’) dropping a cigarette 
end caused the fire.’ Similarly ’Jones caused the fire’ might be 
regarded as shorthand for both the latter type of assertion and 
’Jones’ carelessness ’ caused the fire’, since it was in dropping the 
cigarette end and allowing it to be dropped that Jones and his care­
lessness respectively, earned their title to be called ’ cause’ of the 
fire. This, however, would be mistaken. Certainly they all refer 
to the same event, either directly or indirectly; but the plain man 
uses one or other of these types of sentence in order to specify 
one or other aspect of that event* And, moreover, he often has 
very good reason for wishing to specify one aspect of it rather than
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another. The foregoing should have made the importance of the 
initiating event to the plain man^ sufficiently clear. The ability 
to refer to it briefly is thus evidently essential. But it may be 
equally necessary to specify a continuant in whose history he 
supposes it to occur, whether he so attributes it to one or more. 
Thus when a man is found shot through the heart evidently murdered, 
if justice is to be satisfied and society protected^it is nec­
essary to distinguish the person who pulled the trigger from other 
conditions of the event. Furthennore^ knowledge of the type of 
gun used may prove an useful clue to the identity of the murderer* 
Again, if fires or murders are to be prevented, it is valuable to 
be able to specify any characteristic in people which, it is reason­
able to suppose, renders them liable to drop lighted cigarette ends 
or commit murders respectively.
(d) The commonsense conception of causation*
The variety of the foregoing examples mqkes it clear that none 
of the definitions of ’causation* which are familiar to the modem
c oiviMoHSewS C
British philosopher, (18) is consistent with ^  To most modem 
philosophers^to call an A ’cause*of a is to say that it is reason­
able to expect that whenever an A exists under given conditions it 
will stand in a certain relation to a B* And some suppose that to 
call an A ’cause’ of a B,is to assert that whenever an A exists 
under given conditions, it will stand in a given relation to a B; 
and yet others hold that to call an A ’cause’ of a B, is to say that 
under certain conditions the existence of an A entails that of a B* 
It vas seen that the plain man postulates some ’causes’ which he
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supposes necessarily followed by their 'effects* under given 
conditions. But he was also seen to suppose there are 
’causes* which it is not even reasonable to expect to be always 
correlated with the ’effect* attributed to them; since he is 
prepared to postulate a ’cause* of voluntary action^which latter 
he regards as a choice of one of two or more equally possible 
alternatives,
L#S*Stebbing, who overlooks this, further defines the common­
sense notion of ’cause’ in terms of activity. (19) It is indeed 
true that the plain man supposes some continuants to be * causes’ in
virtue of what they do to something. Thus he regards the tsetse
sc
fly as putting the bacteria into a blood stream and tWs starting 
a disease by its action; he thinks a man may ’cause’ an accident 
by pulling and pushing various parts of his car (e.g. steering 
wheel, accelerator^ etco ). Moreover^it seems likely that the 
commonsense notion of causation originates in experience of actions 
by which a person seems to alter his invironmént* The baby leams 
that when he makes certain muscular efforts^ visual data which he 
comes to associate with his toes} alter; and that the experience 
we describe as putting his toes in his mouth becomes possible. He 
leams also that unless he makes those efforts this experience does 
not occur. He finds likewise that he can ’move’ his rattle, bricks, 
etc. ; and ordinarily he does not see them move unless he can 
suppose them ’moved’ by someone else. And it is in like experience 
that the plain man finds his most convincing evidence of ’causal 
dependence’. Tell him that the death of X, which he supposes
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characteristic of arsenical poisoning, was not due to arsenic - 
and he will think it highly improbable* But he will not suppose 
it wholly unthinkable; he may admit the possibility of factors^ 
in either arsenical poisoning or the present instance, of which 
he knows too little to be sure on the subject* But tell a plain 
man that the existence of a table he has made does not depend on 
the actions of his hands and tools, and the physical and mental 
effort he experienced in making it - and he will regard the 
suggestion as arrant nonsense* AAnd his reaction is the same 
should one suggest that his arrival at the end of an arduous climb^ 
or long walk^was not dependent on the muscular efforts he thought 
he experienced in himself in the process of achieving this.
The plain man, hov/ever, was seen prepared to apply the term 
♦cause* not only to something other than activity^ but even when he 
supposed activity irrelevant to its * causal* role as such* Thus 
he was seen to apply the title to what he regarded as a persistent 
quality of a continuant - namely its temperature; to the absence 
of a given type of factor from a certain situation - namely lack of 
boys* clubs and lack of love; and to a continuant (namely a polar 
bear cub) in virtue, not any activity on its part, but simply of its 
having a specific character and being in a given place at a certain 
time. certainly philosophers iiave described * causes* of all three 
types as * acting on* that in which they are said to * cause* change. 
But clearly in doing so they have simply treated *act on* as 
synonymous with * cause a change in*^  irrespective of the ordinary 
♦sense* of *act®. And that it is the ordinary sense of this
146.
of which L.S.Stevving is thinking in defining the commonsense 
notion of ’cause’ in terms of activity, is evident from t he 
general tenor of her discussion^and in particular from her citing 
as an example altering the shape of india rubber by squeezing it.
It was seen that for commonsense a * cause’ is always in­
trinsically indispensable to its ’effect*. Nor can I discover 
any other characteristic common to all the ’causes* postulated 
T^ y coraraonsense.
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( further discussion of some basic presuppositions of 
the commonsense conception of cause#
The conception of a * cause* as intrinsically indispensable 
to its * effect^ accounts for the plain man* s practice of trea.ting 
•cause* and ’explanation* as synonymous* For if X cannot occur 
in the absence of a certain condition (whether contemporary with, 
or prior to, itselfthen clearly the existence of that condition 
contributes to the explanation of B* A nd if it is supposed that 
the introduction of that condition into a certain set of circum­
stances suffices to make X possible, then the introduction of that 
condition is naturally and legitimately regarded as explaining the 
existence of X in its accustomed relation to that condition#
In all the examples examined above, as in the usual application 
of the terms, the * cause* is an existent other than its * effect*. 
This perhaps seems a rather needless remark since this is so often 
a matter of definition (2o) Today, for instance, most philosophers 
who suppose the term applicable to a non-forma1 relation, regard 
a * cause* and its * effect* as distinct events or at least as 
distinct phenomenal complexes. But this has not been so with all 
philosophers for whom a ’cause* is a necessary condition of its 
’effect** Thus, for instance, both Spinoza and St*Thomas %quinas 
postulate the existance of a G-od whose nature is the necessary 
condition of his existence, the former on this account describing 
Him as * causa sui* (21) while the latter on precisely the same 
ground insists that He is ’uncaused*. (22) Evidently the question 
whether ’cause* is to be defined without qualification as
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’necessary condition’, or as ’necessary condition distinct from 
that dependent on it*, is beyond either the scope or needs of 
commonsense; but it is desirable^for the sake of clarity, to 
note the possible distinction within the commonsense definition.
It has been seen that the plain man asserts some ’causal 
dependences* whose postulation he can justify neither by induction 
nor by claiming insight into their intrinsic character; and that 
unshakable commonsense beliefs such as that a given fire would 
not have occurred had not a lighted cigarette end or match been 
dropped, and that a fire never occurs without some ’cause’, must 
be supposed to rest on the conviction that nothing is inexplic­
able* And this belief was seen to have also been very important 
in philosophical and scientific treatment of ’causation’. Some­
thing further must therefore be said about it.
In the first place it is clear that this belief is not always 
identical vfith, though doubtless fundamental to, that which a 
philosopher intends to assert in postulating ’universal causation*. 
That it is not identical wdth that asserted in postulating ’univer­
sal causation* by those who suppose the ’cause’ of an A to be of a 
type either always, necessarily, or reasonably expected to be 
always, correlated with an A under given circumstances, should have 
been made sufficiently cleqr. And it is as evidently not that 
asserted in postulating it by those interpreting ’universal 
causation* as every event depending on another which precedes it, 
whether a ’cause’ be regarded as entailing or as either certainly
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or probably follwved regularly by a given type of ’effect* or not. 
For an event’s occurrence might conceivably be made possible by 
factors other than, and excluding, a prior event. To disprove 
’universal causation* in any or all of these senses is not, there­
fore, to refute the basic commonsense premise, though this fact
alone does not suffice to justify the latter.
I have been able to discover no argument which could be 
regarded as proving that everything is explicable in the sense 
that there is some condition necessary to its existence; but 
neither have I been able to discover any argument which could be 
regarded as disproving it. So far as I can see, the only line 
which a defence of either its assertion or denial could take would 
be to point out the absence of any just ground for supposing the 
contrary must be true* If a ’cause* is regarded as explaining in 
the sense of entailing the existence of its ’effect’^ the use of 
such an argument against the postulation of ’universal causation’ 
would be self-contradictory if it was intended to assert that 
■ nothing entailing ’universal causation’ is discoverable; since 
this would clearly be to assume what is being denied, namely that 
nothing is unentailed. But against the narrower commonsense 
principle that nothing is inexplicable in the sense that there is
no condition necessary to its existence, this objection is
legitimate. Since, however, it may be raised equally against the 
denial of universal explicability in this sence, it is incapable of 
showing either its affirmation or denial to be more reasonable than 
its contrary.
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Nevertheless plain men, scientists, and at least most 
philosophers^ cannot deny universal explicability without self- 
contradiction. It has been seen that^ unless he assumes it^  the 
plain man has no right to many particular and specific causal 
assertions; and hence without it has even less justification for 
assuming any general principles of causal dependence. Nor is this 
limitation confined to commonsense. Some philosophers and 
scientists have supposed there are causal connections Vnich, in the 
light of scientific analysis^ may be seen to be intrinsically nec­
essary. But most of the connections of which they have supposed 
this to be true can be so regarded only if the iwversality of the 
laws of motion is first assumed. A good example of this is the 
intrinsic necessity which G.A. Mace sees in the connection between 
impact and movement among billiard balls. (23) And so far as i 
can see there is no intrinsic necessity in the laws of motion taken 
by themselves. At best, therefore, the philosopher and scientist, 
who make suppositions such as that a billiard ball will not move 
irrespective of the nature of simultaneous and prior conditions^ 
must be supposed to postulate many ’causal dependences’ which cannot 
be seen to be intrinsically necessary unless belief in the universal­
ity of the laws of motion can be supposed justified on some other 
ground than analysis of their character and that of motion, alone.
The possibility of a Kantian justification of generalisations 
will be discussed fully below; (24) here, therefore, I need only 
remark that I do not accept it. And induction alone can no more 
justify philosopher and scientist in either accepting generalisation^
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or supposing that any given phenomenon would not have occurred 
irrespective of the character of simultaneous or prior conditions, 
than it can justify the plain man in doing so. certainly if there 
is good ground for supposing a correlation to have always occurred 
in the past it is more reasonable than not, on this ground alone, to 
expect that it will continue to occur in the future. For if one 
does not expect this one has no criterion for expecting one thing 
rather than another^ and hence no motive for action. Moreover, if 
a correlation has occurred one does at least know that it can do so, 
whereas for all one knows^ those that have not done so may 
practical impossibilities. Furthermore, if the universe has always 
exhibited regular correlations in the past^ all the available evidence 
supports the view that it is an ordered system. But, unless some 
principle of ’universal causality’ is acceptable, neither 
philosophers nor scientists have very strong inductive grounds for 
supposing any correlations to have always occurred in the past.
For although the precise analysis of experiments may justify a 
certain number of assertions of the form ’An X has never been knovm 
to occur in the absence of a Y S  the experiments justifying this 
assertion are relatively few in numberj while, theoretically at least^ 
an infinite number of experiments which might either confirm or 
falsify it, is possible. Thus unless some form of ’universal 
causality* is assumed, the probability that even the most strongly 
attested ’causal dependence* will occur in the future,is 
negligible. If, therefore, every known phenomenon could be said 
to testify thus to the existence of laws of ’causal dependendence^
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this in itself would not serve to justify belief in ’universal 
causality’ in any form. And, indeed, so far from this being 
so, the majority of experienced phenomena are not subjected to 
nearly precise enough analysis to allow of their being justly 
regarded as testifying to universal laws in a sense consistent 
with the demands of science and philosophy.
Thus unless some form of ’universal causality’ is assumed 
prior to any appeal to induction, that appeal is in itself fruit­
less and wholly unjustifiable. And although to assert universal 
explicability, in the sense in which has been said to be assumed 
by ccmnonsense, is not to assert ’universal causality’ in every 
sense in which philosophers have interpreted that phrase; to 
assert universal causality in any of these latter senses is to 
assert universal explicability. Thus, for instance, to assert 
that no event occurs in the absence of conditions given which it 
always occurs, is to say that every event is dependent on some 
condition necessary to its existence. Universal explicability 
is thus the least which must be assumed to justify most refusals 
to adjnit either the possibility of probability of anything exist­
ing irrespective of the character of any simultaneous or prior 
condition.
As has been indicated such refusals are made^not only by 
plain men^but also by scientists and most philosophers. Russell 
has pointed out (25) that the most advanced sciences no lon^ger deal 
directly with ’causal laws’ strictly so-called. But it remains 
true that the findings of these sciences rest in part on the
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assumption that instruments will not react irrespective of the 
nature of simultaneous and prior conditions, which since it cannot 
be seen to be intrinsically necessary can be justified only by 
assuming universal explicability. Furthermore, even when they 
have regarded this assumption as unjustifiable, philosophers 
(with the possible exception of the extreme Greek sceptics - 
though one is tempted to suspect these of playing a part for the 
sake of showmanship)—have been unable to discanrd it. Thus Hume, 
while ruthlessly affirming its unjustifiability, yet admits it to 
be integral to human thought; and shows Jiimself to be no exception 
to the rule^ despite his critical attitude, by seeking the ’causes* 
of the belief in ’necessary connection’ without even mentioning 
the possibility that it might occur irrespective of prevailing 
conditions ; although he has denied the possibility of either per­
ceiving intrinsic connection between any ’cause’ and its ’effect*^ 
or of justifying the postulation of a law of ’ causal dependence’ by 
induction without assuming ’universal causality’ - hence denying the 
justification of assuming a belief or any other phenomenon to have 
a ’cause’ without postulating ’universal causation’, (26) Generally 
speaking, therefore, neither plain man, philosopher^ nor scientist 
can deny universal explicability without self-contradiction.
The assumption that nothing occurs haphazardly seems to have 
proved useful in the past in leading people to suppose certain 
courses of action might reasonably be expected to prevent the 
occurrence of certain types of phenomenon, these expectation seem­
ing to be justified in the event. Thus it may be supposed to have
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led Ross to expect malaria would not occur in the absence of 
mosquito bites : and it has since been found that when mosquitoes
have been eliminated from an area the disease has ceased to occur 
there* plain men and some philosophers would claim that a 
scientist’s or philosopher’s search for as yet undiscovered 
’causes’, or any other research assuming that phenomena do not 
come into existence haphazard, is evidently intrinsically 
impossible in the absence of belief in universal explicability*
If this contention is justified then the belief may justly be 
claimed invaluable to research* But if the premise is not 
justified^the claim can at best be regarded as not inconsistent 
with the kno^ ;m facts. If it can be supposed true to say that 
no one has been known to look for anything unless he supposed it 
to exist, then it may be maintained that the available evidence 
supports the claim for the utility of the belief; and it may 
justly be held more reasonable than not to hold it given that 
evidence* But as has been seen, without assuming that whose 
utility is in question, such an argument can confer only a neglig­
ible degree of probability on its conclusion. (27)
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CHAPTER II.
ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF CAUSE*
(i) General picture*
In discussing the term ’ cause’ as it has been used by
philosophers^ it is natural to begin with Aristotle. It is
true that the term was used by previous thinkers, but their 
usage has not had the influence on subsequent thought which 
Aristotle’s views have had. Moreover, Aristotle is the first 
to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the conceptions involved.
Aristotle’s philosophy may be regarded as a rationalisation 
of commonsense belief, in that it is a metaphysic which starts 
from^and seeks to explain^ the basic assumptions of commonsense 
regarding experience. Being a metaphysic and an explanation 
of commonsense belief, however, it is far from identical with 
the views of the plain man* The latter are related to it rather 
as a,simple musical theme to the complex set of variations based 
on it, in which that theme may, indeed, be hard to detect. Thus, 
for instance, like the man in the street, Aristotle postulates 
an universe of persistent entities exhibiting more or less 
persistent characteristics* But he makes assertions about these 
continuants and their characteristics^which would never have 
occurred to the plain man; and indeed would probably be denied, 
or at least considered very odd, by him*
The Aristotelian conception of ’cause’ is no exception to 
this general rule. Aristotle adopts without question the
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typical coraraonsense attitude which regards a ’cause’ as in­
variably an explanation, though some of his’causal assertions 
would seem very strange to the plain man* It was noted (1) 
that ’cause’ might be defined as ’explanation’ in the sense of 
logical ground, and hence a ’cause’ be regarded as entailing 
its ’effect’* As will be seen, Aristotle, like the plain man 
does not so regard it, like him supposing it to explain its 
’effect’ as the letter’s sine qua non. But this definition, 
since while it does not involve,neither does it exclude^ a 
’cause’s entailing its ’effect’, does not preclude the title’s 
application to logical grounds among other things*
Aristotle’s definition of ’cause’ in terns of explanation 
is evidenced both by his practice of applying the title ’cause’ 
of X’ only to what he regards as explaining (or rather helping 
to explain) X’s existence as its necessary condition, and by his 
explicit statements on the subject* In introducing his fourfold 
classification of ’causes’ in the second book of the physics he 
writes; ’***.men do. not think they know a thing till they have 
grasped the "why" of it (which is to grasp its cause).’ (2)
And again, later in the same book (.3), he writes ’It is
clear then that there are causes. The number of them is the
same as that of the things oomprehended under the question "why".
These two quotations seem to indicate that not only does 
Aristotle regard every ’cause’ as an explanation^but that he 
likewise regards every explanation as entitled to the name ’cause*.
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This is a view entailed by the unqualified definition of 
’causation* in terras of dependence noted above (4) since what 
is explained by X is, in the same respect, dependent on.
It is rejected, however, by many philosophers who regard ’causes* 
as explanations.
Yet it seems clear that Aristotle was not, in practice, 
prepared to accept the completely unqualified identification 
of ’cause* and explanation which satisfied Spinoza, For while 
he postulates a First cause which is uncaused, he does not thereby 
intend to postulate the existence of something inexplicable. (5)
The fact that the fourfold classification of ’causes’ in the 
physics is explicitly designed as an analysis of the explanation 
of change, its discussion moreover, being concluded with the 
remark; ’This then perhaps exhausts the ways in which the term 
cause is used?^ (6) might indeed suggest an intended definition
of ’cause’ as ’explanation of physical change’. But such a 
definition is as evidently incompatible with Aristotle’s usage 
as is that in terras of ’explanation’ without qualification. For 
he supposes ’final causes’ explain activity in intelligent beings 
by being recognised as desirable to them. Thus, while in 
postulating such ’causes’ his aim is generally to explain some 
physical change - e,g. A ’s going to war - clearly on his inter­
pretation he explains something more in doing so. For he is 
also explaining thereby experience of the type we call consciously 
choosing or deciding; and, whatever relation this may bear to 
physical phenomena, such an experience is certainly not ’physical*
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in any ordinary sence of the word* To call it so would be 
to disregard the very distinction which the terms ’physical’ 
and non-physical’ were designed to express; and hence, the 
bare assertion that, for Aristotle, ’cause’ means ’explanation’ 
of physical change’^ is either untrue or else states what would 
ordinarily be expressed by saying that for him ’cause’ means 
’explanation of change’.
But neither is the definition of ’cause’ as explanation of 
change’ consistent with Aristotle’s usage. For he applies the 
term ’cause’ to mathematical definitions (7) and describes a 
syllogism’s premises as ’cause’ of its conclusion (8) It is 
true that a syllogism’s premises may be regarded as explaining 
change insofar as they lead anyone to accept its conclusion.
It seems evident, however, from the occurrence of this usage 
in the exposition of his logical theory, (9) that it is the 
premises relation^not to the actual deduction^but to the 
deducibility of the conclusion which Aristotle has in mind when 
he describes the premises as ’cause’ of the conclusion. The 
most that could be said relevant to change with regard to this 
relation is that the truth of the premises would thereby serve 
to explain why one, who did not, should accept the conclusion. 
But clearly this is not an explanation of change but only of 
its desirability; and would renain true whether or not a change 
of the type concerned were a practical possibility (i.e. whether 
or no anyone failed to accept the conclusion, and,while so fail­
ing^ was capable of being persuaded to accept it by this con-
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sidération). Similarly, if, like Aristotle, one regards a 
’cause of X’ as something on which X depends, mathematical 
definitions may be considered ’causes' of change in that 
knowledge of them enables one to construct gecmaetrical figures 
and perform calculations. But, his citing them as examples of 
’formal causes’^ (lo) together with his explicit denial that 
they are ’causes’ involving motion^(11) evidences that in 
calling them ’causes’ Aristotle is regarding them^not as con­
ditions of calculations or of the production of mathematical 
figures, but as conditions of the nature of such figures given 
that these exist. (12)
Furthermore, even in the realm of physics Aristotle regards 
•causes’ of all the four main types he lists, as capable of con­
tributing to the explanation of permanence as well as change.
For, as indeed he recognises, in regarding them as explaining 
the coming to be of persistent entities he is, in effect, viewing 
theip as conditions of their existence; that is to say, as con­
ditions of ’effects’ which, he supposes generally endure through 
a period of time.
There is, however, no need to regard the exposition of 
causal theory in the physics as a definition of ’cause’ as 
explanation of either change in general or physical change. There 
is no reason why one adopting a wider definition of ’cause’ should 
not, on accasion^explicitly restrict himself to discussing 
’causation’ only insofar as he regards it as constituting the 
explanation of either change in general^ or physical change in
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particular* And clearly the latter restriction is demanded 
in a purely physical discussion if the terras ’cause* and 
’causation’ appear in it at all*
The form of the paragraph introducing the causal exposition 
in the physics indicates that this was Aristotle’s avowed 
position# For first he asserts that to know a thing is to 
understand*its explanation, which is to say its ’cause’; and 
then he goes on to say; ’So clearly we too must do this as 
regards both coming to be and passing away, and every kind of 
physical change’. Nor need Aristotle’s claim to exhaustiveness 
at the end of this account be understood as claiming more than 
its adequacy as an analysis of the explanation of physical change, 
or its dealing with all the explanations of physical change 
ordinarily offered*
The only definition of ’cause’ in terms of explanation 
entirely consistent with Aristotle’s usage^is that which allows 
the application of the term ’cause’ to every existent in which 
is to be found, partially or fully, the explanation of something 
which is distinct from itself* This is a far wider definition 
than would be accepted by many philosophers regarding ’causes’ 
as ’ explanations’ $ many of these would, for instance, refuse 
the title ’cause’ to the premises of a syllogism, mathematical 
definitions, and Aristotelian forms in general*
W#D*"^oss has remarked (13) that Aristotle applies the title 
•cause’ to ’causal conditions’ rather than to ’causes’ in the
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modern sense of the word. To single out one or more factors 
from a total situation as ’cause* of that thought dependent 
on it, is not peculiar to Aristotle. The plain man has been 
seen to do this constantly; and this is no less true of most 
philosophers, whether they make this explicit or, like Mill, 
define ’cause’ as ’the sum total of the conditions positive 
and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies 
of every description which, being realised the consequent in­
variably follows’. (14) Thus, for instance in discussing 
’causation’ they cite such examples as ’Arsenic causes death’, 
although they do not suppose the ’causes’ they thus discuss, 
to be the only condition of the ’effects’ they ascribe to them. 
Indeed, this practice is inevitable since it would often be 
impracticable, if not impossible, to enumerate all the conditions 
thought relevant to the existence of a given ’effect’. Further, 
as has been seen, the purpose and utility of a causal assertion, 
often lies precisely in its singling out one among many postulat­
ed conditions either as being particularly relevant to a given 
^effect’ or for some other reason. Where Aristotle differs 
from most moder philosophers is in the types of condition he 
singles out as ’causes’, in his refraining from attaching greater 
importance to one of the ’causal conditions’ he recognises 
rather than another, and in his applying the title ’cause’ to 
more than one ’ causal condition’ • These are very important 
distinctions, all closely interrelated, which will be discussed 
fully a  'te below. (15)
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Since it is useful to distinguish certain among the con­
ditions on which an 'effect* is supposed to dpend, and enumerating 
all relevant conditions is inconvenient if not impossible, the 
application of the title ’cause# to a factor within a total 
explanatory situation seems clearly reasonable. But, if con­
fusion is to be avoided, a philosopher adopting this usage should 
make this clear in course of an analysis of ’causation’. And in 
this respect Aristotle is open to criticism; since while the 
’causes’ he enumerates cannot be supposed to include eveiy type of 
condition on which an ’effect’ may be thought to depend, not only 
does he fail to note this, but in fact explicitly denies it. Thus, 
as has been seen, having asserted the number of ’causes’ to be 
’the same as that of the things comprehended under the question 
"why"’, ^ e  states these to be ’form’, agent, end and ’matter’, 
concluding ’The causes therefore are these and so many in number’; 
while a careful consideration of any of the ’effects’ discussed by 
Aristotle reveals that (if it is explicable) factors of types 
additional to these four must be supposed relevant to its explan­
ation. If, for instance a statue’s existence is held to depend 
on the activity of a sculptor with his tools, it is reasonable to 
suppose that it would not exist unless oxygen had been present at 
the time of its making, and some tools had been kept sharp and 
free from rust^ yet neither of these conditions can be identified 
with any of Aristotle’s four ’causes’. The presence of air can 
be regarded neither as the maker of the statue, that from which it 
is made, the end which its making is intended to fulfil, nor the
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character whose possession makes a statue what it is. (The 
role Aristotle ascribes to each of his four ’causes* will be 
fully discussed below (l6) Neither can the maintenance of 
the tools in good repair be identified with any of tlriese. It 
seems clear that by an ’ efficient cause’ Aristotle meant an 
agent (or agent and his instruments) of a specified character 
(or characters) adapted to producing the ’effect* in question^ 
but even though it be granted that for Aristotle his tools’ 
sharpness and freedom from rust is intrinsic to the ’efficient 
causality’ of a sculptor, their being sharp and unrusted is 
clearly distinct from their being kept in a dry place and being 
regularly sharpened,which latter are indispensable to, but not 
part of, that ’causality’ as Aristotle conceived it.
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(ii) Form and Matter.
The conceptions of ’form’ and ’matter’ are basic to
Aristotle’s analysis of phenomena, and hence to his treatment
of ’causation’ since to him this is exemplified among phenomena*
These notions, therefore, demand discussion before a detailed 
examination of his ’causal’ analysis is undertaken.
Aristotle, as his disciple, inherited Plato’s concern to 
give an account of specific differentiation; but, at the same
time, found tJaat Platonic treatment of it unsatisfactory* Plato’s 
doctrine of the ’ forms laid up in heaven’ had served to direct 
attention to the distinction between a common or shareable 
characteristic and its particular exemplifications, and hence to 
the need of abstraction in recognising the universality of such 
characteristics* But its ascription of independent existence to 
specific characters seemed to Aristotle, not without justification, 
to reveal a complete misunderstanding of the nature and role of 
universels, (17) And it was to remedy this defect that he 
formulated his own theory, which regarded ’form’ and ’matter’
(or characterisation and that characterised) as correlative 
constituents of continuants. (18)
To most people today, whether philosophers or no, the 
Aristotelian terms ’form’ and ’matter’ immediately suggest some­
thing obscure and unrelated to everyday experience. There are 
four reasons for this. (%) philosophers have ceased to formulate 
their thought in Aristotle’s terminology and hence this has come to 
have for them the purely antiquarian interest of Egyptian
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hieroglyphics and Mespotaraian cuneiform. (b) In the hands of the 
later Scholastics, Aristotle’s language became very much of a 
technical jargon, serving to formulate arid and useless dis­
cussions which were little more than verbal manipulations, (1 9)
In this situation discarding it became a prerequisite for sub­
stituting real thoughPfor verbal juggling; and, as a result, 
the intellectual heirs of the thinkers who rejected it for this 
reason, have come to identify Aristotelian terminology with arid and 
purely verbal discussion* (c) The philosophers who first dis­
carded the language of Aristotle, together with most subsequent 
thinkers, could not have failed to do so anyway, since it was not 
adapted to frame the questions they wished to ask; hence the 
naturely prejudice in favour of one’s own interests made it easy 
to regard Aristotle’s language as divorced from ’reality’ and ’real* 
problems; (d) Aristotle himself developed the notions of ’foim* 
and ’matter* in such a way that he could legitimately use the 
terms in contexts where they would not ordinarily appear, and, 
indeed, in ivhich they are unintelligible unless one understands 
the development of Aristotelian thought*
If, however, one starts by considering neither the fruitless 
discussions of his lesser disciples, nor Aristotle’s own develop­
ment of the notions; but rather their origin, it becomes apparent 
that in distinguishing ’form’ and ’matter’ he is but analysing a 
distinction recognisable readily enough in an examination of the 
commonsense view of the universe* One has only to consider the 
commonsense conception of any physical object to see that this is so.
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When the plain man speaks of a chair he is intending to 
refer to a persistent entity<> Moreover he supposes this entity 
to be composed of some material (or materials); e.g. he may 
suppose a house to be composed of bricks, or a jar to be composed 
of baked clay. And he will contrast this with other such 
entities by supposing it to be composed of materials other than 
those of which they are made. Thus if J ask him what is the 
difference between a gas-stove and a carpet he will, among the 
differences he lists, assert that while the former is made of 
metal the latter is not, being instead of wool. Very often chairs 
are, on this interpretation^ made of wood^ so I shall, for my 
èxample, discuss a wooden chair. Now it is at once apparent 
that, though the man in the street will contrast a wooden chair 
with other physical objects on the ground that these are not made 
of wood, he does not suppose ’This is a chair’ and ’This is made 
of wood’ to be synonymous. He is prepared to say ’This is made 
of wood* in contexts in which he would refuse to say ’This is a 
chair’. Moreover there are occasions on which he would be 
prepared to say ’This is a chair’ on wWçeh he would refuse to 
assert ’This is made of wood’. He therefore evidently has a 
criterion for distinguishing ’chairs’ from other objects, which 
is independent of the material of which he supposes them to be 
made; and this criterion is not far to seek. For he applies 
the term ’chair’ to those wooden objects only;which possess a 
given basic structure; and he is, moreover, prepared to apply 
it to an object he supposes to be of any other material if he is
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assured that this also possesses that structure. He is not too 
rigid in defining this criterion; he is prepared to apply the 
name 'chair* to objects differing considerably in size and shape.
But these all possess some basic structural and functional 
features; e.g# he would not apply the term to a seat lacking both 
back and arms, nor to one long enough to seat several adults. But 
what is this practice of distinguishing the structure of objects 
from the material of which they are nnde^but that of distinguishing 
what Aristotle calls 'form* and ’matter* respectively. The 
frequency of bowls, statues etc* among his examples, and his use 
of roundness and bronze as examples of 'form* and 'matter’ in 
describing coming to be (in order to prove the important thesis 
that 'form’ is not produced)^ (2o) leaves no doubt that he first 
derived the notions from the consideration of this distinction within 
material objects.
Undeniably, the terms ’form’ and ’matter’ came to mean more to 
Ariztotle than ’spatial structure* (or even ’characteristic 
features of spatial structure’ and ’physical material’. But 
there seems no doubt both that the essence of the notions as he 
understood them is exemplified in the material constituents and 
structure attributed to physical objects by commonsense, and that 
the conclusions concerning them which he reached are derivable 
from analysis of these.
Thus he speaks of the ’form’ of a musical relation^ (21) 
and although he undoubtedly attributes this to vibrations occurring 
in space, it cannot itself be said to have shape nor, in consequenee.
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features of spatial structure, as a chair or table may be said 
to possess them* But it is not difficult to see how he passed 
from applying the term ’form* to shape and features of spatial 
structure to its application to musical relations. The *form* 
of the bronze sphere which he postulates (22) is that which makes 
it what it is, its essence; and from his explicit identification 
of *form* and ♦essence* in the same paragraph^there is no doubt 
that in describing the proportion of 2.1 as ’form* of the octave 
he is regarding the former as the form of the latter relation in 
the sense of its essence. Now it has been seen that we are 
prepared to apply the name » chair* to objects which agree only in 
sharing certain basic features of spatial structure. It thus 
appears that these are regarded as essential to anything being an 
object of the type to which we have decided to apply that name.
That is to say they are regarded as making a chair vhat it is.
The definition of ’form* as * nature* or * essence* in the Aristote­
lian sense of that in virtue of vhich a continuant is of a specific 
type, that which makes us say *This is an X* p is thus not only 
consistent with the usage which applies the terra *fom* to a chair's 
distinctive structural features; but is indeed naturally suggested 
by analysis of their relation to our calling it a chair, when they 
are regarded as an instance of * form*. But once *fom* is so 
defined, then clearly one may legitimately speak of the ’form* of 
anything having a specific nature.
Similarly, the Aristotelian definition of 'matter* as 'that 
characterised by a specific nature»^ is both consistent with, and
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suggested by, the role of material constituents in constituting 
an object of a given type by being characterised by certain 
structural features. And once so defined, the term may be applied 
to anything characterised by a specific nature, whether consisting 
of physical matter or no.
After ray account of his purpose in formulating the conceptions 
of 'form* and 'matter*, it should be unnecessary to stress that for 
Aristotle 'form* is specific and not individual nature. At the 
same time it must be admitted that his definition of * soul* as 
*form of the body* (23) is inclined to suggest the contrary, par­
ticularly to thinkers of the Christian era (in which the notion of 
* 8oul;%* as essentially individual to each person has become pre­
dominant), But there is no doubt that this would be inconsistent 
with both his explicit definitions and his usage elsewhere. And 
it cannot be denied that his discussion of the * soul* is concerned 
principally with the chaipacteristic natures of the three basic 
types of organism, not with the questions of individual conscious­
ness, responsibility, and suriva]^ with which a discussion of this 
title has come to be associated since the spread of Christianity; 
which indicates that for Aristotle its * soul* is an organism's 
specific nature.
It must be admitted, however, that in its application to man, 
Aristotle's definition of 'soul* as 'form of the body* is not very 
satisfactory if, as it appears, he intends thereby to identify it 
with a body's specific nature. For he attributes to the rational 
soul he ascribes to man, properties he explicitly asserts to be 
essentially independent of the body. (24) It would be more
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consistent to apply the terms 'form of man' and 'form of the 
human body' respectively to the specific nature he attributes 
to the psycho-physical compound which^ for Aristotle) is man, and 
to that of the human body. The associations of the term 'soul* 
make it inevitably misleading in such a context. Aristotle* s use 
of it thus, seems to indicate that^while condemning Plato's 
doctrine of universels^ he could not completely divest himself of 
the Platonic habit of ignoring the essential relativity of their 
role.
Even more important than Aristotle's identification of 'form' 
and 'essence* is his identification of 'form' with 'actuality', 
and of 'matter' with 'potentiality*. (25) This is an identifica­
tion particularly significant in his treatnent of * causality* •
Again it is an identification easily understood once his conception 
of 'form' and 'matter' is grasped; and one readily derived from 
consideration of the relation between structural features and 
material constituents within a physical objeot. On the 
Aristotelian analysis^a physical object exists^or is actual^only when 
some material exhibits some specific character. And it is further 
evident that a material, when exhibiting no structure other than 
that in virtue of which it is capable of becoming any one of a 
number of objects which it is not yet* iaau jit is
potentially many things. Thus wood, unfashioned, is potentially 
a chair (among other things) while, when it is given a certain 
specific structure this potentiality is actualised in it.
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An inevitable result of the identification of 'matter* with 
'potentiality* is the conception of 'potentiality* as essentially 
passive (though Aristotle does occasionally use the term in its 
active sense), and hence as evidence of helplessness and incapacity. 
The term has not always been so interpreted: sometimes when it is
said that A is potentially this, or capable of that, what is intended 
is that A can become this, or do that, by its own activity or at least 
through its own inherently natural development. Thus for Leibniz 
'potentiality* is essentially 'tendency to develop*. (26) But when 
'potentiality* is identified with 'matter* in the Aristotelian 
sense this is impossible. For marble does not by itself become 
a statue, nor silver a bowl; nor are the potentialities in the ovum 
realised by its own inherent tendencies alone: and these to
Aristotle are typlical examples of 'matter*. Furthermore, since 
this identification ne ans regarding 'matter* as essentially lacking 
some fulfilment in the absence of 'form*, it also leads inevitably 
to the view that 'matter* is less perfect than 'form*.
It was seen (27) that Aristotle was dissatisfied with the 
Platonic doctrine of universals precisely because it postulates 
the existence of specific forms independent of anything characterised 
by them; and that the Aristotelian doctrine of 'form* and 'matter* 
was avowedly designed to remedy this defect. However, *hen, having
enumerated the possible definitions of substance as 'matter', 'form*, 
and the compound of 'matter* and 'form*, (28) he insists on the 
existence of at least one substance independent of all 'matter*; (2 9) 
he appears to be retracting this position by postulating the
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existence of a «form* independently of any •matter*. And this 
conclusion is supported by his applying to such an existent the 
terms ’actuality* and ’essence^ (3o) which elsewhere he treats as 
synonyms of ’form*; and by his arguing that because such a substance 
is eternal it can contain no ’matter* and is therefore ’actuality* 
(which might with justice be interpreted as arguing that it is 
•actuality# because ’pure form’). (31) It is not surprising, 
therefore, that he should have been accused of inconsistency on 
this score*
I hope to show that, while his postulation of a ’matterless* 
substance is comprehensible, and indeed inevitable, given two of 
his premises; Aristotle would be guilty of both verbal contradic­
tion and intellectual inconsistency in applying the term ’form* to 
such a substance.
The two premises which, in conjunction, demand the postulation 
of a ’matterless* entity, are (a) the essential passivity of 
’matter* , and (16) the non-existence of the inexplicable*
(Though Aristotle nowhere makes the latter Explicit, it is implicit 
in much he writes; for example his argumenbs against an infinite 
•causal* regress and in favour of a prime mover (32).
If nothing is inexplicable and something exists, and if that 
which explains X is that on vhich it depends, then there must be 
at least one existent the explanation of whose existence lies in 
itself. For if there never existed anything self-explanatory; 
then either there is (or has been) something inexplicable, or else 
there has been an infinite number of existants the one explaining
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the other serially. The first of these alternatives is evidently 
inconsistent with the non-existence of the inexplicable, and the 
latter I shall show to be no less so, given the Aristotelian con­
ception of ’explanation*.
It was seen (33) above that as it is humanly impossible to 
enumerate all the conditions one may reasonably suppose relevant 
to any ’effect’, for practical purposes we ordinarily apply the 
terra ’explanation’ to part only of those conditions. Thus i may 
say that a faulty valve ’explains’ my radio’s eccentric behavior, 
although I know there are strong grounds for supposing many other 
factors besides the conditions of the valves, to be relevant to a 
radio’s behavior at any time so that it would be reasonable to 
think they contribute to its explanation. It is a similarly 
imprecise but convenient shorthand for Aristotle to single out 
that on which X immediately depends as its ’ explanation*.
If X*s explanation is defined as that which entails X, then 
given a set of conditions which does so^X can be said to be 
explained irrespective of the possibility of explaining any of 
these entailing conditions in their turn. But if, like Aristotle, 
one regard X#s explanation as that on which X depends whether by 
antailment or no, this is not so. For if X depends on Y, it depends 
on whatever Y depends upon. If therefore Y depends neither on
itself, nor on anything else and so is inexplicable, X which 
depends on it, is likewise inexplicable. Thus if ’explanation* 
be defined as entailment, and his parents* union entailed a*s 
existence, the latter is explicable even though the parents* 
existence is not. But if, like Aristotle, one regard the
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explanation of A*s existence as that on which it depènds; then 
though his parents’ union entailed his existence, one cannot regard 
the latter as explicable if so much as one of his distant ancestors 
was produced neither by a natural process (either organic or 
inorganic), nor by the action of a rational being, while at the 
same time not being such that his existence depended on his own 
nature alone*
That it excludes the explanation of its antecedents from an 
organism’s Explanation, indeed, shows that the definition of 
’explanation* in terms of entailment fails to express the general 
conception of ’explanation’ as answering the questions ’why?’ and 
’how?*. For the dependence of its parents on their progenitors^ 
and these on theirs, and so on through its ancestry, when known^ 
certainly contributes to our understanding of how an organism came 
to exist* if this is to be understood at all*
Now in an infinite series, whose members were explained, each 
by its predecessor, there would be no point at which everything on 
which any one of its members was dependent, was explained in the 
Aristotelian sense. For there would be no point in such a series 
from which it would not be ne cessary to regress in order to reach 
that on which one of its subsequent members directly depended.
Hence on the Aristotelian conception of explanation, none of its 
members would reeilly be explained at all (34). If therefore, he 
was to be consistent, Aristotle had to postulate at least one 
existent, the explanation of whose existence lay itself.
He was, moreover, justified in refusing to regard as self- 
explanatory, the universe as a whole^which he thought a compound^
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some at least of whose members were not self-explanatory. For 
no compound could be self-explanatory. A number of existants 
could not be self-explanatory as a group, though none of its 
members was so individually; for clearly the existence of a 
compound pre-suppoees that of its elements. To suppose its 
explanation to lie in its elements, not as individuals but only 
as conjoined, is thus to suppose the explanation to be logically 
posterior to that which it explains ; which is evidently self­
contradictory. On the other hand, were the elements in a compound 
self-explanatory^ the whole would exist in virtue of the individual
character of each of its elements, which is to say its explanation 
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would like, not in itself as such, but in its elements as 
individuals.
Since A is explained by B insofar as it is dependent on the 
latter; whatever is essentially iracomplete or unfulfilled in the 
absence of something else, cannot be self-explanatory. Therefore 
X cannot be self-explanatory if it contain one part which is 
incapable of completion or fulfilment in the absence of another; 
for, since the incomplete part cannot be self-explanatory, so 
neither can the whole to which it belongs. Thus if X contains 
two elements A and B, the former being self-explanatory and the 
latter depending on it for its fulfilment or completion, then it 
is A and A alone which is the s elf-explanatoiy existent required 
by Aristotle’s premises. Since, therefore, he defines ’matter* 
as essentially unfulfilled èn the absence of ’form’, Aristotle 
cannot with consistency suppose a self-explanatory existent to
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contain ’matter*. Nor would it be iracomprehensible should he 
call such an one ’form*, since for him ’form’ is opposed to the 
incompleteness and dependence of ’matter’ , as that which confers 
on it fulfilment and actuality.
Although such usage would be comprehensible, however, it 
would not be justified since it would be seriously misleading 
and inconsistent. And this for three reasons. 1). Aristotle 
would be guilty of an evident verbal contradiction in postulating 
a ’matterless form’ at one pointy while denying the possibility of 
such an one* at another. 2) Not only did he introduce the terms 
’form* and ’matter’ as correlative, but the correlation he 
designed them to express is such that nothing to which one of them 
is applicable in this sense, can exist in isolation from anything 
to which the other is so applicable. It is possible neither for 
a specific nature to exist in the absence of anything it character­
ises, nor for something to exist lacking any specific nature at all, 
Hence for him to apply the teiro ’form’ to a ’matterless» substance^ 
is not merely to deny an extrinsic connection elsewhere postulated, 
but to use at least one of the terms ’form’ and ’matter’*^ in a 
sense intrinsically different from that which it was originally 
designed to express. In doing so he would be in the position of 
one who not only affirms at one point that ’swans’ are mortal, 
denying it at another; but who, having adopted the term ’ swan’ 
solely to in order to designate organisms, suddently applies it 
to inorganic matter. 3) Aristotle applies the terra ’foira’ to 
nothing, apart from ’matterless’ substance, which he does not
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regard as a specific nature; nor does he anywhere define it in
any terms other than ’specific nature* unless supposing them to
be synonymous with, or include, this. To use it as other than 
correlative, thus implying its definition in some terms other 
than, and excluding, ’specific nature’; is thus inconsistent 
with both his explicit definitions and his usage in all other 
contexts.
The truth of the matter is that, in the sense in which he 
normally uses them, neither ’matter* nor ’form’ are terras which 
could be appropriately applied to a self-explanatory existent.
It has just been seen that, in this sense, neither applies to 
anything which can exist in complete isolation from anything to 
which the other is applicable; and since it has also been found 
that a self-explanatory existent must be simplg, (35) such an 
one could not consist in a combination of both. It is true that
the conjunction of ’form* and ’matter’ is not like most canpounds
which we discuss, whose elements may all exist separately. Yet 
since ’form’ and ’matter’ are separately distinguishable elements 
within an existent, the latter is, in virtue of containing them, 
complex. In a self-explanatory existent, therefore, character 
and that characteriesed would have to be somehow identical so that 
the terras ’form’ and ’matter’ , as ordinarily understood by 
Aristdtle, could not significantly be applied to it. Clarity, 
therefore, demanded that in postulating and discussing such an 
existent, Aristotle should forsake the language of ’form* and 
’matter’ in favour of less misleading terminology.
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In justice to Aristotle, it must be admitted that he does 
not himself apply the terra ’form* to a self-explanatory existent.
But on the other hand it cannot be denied that, while such an 
application is strongly suggested by his applying to such an one the 
terras ’essence* and 'actuality* (elsewhere invariably regarded as 
synonyms of ’form’), his describing it as a ’final cause* (36) 
while elsewhere regarding ’causes’ of the latter types as in a 
sense identified with ’formal csuses’ (37)—which is to say ’forms’; 
and his threefold classification of substances; he iiakes no 
attempt to counteract this suggestion. He says neither that 
’essence’ and ’actuality* are here not to be identified with 
’form’ ; nor that here ’formal’ and ’final cause’ cannot be 
identified; nor yet that there is an application of the term 
’substance’ additional to those enumerated previously.
In places Aristotle appears to be guilty of the opposite 
contradiction to that involved in postulating ’pure form’. For 
he speaks of a ’prime’ or ultimate ’matter’ or pure potentiality, 
to assert the existence of which would be an evident contradiction 
in terns; such formless ’matter’ moreover would be completely 
indeterminate and hence inconceivable. There seems no need, 
however, to suppose that Aristotle meant to affirm the existence 
of unformed ^matter’. When he asserts that ’matter’ is prior to, 
because presupposed by, change (38) he may well mean, not that an 
unformed ’matter’ existed antecedent to all change, but that there 
was never a time at which no determinate or ’formed imtter* 
existed. And when he describes ’prime matter’ as pure potential­
ity^ he may well be intending merely to point out the essential
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relativity of the ’matter’ or potentiality which he 
ordinarily discusses. indeed he may be wanting to emphasise 
the essential relativity of the terra ’matter’ by showing that 
to postulate the existence of ’pure matter* would be self­
contradictory.
Aristotle’s account of the basic constituents of physical
objects confirms the view that he does not intend to postulate
the existence of^formless raatterl For he supposes fire, air,
water^ and earthy to be the four elements of which all physical
objects are composed; and further maintains (39) that these basic
elenents come into existence one from another, explicitly denying
that anyone of them ever comes to be from any more primitive
substance. (4o) Indeed he proceeds to deny that there is even
any such substance, at least in the realm of the perceptible —
(41) by which he means presumably that though one could abstract
from perception sufficiently to know what one would be asserting
in postulating the existence of 'formless matter’^ he could in fact
meet nothing so describable. Again in denying the possibility
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of an infinite regress among ’causes’, he points out^ (42)^that 
an infinite regress among the constituents of physical objects 
is avoided by their all deriving from ’prime matter’^ but that it 
is avoided by their deriving^from another. And yet again, in
discussing growth^Aristotle insists (43) that ’natter* is some­
thing which ’ can never exist without quality and without form’ •
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(iii) The Four pauses.
(a) Preliminary Summary of Aristotle’s Doctrine»
It has been seen that Aristotle supposes ’causes’ to be divided 
into four main types. These he lists in both the physics and the 
Metaphysics. (44) The accounts of this classification appearing in 
both works are essentially the same, that in the Metaphysics indeed, 
having rather the appearance of a summary of the corresponding chapter 
in the physics. (45) Nor does Aristotle confine his doctrine of the 
’four causes’ to its formal exporition; his explanations are invariably 
couched in terras of it.
As is well-known, Aristotle distinguishes his four types of 
’cause* by the titles ’formal’, ’Material’, ’efficient’, and ’final*.
The ’formal’ and ’material causes’ of X are simply its ’form’ and 
’matter’ respectively; that is to say, the specific character in 
virtue of which it is of a given type, and that in it whose exhibition 
of that character constitutes the existence of such an one»
Aristotle cites as examples of ’formal causes’, mathematical 
definitions (4 6 ) i.e. the characters in virtue of which mathematical 
figures are as they are; the proportion of 2;1 in virtue of which 
the octave is such; (47) and the parts of a definition i.e. that in 
virtue of which a definition is as it is. (48) And he speaks of its 
spherical shape as the ’form’ or ’essence’ of a material sphere (49) 
which^according to his explicit definition^(50) is synonymous with 
calling its shape its ’formal cause’. As examples of ’material 
causes’ he cites the bronze of which a statue is made and the silver 
of which a bowl or saucer is composed. (5 1 ) An ’ efficient cause’
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is a continuant whose history includes an event or events con­
stituting a necessary condition of an ’effect’s* coining into being; 
Aristotle offers adviser and father as examples. (52) And a ’final 
cause’ is that for the sake of which, or that to attain which, 
something exists or occurs ; in illustration Aristotle cites health 
as a ’final cause’ of exercise, (53) the attainment of %)ower as a 
’final cause’ of going to war. (54)
To Aristotle these ’causes’ are not simply indispensable to 
their ’effects’, but are related as the essential constituents of 
any ’causal process. For in his view change consists in the 
reception of a ’form’ or character by ’matter* through the activity 
of an ’efficient cause’ or continuant^which latter both before and 
after the transformation is other than the piece of matter thus 
receiving the ’form’» And all change is directed to the attainment 
of some end which is its ’final cause’» He is thus, in effect’ 
assimilating all change to the production of a statue as conceived 
by commonsense»"
In this wqy he possesses a criterion by v/hich he could, if he 
would, distinguish ’efficient causes’ from any other continuants 
an event (or events) in whose history constitute a necessary con­
dition of any given ’effect’.
(b) Some major differences between common modem philosophical 
usage and that exemplified in Aristotle’s formulation and" 
application of his doctrine of the ’four cause#/
As has been indicated^the modem British philosopher ordinarily
supposes either that it is certain, or that it is probable, that any
’cause’ properly so called is related to its ’effect’ according to a
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law of regular corrleation such as is sought and formulated by 
the scientist* Basically there are four possible views of the 
experienced uniformities on which the postulation of such laws 
rests. It may be held; (a) that they rest on intrinsic connections 
between the factors so correlated; (b) that they rest on a necessity 
extrinsic to those factors by themselves; (c) that they exemplify a 
purely de facto universal uniformity; (d) that there can be no 
certainty that they hold except where and when their doing so is 
directly observed. Those holding the latter view may suppose the 
experience of an uniformity renders its universality probable, while 
those denying this may yet suppose that it renders it more.probable 
than not that it will obtain in any given context of a certain type. 
Whether they admit it explicitly or not those philosophers who deny 
certain universality to these uniformities^assume this latter in 
practice. In general the ’causal* conceptions of one defining 
’cause’ in terms of law reflects the view of ’established 
uniformities’ which he adopts.
Although the definition of ’ causation’ in terms of ’ law’ allows 
these differences of causal theory, it demands a certain uniformity 
of usage. For whatever conception of ’ law’ (in the scientific 
sense) may be held, it is generally agreed that nothing shall be so 
called unless it asserts an observed uniformity. Thus, for most 
modem British philosophers (who, as was seen, in asserting a 
connection between ’cause’ and ’effect’ are usually stating 
correlations between types rather than connections between individuals), 
two given types of existent A and B may be said to be mutually
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related as ’cause* and ’effect* respectively only if; (a) whenever 
an A is known to have been observed under conditions of a given 
type, say c , observations having been made that must have discovered 
anything standing in a given type of relation, say r , to A, a B has 
always been found standing to it in that relation; while (b) there 
is not known to have been convincing evidence for the existence of 
an A under C conditions when equally, or more, convincing evidence 
that no B stands to it in an R relation, is known to have existed»
It is true that Russell in his essay ’On the Notion of Cause’, (55) 
defines the term ’cause* as applicable to a type of event generally 
but not invariably followed by a given type of ’effect*. But this 
definition is not necessarily inconsistent with that offered above; 
and indeed whatever the inadequacy of his explicitas definitions and 
analyses may suggest, it seems unreasonable to suppose that any 
philosopher does really believe in an unconditionally invariable 
sequence between ’cause’ and ’effect’* The reasons Russell offers 
for denying invariable sequence between ’cause’ and ’effect’ are the 
possibility of any ’causal sequence’ being intercepted^ (56) and the 
complexity of the factors on which any ’effect’ can be supposed to 
depend^ (57) and as has been seen neither is inconsistent with a 
regular correlation between * cause’ and ’effect’, and indeed it 
seems indubitable that both factors are taken into account, at least 
implicitly in a modem assertion of ’causal law’. Moreover, while 
most modem philosophers would agree M t h  Russell that any ’causal* 
situation, when precisely analysed, may reasonably be thought unique, 
they suppose it possible to isolate within it certain types of factors
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which may be found to exhibit a regular correlation with phenomena
like the ’effect* ascribed to them| and indeed Russell’s own
acceptance (in the same paper) of the admissibility of postulating
laws of functional relation reveals him as admitting precisely the
same principle. Therefore, even though Russell, at the time of
writing ’On* the Notion of Cause’ might have repudiated the
definition I outlined above, his usage, in this paper, was not
inconsistent with it, nor did his analysis of the notion of cause
reveal it to be unjustifiable.
tyiocfr^ n
Although the^British philosopher normally refuses to apply the 
titles ’cause’ and ’effect’ save under the conditions I have out­
lined above, their fulfilment does not suffice to make him do so*
Thus there is as strong evidence that whenever air is present, 
certain other conditions being fulfilled, a hare comes into existence, 
as there is for any ’connection between ’cause’ and ’effect’ asserted 
by the modem British philospher; but it is no more customary to call 
air ’cause* of the coming into existence of a hare today^ than it was 
among Aristotle’s contemporaries. For the modem British philosopher 
does not apply the title ’ cause of A’, to any one among a set of 
conditions which he supposes to have been regularly correlated with A© 
Instead he applies it either to that^or these^ among them which dis­
tinguish such a set from one to which that correlation c annot be 
ascribed; or to ) those which consist in the introduction of a factory 
into a set of conditions^ thereby apparently initiating the coming 
into existence of the ’effect’ regularly correlated with the total 
situation consisting in the initiating factor together with the set 
of conditions into which it was introduced. Many philosophers
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subsequent to Hume, indeed, confine the title ’cause* to the latter 
type of events, or event complexes*
Since the modem British philospher ordinarily thinks of
our
’causation* in terms of^  experienceable correlations, and^experience 
is temporal; to him * cause* and ’effect* are always temporally 
related. To some modem British philospphers a ’cause’ always 
precedes its ’effect’ (or it is at least reasonable to suppose it 
has done so in the past); to others a ’cause’ may either precede, 
or be simultaneous with, its ’effect’.
Normally, if anyone supposes an uniformity to have been 
experienced in the past, he expects it to continue to obtain in 
the future. And, indeed, it seems clear to me that under such 
circumstances it would be unreasonable not to expect this. (l 
shall further discuss and defend this contention below^ (58) where 
doing so will be more appropriate). But this is to say that if 
’to infer’ be defined as ’to reach with justification either a
j
probable conclusion or one that is certain; then if ’causation’ is 
defined in terms of ’law’, an ’effect’ is always inferrible from its 
’cause* no matter what interprétât ion of ’law’ be adopted. But 
whether or no ’effects’ be regarded as inferrible from their ’causes’, 
since on this definition ’causes’ naturally provoke expectation of 
their ’effects* and are by many philosophers regarded as a just basis 
of inference to them; when ’causation’ is defined interms of ’ law’^ 
’causal’ theories are inevitably theories concerning the justification 
of inference from ’cause* to ’effect’.
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Aristotle’s usage is fundamentally different from that of most 
modem British philosophers^ in that it is inconsistent with the 
definition of ’causation* in terms of ’law*. This, however, docs 
not reflect a denial either that experience has been found to exhibit 
certain uniformities, or that it is reasonable to suppose a given 
specific correlation to be exhibited when any phenomenon of a given 
type exists under certain circumstances. Indeed, he often applies 
the term ’cause’ to a type of existent with which he supposes a given 
species of ’effect to be constantly correlated when certain conditions 
are fulfilled. Thus he writes in general of a father as ’cause* of 
his offspring being convinced that the production of offspring 
similar to themselves always follows the union of male and female 
if appropriate conditions prevail at the time of copulation and during 
the period of gestation. And, similarly, he calls bronze ’cause’ of 
a statue, supposing that whenever bronze exists and certain conditions 
(e.g. its being cast efficiently in a certain type of mould etc.) 
obtain, it is transformed into a statue. But he does not use the 
terms ’cause’ and ’ effect’ in order to assert such a correlation.
And this is simply because while (as has been noted) (59) he regards 
the term ’cause of A ’ applicable to B only if A depends on B; he does 
not suppose that in order to depend on B> A  must always stand in a 
given relation to it; nor even that such a dependence cannot be 
postulated even with probability, unless there is not known to have 
been convincing evidence for both the existence of a B^  and there being 
no A standing in a given relation to it when certain conditions have 
obtained. Thus he supposes that there are events (namely voluntary
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actions) which are impossible in the absence of certain conditions 
and therefore, in his sense, ’caused*^though these conditions need 
not always be correlated with any such action.
On the other hand, a ’formal cause* as originally and 
ordinarily conceived by Aristotle, is something indispensable to 
its ’effect* which is not related to it in accordance with a law 
of regular correlation on account of lack, not of uniformity, but 
of relation. For in the formulation of his ’causal’ analysis and 
his most frequent use of the term, the title ’formal cause of A# is 
applicable to a specific character in virtue of its being exhibited 
by A thus making it what it is, ’Matter’ and ’form’ are related as 
that characterisedyand that characterising it; but although normally 
there is a distinction between a specific character and an existent 
exemplifying that character (e.g. the character of being a chair is 
not itself a chair), yet it is not possible, even in thought, to 
distinguish any existent from its specific character so as to 
recognise a relation between them. For once eliminate from a chair 
the character of being a ddair, and it is a chair no longer; and 
similarly to eliminate the conception of its being a chair from the 
thought of a chair, is to cease to think of a chair. In other words, 
once take away a chair’s specific character, even in thought, and 
there remains no chair to vbich it could be related; and, indeed, 
to take its character from an actual chair is to lose both chair 
and character, since clearly A’s character exists only so long as 
it is exemplified in A.
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Moreover, it is clear that no one who wished to assert a 
regular correlation in positing a ’causal connection’ would be 
likely to apply the title ’cause’ to material and agents in general^ 
even though he supposed there to be none not invariably and uniformly 
correlated with its Aristotelian ’effect* under given conditions.
For there are many materials and agents of which it cannot be denied 
that they have in the past been found correlated with many different 
things, although it is reasonable to suppose that whenever one of 
them has been observed and there has been good evidence that one 
specific set of conditions has been fulfilled, it has always been 
correlated in the same way with the same type of thing. Thus, for 
instance, it is reasonable to suppose that whenever bronze has been 
known to exist in the past, certain conditions having been fulfilled, 
it has been transformed into a statue; while it is equally reason­
able to suppose that when it has been observed and there has been 
hl '^ h
reason to oaipfoee another set of conditions to have been fulfills d, 
it has become a bowl; and it has thus appeared to be regularly 
correlated with objects of many other different types - brooches, 
bracelets, va ses^ shields, swords, daggers, lamps, etc* And again, 
it is reasonable to suppose that ^whenever a tomcat has been observed 
and there has been reason to suppose one set of conditions to have 
obtained, kittens have come into existence; while it is equally 
reasonable to suppose that^ whenever a tomcat has been observed and 
there have been good grounds for supposing another set of conditions 
to have been fulfilled, a mouse has died; and similar regular 
correlations seem to have obtained between tomcats and the
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disappearance of milk, the emission of purring sounds^etc. But 
it is clearly most reasonable, natural, and convenient in 
asserting or describing a correlation, to lay primary emphasis on 
its distinctive features.
It is obviously most rational to do this^ since it is in the 
interest of clarity to lay primary emphasis on that which distinguish­
es the correlation one is formulating or postulating. It is clearly 
natural to do so^  since we most readily connect A with B in thought 
when we have both frequently found it related to B and have never 
found it related to anything else* And it is most convenient to 
do so. For if a correlation is stated in the form *A is correlated 
with B given c ’^ when A indicates something correlated with other 
things under different conditions, it is necessary to enumerate some 
of the additional factors in this specific correlation in order to 
distinguish it from the others in which A is found; whereas when a 
correlation is stated in the form *X is correlated with Y given Z* 
when X indicates a factor peculiar to this correlation, it is not 
ordinarily necessary to enumerate the factors indicated by Z^  and 
indeed mention of them may often be omitted completely without
ambiguity* The same considerations prevent any philosopher who
ck5
regards ’causes* azvprimarily something from which their ’effects* 
are inferrible, from applying the title ’cause’ to naterial and 
agents in general*
In addition to these fundamental differences between Aristotle’s 
’four causes’ and anything to which the modern British philosopher is 
normally prepared to apply the term ’cause’ , none of the ’four causes’
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is an event-let alone one that may be regarded as initiating the 
occurrence of its ’effect*. It is true that to some philosophers 
(e.g. Russell) a quantity of matter or an agent is simply a series 
of events; but they are not so regarded by Aristotle, And even if 
they had been, this would not render his application to them of the 
tern ^ cause^ consistent with the usage of the modem philosopher 
who confines it to events; for clearly such a series of events is 
neither a single initiatory event^nor an initiatory event complex.
And clearly neither specific characters^ nor ends, can be regarded 
as events on any interpretation while the term ’event’ is understood 
in its accustomed sense.
It is true that there is one context in which Aristotle does 
in effect treat the title ’cause’ as applicable to events; but this 
usage occurs only in the formulation èf his ’causal analysis^ (6o) 
and in addition does not coincide with any usage common among 
British philosophers today.
It has been seen that Aristotle applies the unqualified title 
’efficient cause’ to agents, that is to say to anything which he 
regards as a continuant in whose history occur events in virtue of 
which he regards acmething else as dependent on it as its maker or 
producer. clearly when the title ’cause’ is thus applied to agent», 
it is necessary to distinguish the events in virtue of which they 
are regarded as such,from the remainder of their histories^ in order 
to make explicit the relation postulated between than and their 
’effects’. In making this distinction,Aristotle uses the terms 
’actual efficient cause», and ’potential efficient cause’; using the 
former to designate an agent when the connecting events are occurring,
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and the latter to designate one at any other time ; thus, in effect, 
he applies the title "actual efficient cause’ to events. In so 
using the title ’cause’ however, not only is Aristotle treating it 
as applicable to series of events, rather than to a single event or 
event complex, but he is regarding it as applicable to series of 
events containing no member to which the modem British philosopher 
would normally apply the title ’cause’. Thus to Aristotle the 
’actual efficient cause’ of a house,is a builder while building it^
(6 1) which is, in effect, to regard the title as applicable to the 
events constituting the building process. And the modern British 
philosopher would regard none of these as playing the initiatory role 
in virtue of #iich he applies the title ’cause’ to events. Such a 
philosopher would suppose that if there is an initiatory event which 
ipay be properly called ’cause* of a house coming into existence, this 
must exist prior to the building process.
Clearly one conceiving ’causal connection’ as do the majority of 
modem British philosophers, is not justified in adopting any of the 
Aristotelian applications of the term ’cause’ discussed above. But 
this is not to say that Aristotle is not justified in adopting any or 
all of them* In order to judge whether he was or not^ it is necessary 
to discover whether his adopting them is consistent with what he intends 
to assert in postulating a ’causal connection’^ and whether he is 
justified in this intention.
(c) The source of Aristotle’s fourfold classification.
One cannot merely dismiss Aristotle’s classification of ’causes’ 
as fanciful or nonsensical, however queer it may seem to the modem
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philosopher,. For no one talks or writes nonsense^ if he can avoid 
it^when he wishes to he taken seriously; and philosophers always 
wish this* I shall therefore consider first what led Aristotle 
to make this classification; and then whether he was, or could have 
been, justified in so doing*
In order to discover what led Aristotle to make his classification, 
one must consider the contexts in which he applied explanation in 
terms of it. Most numerous among these are thos accounting for the 
products of generation and of artificial human making (e.g. the work 
of sculptor, silversmith, etc.)
If one considers artificial products and their explanation^it 
becomes evident that it is reasonable, and indeed a practical 
necessity,to explain their existence in term’s of Aristotle’s 
’fourcauses’* It is clear, for instance, that a chair does not 
exist in the absence of a certain minimum quantity of wood, or other 
appropriate material or materials; and that it does not exist, though 
such material does, unless this latter exhibits a certain basic 
structure. Furthermore there is convincing evidence that chairs 
have not existed unless someone has gone through one of a finite 
number of action series. And, whatever be the correct account of 
’ voluntary action’, there is further evidence that chairs have not 
come into existence unless someone has at sane time had an experience 
describable (according to ordinary usage) either as ’intending to 
make a chair’ or ’ intending that a chair shall be made’j nor does 
the experience of intending seem to have occurred without a con­
temporary or previous recognition of the desirability of that
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intended. (it is true that in postulating the ’final causation* 
of statues, bowls, etc. Aristotle assumes not only a regular 
correlation between intending A and recognising A to be desirable, 
but also the intrinsic indispensability of the latter to the former; 
but the regular correlation is at least essential to that which he 
asserts^ and there seems little doubt that were it not for the 
evidence for that correlation Aristotle would not have framed his 
account of voluntary action).
Moreover, there is evideroe that chairs, statues, etc. do not 
exist unless the role of at least three of Aristotle’s ’causes* is 
known; and, indeed, there are circumstances under which they are 
at least thought (not unreasonably) unlikely to oceur unless the 
indispensability of all four is known. Thus for centuries men wished 
for dirigible aircraft, but none existed until Langley (62) and 
the Wright brothers discovered both materials suitable to be made 
into such an object^ and the structure which such an one would 
exhibit. Similarly, there was no efficient telephone until Bell 
discovered that given materials^ordered according to a specified 
design^ constituted such an object. And a like story is known to 
be true of radio and television sets, cars^steamships, telescopes, 
cameras, and a host of other objects which are today commonplace.
And the time and effort, spent/ not to mention risks undertaken} 
by those with a practical interest in invention, in order to discover 
material and structure which^ in conjunction^constitute an object of 
the type whose existence is aimed at, testifies to their belief in 
the indispensability of such knowledge to that end.
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And there is evidence that no artificial object has existed, 
even given the above knowledge, in the absence of anyone supposing 
specified action attributable to a human being to be required 
before it can exist* Thus to take a simple example, thousands of 
small boys, when they cc«ne to learn carpentry know the nature of 
book-ends, stools, and tables^and that these may be m d e  of wood; 
but it is only after they have also learned that specified action 
series may issue in their existence^ that new book ends etc*, start 
coming into existence correlatively with their activities.
Knowledge of each of the factors involved in an object’s ’efficient 
causation* (namely the type of activity indispensable to its 
coming into existence^and the species of agent to which this is 
attributable) is clearly inseparable frcan that of the other^ since 
the function of each is described properly only with reference 
to the other*
Langley and the Wright brothers respectively^ built the 
aeroplanes they conceived, wishing to do so for the-satisfaction 
of the achievement* But if I wish an aircraft, chair, etc., to 
come into existence, being at the same time unable or unwilling 
to make it myself, I may well find my wish reamin unfilfilled unless 
I take into account the relevance of desire to see it fulfilled on 
the part of a person^ or persons^ capable of achieving this* Thus 
a manufacturer who fails to make conditions of employment sufficient*
ly attractive finds himself unable to obtain sufficient labour or tS
uiith (> 4
faced by strikes fgem his employees* The statements of government 
spokesmen on the recruitment of labour for aircraft production,
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for instance, has testified to their having found consideration of 
•final causation* important in this context.
To those who deny Aristotle’s conception of minds, physical 
objects, and the material constituents of the latter, as persistent 
entities, the foregoing paragraphs inevitably have a meaning 
different from that which they would have for Aristotle or the man 
in the street. But the rejection of this conception renders them 
no less significant or true. As ordinarily interpreted, an 
assertion that this is an object capable of flight because it is 
composed of certain materials in accordance with a specified design, 
or that this is an object incapable of flight because of the nature 
of its design or constituent materials, or both, says something true 
and explanatory about persistent entities. But this is not all.
It has been seen (63) that^ on the commonsense interpretation^ such 
an assertion also says something about actual and possible sense 
experience. A philosopher may deny the truth of the assertion 
concerning persistent entities by denying the interpretation of 
experience it involves; but he cannot deny that about possible 
experience unless he is prepared to assert no more than he actually 
experiences. Furthermore, though interpreted solely as assertions 
concerning actual and possible experiences, statements referring to 
an object’s material constituents are not synonymous with those 
referring to its design. For instance, so interpreted^the sentences 
•This is an object incapable of flight on account of its design*^ and 
•This is an object incapable of flight on account of the materials 
of which it is composed’^ express clearly distinguishable assertions
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oonceming actual and possible experiences* The former asserts 
among other things that no experience of the type we describe 
as ’seeing an aeroplane fly* is possible unless it is also possible 
to see or feel * certain shaped surfaces in given relations one to 
another*, or more precisely »one or other of a finite series of 
differently shaped surfaces^ in one or other of a finite series of 
mutual relations*. v/hile the latter asserts that the experience 
of ’seeing a machine fly* is possible only if certain experiences
of ’hardness and resistance* and given more precisely specifiable
(
experiences of ’reactions of material (e,g* to stress and strain 
tests) are also obtainable»
It must, therefore, be admitted that on any interpretation of 
experience, Aristotle’s ’four causes* are distinguishable factors 
relevant to the explanation of the existence of artificial products, 
factors moreover knowledge of three (and sometimes all) of which 
seems indispensable to their coming into existence (i.e. of the 
truth of the assertions about possible experience implied by 
sentences like *A chair exists’). To say so much, however, is not 
to admit the Aristotelian explanation of other phenomena in terms 
of the ’four causes’. Nor does it involve adopting the Aristotelian 
use of the term ’cause’ with regard to artificial production. It is, 
for instance, consistent with the refusal to apply the tern to 
Aristotle’s ’formal cause’ on the ground that its ’effect’ is not 
inferrible from it. And it is certainly not to assert that the 
Aristotelian account of artificial production should be acceptable 
on any view of experience. For the phenomenalist, though he must 
take into account what Aristotle and plain men regard as the
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character and constituent materials of objects, can neither 
suppose the latter a persistent something, nor the former a 
character exemplified in this or anything else. He cannot 
therefore regard such production, like Aristotle, as essentially 
the conferring of a given character. Nor of course can he conceive 
the roles of ’efficient* and ’final cause' as does Aristotle.
Aristotle's treatment of the ’formal cause’ in this context 
is, indeed, open to criticism even though artificial production be 
regarded as essentially the conferring of a ppeoific character.
For it is of great importance, for practical purposes as well as in 
the interest of clarity for its own sake, to distinguish a condition 
of A*s existence, which is not also a condition of its coming into 
existence, from those that are. Ahd this is a distinction which is 
obscured by Aristotle’s treatment of the ’formal cause*. It was 
seen (6 4 ) that, in his explicit formulation of the fourfold 
classification, Aristotle defines a ’formal cause’ as the character 
which makes anything an existent of a given specific lature: e.g.
the character in virtue of which this marble is a statue. And it 
has been observed (6 5) that, as such, a ’formal cause* is inseparable 
from its ’effect*. But clearly, so conceived, A ’s ’formal cause* 
cannot be regarded as a condition of A*s coming into existence, since 
a character can only be so regarded as ’ formal cause’ of A while A 
is actually existing. Yet in the physics as has been seen (66) he 
presents the fourfold classification as an adequate analysis of the 
explanation of change, which suggests that the * formal cause’ is to 
be regarded as a condition of the coming into existence of its ’effect*.
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Certainly he elsewhere (6 7) identifies ’formal* and ’efficient 
cause’ maintaining that the agent produces his or its ’effect’ in 
virtue of possessing the latter’s form in itself. But, as will be 
argued below^(63) this is clearly a different use of the term 
’formal cause’ from that outlined in his definitions; and hence far 
from removing the inconsistency involved in the explicit 
formulation of his doctrine in the ^ ysica, merely adds a further 
inconsistency to his usage.
presumably, in postulating ’form’ as one of the ’causes’ of 
change^Aristotle is v/ishing to affirm it to be one of the essential 
factors in change in that all change consists in the imposition of 
some ’form’ upon some matter’; but his explicit definition of ’formal 
cause’ certainly does not make this clear. Nor is the imposition 
of a ’form’ identifiable with that ’form’ (e.g. giving wood the 
’form of a chair’ is not itself the ’form’ or nature of a chair)' so 
that it remains necessary to distinguish the condition of con­
stituting an A which is its ’foim’^ from the conditions of a change 
which consists in the giving of that ’form’ to some ’Matter*. And 
it is precisely this distinction which Aristotle fails to make 
explicit.
(d). The general application of the fourfold classification.
If, like V/.E.Johnson (6 9) one holds that all change pre­
supposes a persistent subject^then one must agree with Aristotle 
that all change consists in the conferring of a specific character. 
For, at the least, when a distinctive event occurs in the history 
of a continuant clearly the latter is describable in terms
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inapplicable to it at any other time. And if ’people* and 
’physical objects’ are properly to be regarded as continuants 
then many events and event series are to be regarded as conferring 
on those continuants^ characters persisting through a longer or 
shorter period. if, moreover, one holds with Aristotle both that 
nothing is inexplicable and that there is no quality or event which 
is not attributable to a continuant, then one must suppose every 
change dependent on a continuant analogous to Aristotle’s 
’efficient cause’. (Teleology^ or the general application of 
explanation in terras of ’final causes’^ demands separate discussion^ 
and will accordingly be considered below), (70)
If, as has been suggested, phenomenalism is false, then there 
are at least some changes which consist in the reception of a 
specific character; it seems unlikely, however, that in defining 
change^ Aristotle was intending to give an account of some varying 
event series while admitting others to fall outside his theory.
To justify his position, therefore, it is necessary to do more 
than show phenomenalism to be untenable; rather must it be shown 
that no succession of different events is possible unless its 
members are attributable to continuants; e.g. it would have to be 
shown that claps of thunder and lightning flashes, for instance, 
must be attributable to the histories of continuants. As commonly 
understood, ’change’ presupposes something that changes ; but 
clearly to defend Aristotle’s position it is not enough to point 
this out. It is, indeed, difficult to avoid circularity in 
defending the interpretation of experience in terms of continuants^
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Since the words we use to describe it are generally defined in terms 
of that interpretation. Thus it seems clearly self-contradictory to 
dpeak of a quality existing independently of any continuant^ since 
’quality’ is ordinarily defined as something qualifying, or attribut­
able to something else. In discussing whether any experience can 
be interpreted other than in terms of continuants, one is asking not 
whether qualities can exist without qualifying, or parts of a history 
without being elements in a histoiy (which would be clearly nonsensical)y 
but whether experience is to be interpreted solely in terras of 
continuants or whether sense data or other existants may occur which 
neither persist through any change nor are either characteristics or 
effects, of any other existent.
Johnson aipgues (71) that every event must constitute part of a 
continuant’s history since an event is only definable with reference 
to such a continuant, or rather to the potentialities of such an one.
As an example he cites drinking ether which is adequately defined only 
by reference to the ’causal properties’ of ether. To this it might 
be countered that to say, correctly, that drinking ether is adequately 
describable only wit^ reference to the ’ potentialities of etherneed 
mean no more than that it is correct to describe an event as ’ drinking 
ether* only when certain hypothetical assertions about experience are 
true; and similarly with the description of other events.
A little later Johnson argues that ’causation* presupposes the 
attribution of ’cause’ and ’effect’ events to continuants^on the 
ground that only so can one event be supposed to determine another.
He offers physical and psychological evidence for his view. He
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contends (72) in the first place,that 'the character, date, and 
location* of one movement can determine that of another only 'if 
the same material continuant is manifested in the two movements * *
And again he avers (73) that, similarly,* the character and date* of 
a sensation can only be supposed determinative of those of a thought 
process 'if, in the simplest case, the same psychical continuant is 
existentially manifested both in the sensation and the thought process'. 
The wording of these arguments is somewhat unhappy in that it suggests 
Johnson to be contending that only immanent causation is possible - a
view which he certainly does not hold since he is careful (74) to
distinguish transeunt and immanent causation, regarding them as 
correlative processes. The parenthetic 'in the simplest case' in 
the second argument must,therefore,be regarded as exemplifying a 
general intention of asserting the simplest hyposthesis consistent 
with the determination of one event by another, to be their joint 
attribution to one continuant*
There is no doubt that for Johnson, as for many others, an
essential ground for postulating a 'causal* connection between events
is always their attribution to continuants. Thus he supposes one 
movement to entail the prior or subsequent occurrence of another 
because he attributes it to a moving continuant, and holds continuants 
to move in a certain manner under given conditions. And similarly he 
supposes one psychological experience to depend on, or determine, 
another in virtue of laws governing the behaviour of persistent minds, 
and so on. For him, therefore, it is true that to deny the reference 
of an event to a continuant, is to sacrifice the ground for calling it
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* cause' or 'effect'. But this is not universally true. There 
is no inherent contradiction in supposing that events not referable 
to continuants, might always occur consistently with the truth of 
certain sets of hypothetical assertions about experience. And were 
this so,the occurrence of one event could be said to depend on that 
of another. Moreoever were it unjustifiable to regard such 
regularities as universal, the available evidence might yet point to 
their always having obtained in the past; and were this so the 
occurrence of one event might still be justly inferred from that of 
another. If, therefore, 'causation' be defined in terras of de facto 
regularity in general, dependence, or inferribility, there is no 
inherent need for a 'cause* or 'effect* event to be attributed to any 
continuant. If, however, 'causation* is defined in terms of 
intrinsic connection the position is less simple. In the first place 
there could be no intrinsic connection between events not attributable 
to continuants, unless they were temporally continuous. For since 
such an event would contain nothing which existed prior to itself, were 
any two wholly successive, or wholly simultaneous, neither could con­
tain anything in virtue of which either could be connected with any 
time other than that in which it actually existed. This would not 
ordinarily preclude the modem British philosopher from admitting the 
possibility of intrinsic 'causal' connection between such isolated 
events, or analogous existants, since most modem British philosophers 
suppose 'causal sequence* continuous. Again, if two events are 
continuous,at least one of thaamust have duration; but this, in its 
turn, does not preclude the ascription of continuity to isolated
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events» For the refusal to attribute events to continuants need 
mean, not the unqualified denial of their persistence, but merely 
the denial of their persistence through change»
But although an intrinsic 'causal* connection between continjious 
isolated events, or analogous existents,may thus be admitted possible; 
we have no adequate ground for postulating such a connection between 
any given phenomena so conceived» If two phenomena are each regard­
ed as neither containing ^ nor characterising, anything existing prior 
to itself; one can be said to determine, or be necessary to the other 
intrinsically, only if it either creates that other *out of nothing*
< I
or enables it to come into existence *out of notherg respectively - 
i.e. is capable of rendering it either necessary or possible that 
whereas at one minute there is nothing from which A could develop 
or be formed by a process of any length, at a subsequent time A 
should exist. And whether or no a philosopher allows the possibility 
of either of these contingencies, he can hardly claim to understand 
how either can be achieved. Neither, therefore, could he claim to 
discover,by inspection,such a relation between phenomena regardes! 
as thus isolated, since he would not know for what to look. And 
this ignorance would equally preclude him from seeing the character 
of any such phenomenon to entail, in itself, its so conditioning, or 
being conditioned by, another. Nor could he defend the ascription 
of such a relation to them on any of the gounds on which the belief 
in God's having originally created the universe 'out of nothing*, has 
been defended. We have, for instance, no ground for ascribing to 
any transient phenomenon an overflowing goodness and love, prompting
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it to create something apart from itself to he an additional object 
of its love and recipient of its goodness. Again, while if one 
allows everything to be explicable and deny the eternity of the 
physical universe, however conceived, one must hold that universe 
to have originally come into existence 'out of nothing' through the 
agency of a self-explanatory, and hence eternal, being; clearly one 
could use no such argument to defend the ascription of a like 
creative role to a transitory existent. Nor is there any inductive 
ground for postulating intrinsic 'causal* connection between 
phenomena, if these are not conceived in terms of continuants. It 
was seen (75) that when interpreted in terms of phenomenalism the 
'causal laws' ordinarily asserted must be regarded as affirming the 
occurrence of experiences of a given type in a specific context 
when certain hypothetical assertions are true# And it is further 
undeniable that the available evidence contradicts the assertion of 
regular correlations between actual experiences independently of 
the truth of any hypothetical assertion# Thus, for instance, while 
the evidence indicates that the experience of 'turning on a certain 
switch* is always followed by an experience of illumination if 
certain hypothetical assertions are true; this sequence has failed 
to occur when there has been evidence inconsistent with the truth of 
hypotheses such as—that if there occurs an experience describable 
as 'looking in a certain fuse box', there will be another describable 
as 'seeing a given wir$ intact'. And since the truth of a set of 
hypothetical assertions cannot be regarded as an actual existent or 
existants, phenomena or no; it follows that if phenomena are not
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attributed to continuants there is no evidence of regular 
correlations holding simply between one existent or complex of 
existents^or its actual states or relations^and any other actual 
conditions. But the only inductive ground for supposing A such 
that it cannot exist in the Absence of B, is evidence of the non­
existence of A in the absence of B.
Since Aristotle clearly regarded an 'effect# as intrinscially 
dependent on its 'cause», he would not, therefore, have been justified 
in asserting specific 'causal' connection among phenomena had he not 
interpreted series of different events in terms of continuants^and 
hence as exemplifying 'change' in the sense of the conferring of a 
character on something already existing*
Whether or no one agree with Aristotle that all successions 
of different events are properly analysable in terms of his 'four 
causes', it cannot justly be denied that for practical purposes it 
is inconvenient, and may indeed be positively misleading, to 
describe phenomena other than artifical production in terms of them*
I shall confine myself to pointing out the inconvenience of so 
describing generation,since this is the subject of Aristotle's most 
frequent use of the fourfold analysis*
Very little thought is needed to show the inadequacy of his 
describing generation simply as the bestowal of a given specific* 
'form' or nature on 'matter'* For although an animal, like a chair 
or an aircraft, can be described as certain materials ordered in 
a specific manner; generation, unlike the making of a chair or a 
statue, cannot be described merely as a process whereby those
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materials are ordered in that way* Rather would it have to be 
regarded as one which includes the production of most of the 'matter* 
eventually so ordered* To describe it in terms of the imposition of 
'form' on 'matter' one would, for instance, have to say that it is a 
process in which the 'matter* which is some of the chemicals in the 
soil-or some of the mother's food (as it is the generation of plant 
or animal respectively), receives the ^ form^  which renders it 'matter* 
adapted to become an organism of a given type; this in its turn re­
ceiving the 'form* which makes it such an organism* But even this 
would be a misleading oversimplification; for generation cannot be 
regarded simply as the consecutive conferring of two 'forms* i*e* the 
production of plant fibres or of flesh blood, bones, nerves and sinews, 
followed by their being formed into an organism of a given type.
Rather must it be regarded as a process in v/hich cells or minute pieces 
of 'matter* having a given 'form* increase in size by the addition of 
fresh 'matter*, and in number by dividing as one worm becomes many; 
and the ever increasing cell-group exhibits first one structure and 
then another, until finally that characteristic of the complete organism 
is reached. Further, neither bone nor sinew is present in the 
embruo's original cell structure, but both are produced concomitantly 
with its growth and structural development* And, indeed, even when 
'matter* exhibiting the characteristic structure of the organism 
generated can at length be said to exist, this still has to increase 
in size (in animals, both before and after birth). This means that^ 
not only is more of the appropriate 'matter* produced and added to itj 
but that the materials added to, must continue to alter their mutual
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correlations in order that with the additional 'matter*, they may 
constitute the same structure as they previously did without it*
One might indeed say that throughout the process of generation,
♦forms* first different and then alike are being continuously con­
ferred on ’matter*, or rather on different collocations of ’matter*.
To speak, therefore, as Aristotle habitually does, of father 
or spermatazoon as simply conferring the 'form* of a given animal 
species on ’matter* within the mother,is thus a gross oversimplifica­
tion (quiteapart from the biological inaccuracy in his failure to 
realise that the father contributes some of the ’matter* of which 
the offspring is originally composed, and that ovum and spermatazoon, 
once conjoined, may^be said-(«in the common parlance which he acEepts^ 
* to act on one another*). Doubtless the whole generative process 
could be described in terras of events attributable to * physical 
objects* (however these are conceived), on which the exhibition of 
specified ’forms* in corresponding 'matter* appears to depend; but 
it is equally certain that it must consist in a very long series of 
such events, the precise description of it in these terms being both 
long and complex (and thus very unlike that proffered by Aristotle).
To describe generation correctly in these terms would, therefore^ seem 
to be very inconvenient and, in all probability, a practical im­
possibility to the human intellect.
It seems probable that Aristotle failed to see the over­
simplification of his account of generation because, though realizing 
the final structure of the generated organism to be reached only 
later, he regards conception-or fertilization-as conferring the 
species of the complete organism on that resulting from it. This
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is the usual attitude; the man in the street regards the aoom as 
of the same species as the oak, the human embryo as that of man, the 
hen*3 egg as that of the hen, the frog* s spawn as that of the frog* 
And, indeed, this is in accordance with a recognised and necessary 
form of biological classification. When the biologist speaks of 
biological species^ he is intending to distinguish,not actual 
characteristics, nor existent? in firtue of actual characteristics; 
but various series of material-groups in which no group has not some 
matter in common with its successor and some with its predecessor.
The biologist might express this by saying that bièlogical species 
are Bset types^of static existants (or characteristics of such an one), 
but of developing organisms. Many would interpret the latter 
sentence as ascribing, in addition, a greater degree of unity and 
continuity to such series than many mo»iern philosophers would think 
justified, supposing for example tliat in acom, seedling, sapling, 
and oaktree (when common members of such a series) is to be found a 
common entity in different stages of development. Thus the plain 
man having planted lettuce seèd, will point to plants subsequently 
growing at the same place and say There are the lettuces I planted*— . 
convinced that he sees *what he planted* after this has undergone 
some alteration and addition. The modem critic of this view points 
out that not only is there neither structural nor material identity 
between seed or embryo and full grown organism, but that the latter 
may contain none of the ’matter* present in the former - as in fact 
is true of the human organism. This being so, they urge, it is 
both mistaken and misleading to speak as though identity is maintained
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throughout an organism’s history.
Whether one agree with this criticism or no, one cannot^ 
without refusing the evidence of experience^hold it reasonable 
to deny the truth of hypothetical assertions consistent with, and 
expressible in terms of, the existence series of material groups 
in which there is no group not having some matter in common with 
its predecessor, and some in common^ with its successor. Nor can 
one with any justification reject the hypothesis that such series 
would be of different types. For experience, though rich in 
evidence for both hypotheses, provides none which supports the 
rejection of either.
Furthermore there is strong evidence for ascribing regularity 
to such series. Repeated observations have provided good evidence 
consistent with the assertion that * a seed which has come from a 
lettuce’ always belongs to such a series, which latter also contained 
previously *a full grown lettuce*, and will, under certain 
circumstances, later contain another. And observation has further 
provided good evidence consistent with the conclusion that, under 
given circumstances, such a seed has always the same relation within 
a series of this type to an earlier and later lettuce, and likewise 
has always the same relation within it to a material group of any 
one specified type aiïiong those regularly found within it. And the 
evidence is further consistent with analogous conclusions about 
lettuces. And similar evidence has been amassed relevant to e%ch 
analogous postulated series which has been subjected to investigation.
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If, therefore, the assertion^at fertilisation is produced 
a seed or embryo of the same type as the complete organism of which 
this is the forerunner*^is intended to be understood as saying 
that at fertilisation is produced a material group belonging to such 
a series which is similar in type to that to which another group 
of a given character belongs; then it must be admitted that this 
is an assertion consistent with the evidence, and one moreover 
whose denial on any ground other than the refusal to interpret any 
of the phenomena involved in terms of continuants at all, must on 
any view be regarded as inconsistent with the evidence. But it 
must also be admitted that it is quite unlike the assertion which 
Aristotle intends to raeke when he says that a craftsman confers the 
form of a statue or bronze or marble. If, therefore, the former 
is what he intends to assert in saying that at fertilisation the 
* form* of a complete organism is conferred on ’matter*, his usage, 
in suggesting both assertions to be analogous, is so misleading as 
to call for unequivocal condemnation. And even t hough it be 
allowed, as indeed it must, that Aristotle supposes there is some­
thing which may be said to persist through the development of an 
organism, and which may further be said in some sense to possess a 
given nature throughout; to speqk of conferring the form of such an 
one must still be regarded as saying something very different from 
speaking of conferring the form of a table or chair. For if some­
thing can be said to persist throughout the development of an 
organism, and to exhibit the same nature throughout, clearly it 
must be supposed * to be one* and 'possess one nature* in a sense
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very different from that in which Aristotle supposed this to be 
true of chairs and tables.
Not only does Aristotle adopt an usage so ambigyous^in his 
general application of the fourfold analysis; but he appears to 
be unaware of its ambiguity, completely failing either to point 
this out or to make his ov/n position explicit. Clearly if a 
general application of the fourfold analysis is to be adequate^it 
demands a much préciser examination of both the notions concerned 
and the phenomena to which they are applicable.
(e) Aristotle's identification of *formal*, final* and 
* efficient cause! '
Having carefully distinguished *the four causes’ one from 
the other, Aristotle disconcertingly proceeds to remark (7 6) that 
three of these may be regarded as identical* This might, at first 
sight^appear simple self-contradiction; for clearly to distinguish 
A a n d  G,is to deny their identity in at least one respect. But 
the very evidence of the contradiction involved if Aristotle's 
assertion of identiy between these three ’causes’ is understood in 
the same sense as his distinction between them, makes it unlikely 
that he should have been guilty of it. J think, therefore, that 
in asserting the identity of ’formal*, ’final* and * efficient cause*, 
which he previously distinguished, Aristotle must be understood as 
saying that there is one factor in change - namely ’form* - which 
may be said to fulfil three distinct explanatory roles. It seems 
to me that he must be regarded as saying in effect; (a) that 
exhibiting a given ’forra*^  or specific nature^ is a condition of this
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’matter’ constituting a certain type of existent - exhibition of 
that nature being properly called ’formal cause* of such a thing’s 
existence; (b) that it is only in virtue of possessing this same 
specific nature in some manner that an agent is able to confer it 
on ’matter* - that nature’s thjrs making possible the process con­
stituting its being conferred on something else being properly 
called ’efficient cause* of that so produced; (c) that the 
exemplification of that specific nature is the ’end’ of the process 
by which such an object is produced, that towards which it is 
directed - and as such it is a ’final cause*. Thus he holds that 
marble can constitute a statue only bg exhibiting a certain type of 
character, which in this role constitutes its ’fornoal cause*; and 
he further supposes a statue could not come into existence were not 
an idea of that character in the mind of a sculptor^ enabling him
to make it and thus constituting its real ’efficient cause’; and
finally he holds the process^thus made possible^to be diredted to 
the exemplification of that character (the attainment of which end 
being also in this instance a conscious purpose provoking that 
process)—which constitutes it a ’final cause’.
This interpretation of Aristotle’s * identification’ of ’formal*, 
’finaland 'efficient cause*^ is b o m  out by many passages. The 
above view of the role of a ’form’ or character constituting it a 
’formal cause’ is evidenced by Aristotle’s explicit definitions of 
’formal cause*, where he defines such an one simply as an ’essence*
or specific character (77) whose most obvious rolejf and that
attributed to it when Aristotle refers to it without qualification, 
as in discussing the possibility of producing a form^(78) is that
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of constituting a quantity of ’matter* a specific type of 
existent. The above interpretation of the role of *form* as 
’efficient cause* is made explicit in the De Generatione Animalium* 
(79) where Aristotle affirms that ’as the products of art are made
by means  ....... of the art, and the art is the form of what
is made in something else’ so is it in generation. And this 
interpretation is further supported by other passages. Thus in 
the chapter in the physics devoted exclusively to the analysis of 
’causation’, a builder is said to build ’in virtue of his art of 
building’; (80) while in the Metaphysics (81) ’the building art’ is 
described as ’the fonri of the house*. And the above interpretation 
of the role of *form* as ’final cause’ is supported by many 
passages. Not merely in his explicit definitions of ’final 
causation’, but constantly throughout his works (82) Aristotle 
describes, and refers to ’final causes’ as those ’for the sake of 
which’ changes occur. And it is sufficiently clear that the role 
fif a form as that ’for the sake of which* or to attain wliich, a 
change occurs is very different from its role as characterising 
that brought about by the change. This distinction seems 
evident in one of the passages (83) which, in Aristotle’s 
terminology, treat ’fomal* and ’final cause* as ’identical* - where 
he v/rites of the products of change ; ’cause in the sense of their 
’end’ is their ’figure* or ’form* - and that is the formula ex­
pressing the essential nature of each of them*. For clearly 
though to say A^s existence is the adiievement of the exemplification 
of a given character iraplires that A exemplifies that character, the
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two assertions are not synonymous; for the one states the ’forms* 
relation to the process of change ending in its exemplification^ 
while the other^ states its role in the constitution of that 
exemplifying it.
But although one must allow the consistency of Aristotle’s 
fourfold classification of ’causes’ with what he intends to assert 
in affirming the ’identity’ of three of them; one must nevertheless 
deplore his mode of expressing it as wholly misleading. The fore­
going should have made it clear that^  though for Aristotle a ’form’
can and does fulfil the role of ’formal.’finaland ’efficient
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cause’, the three latter terms are by no means synonymous as they 
would be were it correct to describe ’formal’, ’finaland 
’efficient causes’ as ’identical*. Aristotle’s terminology^ 
therefore^ both lays him open to a charge of verbal inoons is teneur 
and fails to express his meaning accurately according to the 
linguistic rules ordinarily exemplified in his writing.
It remains to ask whether what he intends to assert in affirm­
ing the ’identity’ of ’formal’, ’final’ and ’efficient cause’ is 
justified. It is at once evident that his contention, even on 
its simplest and most obvious interpretation, is by no means un­
founded. All the changes which he considers may be, and by him 
must be, regarded as directed towardd the exemplification of a 
specific character-^this exemplification in its turn being regarded 
as that which makes the outcome of such change v/hat it is.
Moreover there is good inductive evidence that many of Aristotle’s 
’efficient causes’ possess, in some sense, the ’form* which they
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confer. Sculptors have not been found to produce statues 
without having an idea of the character of a statue^ plants and 
animals which differ specifically from what may be regarded as 
the nature common to both parents, are not generated. And the 
two other types of * efficient causation* most frequently mentioned 
in his works are: the passage of heat from a warmer to a colder body, 
and a body’s being set, or kept, in motion by being pushed or 
pulled by another already moving. Nevertheless the * identification* 
of ’formal* with both ’final* and ’efficient causeis a less simple 
question than this^each ’identification* indeed, raising its own 
problems and demand for clarification*
I will deal first with the ’identification’ of ’formal* and 
’final cause’, as the simpler and that of least historical importance. 
While it is undeniable that for Aristotle all change must be directed 
towards the exemplification of the character in fact conferred by 
it, it is equally true that he himself postulates ’final causes* 
consisting in the achievement of sonB thing different in character 
from the ’effect’ he attributes to th«n* Thus, for instance, he 
specifies the attainment of power as a possible ’final cause* of 
going to war^; (84) and clearly the achievement of power is 
specifically distinct from going to war^ even when the former results 
from the latter* Nor can going to war even be identified with 
the process of achieving power^ since cléarly if one side gains 
power by going to war^ the other must lose it. This example makes 
it clear that if ’formal’ and ’final cause* are to be ’identified’ 
in the sense in which Aristotle frequently asserts them to be.
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’final cause’ cannot be identified with purpose if this extends 
beyond an immediate course of action such as going to war or 
producing a statue. For it has not been unknown for a race or 
ruler to go to war to acliieve power and to fail to achieve that end. 
And there are many other instances when action is undertaken to 
achieve a purpose^but is unsuccessful in this. if therefore ’formal* 
and ffinal cause* are ’identifiable* in the Aristotelian sense, such 
unfulfilled purposes can be called ’final cause* of no actual ’effect*.
And if this * identification* is maintained, then even when a 
long term purpose, such as the achievement of power, is fulfilled^one 
would have to distinguish between the purpose constituting its ’final 
cause’^ and the subsidiary purpose properly called ’final cause’ of 
the means adopted to achieve this end. For instance one would have 
to distinguisjjc between the purpose of achieving power as ’final cause* 
of the whole process culminating in its achievement, and the 
incidental purpose of going to v/ar properly to be regarded as ’final 
cause* of this condition of, or means to, that end. Here once more, 
so far from attempting to clarify the ambiguities in his position, 
Aristotle appears unaware of them.
The ’identification* of * formal’ and ’efficient cause’ is of 
considerable historical importande as the source of the conviction 
that a ’cause’ must resemble its ’effect*. The modem philosopher 
will at once point out that^ if we are justified at all in postulating 
* efficient causes* in the Aristotelian sense, we must postulate many 
to which we have no ground for attributing the character of their 
'effedts*. Thus it may be said that the bacteria which might be
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described as ’efficient cause* of a person’s suffering from food 
poisoning, have not themselves the characteristics of one so 
afflicted; nor, unlike mumps* and measles* germs, can they even 
be supposed to come normally from such an one. Nor, it might be 
pointed out, could we be supposed to have any ground for supposing 
bacteria to have the idea of the illness they produce, as does a 
sculptor of the statue he chisels. Such an argument, however, 
while it would show a modem philosopher unjustified in holding 
that an ’efficient cause’ must either entertain the idea of its 
’effect’^ or actually exhibit the same specific character; could 
/ should Aristotle to be unjustified in supposing so^only if it could 
show this to be untrue of one of the * efficient causes’ he recognised. 
It might perhaps, be contended that, in postulating unmoved movers 
Aristotle himself was alloiving the existence of ’efficient causes* 
lacking that which they produce - namely motion. But it seems 
sufficiently clear that although Aristotle insists (85) that all 
motion presupposes some physical objedt which is at least relatively 
motionless, the only unmoved movers he postulates which he can 
properly regard as«efficient causes’ are God and other minds, which 
can be regarded as conceiving the motion they produce as a sculptor 
conceives the statue he chisels. To speak of an animal’s soul in 
the sense of its ’form* or character^insofar as this is exhibited 
by it} as ’cause’ of its motion, is to say that an animal is such 
as to move-.which is clearly not to attribute an ’efficient cause’ 
to its motion in the sense in which a builder could be called 
* efficient cause’ of a house, or nerves and muscles (or even the
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mind insofar as its conscious intentions could be regarded as
S upposeci
stimulating nerves and muscles) could be rogaydod ’efficient cause’ 
of movement* Nor can the relatively stationary earth and joints 
which ^fidtotle regards as conditions of walking in providing some­
thing firm against vrhich the limbs can push, or the relatively static 
shore which he cites as fulfilling the same function when a boat is 
pushed off, (86) be regarded as ’causing* in a sense analogous to 
producing a statue or bowl or generating* Yet Aristotle does seem 
to postulate one type of * efficient cause* which can in no sense be 
said to confer a character in virtue of possessing it, namely the 
heavenly bodies insofar as their movement is regarded as bringing 
about; or making possible^'•‘generation and decay in general*
For aristotle insists that they themselves are incorruptible, 
and as there seems to be no question of choice in the matter since 
the movements of the heavenly bodies are regarded as determined, the 
attribution of them of minds (which is sometimes suggested) which 
could conceive this ’effect* would seem irrelevant*
It seems to me, however, that #ien Aristotle maintains that 
an ’efficient cause’ must possess the ’form’ of its ’effect*, he 
does not mean that the former must either exhibit the latter or 
entertain an idea of it* This is indicated both by his attribution 
of the ’form’ conferred to the instruments used by the ’efficient 
cause’ in producing its ’effect’ and by^-ferms in which he asserts 
this* It is indicated by the mere attribution of the ’form’ thus 
conferred to these instruments, since these clearly do not exhibit 
it as does the ’effect’, nor can they be supposed to entertain its
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idea* Chisel and saw obviously do not exhibit the characteristics 
of statue and chair respectively, and it seems as obviously un­
reasonable to suppose either tool to entertain an idea of the object
it is instrumental in producing* And this conclusion is confirmed 
by the passage in the do Ceneratione Anaimalium (87) already quoted 
in part, where Aristotle writes; ’as the products of art are made 
by means of the tools of the artist, or to put it more truly by
means of their movement, and this is the activity of the art, and
the art is the form of what is made in something else, so it is vdth 
the power of the nutritive soul’. For the most obvious interpretation 
of the assertion that a statue is produced ’by the activity of the 
art’ (here explicitly identified with Yorm’) is that it is brought 
into being by the active fulfilment of the power to iiaake it. And 
this interpretation is supported by Aristotle’s explicitly asserting 
this role of art or ’form’ in artificial production to be analogous 
to ’#be power of the nutritive soulwhich latter cqn hardly be 
regarded as other than its ability to produce growth and generation*
It therefore seems that ascribing the ’form’ it confers to an agent 
or instrument, is, for Aristotle, essentially the ascription to it of 
the power to confer that ’form’ - to which power exhibiting the ’form’ 
in question, or entertaining its idea, is not always necessary.
It will be objected that^if in ascribing the ’form’ it confers 
to agent or instrument Aristotle need be regarded as attributing to 
it no more than the power of producing a given ’effect’, his 
contention is a useless tautology. That it is tautologous in the 
sense that to call A agent or instrument in the production of is
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to call it capable of either bringing B into existence or enabling 
it to come into existence, |ls indubitable. That it is useless 
cannot, I think,be regarded as true unless all definition is re­
garded as useless. And it seems clear that a definition is useful 
at least insofar as it makes explicit how a terra is being used,çr 
at least how it is meant to be used. And the definition under 
consideration seems to me extremely important in this respect.
That the power of conferring a ’form’ can be regarded as possession 
of that ’form’ and a significant condition of conferring it, depends 
entirely on the view of ’causal’ connection as intrinsic.
Aristotle, in supposing an ’effect’ intrinsically dependent on its 
’cause’ was thereby justified in, and indeed comitted to, the 
suppostion that every agent and instrument is essentially such as
A
either to produce or make possible its’effect’ (as this is necessary 
or no respectively). And this is to regard that capacity as 
intrinsic to the agent’s or instrument’s definition^which may thus 
be said to include that of its ’effect’^ or, to put it another way, 
it is to suppose it impossible fully to understand the character 
of the agent or instrument without understanding that of its ’effect’ 
Thus, for instance, on this view, to fully understand the character 
of a chisel is to see it to be such that^under given circumstances^ 
it cannot but cut marble so precisely as to thus form it into a 
statue* Vi/hether a philosopher so conceives any or all ’causal 
conditions,clearly makes a great difference to his treatment of 
’causes’ and ’effects’, and his inferences from postulated ’causal’ 
connection^ and it is therefore of great importance to have his
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position in the matter made explicit.
Many philosophers who are far from being Aristotelians have 
so conceived ’causes’, many regarding them in addition as all 
intrinsically entailing the existence of their ’effects’. The 
notion has therefore played an important role in many discussions 
concerning, or assuming ’causation’, even among those who would be 
emphatic to deny ’resemblance’ between ’cause’ and ’effect’ or the 
’possession’ of its ’effect’s form’ by a ’cause’,
(f) Teleology.
As in many other features of his treatment of the ’four 
causes’; Aristotle’s statements about ’final causation’ are not free 
from ambiguity; but unlike his treatment of other aspects of the 
fourfold analysis, his view of ’final causation’ is itself inherently 
contradictory.
If one suppose the universe the voluntary creation of a G-od who 
is omnipotent, intelligent, and good; then one must hold,not only 
that its creation may be supposed to fulfil a purpose,but that its 
constituents are of such a nature and so arranged that this will be 
achieved as conveniently and adequately as possible. That is to 
say^  one must regard the constituent elements of the universe as 
analogous to the parts of a precise and delicate mechanism,each 
deliberately and carefully designed to fulfil a role contributory 
to some end such as the precise recording of radioactivity.
Although Aristotle maintains the existanteof a good and 
intelligent G-od, however^ he supposes neither Hini; nor anyone else, 
to have created the universe-which latter he regards as eternal.
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In his view therefore, though G-od is responsible (either directly 
or indirectly) for all change, He is not responsible for the universe’s 
basic constituents being such as to render possible certain t ypes 
of change under given conditions. Aristotle has, therefore, no 
ground for affirming teleology in the sense of conscious purpose 
governing everything within the universe; nor does he attempt to 
maintain this,but rather is explicit^ in its denial. For not only 
does he maintain (88) that it is unnecessary to ’observe the agent 
deliberating* in order to postulate ’final causation’ (a contention 
in itself quite consistent with the belief that the existence of 
such deliberation is yet inferrible), but proceeds to d efend this 
contention by arguing that deliberation itself is unnecessary to 
’final causation’. Thus he writes; (89) ’Art does not deliberate.
If the shipbuilding art were in the wood, it would produce the same 
results by nature. If, therefore, purpose is present in art, it is 
present also in nature’. And he adds, not wholly helpfully, ’The 
best illustration is a doctor doctoring himself; nature is like 
that’. (9o) This illustration is hardly ’the best’ as Aristotle 
optimistically suggests, since a doctor cures neither himself nor 
anyone else automatically without conscious thought. presumably 
Aristotle’s point is that as medicine is essentially directed 
towards the achievement of health, so is each natural process 
directed,of its nature,to the attainment of an end. The position 
he is intending to maintain in urging the universality of ’final 
causation’, would thus seem to be analogous to that of Leibniz (91) 
and Stout (92) insofar as they regard ’causal’ process^ properly”
225.
so-called;as essentially the fulfilment of an inherent tendency 
in that which changes. (Change, for them^being always referable 
to a continuant).
If a causal process is so conceived, however, its end, 
regarded as something distinct from itself, can be said to ’cause’ 
it neither in the sense of entailing it nor as that on which it is 
dependent, unless the change is regarded as the deliberate pursuit 
of that end either by the subject of the change or by another.
For clearly, save insofar as it can be entertained in thought and 
thus render a course of action either inevitable or merely possible, 
the end, as scxnething distinct from the process towards it, does not 
exist until achieved; and hence neither does a relation between it 
and the process tov/ards its achievement. An end, therefore, could 
be regarded as ’cause’ of the process towards it^  only insofar as it 
entered into the letter’s definition and hence into its ’formal 
cause’. That is to say that an end, not deliberately sought, could 
contribute to the explanation of the process towards it^  only in the 
sense that the question ’what makes this process what it is?’ could 
be answered with: ’its being intrinsically such as to achieve a 
specific type of end’. But this certainly does not seem to be what 
Aristotle intends either in affirming the ’final causation’ of 
phenomena other than voluntary human behaviour, nor in ’identifying’ 
’formal* and ’final cause*. My interpretation of the latter 
’ identification’ has already been outlined and defended, (93) The 
truth of the former assertion is witnessed by the fact that 
Aristotle makes it clear (94) that he supposes ’final causation*;
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outside the sphere of voluntary action, a determining principle 
to "Ahioh natural necessity is subordinate - a role which the 
former certainly could not fulfil in the capacity of 'formal 
cause’ in the strict sense of the terra.
Aristotle’s conviction that; in postulating ’final causation 
outside the sphere of voluntary action^he is opposing those who 
suppose physical processes to be necessary, is completely 
inconsistent with his postulation of non-deliberate ’final 
causation’ which can only be conceived as inherent tendency to 
achieve a given end* For, in effect, to say that A is intrinsically 
such as to progress to the achievement of B under given circumstances, 
is to say that it must alter in a certain manner under those 
conditions*
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iv. The significance of Aristotle’s postulation of chance.
Today, the adjectives ’chance’ and ’haphazard’ or ’lawless*, 
are generally treated as synonymous. Thus when a philosopher who 
postulates ’universal causation’ discusses ’chance eventsin the 
sense of those not justly inferrible with the confidence with which 
a well attested ’causal connection’ may be expected to hold; he 
generally insists that the element of ’chance’ is due to the 
limitation of our knowledge and is not, properly speaking attribut­
able to the events themselves, which must be supposed to exemplify 
regular correlations as must all other phenomena. At first sight, 
therefore, Aristotle’s insistence that there are events which may 
properly be said to happen ’by chance’ (95) might suggest to the 
modem reader that he supposed there were events which occurred 
irrespective of the character of any prior or simultaneous 
conditions.
It is clear, however, that though he aligns the ’chance’ with 
the ’indeterminate’^ (9 6) Aristotle does not suppose the ’chance’ 
events he postulates to occur at random. Thus he cites as instance 
of a chance event-A’a collecting a subscription from B because they 
happened to meet at C, though neither went there with the intention 
of meeting the other; but he does not suggest either’s being there 
then to have occurred at random* He says explicitly (97) ’the 
causes of the man’s coming and getting the money (when he did not 
come for the sake of that) are innumerable. He may have wished 
to see somebody or been following somebody or avoiding somebody, 
or may have gone to see a spectacle’.
228,
Aristotle’s definition of ’chance’ rests on his conception 
of ’final causation’, a ’chance’ event being for him one which 
is in fact the achievement of something (such as the collection 
of the subscription) the attainment of which might have been a 
conscious purpose which caused that event to occur (e.g, A might 
have gone to 0 because he intended to meet B there and collect his 
subscription). He confines the title ’chance’ to events which 
might have been deliberately intended, but supposes these a 
subsection of a wider class ’the spontaneous* which includes every 
efent which is the achievement of an end à  not describable
as its ’final cause’; as examples of ’spontaneous’ but not ’chance’ 
actions^ Aristotle cites a horse saving himself by coming to a 
aertain place although his action was not directed tov/ards that end, 
a tripod falling so as to form a seat although the attainment of 
this end could in no sense be called the ’ cause’ of its falling 
thus. His choice of examples might at first sight suggest that 
Aristotle regards the behaviour of non-rational things spontaneous 
when it might have fulfilled a deliberate purpose such as the 
intention of escaping# But as Aristotle^ in denying the end they 
achieve to be the ’final cause’ of ’spontaneous’ events, is 
intending to distinguish them from other non-rational behaviour, 
moreover reiterating at the outset of his discussion of chance 
(98) that of things ’which âre for the sake of something’ some 
’are in accordance with deliberate intention, others not’, it is 
clear that this is not so# Taking his treatment of ’chance’ 
events/ strictly so called) as an analogy, it seems that one must
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suppose that in denying the horse’s safety (which it in fact 
achieves) to be ’final cause’ of its coming, he is implying 
that there is another end properly so-called (e.g. his arriving 
here) to which his being saved is incidental. And similarly 
with the tripod’s fall; Aristotle’s view, presumably, is that 
its fall is intrinsically such that it must land on its feet, 
and that its landing so that it is capable of providing a seat 
is merely incidental to this.
This is, indeed, the most significant aspect of Aristotle’s 
treatment of ’chance’ and ’spontaneity’ in that it emphasises 
strikingly the fundamental: element in his conception of causation^ 
which has been seen to be intrinsic to his ’identification’ of 
’formal’ and ’efficient cause’, - namely the definition of a 
’cause’ properly so-called as the intrinsically necessary condition 
of its ’effect*. It is true that he does not refuse the title 
’cause’ to the ’accidental cause’, that which can be said to be 
a condition of A*s existence in virtue merely of a de facto 
correlation with an intrinsically necessary condition of A- But 
whenever he admits this usage^he is careful to distinguish the 
’accidental cause’ funm the cause ’per se’; his very practice of 
describing them so sufficiently testifying to his view of the 
matter. Moreoever, ordinarily when discussing anything’s 
’causes’^ he considers only what he regards as its intrinsically 
necessary conditions; and whenever he uses the term ’cause’ 
without the qualification ’per se’ or ’accidental’^ he applies it 
to such a condition thereby indicating that this is, to his mind
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the natural use of the term.
It is this conception of ’causation* rather than that of 
’final causation’ (which merely provides the framework in which 
his treatment of 'chance* is framed), which allows Aristotle to 
admit events which are ’chance’ or ’spontaneous’ in their own 
right, without admitting lawlessness within the universe. The 
’chance’ event is regarded as such^not because it occurs irres- 
spective of any condition, but because it depends on at least one 
condition which is not in itself intrinsically necessary to it.
Aristotle’s treatment of ’chance' and ’spontaneity’ is 
interesting and. important in that it leaves no doubt that, although 
Aristotle does not, as has been seen, (99) conceive ’causation’ in 
terms of ’natural law’ in the sense in which the modem philosopher 
generally does, he yet supposes a ’causal’ connection properly so- 
called exemplifies a law. (it will be clear from what has gone 
before that this may, and indeed often does, state merely the 
dependence of a given t^ rpe of effect on a specific ’cause’). For 
in distinguishing the ’ chance’ event from what can properly be 
described in terras of his ’four causes’ , he is in effect' distinguish­
ing an even’t dependence on a complex situation, from the specific 
dependencies he supposes the condition of this. His distinction 
is thus analogous to that between assertions like ’Arsenic causes 
death’ and those like ’The train crash caused his death*, when the 
latter is understood to assert the dependence of ’his death* on a 
complex situation in virtue of its exemplification of various ’laws* 
of dynamics and physiology.
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The distinction is extremely important in that it is a
condition of any comprehensive understanding of experience and
any reliable prediction. Complex situations, such as the
accidental meeting of A and B, and Z*s death in a train accident,
are rarely repeated in all their details; and when they are,
little is to be gained save evidence concerning complexes exactly
similar in type unless they may be regarded as exemplifying
principles of more general application. But this latter is
possible only if they are analysed in terms of ’laws* or
correlations there is reason to suppose exemplified both in these
and other situations. That Aristotle not only assumed this
distinction,but was careful to make it explicit, is significant 
ho
as testifying^his recognition of the importance this basic 
condition of science.
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y» The Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God.
Aristotle appears to have been the first philosopher to 
formulate the cosmological argument for the existence of God.
His use and treatment of the argument provides important evidence 
of the conceptions underlying his treatment of causation, his 
mode of framing it providing useful evidence of his use of terms. 
His use of the argument is, moreover, of considerable histarrical 
importance, since it was due to his influence on St. Thomas Aquinas 
that the essence of this argument became the generally accepted 
Christian demonstration of the existence of God; and there seems 
no doubt that its reappearance in more or less fresh guise in the 
works of Descartes and Leibniz was due to the intellectual climate 
thus created. perhaps even more important, historically were the 
notions presupposed in the argument, whose general acceptance 
therefore ensured their being so intrinsic to Europe’s intellectual 
atmosphere, that they were fundamental to much that was written 
by the outstanding seventeenth century philosophers who explicitly 
rejected the Aristotelianism which had governed European thought 
during the past three centuries.
Aristotle devotes some space to this argument which he 
formulates more than once (iQ#) but its essence may be briefly 
stated. It consists in deducing the existence of an unchanging 
source of cliange (in the sense of an unchanging ’efficient cause^ 
(loi.) on the ground that all change depends on a ’mover’or 
’efficient cause’ external to that in which it occurs, and no 
’causal’ series is infinite. The argument as formulated by
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Aristotle thus rests on his definition of change in terms of 
an agent’s conferring a specific character on a continuant.
And it also pre-supposes both the definition of ’causation’ in 
terms of the intrinsic dependence of ’effect’ on ’cause* and the 
belief that everything is explicable in the sense of existing in 
virtue of some condition (whether this latter is intrinsic or 
extrinsic to itselfwhich  have both been seen (103) to be 
demanded by the denial of an infinite regress. Indeed universal 
explicability, so understood, is the basic principle on which 
depend all the varying forms of this argument which philosophers 
hqve framed. For each of these cons is ts^  basically, in contending 
that there must be something the explanation of whose existence 
lies in itself, because there is something not thus self-explanatory 
or self-sufficient, whose existence would be inexplicable did it 
not derive from such an one. It has already been seen (1Q$.) that 
the phenomena of change, however interpreted, presuppose such a 
self-explanatory condition, if the principle of universale 
explicability is true. To deduce the existence of God, so 
conceived,from the principle of universal explicability, it is 
necessary indeed to know only that something exists, irrespective 
of knowing it not to be self explanatory. For given that the 
principle is true,and that something exists; then this something 
must either be self-explanatory, or else depend for its existence 
on something which is. Those philosophers who have used the 
cosmological argument, have done so, I think, because they wished 
to prove, not merely that there is something the explanation of
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whose existence lies in itself, but that this something is dis­
tinct from the phenomenal universe^to do which it is necessary 
to point out that this universe does not itself fulfil this role. 
That Aristotle supposes God to be distinct from the phenomenal 
universe whose changes depend on Him, is put beyond doubt by his 
combining the postulation of God as prime Mover (i.e. first 
’efficient cause’) with belief in the eternity of the universe.
It is thus clear that for him God is first ’efficient cause’, not 
as the first term in a succession of agents,but as a condition 
of their agency which lies outside that succession* His con­
ception of God is in this respect analogous to Kant’s conception 
of Things in Themselves; though Kant eschewed Aristotle’s 
terminology, confining the title 'cause* to phenomena, and denied 
the possibility of doing more than postulate such a condition 
(or conditions), while Aristotle supposed it possible to draw 
further conclusions concerning God*
Aristotle’s use and treatment of the cosmological argument 
has been seen to provide further evidence of the notions discover­
able throughout his treatment of causality - namely universal 
explicability; the interpretation of change as an agent’s con­
ferring a specific character on a continuant; the definition of 
’change* in these terras, and of ’cause of A* as ’indispensable 
condition of A’. More important still, as unmistakably regarded 
as demonstrating the dependence of phenomenal change on a 
condition external to the phenomenal world, which condition is 
yet described as ’cause’ (loi) and ’mover’ (IQ^)  ^  terra ordinarily
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used as synonymous with ’efficient cause* his use of the 
argument testifies not only to his regarding the postulation of 
such dependence admissible, but also to his rejection of any 
definition of "causation’ which would confine its application 
to relations within the phenomenal universe. It thus excludes, 
for instance, its definition in terras of temporal relations 
which could not be assumed to hold outside the phenomenal sphere, 
as well as any conclusions resting on such a definition. Thus  ^
even though all the ’causal connections Aristotle postulated within 
the phenomenal sphere could have been conceived in terras of 
natural law as may the ’causal’ assertions of most modem 
philosophers ; his use of the cosmological argument as proving 
the existence of an extra-phenomenal ’cause’, would have 
rendered his use of the term fundamentally different from that 
adopted by most modem British philosophers.
Aristotle’s conception of the First Mover as outside the 
succession dependent on Him ensures his avoiding the Kantian 
antinomy, (lO^) which latter arises when the existence of a first 
cause, in the sense of a first term in such a succession is 
inferred from a generalisation about the members of that 
succession which excludes the possibility of its having a first 
term.
Russell (iG^) criticises Leibniz’s version of the cosmological 
argument as being formally invalid in that it claims to infer 
the necessaiy from the contingent, (My earlier account of the 
essence of all forms of the argument^ should have made it clear
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that this criticism would, if sound, apply equally to all its 
versions whether the terms ’necessary* and ’contingent' were 
used in framing them or no). Russell’s obyjg&t seems to rest 
on confusing the assertion that A presupposes B in the sense 
that it could not exist without B,with the assertion that a 
entails B in the sense of making B exist; it is in effect to 
regard ’This picture could not have existed in the absence of 
an artist’&nd ’This picture forced an artist to exist’, as 
synonymous. The confusion arises naturally from Russell’s 
regarding ’necessary’ and ’entail’ as terras properly applicable 
to linguistic relations alone. To say that one set of symbols 
is entailed by the conjunction of others,is always to say that 
according to a certain set of rules the former set of symbols 
may be substituted for the conjunction of the latter; and there 
is no possibility of the assertion of one set of symbols being 
entailed by others, being legitimately capable of two quite 
opposite meanings. Once admit, however, that the existence 
of one situation may be deducible from that of another irrespective 
of linguistic rule, and it becomes possible to assert A to entail 
B thus, either in the sense in which a picture might be regarded 
as requiring a painter in order to exist, or in that in which the 
taking of arsenic might be supposed to make someone die.
Obviously the existence of something contingent could not entail 
that of something necessary, in the sense of being that in virtue 
of which the latter existed; but this does not exclude the 
existence of the former entailing that of the latter^ in the sense
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in which that of a picture is generally supposed to entail 
that of an artist* And a philosopher who denies non-linguistic 
entailraent is not thereby exonerated from noting the relevance 
of this distinction in the arguments of others who admit it. (lO^) 
Those who confine the title ’significant’ to assertions 
observâtionally testable, at least in the sense of being 
falsifiable, must dismiss the conclusion of the cosmological 
argument as non-significant* Since, however, this conclusion 
appears to be legitimately deducible from its premises, and it 
would seem unreasonable to suppose a non-significant conclusion 
entailed by significant premises, one holding this view must, if 
he is to be consistent, suppose one of these premises non­
significant also. And it is indeed true that, according to his 
criterion its basic premise, namely universal explicability must 
be regarded so. For it is not observâtionally testable by us, 
since its truth is consistent with anything we might experience.
It is, on the one hand conceivable that although nothing occurred 
or existed irrespective of some condition, the universe might be 
so complex or our powers of perception so limited, that we might 
be able to discover no regular correlations within it, or at 
most very few. On the other hand, the appearance of regular 
correlations within experience might be fortuitous and not the 
result of the dependence of one type of existent, quality, 
relation, experience, or experiential complex, on another. It is 
possible,therefore, when regarding observable testability as the 
criterion of ’significance, to describe the conclusion of the
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cosmological argument as non-significant^ without self- 
contradiction.
It seems to me, however, that the very possibility of 
recognising that an assertion is not experientially testable, 
shows the inadequacy of observational testability as a criterion 
of ’significance’, if a non-significant sentence is to be regarded 
as a set of symbols incapable of expressing anything beyond a 
verbal rule. For it is clearly not the testability of a verbal 
rule which is here in question, and unless a set of symbols states 
something, and I can recognise it to do so, how can I possibly 
loiow whether or nof'a given type of experience would be relevant to 
its truth or falsity?
I have said (1$0) that I can find no argument which could 
prove the truth of the principle of universal explicability, nor 
does its truth seem self-evident. I have contended, (114)) however, 
that it cannot be consistently denied by anyone accepting the 
legitimacy of induction (which includes plain men and most, if not 
all, philosophers). It seems to me, therefore, that since the 
phenomenal universe must be regarded as consisting of either 
tranaitory existants, or changing continuants (or both), neither 
of wbich could be regarded as containing the condition of its 
existence within itself, (111) the cosmological argument demonstrates 
that few^ if any, can deny its conclusion with consistency; and that 
neither, therefore, are they in the position to deny the possibility 
of the dependence of the phenomenal on the non-phenomenal^ v/hich it 
involves. But this, of course, does not preclude the definition 
of ’causation* so that the term is inapplicable to such a relation.
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vi Summary*
Aristotle shares with plain men the definition of 'causation’
in terms of the intrinsic dependence of 'effect’ on ’cause*, the
interpretation of experience in terms of continuants, and the belief
in universal explicability. Consistently with these premises, he
conceives change as the conferring of a specific character on one
continuant by another. He distinguishes as four types of ’cause’,
the four types of conditions he regards as essential to change so
conceived; namely 'form’, ’matter*, agent, and end (or 'final cause’)
These, on any interpretation, represent distinctive factors among
the conditions of artificial making, v/hich for Aristotle is the 
of
paradigm causation’. And one accepting his premises must, to be 
consistent, interpret them as he does. ’Form’, ’matter’, and agent, 
also constitute distinguishable factors in other types of change; 
but it is often inconvenient to describe these in terms of them. 
Aristotle’s attempt to do so is, to say the least, ambiguous; and 
indeed, capable of being positively misleading. Ris view of 'final 
causation’ outside the sphere of human voluntary behaviour, on the 
other hand, is inherently contradictory. He explicitly denies its 
being deliberative, and hence cannot regard it as other than an 
inherent tendency towards an end* But, inconsistently with this 
position, he treats it as determinative in a sense other than merely 
definitive, and as refuting the assertion of natural necessity.
Aristotle’s definition of ’cause’ is intrinsically different 
from those common among most modem British philosophers in being 
inconsistent with the conception of ’causation* in terms of natural
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law’* Yet at the same time, for him, to state a ’causal’ 
connection properly so-called^is to assert a law - namely one of 
intrinsic dependence. And he is careful to distinguish these 
specific laws of dependence^from dependence on a complex situation 
in virtue of them*
An even more fundamental difference from common modem usage 
is revealed in his postulation of Qod^as first ’cause’ of change^ 
existing outside the phenomenal sphere. The comological argument, 
a version of which he uses to defend the postulation of God as 
fulfilling this role, seems to show that the possibility of the 
dependence of phenomena 1 on extra-phenomenal^ cannot be denied. But 
it does not demand the application of the term ’cause’ to such an 
extra-phenomenal condition.
Through the instrumentality of St,Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle’s 
describing God, as ’cause’ of phenomenal change, and his view of an 
’efficient cause’ as essentially such as to be capable of producing 
a given ’effect’, had a profound influence both on the use of the 
term ’cause’ and the development of the notions associated v/ith it 
in Europe from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century.
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denied any ground for the common supposition that a 'cause* 
deterraines its 'effect* in any sense in wliich the converse is
not equally true. Bit he did so because he supposed 'causal*
assertions a misleading form of stating complex regular 
correlation, which could be expressed by describing one 
variable as a function of others. But clearly, once again 
this view does not exonerate him from ignoring the significance 
of the distinction in the arguments of those who recognise it©
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CHAPTHR 111
TH3 HOLS OF ST.THCmS AQUIHAS IN THIÜ DTVE40F:m!T 
OF THE USB OF THTÎ TERM CAUSE AIO OF g-'E MOTIONS ASSOCIATED T/ITH IT^I)
St.Thomas Aquinas plays an important, and indeed unique, role 
in the development of the use of the term 'cause*^ and of associated 
notions* For so well did he champion Aristotle against 
ecclesiastical criticism^that he ensured European philosophy being 
basically Aristotelian during the succeeding three centuries.
Owing to the influence of the Church at that time, St.Thomas's final 
success in converting ecclesiastical opoostion to aristotelianism 
into benediction, gave him an unparralleled role in the history of 
thought, placing him in the strange position of being e dominant 
influence in the thought even of those who seem to have had no direct 
knov/'ledge of his writings. Thus, to take a notable example, it 
seems unlikely that Descartes would have framed the argument for the 
existence of God found in his third Mediatation had not St*Thomas 
won general acceptance for the notions underlying it, yet there i s 
no evidence that Descartes was familiar with St.Thomas's own writings, 
appearing instead to have derived his knowledge of Scholasticism 
mainly from Suarez who was a far csry from St*Thomas.fZ)Indeed, the 
way in which Descartes, while supposing himself to have made a clean 
break with the past, yet took for granted notions intrinsic to 
Thomism, is startling evidence of the extent of the latter’s 
influence*
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St.Thomas's influence on seventeenth centry rationalism 
was twofold. On the positive side he was responsible for its 
exponents taking for granted many notions fundamental to much that 
they wrote, and on the negative side he influenced the direction of 
their thought in so far as his philosophy coloured the background 
against which they reacted; prompting them for instance to con­
centrate on spheres of thought which it had neglected or to which 
its methods were inadequate, such as mathmatics and scientific 
research respectively.
I have said, as indeed is commonly accepted, that St.Thomas's 
influence was responsible for making European thought predominantly 
Aristotelian from the thirteenth till the seventeenth century. It
might, therefore, be imagined that he was but a mouthpiece of 
Aristotle, whose only claim to innovation lay in his expressing 
Christian theology in terns of Aristotelian philosophy. But this 
view is unjustified. For not only did St.Thomas differ from 
Aristotle on occasion, more often elaborating, modifying, or putting 
fresh emphasis on, various Aristotelian notions^but, it seems to me, 
it is precisely this modified, developed, and reorientated 
Aristotelianism vfhich proved so far-reaching an influence. Nor 
indeed are Aristotelianism and Christian theology the only influences 
apparent in St.Thomas's woriting. The Neo-platonic conception of 
existence as hierarchical and the Augustinian statement of the 
problem of evil, were both important^ not merely as factors in the 
formation of St.Thomas's thought^but also among the notions which his 
influence contributed to non-Scholastic seventeenth century thought*
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The most significant differente.between the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic conception of 'causation* , is one which would have 
been demanded by St.Thomas's theology, although it might have 
rested on purely philosophical grounds. This lies in the difference 
betiveen the Aristotelian and Thomistic views of God* s role as 
'cause*. Aristotle, as has been seen^regarded God as ultimate 
or first * cause', not of the existence of the phenomenal universe, 
but of the changes within it. His role is thus conceived as 
somewhat analogous to that ordinarily attributed to the atmosphere, 
whose existence is regarded as a necessary condition of the 
successions of generations on this planet, but is not thought relevant 
to the existence of the cheînical elements held capable of con­
stituting an organism. For Aristotle, therefore, the role of 
'causation* in explaining change, lay simply in showing how new 
specific characters came to be conferred on already existing 
♦matter*. To St.Thomas, on the other hand, (who, like Aristotle 
regards change as occurring in a persistent subject), not only the 
occurrence of change, but the existence of that which changes pre­
supposes the existence of God as its explanation. And moreover^', 
not only does he treat the term 'cause* or its synonyms as 
applicable to God as wAtime 'cause* of change, (3) but applies 
it to him equally v/ith reference to his role of creator in the 
absolute sense. (4)
The Thomistic position, indeed, seems more consistent with one 
of the basic tenets of Aristotelianism that? does Aristotle's own
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It was seen that both Aristotle's interpretation of change^ and 
his denial of an infinite 'causal* regress^require the postulat ion 
of universal explicability for their Justification (£) » But if- 
this is 30^  then not merely changes and the things they may be said 
to bring into existence, but also the basic material constituents 
to which these are reducible^must be explicable in terms of some 
condition intrinsic or extrinsic to themselves on which their 
existence is dependent. Jn Aristotle's view these basic 
constituents are the 'four elements' - fire, air^ water^ and earth; 
and although he may explain the coming into existence of any one 
of these in terms of the transformation of one or more of the 
others, this, still leaves unexplained why^or how there ever existed 
any element to be transformed into another. If, therefore, he 
supposed the existence of 'matter’ultimately^ required no 
explanation outside itself, Aristotle, were he to have been 
consistent^should have postulated a basic material the condition of 
whose existence lay in itself, clearly this could not have been 
pure 'matter* which would be mere potentiality (and hence has been 
seen to be a mere logical abstraction), and so would have to be 
either one of the 'four elements* , a possibility which he explicitly 
excludes, (é) or else a basic element common to them all (a notion 
which he deafly dislikes). On either view, however, it would 
have to be regarded as constantly changing (since Aristotle 
supposes the elements constantly transmuted one into another). And 
this would seem inconsistent with the condition of its existence 
lying in itself, For if in any given state^is such that it
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cannot but exist, its being in any other state 'would seem to be 
thereby excluded. Were this not so, however, Aristotle would 
seem to be involved in contradiction by postulating a self- 
explanatory basic element of the universe. For if a changing 
existent could contain in itself the condition of its own 
existence, this must be the condition of its changeableness 
otherwise it would not serve wholly ta explain the existence of 
such an one* To say that as subject to change it requires a 
source of its changes external to itself (as Aristotle maintains)^ 
would thus be not merely superfluous, but contradictory. If, 
therefore^Aristotle could maintain the eternity of * matter^ his 
argument for the existence of God as prime mover would fall to 
the ground* gt.Thomas's divergence from the Aristotelian position 
in this respect^thus serves to bring out the implications of 
Aristotle's premises* That St.Thomas realised this,is indicated 
both by his use of a form of the cosmological argument to prove 
God the 'cause' of the existence of ever^^thing other than himself 
(^) and by the first of the arguments in the Summa Contra Gentiles 
which he directs explicitly against the Aristotelian postulation 
of the eternity of 'matter' (^).
The application of the title 'cause' to God in respect of 
his creative role is extremely significant; for whereas Aristotle’s 
application of it to Him as source of change^precludes its 
definition in terms of any realtor supposed^phenomenal dependence; 
St.Thomas's usage precludes its definition on the analogy of any 
such dependence^ if the analogy is regarded as precise enough to
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give any insight into the relation beyond its involving 
dependence. Tt was seen that^ in 'the existence of atmosphere*^ 
we experience a factor which may be regarded as a persistent 
condition on which series of changes distinct from it, depend.
But as has been seen; (ff) though^ if all change be not attributed 
to continuants and universale xplicability be assumed, there are 
phenomena which must be interpreted in terms of creation 'out of 
nothing* , we have no idea how such creation might take place or 
of its precise nature.
To my mind St.Thomas's most important contribution to the 
development of the usage of the term ' causewas probably quite 
unsuspected by him. For it seems to me that the conception of 
the creative Qod as the 'Cause* par excellence^which is fundamental 
to his whole philosophy, played no small part in developing that 
attitude to which a 'causeproperly so called, is essentially a 
'maker' or producer. And tha.t St,Thomas was himself unaware of 
this tendency in his thought, or at least of its full force, is 
indicated by his zealous adherence to the Aristotelian fourfold 
classification of 'causes' in contexts other than that of creation 
(IÔ) to which it is obviously inapplicable. Yet at the same time 
he betrays this influence in his own thought^ since often, when 
using the term 'cause' without qualification he clearly intends 
the Aristotelian 'efficient cause' (1&), %t is true that be 
explicitly gives pride of place to the 'final causedescribing 
it as the 'cause of causes' (li) But at the same time he
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attributes this primacy to it in virtue of its role as prompting 
an agent, so that he is even then regarding agency or productivity 
as fundamental to 'causal* explanation as a whole. The view that 
the emergence of the definition of ’cause* as producer^ ov/ed not a 
little to St*Thomas's rendering the notion of God as creati'^ '^ e 'cause' 
fundamental to the philosophy of succeeding centuries^ is (to ray mind), 
supported by its appearance in the writings of Locke (TJ) a thinker 
wbo, despite his eicplicit criticisms of 3cholastioisin^(l^) yet 
betrayed its influence in more than one aspect of his teaching^as 
for instance in his conception of natural lav/^  (if) and his 
attribution to 'causes' of intrinsic ability to produce their 'effects'.
(lé).
I am not suggesting^ of course, that St.Thomas v/as peculiar among 
Christian philosophers in regarding God as creative, but merely that 
the role and description of the doctrine in his philosophy had an 
unique opportunity of influencing subsequent thought and usage.
Nor do I mean to deny that the birth of modern science regarded, as 
it undoubtedly was by its originators, as the search for laws 
exemplified in the behaviour/ and hence the interaction) of bodies, 
was at least equally important in encouraging concentration on 
'efficient causation'.
It should perhaps be remarked in this context that St.Thomas's 
concern to discuss God much more fully than did Aï'istotle^and in 
particular the importance for him of discussing what was meant in 
attributing will to God, and regarding his 'effects' as vdlled by 
Him)^ provided him with more contexts than had Aristotle for
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postulating reasons which could not properly be caller] 'causes*^ 
on the Aristotelian definition. Thus, for instance, he supposes 
it correct to say that A's being the means by v/hich God wills to 
achieve an end^makes it correct to describe this as the reason for 
God willing Al« And since he held that no process can be attributed 
to God's willing^and no complexity ascribed to Him at all; St,Thomas 
argued that his willing the means cannot be said to be ' caused', 
either by his willing the end or by his willing to achieve it thereb^r 
as the reason is in fact indistinguishable from that which it explains, 
(1^) This increased opportunity for postulating reasons v/hich are 
not 'causes* seems not without significance^since it must have served 
to emphasise the distinction and familiarise philosophers v/ith it, 
so making them more prepared to reduce the number of reasons to which 
they applied the title 'cause».
Equal in historical importance to God's creative role in his 
system, is St.Thomas's modification and development of the notions 
contained in Aristotle's treatment of 'final causation'.
Since St,Thomas postulates a creative God, logic combines with 
theology in demanding his regarding the content and structure of the 
universe as deliberately designed for the achievement of an end, and 
that as adequately as may be, St.Thorras, therefore, unlike Aristotle 
is justified,and indeed obliged, to regard 'final causation' as 
determining natural processes in other than a merely definitive sense, 
and hence as providing a principle to which natural or mechanical 
necessity is subject. Had not St,Thomas ensured teleology being 
generally understood thus, it seems unlikely that its acceptance or
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rejection would have presented the vital question v/hich it did 
for seventeenth century thought in general.
It is not only in making teleology a vital question that 
St.Thomas's treatment of the subject influenced seventeenth century 
thought* • In making explicit the implicit Aristotelian view of 
natural processes as the fulfilment of an inherent tendency to 
achieve a perfection, (18) St.Thomas made current the notion 
fundamental to both Spinoza's concept of conatus and Leibniz's idea 
of appetition© Moreover, his treatment of willing, and voluntarily 
seeking to attain a desired end, as an instance of such a tendency (19) 
suggests the Leibnizean view of voluntary endeavour as an instance 
of the appétition found, differing in degree only, in all monads.
St.Thomas's concern to defend the postulation of free will, however, 
prevents him from asserting so rigid an analogy between natural and 
voluntary tendency as does Leibniz. Instead, he reconciles the two 
notions by maintaining (2q ) that while the m i l  naturally seeks some 
good, it may choose between seeking a good which cannot be achieved 
without sacrifice of a greater good (which to him is what evil 
choice consists in) and one of v/hich this is not true. (Conditions 
necessary for reconciling the assertion of free-will with the 
conention that only the desirable is willed, were noted above)»(21)
St*Thomas's treatment of evil and its explanation, together 
with the Aristotelian notion of the 'efficient cause* as conferring 
an actuality and the Neo-platonic conception of 'reality' as 
hierarchical, combined to produce the view of 'causation' fundamental 
to Descartes' argument for the existence of God, appearing in his
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third Meditation. And, as t suggested at t'^ e outset, it seems 
highly iiiiprohable that he would have regarded the truth of its 
implications as 'manifest by the natural light' (2^ 1) had 
St.Thomas' influence not made it fundamental to European thought»
St.Thomas, having defended God's role as ultimate source of 
all existence, v/as faced with the problem of evil in an acùte form© 
For if evil could be said to exist then God would have to be 
regarded as its 'cause', a position clearly anathema St.Thomas's 
theology* Ke took the only course open to him in regarding 
existence as essentially good, and evil as essentially negative/X3>) 
Thus, he maintained that what is ordinarily called the existence of 
some evil, is in fact the existance of some good which yet lacks, 
or excludes, the existence of some perfection*(2i^I'rom the historical 
point of view the importance of this doctrine lies in the identifica­
tion of good or perfection with existence or actualityso that a 
thing is said to 'be' or to have 'actuality' insofar as it is 
supposed to constitute the existance of some perfection)^ and. the 
conception of a 'cause of existance or being' as essentially the 
'cause' of 'actuality' in the sense of the existence of a perfection 
or good. T/hen this conception is combined with the Neo-platonic 
belief in degrees of existence (% belief doubtless suggested by 
differences such as that between the abilities of various types of 
organism, or members of the same species)^ and the Aristotelian 
conception of the agent as conferring its 'effects' actuality', the 
'efficient cause' is conceived as a specific degree of perfection 
which it must,in consequence^first possess. This conception is
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reinforced by 3t.Thomas's view of creative and generative impulse 
as an extension of the inherent tendency towards perfection which^ 
the latter having been achieved in the one possessing that 
tendency^leads it to seek to produce further perfection extrinsic 
to itself (2T) It also provides a possible interpretation of 
Aristotle's insistence that the 'efficient cause' possesses in 
some manner the 'form' or actuality which it ijnparts* Thus, by 
the combination of these doctrines St*Thomas arrived at the 
conclusion which Descartes attributed to 'the natural light' - 
namely that an agent must contain at least as great a degree of 
' reality' or 'actuality' as it confers on its ' effect' *
Like many of his successors St. Thomas was presented with a 
problem in his desire to maintain the freedom of the will. His 
problem was, however, fundamentally different from that which beset 
Descartes and Kant© For these latter (as for the majority of 
St.Thomas's non-Scholastic successors concerned v/ith free-will)^ the 
difficulty was to reconcile the postulation of free-will with that 
of a universe governed by deterministic natural laws. For 
St©Thomas^ on the other hand, the problem v/qs to reconcile the 
postulation of free m i l  (in man) with the role of God as ultimate 
'cause' of all change, and moreover as having ordered the universe 
intentionally so as to achieve the existence of the greatest amount 
of finite good possible. St.Thomas meets his problem with the 
contention that the possibility of a free choice of the highest good 
is better than an automatic tendency twv/ards it, (27) and that God 
'causes' free actions in the sense of making man such as to be able
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either to perform them or not. (28) He is able to avoid asserting 
determinism with 'causation' thus, since - like Aristotle and the 
plain man - he regards a 'cause* as a necessary condition of its 
'effect', but not as .entailing it. But since their problems were 
basically different St.Thomas's discussion of free-will did not 
influence that of his non-gcholastic successors*
The foregoing indicates that, again like Aristotle and the plain 
man, St.Thomas supposed neither that everything happens inevitably 
nor that anything happens at random, supposing all existence consistent 
with laws of intrinsic dependence. Jt is further clear that like 
Aristotle and plain men he supposes there are many processes which 
always occur under given conditions© But, like some plain men, he 
supposes divine concurrence always one of those conditions. His _ ;
conception of an ordered universe therefore, had in it room for 
miracles, (2 9) and thus differed from the conceptions of natural ^
order current among many of his successors* At the same time his j
consistently exchewing the suggestion of randomness and his evident 
conviction that phenomenal events other than voluribary behaviour - d
. 'I
must occur under certain conditions (30) rendered his position not 
wholly at variance with those of later determinists, so that the f
transition of philosophers from the one position to the other does 
not represent too startling or fundamental a break.
.a
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NOTES*
1. Owing to pressure of space, and to prevent overlapping with the 
discussions in earlier and later chapters, i am confining my 
discussion here to what seems relevant to the purely historical 
importance of the doctrines concerned. Also for the sake of 
brevity, I merely give the references which seem to substantiate 
my views, without quoting the text*
2. I base these remarks on what seems to be the opinion of M.O.D'Arcy 
(Thomas Aquinas gmest Benn Ltd. 1930 pp26o-l), but I see Russell 
quotes St*Thomas as one of the authors represented in Descartes' 
library (The History of Western philosophy; Allen & Unwin 1946
p.582) but he does not quote the source of this information* 
Certainly Descartes' approach to the problan of knowledge reflects 
the influence, not of StoThorms, but of Suarez; but of course this 
need not argue absence of direct knowledge of the former,
3. Summa Theologica pt.l Q 2 Art. 3 1st formulation of the 
cosmological aj'gument©
4. S.Th# pt 1 Q 44 A 2. q2 Art 3 3rd formulation of cosmological 
argument.
5. pp 204-7, 174-6
6« De Gen, et Corr. 11 5 332b 6fff
7* S*Th pt, 1 Q 2 Art, 3 3rd form of cosmological argument,
8. Summa contra Gentiles Bk 11 Ch.XVl 1st argument©
9. p, 2o5.
iQ. Cf S. Th* pt.l, Q 44 A*2{ Summa contra Gentiles Bk , U  Ch.XVI 1st.
argument.
11. Cf. S Th. pt.i, Q.45. A. 1,2,3,5,6,7.
12. S. Th. pt.l, Q V Art 2 Rep. Qbj, 1
13. Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Routledge & Sons)
Bkll Ch XXVl p. 238-9
14. Cf. Essay Bk»III Ch.X Sects. 6ff.
15.^Treatise on Government
16. Essay pk 11 Ch XXI (Of Power).
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17. S-The pt.l* Q.I9. A.5*
18. S.Th. Q*19. A.l
19. Ibid,
20. Of. S. Th. pt.ll (1st. pt.) Q.5. A.8 Rept. Obj* 3; Q.8. A. 1
21. pp.115-7.
22. Meditation 111 (Haldane & Ross tr. 1931) pp.162-3.
23. S. The pt. 1* Q.48 ApI
24. S. Th. pt. 1 Q.49 A*2. (of. especially Rep, Obj. 2)
25. S. The pt 1. Q.I9 A. 2
26. Of- S. Th. pt. 1 Q.49 A. 2 Rep. Obj. 2; Q. 49. A. 1
27. S. The pt. 1© Qe 48 A. 2; Q. 49 A.2
28. So The pt. le Qe 19 A 8
29. For discussion of the possibility of combining the notion 
of an ordered universe with the postulation of miracles cf* 
supra pp. 119-24
30. Cf. S. Th. pt. 11 (1st pt.) q .85. a .5. Rep. Obj.'1
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CHAPTER IV
CAUSAL NOTIONS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY RATIONALISTS. 
i. The influence of scientific development.
If the seventeenth century rationalists owed many of their 
assumptions to St.Thomas (either directly or indirectly)^ the 
scientific development which took place in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries largely responsible for both the new
channels into which these philosophers directed the old ideaa^and 
for their rejecting or ignoring certain other Scholastic notions.
That the birth of modem science, properly so called, took 
place in the sixteenth century, was no accident. In non-mathematical 
terms it is possible to express only generalisations so broad as to 
exclude precise prediction,and hence a science which lacks mathematical 
formulation leaves room for many more hypotheses which are not 
empirically testable than one which does not. Thus^ for instance, 
Galileo first mistakenly supposed the rate of acceleration of falling 
bodies proportional to the distance through which they fall, later 
justly concluding it to be instead proportional to the time in which 
they fall. Had it been impossible to express these theories 
mathematically^ it would have been impossible to base on them 
predictions precise enough for them to be adequately tested 
empirically. Nor^ could Newton then have shown Galileo's conception 
of gravitational acceleration^consistent with the movements of the 
planets when these are computed relative to the sun, and thus 
provided the first positive evidence in favour of the Copemican 
hypothesis. The mathematical formulation of principles of dynamics
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was thus essential, not merely to the development of dynamics as 
we understand it today, but also both to that of astronomy in 
particular and to the formulation of laws conceived as applicable 
throughout the universe (or at least to the earth and other members 
of the solar system alike), (1) And it was not till the sixteenth 
century that mathematics was sufficiently developed to be success­
fully applied to the description of phenomena other than astronomical. 
Even in astronomy the most convenient method of computation vas not 
adopted before then^ so that the maximum precision possible (without 
the aid of telescopes) was not obtained. Burtt has pointed out 
(2) that even here ^ where advance depended^ not on discovering how 
to apply mathematics successfully to the phencxnena in question, but 
merely on adopting a more convenient method of doing so, it was 
closely related to mathematical developments.
It is small wonder therefore that the beginnings of mathematical 
physics have been identified with the beginnings of physics in 
general, sptgat Burtt can write (3) that the Medievals were concerned, 
not with the 'how* of motion (by which he evidently means its 
scientific analysis), but only with its 'why' or purpose. That 
Medieval scholars were far from disinterested in what Burtt calls 
the 'how' of motion,has been amply proved by nuhem's researches, (4) 
and Koyre's lengthy quotations from Bonamico's De Motu (5) reveal 
that even a sixteenth century Aristotelian was extremely concerned 
about the 'how' of motion. It was solely because some of the 
Medievals were unable, and the others unwilling, to apply mathematics 
succeasfully to dynamics that their theories, however ingenious
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and hardly won, remained incapable of adequate empirical testing 
and hence sterile. For so long as it was sufficiently ingenious 
to account for commonsense experience one theory was as good as 
another, there being no generally acceptable criterion for the 
admissibility of any theory, let alone its development.
The copemican hypothesis, the successful application of 
mathematics to dynamics, and the conception of all physical change 
in terns of dynamics, combined to produce the deteiministic picture 
of the universe as a whole, which dominated the thought of the seven­
teenth century rationalists. For if the earth be regarded, not as 
the unique centre of the universe, but as one planet among many, then 
the laws which may be supposed to operate on the earth must be 
supposed typical of those applicable to the universe as a whole; and 
if the minutest physical change is mathematically calculable given 
sufficient data then all change must be necessary^ since it is 
nonsense to describe a mathematical conclusion as sometimes, or 
generally, true. And doubtless it was the enthusiasm evoked by 
discovering the possibility of applying mathematics successfully to 
dynamics, which provoked the conviction that all physical change was 
reducible to the letter's principles^although these were then capable 
of verification in a relatively limited sphere.
In general the discovery of the scientific importance of 
mathematics stimulated the view of the latter as the ideal to which 
all true knowledge should attain. The role of philosophy is 
therefore conceived, more than ever before, as the demonstration of
p j ^ i  f o S O p i t ï C C t l
certainties. The formulât ion « of a philosophie method capable of
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achieving this aim,thus assumes paramount importance, receiving 
considerable attention from both Descartes and Leibniz. In 
particular this ideal, together with the deterministic picture of 
the universe,gives the notion of a 'cause* which entails its 'effect', 
an importance which it has never assumed before.
Despite the development of algebra, which made scientific advance 
possible, mathematics was still generally conceived geometrically 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries^(6) and this in its turn 
had an important influence on the current science and philosophy.
It seems not unlikely for instance, that Galileo (despite the fact 
that he freed his conceptions from geometry more successfully than 
many of his contemporaries) was yet inspired by the thought of a 
geometry laying down ideal conditions, to conceive a physics which 
should do the same^actual phenomena having to be conceived in terms 
of interfering factors provoking deviations therefrom; e.g. the first 
law of motion which asserts that an undisturbed body moves con­
tinuously in a straight line at a uniform speed,although owing (it is 
assumed) to interference no body is observed to do so. The 
influence of the predominantly geometrical conception of the all 
important mathematics is no less significant for much philosophical 
thought. It is thus fundamental to both Descartes' metaphysics 
and to his physical notions, and it is equally fundamental to 
Spinoza's position. The latter philosopher* indeed betrays his
geometrical ideal of knowledge by setting out the principal statement
t^ t
of his position in-style of a Euclidean manual, as a system of axioms
f
and theorems. And on the oth^r hand, it was his recognition of the
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inadequacy of the current purely geometrical conception of the 
universe, which prompted Leibniz into the extreme reaction of denying 
that any reality can properly be regarded as quantitative, hence 
provoking his account of experience with its (for the present subject) 
all important treatment of apparent phenomenal interaction.
AS has been already remarked, (7) the conception of the physical 
universe as a compact, necessarily determined,system raised serious 
problems for those philosophers who wished to maintain the freedome 
of the will. And some of the discussions which this problem 
provoked,in Malebranche for example,(8) are equally important in the 
development of 'causal* notions.
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ii. Descartes.
(a) The use of the term 'cause* in his metaphyaicso
Although the term 'cause' does not occur much in Descartes# 
writings on physics, these contain notions generally regarded as 
'causal#, which have furthermore proved important in the history 
of philosophy. Although these have much in common with the notions 
underlying his use of the terra 'cause' in his metaphysical and 
epistomological writings, they are not identical; it is necessary, 
therefore, to deal separately with these two conceptions.J shall deal 
first with what I may perhaps, for convenience, call the 'metaphysical* 
notions, as these are most significant historically ih linking 
Descartes with his predecessors, while the physical notions are 
primarily important in linking him with his successors.
Descartes recognised how disastrous is the uncritical acceptance 
of inherited assumptions, and indeed succeeded in performing the 
major operation of divesting himself of the language and methods of 
contemporary philosophy. Being human, however, he was unable to 
avoid taking some prevailing notions for granted without due 
analysis. Despite his unconscious inheritance from the past, 
however, Descartes* break with the language and methods of his 
predecessors and his sincere attempt to look at philosophical 
problems with new eyes, succeeded in making him the father of 
modem philosophy properly so-called. Bacon, it is true, was 
critical of the old ideas and nethods, but he opposed them very much 
in their own terms; and Hobbes, though more 'modem* than Bacon
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in his general attitude, had not the wide influence of Descartes,^ 
nor was his position so systematically defined* Descartes more 
than any other philosopher was responsible for making current the 
view of philosophy in general, and of ’causation# in particular, 
which was the object of Hume’s criticism. It is therefore of no 
mean interest to see the extent to which he was influenced by 
notions and attitudes, integral to the philosophy whose ascendancy 
he so effectively challenged.
It has been seen (9) that St.Thomas, apparently unwittingly, 
prepared the way for the attitude of mind which defines a ’cause’ 
as essentially a producer; Descartes is the first outstanding 
philosopher to make this position explicit. He differs from his 
Scholastic predecessors in this respect, not merely in terminology 
but also in his denying the utility of seeking teleological
explanations. That there are such he does not deny but he maintains
that ’we should not take so much upon ourselves as to believe that 
God could take ms into his counsels*’ (lo) His conception of 
’ efficient causation* as expounded in the metaphysico - epistemological 
discussion of the Meditations however^basically »  Thomistic and is 
defensible, not to say explicable, only on Aristotelian - thomistic 
principles.
The Cartesian conception of ’efficient causation* is iB^ de 
explicit in the course of the argument for the existence of God
found in the third Meditation; or, rather, it is made more explicit
here than anywhere else since, as will be seen, its basic pre­
suppositions are not made at all clear, so that it seems completely
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inexplicable to one unfamiliar with the medieval ideas whence it 
derives. The passage in question is very familiar but as I wish 
to discuss its basic ideas in some detail it seems convenient to 
quote it in full at the outset#
•Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must be 
at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in 
its effect. For pray whence can the effect derive its reaility 
if not from its cause? And in what way can this cause communicate 
this reality to it unless it possessed it in itself? And from 
this it follows not only that nothing cannot proceed from nothing, 
but likewise that what is more perfect, that is to say which has 
more reality within itself cannot proceed from the less perfect.
And this is not only evidently true of those effects which possess 
actual or formal reality, but also of the ideas in which we consider 
merely what is termed objective reality. To take an example, the 
stone which has not yet existed not only cannot now commence to be 
unless it is produced by something which possesses within itself 
either formally or eminently all that enters into the composition 
of the stone, and heat can only be produced in a subject in which 
it did not previously exist by a cause which is of an order at 
least as perfect as heat. But further, the idea of heat, or of a 
stone, cannot exist in me unless it has been placed within me by 
some cause which possesses within it at least as much reaility as 
I conceive to exist in the heat or the stone. For although its 
cause does not transmit anything of its actual or formal reality 
to my idea, we must not, for that reason, imagine that it is
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necessarily a less real cause; we must remember that (since every 
idea is a work of the mind) its nature is such that it demands of 
itself no other formal reality than that which it borrows from my 
thought, of which it is only a mode. But in order that an idea 
should contain some one certain objective reality rather than 
another, it must, without doubt derive it from some cause in which
there is at least as much formal reality as this idea contains of
objective reality.# (11)
On the basis of this definition of 'causation* Descartes
proceeds to argue that our possessing the idea of a supremely
perfect being presupposes the existence of such an one, since only 
thency could the idea derive its ’objective reality’. It is at 
once evident that this is in fact a novel version of the cosmological 
argument, resting primarily on the assumption that nothing is in­
explicable; for if something may exist inexplicably^ clearly there 
is no need to suppose the existence of either a stone or the idea of 
one, to be dependent on some external ’efficient and total cause’.
The occurrence of Descartes' account of ’causation* in this context 
is therefore important, sine e it makes it clear that Descartes supposes 
his remarks concerning ’effects’ to apply to every existent which 
does not contain the condition of its existence within itself.
As for his predecessors, the belief ti;iat nothing is inexplicable 
is so integral to Descartes’ thought that he never makes it explicit. 
That he, an arch-rationalist should so have taken it for granted, is 
hardly to be wondered at, however, when it is remembered that even the 
critical Hume appears to do so when, without comment, he embarks on
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a lengthy search for an explanation of our possessing an idea of 
necessary connection between 'cause* and 'effect'*
Descartes' failure to indicate any awareness of the affinity 
between his argument and those current among the scholastics (unless 
attributed to dishonesty, which would not seem justifiable)^ is 
explicable only on the hypothesis that the assumptions he held in 
common with them were so intrinsic to his thought that he regarded 
them as axiomatic on any view and, as was suggested above^(12) this 
hypothesis is supported by his asserting them to be 'manifest by 
the natural light»*
The Aristotelian and Thomistic roots of the conception of an 
'efficient cause» as giving a 'reality' which it must first possess 
itwelf, been outlined above (13). And it is in accepting this 
that Descartes aligns his treatment of 'causation' with Scholasticism 
in particular, since the belief that nothing is inexplicable is 
common to all rationalists* jn order to understand and assess 
Descartes' 'causal' argument for the existence of God, and the notion 
of 'causation» on which it rests, it is necessary to ask i^ iat he cam 
be supposed to mean by the possession of more or less » reality' and 
a 'cause's' giving 'reality' to its 'effect'* To examine what he 
meant by degree of 'reality' or 'perfection'^ it is necessary to turn 
back to St* Thomas as the source and basic influence of the 
Scholasticism whence he derives the idea* For St*Thomas, different 
types of existent exemplify différant degrees of » actuality', God 
being the highest and alone fully 'actual'* It has been seen (14) 
that, in speaking of ' actuality', St*Thomas is speaking, not only of
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existence,but also of what exists; i.e. that in speaking of A*s 
 ^actuality'he intends to refer to the existence of sorae thing of a 
given character* All that he attributes to God he regards as 
intrinsic to his nature; whatever he ascribes to Him,therefore,he 
regards as intrinsic to 'perfection* or 'actuality*. Thus from 
what he says of God,it is possible to discover criteria of 'actuality* 
as it has meaning for his system* God alone is 'uncaused*, and He 
alone is the ultimate 'cause' of all 'effects'; that is to say God is 
such that He cannot but exist (since nothing is held to be inexplicable), 
and every other existent depends on Him insofar as it is the fulfil­
ment of some perfection* prom this it is clear that, although 
simple existence is not identified with 'actuality' for St.Thomas, 
in speaking of a being's 'actuality' he is saying something very 
important about its existence. God alone is fully 'actual', and God 
alone is such that He cannot but exist; while everything else has a 
derived or dependent existence* The existence of the one is 
absolute and unchangeable, that of the others conditional. If, 
therefore, existence is regarded as something completely excluding 
non-existence, then clearly only God can properly be said to possess 
it* This is not the normal use of the terra existence; but is quite 
naturally derived from the latter,given the Thomistic conception of 
God. por StoThoraas, therefore, and presumably for Descartes (his 
heir so far as the attribution of degrees of reality is concerned)^ 
anything is 'actual* insofar as it is independent* Moreover, for 
St.Thomas and Descartes' God is omnipotent; this for the former means 
that He is capable of producing any 'effect* which is logically
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possible, while for the latter it means that his power is limited 
by nothing not even the law of contradiction,_but for each it means 
that He has the greatest power conceived possible. Thus for each,
He who has the fullest actuality is He who has the most extensive 
'causaf power* The ascription of the most extensive power to God 
is not of course regarded by either St.Thom s or Descartes as 
attributing to Him the greatest variety of activities. Man has to 
use a different activity as he wishes to produce statue, table, bowl, 
book, etc., since he has to make them by means of physical processes. 
But God is not held to be so limited; and^ indeed, since He is held to 
be both changeless and completely simple, such multiplicity could not 
be ascribed to Him without evident contradiction. This serves to 
emphasise the fact that for St.Thomas and Descartes, unlike Spinoza, 
to call God 'cause* is to ascribe to Him the production of something 
external to Himself. To the modem philosopher accustomed to apply 
the term 'cause* either exclusively, or predominantly, to events, a 
confusion is possible here which did not present itself to the 
Aristotelian and his immediate successors,to whom an 'efficient 
cause* is by definition a continuant*
The correlation of a 'cause's* 'actuality* thus with the extent 
of its capacity to produce effects^ clearly involves the Aristotelian 
and Thomistic conception of a 'cause* as essentially such as to be 
capable of producing its effects. jf certain 'effects' happen in 
the past to have been correlated with A ’s activities, there is no 
ground for supposing it superior to B on this account; nor if its 
regular correlation with certain 'effects', though not fortuitous^
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was due,not to anything in itself, but to some external factor such 
as the universe being ordered in a certain manner. But if A is such 
as to be intrinsically capable of producing more extensive, or more 
varied,effects than B, this does provide a criterion for regarding the 
one essentially superior to the other.
This hierarchical conception of existence may, at first sight, 
seem to involve an unnecessarily complicated usage, which is a far cry 
from everyday experience* Yet it has in fact a counterpart in 
commonsense usage. Whether the coramonsense usage derives from the
philosophical notion,or originally helped to suggest the latter, I do 
not pretend to judge. But since the comraonsense usage is familiar 
while the philosophical has grown strange, a brief survey of the 
former may help to throw light on the latter. The plain man does not 
speak of degrees of 'reality* or 'perfection*, but he does refer to 
'higher' and 'lower' forms of life* Thus the caterpillar is commonly 
regarded as a 'higher’ form of life than the cabbage,vhile at the same 
time being a » lower one than man* Clearly, in holding this the plain 
man does not suppose a caterpillar more alive than a cabbage or less 
alive than a man^in the simple sense in which any particular organism 
may be said to be alive or half dead* In this sense, a man who was 
half dead would presumably be less alive than a healthy caterpillar, 
while a sick caterpillar would be less alive than a healthy cabbage. 
The difference between these species, which is normally regarded as 
the criterion of 'higher' or ' lower' life, would seem to be precisely 
that which St,Thomas regards as the criterion of greater or less 
* actuality*, namely degree of independence and extent of power. It
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has been seen that, like Aristotle, St.Thomas and Descartes, the plain 
man regards cabbages, caterpillars, and men as continuants, to whose 
natures capacity to produce certain 'effects' and perform certain 
actions (if these are differentiated), is intrinsic. That is to 
say, they suppose 'Caterpillars can crawly but plants cannot' to assert 
that while the former type of existent has a character which enables 
it to perform a certain activity, the latter has one which precludes 
its doing so. Furthermore, greater 'power' means greater independence. 
Thus if A is intrinsically incapable of either moving itself or 
voluntarily stimulating others to move it, its being here or there is 
completely dependent on something outside itself (if it is to be 
regarded, as the plain man would regard it, as dependent on auiything); 
but if its power is not so limited, at least one condition contributing 
to its being here or there can lie in itself.
The distinction between 'higher* and 'lower* forms of existence 
was,indeed,upheld by so recent a philosopher as Spencer, who viewed 
the history of the universe as a gradual evolution of the 'higher' 
from the 'lower*. His explicit criterion of 'height' is different 
from that of St.Thomas, since for him the highest existants are the 
most highly complex and differentiated; whereas for St. Thomas although 
(owing to the inherent limitations of the physical)^ within the 
universe the higher existants are inevitably the most complex, God, 
the highest existent, is completely simple. Nevertheless since-j the 
more complex physical organisms are those which could be regarded 
as havii^ g the greatest variety of powers, his 'higher* and 'lower* 
organisms in fact coincide with those so regarded by commons ense,
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St*Thomas, and Descartes. Today, of course, if a philosopher
wished to regard a man as a higher form of existence to an atom,
while at the same time correlating such superiority with more
extensive power, he would have to ijustify preferring the greater
variety of 'powers’ attributable to a man as such,to the far greater
capacity for destruction, heating, etc* attributable to an atom as
such* He would not, however, be faced here with a problem different 
'from
in principle any which the Thomistic-Cartesian conception en­
countered; for this clearly preferred the greater variety of powers 
attributable to man,to the greater capacity for pulling and crushing 
attributable to an ox.
It seems indubitable that it was the conception of wider power 
as the criterion of greater ' reality’ or * perfection*, which Descartes 
inherited. For not only is it a conception which he might have 
derived either from Scholasticism or commons ense, so that the com­
bination of both influences on his thought would be more than enough 
to account for his taking it for granted; but it doeer seems to provide 
the only interpretation which makes his argument intelligible. For 
then its basic premise means simply that every 'cause* must be in- 
trinsically capable of producing the same type of 'effect* as eamr its 
'effects'. This would mean, for instance, that one intelligent being 
can only be produced by another, that the finite cannot produce the 
infinite, that the illiterate cannot teach reading. It is then, a 
conclusion entailed by the Aristotelian conception of the 'efficient 
cause' as intrinsically such as to be capable of producing its 
'effect'. For this means that if A is the 'efficient cause' of B,
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and B of G, A is intrinsically capable of producing that which is
such as to produce 0: in other words A is intrinsically such as to
produce its «effect's* 'effect', at least indirectly, so that
capacity to produce c enters into its complete definition. The
conception of 'causal power' as inherent in an agent's character,
is of the utmost importance to Descartes' argument in another
respect. For unless one can say that an agent*s possessing a given
character is indispensable to is producing a certain 'effect'^ one
cannot maintain that the existence of something of character, pre-
A
supposes that of an agent of character X.
Before leaving the subject,it will be well to consider more 
closely the notion of an agent as conferring a power it possesses 
itself; since its entailment by the Aristotelian principle, though 
it may serve to explain its acceptability to one brought up on 
Aristotelian principles, does not serve to make the conception 
comprehensible to the modem mind accustomed to an entirely different 
line of thought.
The phenomenon ordinarily called 'giving* is understandable 
enough: one person passes to another something which he himself
previously possessed. It is essentially th# transference of some­
thing from one person to another, and therefore it is clearly 
impossible for A to 'give*,in this sense,what he does not first 
possess. clearly I cannot give away apples or cakes if I have none 
to begin with. The analogy between A giving B an apple and A 
producing B, however, is not immediately apparent. Even if one 
supposes that the agent makes the 'effect', and thus makes it what
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it is; it is not at once apparent in what sense it could be said 
to give it its character, and hence (for Aristotle and those sharing 
his view in this) its power. The only apparent analogy between the 
two, lies in the fact that just as B did not possess the apple before 
A performed the action of giving, so neither did it possess character 
or power before A performed the action of producing. And a 
difficulty at once presents itself,since clearly there was no B to 
be given character or power before A did this producing. So long 
as the production is of the type considered by Aristotle, namely that 
consisting in making scsnething from an already existing substratum, 
not only may the difficulty be avoided, but the postulation of the 
analogy is readily comprehensible. For then all production is con­
ceived as consisting in giving a character to something already 
existent. But both St. Thomas and Descartes hold God both to be the 
agent par excellence,and to have produced all other existents 'out 
of nothing' - i.e. that whereas there was at first nothing beside 
Himself, Ho caused something distrinct from Himself to come into 
existence. In this instance, 'giving* seems a less appropriate term 
since the analogy with the ordinary use of the terra breaks down.
It seems probable, therefore, that it was the Aristotelian usage, or 
consideration of the types of production Aristotle discussed, which 
originally suggested the conception of agency as 'giving'.
There is a further serious difference between 'giving* in its 
most usual sense, and divine agency as conceived by St.Thomas and 
Descartes. The act of giving an apple, as pointed out above (15) 
is essentially a process of transfer, so that A cannot give B an apple
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while himself retaining it; but both St.Thomas and Descartes hold 
God* 3 perfection and power incapable of diminution, and hence must 
have thought that He could give perfection and power to his 'effects* 
without losing any of his own.
The popularity of heating as an example of 'efficient causation' 
analogous to that ascribed to God, throws light on the conception and 
its origin. The Scholastics and Descartes clearly have in mind 
examples similar to the following; A places a kettle of cold water 
on a stove, and if the stove is hot both kettle and water become 
heated also, whereas if the stove is cold they remain unchaged; again 
if hot water is poured into a cold teapot or cold water is poured into 
a hot kettle, teapot or water respectivel;jr becomes warmer. Here 
the analogy with 'giving', in the commonest sense, is close. Kettle, 
water, and teapot, not only lack heat before contact with stove, 
kettle, or water, respectively, while possessing it afterwards; but 
gain heat after such contact, only if that with #iich they come in 
contact itself has warmth. Moreover these examples may be regarded 
as an agent's giving a power which it possesses itself, since not only 
lâkoes water itself become hot after contact with hot stove and kettle, 
but it is then able to warm something else - a teapot for example* 
Indeed the analogy with 'giving', in the simplest sense,might have been 
thought sometime s too close for there to be an analogy with divine 
agency as well. For sometimes when a cold object comes in contact 
with a hot one, not only does the former become warmer, but the latter 
also becomes colder;^ Thus for instance if a hot teapot is stood on a 
cold tile, not only does the tile become warmer,but the teapot becomes
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colder. Descartes and the scholastics would doubtless have
answered any contemporary objection to their example on this score,
by appealing to the natural belief, supported by experience, that
whereas a hot body not containing, nor in contact with, a source
of heat naturally cools, a cold one does not naturally grow warmer.
They would doubtless have argued that a hot jug ÿ'ows colder on
contact with a cold tile, not because it loses heat in conferring
it,but because it has no natural source of heat in itself and so
begins to cool as soon as removed from contact with anything hot.
And they would doubtless have supported thealr citiig heating as an
example of 'giving' which does not involve loss to the giver, by
pointing out that a fire, while maintained, willheat anything in
proximity to it without itself growing colder and thus lessening
its own power to heat. (I am suggesting a way in which they might
have defended their example against contemporary criticism, in
commons ense terms, since they could have supported it only by appeal
to experience as known to ccHnmonsense as no science of thermodynamics
ho
in the sense in which this is understood today, was known^ t^hera).
St.Thomas cites (l6ÿ another example, namely teaching, to 
illustrate his meaning in describing God as 'giving* reality to his 
'effects'. This is much easier to discuss today than the former 
example, since it is no longer possible to discuss phenomena of heat 
and heating so as to show whether or not the analogy holds* and is 
illuminating, without entering into the technicalities of 
thermodynamics. Even on the commonsense level it presents a simpler 
analogy, por if all types are to be covered, heating cannot be
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defined as the conferring of a quality of warmth possessed by the 
^iver^but only as the giving of a power of heating so held, whereas 
if one confines oneself to deliberate teaching it is possible to 
describe it simply as the giving of knowledge already possessed by 
the giver*
The teacher clearly has to possess the knowledge he intends to 
impart to his pupils; I cannot start teaching latin or mathematics 
unless I myself understand them, nor indeed can I consciously possess 
anyone of the knowledge of the time the next 'bus goes^unless I 
already have it myself. But I do not lose the knowledge which I 
give thus* I may teach latin all my life without losing the 
knowledge of it myself, indeed I am more likely to retain that 
knowledge if I spend my life giving it to others than if I do not 
use it; and similarly I do not lose the knowledge that the next 
•bus goes at 3*30, because I have passed it to ray neighbour, nor is 
my knowledge even lessendd by my sharing it thus with him* clearly 
if Grod 'gives' reality or power as a teacher 'gives' knowledge. He 
can be supposed to retain his own 'reality' or power undiminished in 
the giving. One cannot accept this analogy without further 
examination, however. One must ask why it is that one form of 
'giving' involves loss to the 'giver', while another does not. It 
will then be possible to understand what St.Thomas and Descartes can 
be supposed to mean in ascribing 'giving' of the former type to God, 
and whether they are justified in so doing.
A little consideration shows that the distinction rests on the 
character of the thing given. An apple cannot be possessed #iolly
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by two people; either it must be divided so that each has a part 
of it^  or one must possess it as a whole while the other does not.
This is because ownership, where physical objects are concerned, 
is a social convention allowing a person the right to do certain 
things with them. Por example, to own an apple is to have the 
right to eat it or keep it, to put it here or there; but it is not 
to have the right to poison it and then offer it to someone else^or to 
throw it at someone's rare plants or delicate ornaments. it is at 
once apparent that the rights which ownership of an apple involves 
cannot belong wholly to two people at one e, since an apple can uid ergo 
only one physical change at a time. Thus for instance, two people 
cannot have the right to eat all of it^  since it can only be eaten 
once,and A*s eating it precludes the possibility of B*s doing so, 
as it and each of its parts, once completely transformed as in 
being eaten, cannot reassume its former character again. Similarly^
A and B cannot both have the absolute right to move an apple as they 
wish,since their wishes may not coincide,and an apple, if it remains 
undivided, cannot be in two places at once. When the discussion is 
confined to ownership of one apple,these points may seem frivolous^as 
we are not normally concerned over the rights of ownership of a single 
apple,* but they clearly become of paramount importance when a whole 
crop of apples is concerned.
With knowledge,however, the situation is completely different.
In the first place^though it is sometimes legitimate to speak of the 
right to use knowledge in a certain way, the possession of knowledge 
is not ordinarily conceived in terms of possessing certain rights.
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More important than this, the nature of knowledge clearly precludes 
the need for conceiving its 'possession' in terms of exclusive rights. 
It is not a physical object which must be either here or there, and 
cannot be shared without division: spatial descriptions simply do not
apply to it at all. There is therefore no reason why as great a 
number as have both opportunity and ability to acquire any given 
knowledge^should not possess it in its entirety.
Fantastic as the suggestion may appear at first sight, therefore,
it is clear that there is a common phenomen which may be, and often
is, described as A's giving something to B, which does not preclude
A's retaining that which he may thus be said to give. And it is
further evident that 'actuality' or 'reality'^in the sense of
character or power as conceived by Aristotle, St.Thomas, and Descartes,
resembles knowledge in that it may be shared without being divided,
and so might be'given' in a similar sense© The possession of a
character is not such as to confine it to one existent, unless the
character in question involves uniqueness; and it is sufficiently
evident that most of the characters we distinguish (e.g. roundness,
brown-ness etc.) are in fact shared by many existents (whether we
regard,these latter as sense data or continuants). And since for 
Me
Aristotle,^Scholastic, and Descartes, an agent's capacity to produce 
a given effect is inherent in its character, it is reasonable for 
them to suppose this may be shared as the latter is. And they might 
have pointed to teaching once more for evidence of the possibility 
of 'giving' power in this way. For instance, a sculptor may make 
a pupil into a sculptor, thus giving him the ability to make statues.
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without losing that ability himself. The characters and powers 
which Descartes and his like minded predecessors ascribed to created 
things do not involve uniqueness; nor did they suppose them to.
They were, therefore, justified in supposing God could give these 
powers to his 'effects' without lessening his own*
It is unfortunate that Descartes did not make it clear that 
he was identifying degree of 'reality' with extent of power^in his 
argument. For not only does the contention that a 'cause' must 
equal its 'effect' in ’reality» seem defensible only on the ground 
of this identification^ in conjunction with the Aristotelian conception 
of the 'agent’ as essentially such as to be able to produce its 
’effect'; but on any other interpretation of 'reality' the assertion 
is palpably inconsistent with experience^since a 'cause' does not 
always possess whatever it may be said to confer on its 'effect'.
Thus that which gives heat is not always hot; I may^for instance^ 
warm my hands^ not only by holding them near a fire^ but also by 
rubbing them together; similarly a man with one leg might carve or 
draw a perfect human figure. But it is always possible to describe 
such phenomena in terms of the conferring of some power possessed by 
the 'cause’: thus that whidi is warm can heat and so can frictior^
so that the latter can be described as conferring the power of heating 
which it possesses; similarly the lame sculptor could be said both 
to possess^and to confer on his statue ^ the power of expressing an 
idea or of giving pleasure.
Descartes' failure to give 'reality' the only definition on which 
he could have defended his premise is doubly disastrous,since it
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involves a failure to offer any defence of this all important step 
in his argument. He clearly thought it self-evident^ precisely 
because he took the Aristotelian conception of the 'efficient cause 
as intrinsically such as to produce its effect-for granted. This 
assumption is not surprising since it was common to his contemporaries, 
at least insofar as it essential to his argument, so that the need for 
its defence is unlikely to have arisen for him. But it is precisely 
this basic premise of his argument which majiy modem philosophers would 
question. I shall not discuss it here however, as I have devoted 
some space to its analysis above^(17) and shall, more appropriately 
discuss all notions of intrinsic connection between 'cause' and 
'effect' more critically below. (18)
Descartes' odd extension of the notion of degrees of 'reality' 
and equality of 'reality' between 'cause' and 'effect'— to ideas^was 
evidently prompted by his method of sceptical doubt^which led him to 
deny the justification of belief in the existence of the external world 
apart from the existence of God which alone vindicated our confidence 
in the evidence of our senses when they purported to present us with 
reality external to ourselves. Descartes' application of his 
argument to ideas evidently rests on the premise that an idea can 
only derive from a 'cause' having at least as much power as that of 
which it is the idea; e.g. the idea of something which can walk must 
derive ultimately from the actual existence of something capable of 
walking. There is, so far as I can see, no possible justification 
of this contention in any sense which would enable it to vindicate 
the conclusion which Descartes deduces from it. For the defence
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on the basis of the Aristotelian conception of agency seems clearly 
inapplicable, since no actual power of the postulated 'effect* itself 
is here in question. Jt seems, therefore, that it could only be 
defended, if at all, by an appeal to experience; e.g, by trying to 
show that we could never conceive the possibility of building a 
house were we neither aware of a possibility of achieving this 
in ourselves, nor had observed it achieved by others. Such an 
argument, however, would seem to lead, not to Descartes* conclusion 
that the idea of God can derive only from Him, but rather to Hume's 
view that it must derive from the content of our own experiences, 
i.e. that it can contain nothing we have not actually met with in 
experience - which is the converse of what Descartes wished to 
maintain.
His introduction of this questionable principle, and indeed 
his whole complex argument, was superfluous; since, as has been seen, 
the existence of God is deducible from his two basic premises; 
namely that nothing is inexplicable and that something exists.
And he could have deduced the existence of a creative God on which 
his experience depended, from these premises in conjunction with the 
experienced transitoriness^ changeability^ and limitations^ of his 
experiences - which would exclude the condition of their existence 
lying in themselves.
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(b) The 'causal* notions inherent in his physics.
As has been suggested^ (19) the 'causal' notions inherent in 
Descartes' physics are neither identical with, nor wholly dissimilar 
from, those which he supposes to have a wider application. The 
difference is sufficiently obvious. Descartes thinks that from a 
given set of physical conditions^ a given type of event must follow^ 
so that he supposes the entire history of the physical universe 
deducible by means of his principles; which is to say that within 
the purely physical sphere he postulates what philosophers 
ordinarily describe as 'causes' vhich entail their 'effects'^ and 
no other 'causes'. Yet at the same time^ he supposes the existence 
(and persistence) of the physical universe completely dependent on 
a 'cause' external to itself - namely God - Whom he thinks free 
either to produce his 'effects' or not. Furthermore, he also 
ascribes free choice to human minds. His position may thus be 
summarised by saying that he assumes 'causality', in the sense of 
intrinsic dependence, both within and without the physical sphere, 
but that within that sphere (and within it alone) he postulates one 
type only - namely intrinsic dependence on entailing 'causes'. He 
reconciles the postulation of complete physical determinism with his 
belief in human freedom^^ by maintaining a dichotomy between mind and 
matter which excludes the possibility of the latter's being 
determined by, or rather as a result of, physical laws. But his 
dichotomy is not absolute^ as he supposes the mind capable of 
affecting the direction, though not the quantity, of certain motions 
within the body associated with it. It was left to his successors
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to make the dichotomy complete. Jn suggesting distinct determined 
and ♦free» spheres Descartes* position, and still more that of his 
Occasionalist heirs who made the distinction absolute, foreshadows 
that of Kant insofar as the latter postulates complete determinism 
within the phenomenal sphere while at the same time justifying his 
asserting freedom by ascribing the latter to nourafina.
That the "causation* Descartes assumes within and without the 
physical sphere may in truth be regarded as two types of one basic 
generic relation^ seems apparent from his detailed discussion of 
physical questions. All physical change is, to his mind, explicable 
in terms of the movement of one piece of matter by another. And it 
is intrinsic to his treatment of such phencmiena that A^  in moving 
gives it mov©nent and can confer thus no more movement than it 
possesses (2o).
Dewcartes dislikes the use of such terms as •power* and "force* 
as the medieval discussions had often attributed movement to‘power* 
or ^ force* without any precise definition of those terms (21). It is 
clear, however, that for Descartes a given quantity of movement is^in 
effect^ the capacity to move a body with a given degree of resistence 
at a given velocity, so that a body with resistance x moving at y ra.p.h. 
would be said to have as much movement as one whose resistance was 2x
y
and whose velocity was Y. (22) From the scientific point of view 
Descartes* writings on physics are of no more value than those of 
Aristotle, for despite some familiarity with Galileo's work, so far 
as dynamics is concerned,^ he appears to have derived from the letter's 
example neither fruitful methods nor sound conclusions. Nor does this
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seem attributable to unwillingness to call down condemnation on 
himself as Galileo's disciple, since he shows cautious preference 
for the Gopemican hypothesis, which was both the occasion of 
Galileo's fate^ and of far less importance to the establishment of 
the type of viev/ of the universe which he was trying to formulate 
than were sround methods and conclusions in dynamics,
Koyré has argued forcefully^and in detail^(23) that Descartes' 
'géométrisation to the extreme' was responsible for his failure to 
deal adequately with one particular problem in dynamics, namely the 
correct formulation of the law of acceleration of falling bodies.
And there seems no doubt that the same too rigid adherence to a 
purely geometrical conception of motion was largely responsible for 
the general inadequacy and sterility of his physics as such© His 
conceiving it so^was by no means wholly unscientific in origin, 
springing largely from the wholly creditable aim, remarked above, of 
avoiding 'explanations* which, in their appeal to undefined terns 
such as 'force' and 'impetus' then were in effect, constituted in 
fact an elaborate cover for ignorance© It has been seen that he 
did not succeed in excluding all notions of motive power or force 
from his account of motion, but he certainly endeavoured to frame 
it as far as possible in terras of spatial displacement alone. (24) 
The difference between the approach to these problems by Descartes 
and Galileo respectively^ is well illustrated by the fact (also 
discussed by Koyré) that while the latter, like the former, was led 
by the predominance of geometrical conceptions into regarding the 
acceleration of falling bodies as proportional to the distance
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traversed, he recognised and rectified his error. It seems clear 
that Galileo's dynamics was not strangled by his geometrtoal notions 
as was that of Descartes^because^ (despite his confident affirmation 
of the deducibility of physical principles without appeal to 
experiment) (25) he understood, as Descartes did not, the fruitful 
correlation of mathematical principles with observation* Jt has 
been suggested (26) that Galileo's conception of physical principles 
was probably inspired by consideration of geometry; but in his 
specific attempts to reach conclusions relevant to the real world 
geometry was but a tool to Galileo^whereas to Descartes it was 
always little short of a god* The overweening importance to 
Descartes of geometrical notions is illustrated in the Meditations^ 
where 'matter* is defined in terms of extension alone, (27)
Despite their scientific sterility, however, Descartes' 
pAyjfcs
writings on phaies are of the utmost importance in that they 
constitute the first systematic account of physical phenomena as 
determined by physical laws, framed by a philosopher as distinct 
from a scientist, (The view was evidently shared by Galileo^ since 
he supposed conclusions concerning physical phenomena mathematically 
deducible from correct premises). The conception that there must be 
a strict proportion between the motive power of a mover and that 
exemplified in, or required to achieve, its 'effect*^ was not new*
It was implicit even in the much decried Aristotelian account of 
the motion of projectiles,(28) and it was made explicit by 
St, Thomas (29) and other medieval writers. (3o). But no philosopher 
had framed a systematic conception of the universe in which all
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physical change is reducible to such intrinsic and precise
correlations. (St#Thomas, of course, could not consistently have
held given physical conditions,by themselves^to entail a given
’effect*, since he held the voluntary concurrence of a Qod bound
all
by the law of contradiction to be a condition of ’effects* whether
A J
physical or no). Descartes* relation to his predecessors is 
epitomised in his attitude to their use of the t^erra^  ’force*.
He condemned this, not because he denied the intrinsic connection 
between the state of the mover and that of its ’effect* which this 
implied, but precisely because its use covered a failure to make 
this intrinsic connection explicit* just as he sought,in the 
principle that a * cause* must have as much ’reality* as its ’effect*, 
a logical ground for the commons ense and Aristotelian belief that 
all ’effects* are intrinsically dependent on their * causes*; so, in 
his analysis of motion(and of all physical change in terms of this) 
he sought a logical ground for the ccxnmonsense and Aristotelian 
belief that certain physical sequences must occur under given 
conditions* Doubtless it was the inspiration of the mathematical 
ideal, reinforced by discovering the possibility of formulating a 
mathematical physics, which stimulated the desire to show these 
fundamental concepts of a rationalist view of the universe, to be 
indubitable*
By expressing the idea that the intrinsic connections commonly 
assumed between physical events, are basically mathematical, or at 
least mathematically formulable, Descartes made the conception of 
such connection not only more explicit, but also more comprehensible
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and so more credible. To say that A is such that it must produce B 
under given conditions is, admittedly, to call B intrinsically 
inevitable given A under those circumstances, just as much as is 
affirming raathematicaly formulable principles of movement entailing 
that A must then produce B# But clearly the latter gives a far 
préciser picture of the type of relation asserted. it states un­
ambiguously that, just as a mathematical conclusion may be deduced 
with certainty from the appropriate premises, so might the occurrence 
of phenomenon B from that of phenomenon A, given sufficient other data. 
More than this, since at least many physical * causes * and 'effects* 
are ordinarily postulated,between which unquestionably we can directly 
observe no intrinsic connection; the hypothesis that these are all 
reducible to movements which regularly exemplify certain mathematical 
correlations, suggests a manner in which they may be intrinsically 
related, whereas we should otherwise have no idea how this might be* 
Thus, for instance, as they present themselves to coramonsense un­
acquainted with the findings of classical science, there is nothing 
to suggest how the successive movements of the moon might be in­
trinsically Gonnected| but once grant that the first law of motion 
and the law of gravitation as formulated by Newton may be exemplified 
in those movements, and it is possible to conceive an intrinsic 
connection between them*
Moreover whether any particular raatheraaticàlly formulable law
*
is in fact exemplified by phenomena, it is always possible that 
evidence may be found supporting the view that one such law is so 
exemplified. And, indeed, the phenomenal exemplification of such
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laws has received experimental confirmation during the past three 
centuries* The Cartesian conception of physical » causation* in 
terms of such laws,therefore, not only makes the conception of 
intrinsic entailment more comprehensible,but also renders the 
postulation of intrinsic connection between many phenomena 
empirically testable whereas it would otherwise not be so. Both 
Descartes and Galileo (in common with other believers in physical 
determinism such as Laplace) evidently supposed the existence of 
such connections demonstrable with certainty; but in this they 
were clearly confusing the certain truth of conclusions deduced on 
the basis of their physical principles,given the truth of the latter, 
with the grounds for accepting those principles-which must ultimately 
be inductive and hence can confer no more than a high degree of 
probability. Nevertheless the postulation of a type of intrinsic 
connection which evidence might at least show to be probable, was 
certainly an important contribution to the defence of that notion* 
Descartes* pioneering the idea among philosophers is thus significant 
in yet another respect*
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iii. Spinoza.
In Spinoza’s philosophy is to be found both an use of the term 
’cause’ and a conception of ’causation’ not adopted vie it her by 
commons ense,nor by any of the philosophers previously discussed.
The distinctive usage has already been remarked: (31) namely 
Spinoza’s describing that containing the condition of its existence 
in itself as ’causo sui’. jt is made explicit in the definition 
with which he opens his Ethic; ’By cause of itself, I understand 
that, whose essence involves existence; or that, whose nature cannot 
be conceived unless existing’» The complete identification of 
’cause* with * explanation* which this represents, is the more 
significant since Spinoza aligns all explanation with that proper 
to mathematics, so that the identification means for him that all 
’causes* are related to their ’effects* as premises to a conclusion 
validly deduced from them. Thus although Descartes did much to 
make the ntjrion of an entailing ’cause* significant and acceptable, 
Spinoza is the first major philosopher to define * causation* solely 
in terms of entailment. He is, therefore, an important figure in 
the history of philosophy, despite the fact that in most respects 
his thought had far less influence than that of either Descartes 
or Leibniz»
The view that all phenomena and their correlations exist
necessarily^ is a direct corollary of Spinoza’s monism. For if,
as he holds, all phenomena are but manifestations of the one self-
sufficient being, to postulate contingengy within the universe would 
hkcxt
be to assert,^that which cannot but exist could, in some respects at
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least, be other than it is - an evident self-oontradiction# And^ 
in the twentyninth proposition in the first part of the Ethic,
Spinoza explicitly deduces determinism, on these grounds, from the 
monism which he thinks himself to have demonstrated.
The seventh proposition in the second part makes his alignment 
of logical and physicàl connection further explicit, and offers a 
ground for it in Spinoza’s monism. Whereas Descartes had 
distinguished matter (defined as extension) and mind as two types 
of substance, Spinoza, regards them as two among the infinite number 
of attributes of the one substance. In other words they constitute 
different aspects of precisely the same thing. To use what is 
necessarily a very rough analogy, God’s relation to the mental and 
material respectively, is somewhat like that of a certain rock 
formation near T hi rime re to the outline of a lion and a lamb and 
that of an old woman playing an organ, respectively - its outline 
from a distance roughly corresponding to that of the former group 
when viewed from one side, and to that of the latter when viewed from 
another. The analogy is imperfect since the observer’s role is an 
important factor in the distinction between the two aspects of the 
rock formation as ordinarily conceived. Yet at the same time, in 
saying it appears thus under certain conditions,we ordinarily 
suppose ourselves to be saying something about the object of our 
observation; and when we say its appearance is A from this side, 
but B from that, we do suppose ourselves asserting a distinction 
which rests^ not only on the conditions of observation,but also on 
the character of that observed.
295,
Now if the mental and the physical are in fact different 
aspects of the same thing^ there must be a precise correspondence 
between them^just as the rock formation’s outline from one side 
cannot be inconsistent with that from the other e.g. under identical 
conditions its outline could not correspond on the one side to that 
of a lion and a lamb and on the other to that of a group of small 
girls dancing round a maypole. And since, in regarding geometryaJ 
the type of all thought properly so called, Spinoza thinks all true 
connections betweena ideas to be necessaiy, he regards all physical 
connections similarly. Thus he writes that ’The order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things* 
because *t^e idea of anything caused depends upon knowledge of the 
cause of which the thing caused is the effect*. And he adds 'Renee 
it follows that God’s power of thinking is equal to his power of 
acting;% that is to say, whatever follows formally from the 
infinite nature of God follows from the idea of God in the same 
order and in the same connection objectively in God, * ^
illustration he writes » the circle existing in nature and the idea 
that is in God of an existing circle are one and the same thing 
which is manifested through different attributes; and therefore, 
whether we think of nature under the attribute of extension or 
under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute 
whatever, we shall discover one and the same order or one and the 
same connection of causes*. (32)
Spinoza’s monism has yet another important corollary in his 
treatment of * causation* - this is the hitherto undiscussed
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conception noted above. For if, properly speaking, there is but 
one existent, of which all apparent finite existants are but 
manifestations, then all 'causation* is ultimately immanent since 
there really are no two existants to interact. Every finite 'effect* 
thus depends on God^not as an external condition (as it does for 
Aristotle, St,Thomas, and Descartes)^ but as that of which it is a 
manifestation, Spinoza writes that 'God is the cause of his modes 
not only insofar as they simply exist, (1,Corol.Prop.24) but also 
(1.prop.26) insofar as they are considered as determined to any 
action' (33) i*e, insofar as they are exemplified in given 
particular manifestations. And again he writes: 'All things which
are, are in God and must be conceived through Him (1 Prop. 15) and 
therefore (l.Corol. 1. prop,l6) He is the cause of the things which 
are in Himself' (34).
This not only represents a conception of natural causation 
fundamentally different from any considered above^ but it also 
introduces a different usage. For whereas both Aristotle and 
St, Thomas attribute to continuants^ other than God^an inherent 
tendency to develop in a certain manner, and further attribute the 
title ' cause' to conditions which are such only in virtue of being 
constituents of their 'effects' ; they normally confine the title
♦cause' to conditions of what they regard as instances of production
/
V and hence of transient causation.
At the same tirae^  Spinoza is not led by his conception of 
causation as basically immanent, to deny the reality of the 
phenomenal connections ordinarily regarded as 'causal*, nor even
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to deny them that title. It has indeed been seen that^ so far 
from denying the reality of phenomenal relations, he regards them 
as all having the necessity of geometrioal conclusions. More than 
this^ he does not suppose them necessary solely in virtue of the 
nature of God or reality as a whole, as giving them a certain de­
terminate order. Not only does he suppose finite Existants (or 
rather manifestations of the one existent) intrinsically connected 
as such, but he explicitly denies that any individual finite mani­
festation is entailed directly by the nature of God. God is such 
that he must be manifested in various modes, which latter can be 
exemplified only in given (apparent) individuals. But each of 
these finite manifestations of the mode must be entailed directly, 
not by God's nature or this mode of his existence^but by another 
of his finite manifestation under that mode. (35) Spinoza's 
position is thus somewhat analogous to the assertion that the 
occurrence of movements attributable to a particle^is entailed by 
the existence of a particle which is such thàt it must move; while 
its moving from A to B is entailed^not by this^but by the character 
of particular movements occurring in its history.
Spinoza, somev;hat oddly, even retains the Aristotelian 
classification of 'causes* although this loses its original 
signification in his monistic philosphy. He even goes so far as 
to describe God as 'efficient cause* (36) of his finite 
manifestations^ an usage clearly inconsistent with that of Aristotle, 
St.Thomas, and Descartes^for whom an 'efficient cause* is always 
external to its 'effect*.
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The monistic conception of the universe^with the 'causal* 
notions it entails, was not introduced into European thought by 
Spinoza. The basic conception had been formulated, and its 
corollaries in the treatment of 'causation* made explicit, (37) in 
the previous century by Giordano Bruno (whether it had earlier 
exponents in Europe I do not know). The extent to which he may 
have influenced Spinoza, however, seems uncertain. And I think 
there can be no doubt that Spinoza’s exposition of the view is the 
most coherent, and historically the most important, to be found in 
western philosphy. Indeed, so far as my limited knowledge of the 
subject justifies an opinion, it seems to be a far better statement 
of this position than any produced by the east, its natural home.
Despite its coherent and systematic exposition, however, 
Spinosa's position involves a fundamental inconsistency'for, as 
has been seen^(38) it is self-contradictory to attribute anything 
transitory or mutable to a self-sufficient existent, which is in 
fact what Spinoza is doing in asserting such an one to be manifested 
in infinite series of finite modifications. But there is no need 
here to discuss his philosophy apart from its bearing on his treat­
ment of 'causation*.
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tv. Leibniz.
Leibniz has been called an eclectic, and it is certainly true 
that both the principal opposing schools of the seventeenth century - 
the Mechanist and the Scholastic-contributed much to his thought#
Yet, as Russell has pointed out in the very act of using the term,
(39) Leibniz was not a superficial borrower; he did not produce a 
scrapbook, as it were, of cuttings from the work of other philosophers, 
but rather a harmonious whole. The reason for this seems to lie in 
the fact that he cannot justly be called an eclectic at all, unless 
the normal meaning of the term is much qualified He was influenced 
by opposite schools; but it is truer to say that he constructed his 
own philosphy in the light of what he learned from them^ than that he 
simply fitted together snippets from their thought. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in his treatment of the problems of 'causation*.
It seems true to say that no previous philospher penetrated them 
so deeply. He appears to have been the first to make t W  explicit 
the basic alternatives in the interpreation of 'causal* connections 
when these are not regarded as purely fortuitous conjunctions. This 
he was probably able to do^  precisely because he studied in both the 
old and new schools* A disciple of one or the other alone^ would 
have been studying an incomplete picture all the time without 
realising it* And a mere scrapbook collector of cuttings from both 
sides^would have been equally unlikely to penetrate the question 
adequately; or indeed to have produced anything like a consistent 
account of 'causation* at all.
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It has been seen (4c) that the fundamental difference between 
the Aristotelians and the philosophers inspired by the new science^ 
lay in their conception of physical explanation. And it was 
further seen (41) that although Aristotle produced a comprehensive 
analysis and rationalisation of the commonsense conception of 
•causal* explanation, his analysis is totally incapable of providing 
a basis for either the discovery or formulation of precise natural 
correlations© It is thus of no use in the formulation of any but 
the most general predictions. what the Aristotelian said of 
change was basically true, but he failed to say what is essential 
to a precise physics© The heralds of the nev/ science, on the other 
hand, were gradually building up a method of describing and analysing 
phenomena^ which enabled them to detect and formulate the precise 
correlations discoverable therein. They were thus enabled to reveal 
an order and regularity in nature undreamed of by Aristotle, and in 
so doing were able to provide a basis for much more precise and 
detailed predictions.
It was the recognition that it opened up the way to physical 
knowledge unattainable by the traditional Aristotelian methods^which 
led the young Leibniz to reject Scholasticism for the modem 
mechanism. At that time *here were two types of mechanistic theory 
current. The most popular and influential was that of the 
Cartesians for whom 'matter* was essentially extension. The 
palpable inadequacies of the cartesian analysis (e.g. its faulty 
treatment and definition of 'force*) would^have prevented Leibniz 
from accepting it^  even had its fundamental premise been less 
unpalatable to him© Jt is likely, however, that the same argument
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which he was to make the basis of his monadology, (42) namely 
that the existence of an aggregate presupposes the existence of 
simple elements to which it is ultimately reducible, was responsible 
for his adoption of the other form of meclianism current at that 
time, which postulated indivisible material atoms as the basic 
elements of which the universe is composed. Since it was the 
mechanism of Gassendi and Hobbes which he had adopted, it may seem 
surprising that Leibniz always seems to write with the cartesians 
in vieWo yet this is readily explicable. Jn the first place 
Leibniz' writings were mainly addressed either to individuals who 
were Cartesians or to those for whom (jartesianism and * contemporary 
philosophy* were synonymous. In the second place, cartesianism v/as 
by far the most influential form of me'chanism then current. Thirdly, 
as a result of his stay in paris and the contacts he made there, 
Cartesianism must have presented itself to Leibniz as the most vital, , 
vocal, and generally accepted,of current theories. Furthermore, 
Leibniz* basic argument against Cartesinisrn - namely the infinite 
divisibility of the extended, wdth its consequent exclusion of real 
extended units and hence of real extended wholes - told equally 
against the ’matter* of the Cartesians and the atoms of Gassendi.
The need for wholly simple existants, if anything is to exist 
at all (which it evidently does), is the argument which Leibniz 
constantly puts forward (43) both as fundamental to his rejection 
of the theories of Descartes and Gassendi, and as the basic 
justification of his own view of the universe. According to this 
latter, (44) its basic constituents are absolutely simple and
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therefore unextended; and these simples, or monads, are completely 
incapable of interaction. (45) Monads other thèm God, however, are 
not wholly independent since He brought them into existence, or 
rather allowed them to come into existence; (46) but they are 
completely independent of each other*
It might be supposed^on this account, that Leibniz came to 
reject mechanism, as he had previously come to reject Scholasticism, 
because he had felt forced to a conception of the universe which 
excluded it© For what, it might be asked, could be further from 
a universe^ the behaviour of each of whose constituents is entailed 
by that of others, than one whose basic elements are completely 
independent of each other© Yet Leibniz* conception of monadic 
independence is not necessarily inconsistent with the acceptance of 
a form of mechanism, nor does it seesn. to have been the source of 
his rejection of any form of it. I will try to elaborate and 
justify both these contentions*
Leibniz holds that each simple substance 'perceives*, that is 
to say represents or reflects, the rest of the universe. (47) Only 
God represents it completely distinctly, the created monads 
reflecting it with a greater or less degree of confusion. (48)
This varying distinction of perception is the sole source of 
differentiation between substances (49) As there is an infinity 
of degrees of distinctness^so the collection of monads is infinite^ 
(5o) the (fenn(?(fiia’ons of each being continuous with those most 
resembling it (51). This is to say that there is no monad whose 
perceptions can become clearer without it becoming indistinguishable
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from another unless the one nearest to it in the scale of
distinctness changes correspondingly© Hence if the monads are
to change while at the same time preserving their identity, to
a change in one must correspond simultaneous changes in all the
rest. (5 2) Thus,although the states of any one monad are
produced by its own inherent activity alone, there is a mutual
»
dependence between the states and changes of any one created monad 
and those of all the rest^ insofar as each is such that its states 
and changes are correlative with those of all the others. That 
is to say though the changes in the monad M depend on itself alone 
so that though all else were annihilated they would continue as 
usual; yet there is a monad M such that it will change in manner 
X at time t, precisely because other monads have been created such 
that they will change in manners Xl Xn at time t.
Experience does not of course present us with monads directly^ 
since its direct objects are extended. Therefore Leibniz fore­
shadows Kant in supposing our experience of the * external world* to 
be but an appearance or distorted reflection of things as they are 
in themselves. (53) A phenomenal body is thus a distorted 
appearance of a number of simple substances. (54) Scientific laws 
and commonsense clearly assert correlations^not between substances 
as they are in themselves (on Leibniz's View)^but their phenomenal 
appearances. 'Further since most of these correlations involve 
'physical objects* in the ordinary sense, these correlations are 
generally between^not appearance of isoAed substances, but 
appearances of collections of substances. Leibniz's interpretation
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of the ordinary usage of the term * interaction' must be urd erstood 
in the light of the foregoing. One thing, he says, may justly be 
said to act upon another,in this sense, when in the state or change 
of the former may be seen the explanation of a state or change in 
the latter more clearly than in the latter itself (55) In this 
sense, one monad would be said to act upon another when it reflected 
the universe in such a way as to show how the order of the whole 
demanded a given change or state in that other monad^ more clearly 
than did the latters perceptions (56). But the interactions 
asserted by commonsense are attributed, not to monads as they are in 
themselves, but to phenomena. If their assertion is to be justified, 
therefore, the distorted phenomenal appearance to which activity is 
thus attributed, must likewise reflect the universe in such a way 
that it reveals the explanation of the state of the phenomenal 
appearance said to be passive in relation to It* And this relation 
must hold because the monads^ of which each is the appearance, are 
thus respectively active and passive. Leibniz himself does not 
make this distinction between monadic and phenomenal interaction, 
explicit. When discussing interaction in this sense in the 
Monadology he speaks in terms of monads; but clearly it is 
phenomena which have suggested this way of speaking, and it is in 
terras of these that it must be preserved if the judgments of science 
and commons ense are to be preserved* The foregoing elaboration of 
his principle is implicit in his explicit discussion of interaction, 
and his attitude towards the judgments of science and commons ense*
It is, in short, the only interpretation consistent wihh his
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conception of the universe,and his attitude to science and cornmon- 
sense combined.
From the foregoing it is clear that a mechanistic interpretation 
of phenomena (and hence mechanism in the generally accepted sense since 
this concerns the relations between phenomena) is open to Leibniz, as 
it was to Kant, without involving him inits application to substances 
or things as they are in themselves. He could therefore maintain it 
without contradicting his denial of actual interaction between monads. 
Indeed to the post - Kantian it might well seem that the doctrine of 
the pre-established harmony involves mechanism,for it involves it in 
the Kantian sense. One has, indeed, only to identify explanation 
with implication, and physical explanation with entailment^and his 
interpretation of interaction can mean nothing but mechanism. If 
to say that the condition of the rest of the universe explains the 
state of any one monad and vice versa^ and to say the changes in the 
rest of the universe explain those in any one monad and vice versa^is 
to say that the state of the universe as a whole, and the changes in 
the universe as a whole, entail the state or changes respectively in 
any one monad; then the doctrine of the pre-established harmony and 
the Leibnizian interpretation of interaction plainly assert 
mechanism. If this is so, phenomena as reflections of b'aflections of 
the universe, will also entail each other; and that which exhibits the 
explanation of anothers occurrence,will exhibit how it could not but 
have occurred. The existence of one phenomenon will thus be deducible 
from the character of that which is said to explain it, or to be active in
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relation to it' while to an omniscient mind, the whole state of the 
universe past, present, and future, would be deducible from any one 
monad or phenomenon, and from any one event,monadic or phenomenal.
But Leibniz does not accept this interpretation. He denies 
that one phenomenon entails another; he denies that one event, either 
monadic or phenomenal, entails another; he denies that either the 
order of monads, or the order of phenomena, is necessary. In other 
words, he appears to deny mechanism, not on account of his metaphysical 
theory, but for the reason which led Hume to deny national justification 
for its acceptance; namely because he could find no ground for 
postulating entailment as a physical relation. Yet he accepted as 
certain, not that there was some order among phenomena, but that a 
given order-namely that affirmed by physics-holds invariably (eacept 
for the intervention of miracles which Leibniz admitted but,like 
St. Thomas, regarded as part of a wider order to which the order of 
nature is subservient, and hence not as a contradiction of order). 
Leibniz indeed goes much further than Kant, asserting not only a 
determinate order^among phenomena^ but also among the substances, 
or things in themselves, of which phenomena are the appearance. He 
even goes so far as to define the nature of this order as consisting 
in a correlative alteration in distinctness among the monads, which 
is presumably contingious^ though he is nowhere explicit on this 
latter point^.
There are difficulties in this conception,which Leibniz hever 
discusses} and it is not easy to say how he would deal with them.
In the first place, if the imperfect monads* perceptions are
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constantly increasing in distinctness, and none of them ever becomes 
identified with God (a possibility which Leibniz would 
emphatically deny), the possible degress of imperfect distinctness 
must be infinite so that there is none between which and that of 
God no other is possible. But if this is so, every possible • 
degree of distinctness cannot ever be represented in the monads* 
perceptions as Leibniz explicitly maintained it to be (57).
Even if Leibniz had admitted the incompleteness of the series 
of actual perceptions so far as their degrees of distinctness are 
concerned, he would still have been left with the difficulty that 
his philosophy demands a continuous progression, while experience 
forces him to admit periodic retrogressions e.g. he has to admit 
(5 8) that the death of an animal means an increase of confusion 
in the perceptions of its dominant monad (or more precisely in 
the dominant monad in the monad collection of which the phenomenal 
’animal* was the appearance). He might however have maintained 
his teleology, and his conception of the soul, by sacrificing the 
presuppositions of commonsense, refusing to regard death, even among 
animals and plants, as retrogressive,insisting boldly that their 
constituent and dominant monads progress to distincter perceptions 
through it and after it, although we have no evidence of this.
To do this, however, he would have been forced to modify his 
doctrine of unconscious perceptions, refusing to identify them, 
as in practice he did, (^^ with confused ones, since if sleep or 
unconsciousness also involves loss of distinctness, the same problem 
remains. To maintain that sleep and unconsciousness do not lessen
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the distinctness of perceptions would probably be psychologically 
impossible, owing to the ordinary definition of perception in terras 
of consciousness. In his sense of perception as a representation 
of the universe, however, Leibniz could consistently have supposed 
it unaffected by lack of consciousness. But this would involve 
him in his own difficulties since then he could not regard 
apperception (in his sense of conscious perception or representation) 
as a higher form of perception on his criterion, and hence would lose 
his ground of distinction between the soul and non-rational raonads/6D^ 
He could rescue himself ^ even here^by regarding 'apperception* as 
specifically distinct from 'perception', and at the same time 
regarding its periodic possession by a monad as a sign that its 
perception was of a specific type intrinsically superior to that of 
those lacking it at all times. If however he thus maintained the 
continuous series of development among the monads,he would be forced 
to deny the intrinsic difference between souls and other monads 
which he wished to maintain*,(6l) since if feoth the monad series 
and the increase in distinctness is continuous, at eveiy moment 
of change a non-rational monad must be becoming a soul.
It is therefore impossible to state Leibniz's conception of the 
order of monads precisely; but it can at least be said that he 
conceived it as the correlation of the continuous alterations in 
the degree of distinctness in the perceptions of each monad, with 
the alterations in every other, such that no two monads at any 
time possess identical perceptions (the differences between i^the 
perceptions of the created monads constituting at any time a 
continuous series).
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However obscure in important details Leibniz' account of the 
order among monads (and hece basically the phenomenal order) may 
be, of the general character of that order and its implications 
there can be no doubt. The monads have been so ordered by an 
inviolable decree or volition on the part of God,that the activities 
of each will correspond with those of every other. But this 
cannot but mean that the character of every persistent constituent 
of, and event in,the universe of monads (and hence also of the 
phenomenal universe which reflects it) is determined. A has been 
so constructed that it will change (or act, to be more Leibnizian) 
in manner x at time t, while B has been so constructed that it will 
act in manner Y at that time. And so it is with every action in
the history of each; and so it is with the character and actions
of every monad. But what is this but to say that in fact no event 
and no monad (and hence no phenomenon), can be other than it is; 
and so, it may be asked^ what is this but to say that everything in
the history of the universe (either monadic or phenomenal) is
necessary.For what, it will be asked,is the ’necessary* save that 
which cannot be otherwise?
Yet Leibniz affirms that no such event is necessary, (62)
Why is this? The answer is evident; his definition of necessity 
differs from that assumed above.
A little reflection will show that the terra 'necessity is 
commonly used in two distinct senses, and that Kant was by no means 
revolutionary in affirming two distinct types of 'necessity*.
(This distinction, of course is apart from and independent of the
310. % '
basic and highly important distinction between ’necessity’ regarded 
as an attribute of propositions and as an attribute of non-verbal 
existants. This latter distinction is important, since whereas the 
necessity attributable to propositions or rather their deducibility 
one from another, is conventional, since it depends on definitions 
and rules which are in the last resort arbitrary or a m  tter of choice; 
that attributed to non-verbal existents or facts is generally not 
supposed to be of this type but rather to be independent of all 
choice. Confusion is invited by most of the philosophers of the 
past who have discussed ’necessity’, by the fact that they have often 
explicitly discussed ’necessary propositions’ whereas in fact they 
were considering not verbal but non-verbal ’necessity’. The 
distinction may be ignored for the present, however, since Leibniz,
Kent, and the man in the street, in expressing the conceptions to be 
examined below suppose them to concern non-verbal ’nècessity’. In 
speaking of ’necessity’ in what follows I shall, therefore, be con­
sidering only attributes ascribed to non-verbal existents).
Nor is it unusual to apply different terms to the different types 
of ’necessity’ discussed below© T he man in the street distinguishes 
them as ’logical’ and ’physical’ necessity, the scholastics called 
them ’absolute’ and ’suppositional’ respectively, in addition to the 
Kantian use of the terms ’analytic* and ’synthetic’ to express what is 
basically the same distinction, Jt is not difficult to discover the 
meaning;s which have been given to these terms,When St,Thomas says that A
V
is ’absolutely necessary’, when Kant says A is analytically necessary 
when the man/
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in the street says it is logically necessary, they mean that it is 
such that it cannot be otherwise* That is to say they suppose 
its denial to involve a contradiction, not simply in virtue of 
conventional definitions or rules of language^ but in virtue of the 
intrinsic character of Ae The impossibility would remain whatever 
language was used, whether there was any language or none; it would 
be expressible linguistically however, only by a language whose 
rules and definitions made this possible* Thus if ’God is eternal* 
is a proposition which is absolutely necessary in this sense,it 
asserts something which is absolutely intrinsic to a certain 
character; but there is no connection between the terms *God* 
and ’eternal» apart from the characters they designate save only 
a conventional definition and rule* Other words may be used 
equally well (e.g. ’Dieu est etemel)^ or even ’Electricity is 
adamant', if these terras have been chosen to designate the same 
characters). Thus when St.Thomas says God’s existence is 
absolutely necessary, he means that He is such that He cannot fail 
to exist, that there is a certain character which is such that it 
cannot fail to be realised by existing. Most of the absolute, 
analytic,or logical,necessities asserted, concern not existence 
as such,but the correlation of certain attributes or qualities; 
they assert,not that A must exist because it is A, but that should 
any A exist it must have the attribute B since the character A is 
such that it cannot fail to possess attribute B* For instance, if 
the man in the street regards ’Man is mortal* (given the normal 
definition of ’man’ and ’mortal’) as asserting a logical necessity.
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and if the Scholastic had regarded it as asserting an absolute 
necessity, or the Kantian supposed it to assert an analytic 
necessity, these would be supposing that the character of being 
human is such that no one possessing it can escape death; they 
would be supposing that to be human is to be an organism so 
constructed that it cannot fail to disintegrate sooner or later.
(This, of course, is to assert neither that any of these do so 
regard the proposition 'man is mortal*, nor that they would have been 
justified in so eking; the question as to whether either of these 
assertions would be justified is here irrelevant. The example 
is only meant to illustrate the type of thing they suppose them­
selves to be asserting in 'absolute*, 'analytic*, or ’logical* 
necessity.)
On the other hand, when St.Thomas says that ’A is B’ is 
’necessary by supposition’, he means not that its denial is impossible, 
in virtue of the intrinsic character of A, but only that its denial 
is impossible given certain conditions, that under certain 
circumstances A cannot fail to be B* St.Thomas does not appear 
to have recognised the full value the conception of ’suppositional 
necessity’ in the pursuit of knowledge; he is not in the habit of 
using it to obtain conclusions, and the illustration of it which he 
offers (6 3) is trivial (granted that Socrates sits it is necessary 
that he should sit so long as he is sitting). The conception is 
introduced to show that it is not absolutely necessary for God to 
will all that H©does will, and St.Thomas appears to be interested 
in it only as it serves that purpose. Jt is however evidently a
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very useful principle, if it can be applied; for if it can be 
shown that given certain circumstances A must exist or must be 
in such and such a state,then it may be possible to deduce 
conclusions about the existence or state of A at a given time^ 
though these are not deducible from its character alone.
The man in the street is using precisely the same principle 
when he asserts a thing to be physically necessary. paradoxically 
he usually does this by asserting its opposite to be physically 
impossible. No doubt this is because he takes what he regards 
as physical necessities for granted^ and so has only occasion to 
assert them when they are denied, which occasions naturally provoke 
a rejection of the denial rather than an assertion of the necessity 
which contradicts it.
The contents in which physical necessity^ or impossibility, is 
asserted, and the content of such an assertion are familiar enough, 
physical necessity, or impossibility, is normally ascribed to a 
phenomenon which no one supposes to be absolutely necessary in its 
own right. For instance it may be asserted that JonejV death 
within a very short period is physically necessary (or alternatively 
that his living long is physically impossible). Yet no one 
supposes that the disintegration of Jones is an event which of its 
very nature (taken by itself) must take place at a given time (or 
within two specified points of time which are sufficiently close).
It might perhaps be held intrinsically impossible that his death 
should not have occurred by 1930,given that he was born in I80O} 
but even this involves, in the date of his birth,a condition which
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might not be thought intrinsic to the character of being Jones 
(though Leibniz would have regarded it so)* It would not 
ordinarily be held that there is any intrinsic centradicition 
in supposing Jones to die at 4 p.m. January 12th 1955, or in 
supposing him to be alive after that time. Yet there are 
circumstances under which it would generally be supposed 
necessary that he should be dead by that time, or impossible 
that he should live as long. Thus while there is no intrinsic 
necessity that Jones should be dead by 4 p.m. 12th January 1955, 
if he has taken a large dose of arsenic some hours previously 
and has not since taken an emetic, it is necessary that he should 
be dead by then. Similarly though there is no intrinsic im­
possibility in letters reaching me between January 5th and January 
loth i9 6 0, it may in fact be impossible that they should do so; 
this will be so if I should be snowed up in a remote farmhouse 
between those dates.
From the foregoing it is evident that physical necessity is 
ascribed to phenomena, not in virtue of their intrinsic natures^ 
but in virtue of the existence of some further condition which is 
held to entail it. Whether the existence of this condition is in 
itself necessary or not, or in what sense it might be regarded as 
necessary, need not be discussed here. The important point here 
is simply the conditional nature of ’physical necessity’.
It is further evident that although conditional necessity 
differs from ’absolute’ necessity^precisely in being conditional, 
it does not necessarily involve any basically different form of
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necessitation; That a phenomenon is conditionally necessary 
depends on two things; firstly on the existence of something else 
(which may or may not be itself necessary)j and^on some necessary 
connection between such an existent and that to whose existence 
it gives necessity. And this necessary connection might well be 
of the analytic or absolute type. Taking arsenic in sufficient 
quantity might necessitate the occurrence of death^simply because 
arsenic is of sudh a character that it cannot fail to initiate 
disintegration in an organism into which it is introduced in 
sufficient quantity. There is no doubt that many philosophers 
have so regarded the relation the between arsenic and death. This 
view may be questioned,but need not be discussed here as the problems 
it involves will be considered below. (64)
The fact that the intrinsic or ’analytic* necessity of 
relations on which conditional necessities were held to rest, was 
ordinarily taken for granted by Kant’s predecessors, doubtless 
explains why they devoted so little attention to the latter, which 
were simply regarded as subsumed under the former and so not 
needing separate consideration.
Yet as StoThomas recognised, the distinction between ’absolute’ 
and conditional or ’suppositional* necessity, was of considerable 
importance to them, precisely because the conditional necessity of 
the existence or character or anything depends equally on the 
necessary connection between that existence or character and a given 
condition, and the existence of that condition @ which latter in its 
turn may or may not be necessary either absolutely or conditionally.
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That the existence of such a condition might not be necessary, was 
a very real possibility for the Aristotelian and for Leibniz since, 
like the plain man, they postulated contingent events* indeed, 
both the scholastics and Leibniz held, not only that no existence 
save that of Qod is intrinsically necessary, bat also that no other 
existence is entailed unconditionally by his, i.e. independently 
his freely willing it.
It is evident that unless the necessary condition of A ’s 
existing, or possessing a given character, either exists absolutely 
necessarily itself, or is dependent on an entailing condition which 
does, there is no fundamental contradiction in supposing it not to 
exist (or possess that character) since none of the conditions of 
its doing so is such that it cannot fail to occur» There is, 
therefore, precisely speaking a strict or absolute type of necessity 
which cannot be ascribed to objects so conditioned; and it seems 
clear that when Leibniz uses the term ’necessity», he interprets it 
in this strict, or completely absolute, sense* Thus when he denies_ 
necessity to events, he is not denying the existence of any 
conditions which entail them; this he not only admits but takes 
pains to affirm (65). What he danying is the necessity of these 
conditions existing, (The postulation of an absolutely necessar^r 
existent has been considered sufficiently for the present purpose 
in discussing the cosmological argument forthe existence of God;
(66) and clearly the admission that there is anything to which such 
absolute necessity is ascribable is irrelevant to the present 
discussionvhich is concerned only with understanding the Leibnizean 
definition of 'necessity’*
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Leibniz denies necessity to phenomena in this sense because, 
like St.Thomas and Descartes, he supposes their existence 
dependent on a free volition of (kjd. it is thus that he is able 
to reconcile the postulation of the pre-established harmony (and 
indeed the view of a monad’s changes as intrinsic to its nature) 
with the denial of necessity in either the monadic or phenomenal 
•universe’. Given that God wills that a certain monad should 
exist, this latter must develop in a certain manner; and given that 
he wills more than one to exist, the principles of continuity and 
identity of indiscemibles entail that the nature of each shall be 
such that its changes will be correlated with those of all the others 
so that each retains its identity. And given that God wills the 
existence of the present universe, the characters of the monads 
constituting it (and hence the phenomena which are their appearance) 
must be determined so. But God was free either to will the 
existence of the present universe^ or not ; and was free either 
to will the existence of any monads beside Himself^ or not.(^ 67}(Leibniz’ 
position here is basically that maintained by St.T homas in the 
passage referred to abovej|.(6^).
It may be questioned whether Leibniz succeeded in justifying this 
latter contention. It might, for instance be held that, by the 
conjunction of his conception of God’s goodness (6^) with his view 
that existence is better than non-existence^ (%) he has suggested 
that God is such that He would not have failed to create as many 
existents as possible; and further that he could have created only 
one universe^ since He is such that He could not fail to create the
318,
best of all possible worlds© (70) Leibniz defends his contention 
that God was really free both to will the existence of something 
beside Hirrself or not, and to will that of the present universe 
or not, by maintaining that ends or purposes incline without 
necessitating. (71) It has been seen, (72) however, that the 
acceptance of such an assertion is by no means straightforward, 
and is indeed admissible only if 'incline* is uiderstood, not in 
the ordinary sense of prcanpting, but solely as making something a 
possible object of choice. Leibniz it must be admitted, v/ent 
deeply enough into neither this^ nor the general problem as to how 
God can be regarded as a non-neces sit ting ’cause*. He subjects 
the latter problem, for instance, to a far less rigorous analysis 
that does St.Thomas (7$-) It is unnecessary to pursue these 
considerations further here, however. That Leibniz supposed 
himself to have been justified in regarding God as the *free* 
cause* of the universe^ is sufficient to save him from self- 
contradiction in both postulating a pre-established harmony and 
denying necessity to phenomena or created nomands. (The 
postulation of human free-will, vhich he also wishes to maintain, 
appears extremely difficult to reconsile either with his principle 
of pre-established harmony^ or with his conception of a monad’s 
changes as intrinsic to itself; but it seems unnecessary to discuss 
this here either, as it has no especial bearing on his treatment 
of 'causality* in general).
It might perhaps be supposed that Leibniz’ treatment of 
necessity was outmoded by Kant’s analysis; Leibniz, it may be
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said, was thinking in terms of analytic necessity alone^whereas 
Kant has shown such an account to be inadequate. He has pointed 
out, it may be urged, that A may be necessarily connected with B 
although the connection is intrinsic to the nature of neither 
taken by itself; for he has drawn attention to the fact that if 
A and B are constructed so as to form constituents of a given 
synthesis, the position and character of each is thereby 
determined. It is in this manner that the character and relative 
positions of each constituent of a pattern is determined; and in 
the same way the characters of each member of a pack of cards or 
set of chessmen, and their mutual relations are determined by the 
rules in accordance with which the group is constructed and used. 
This form of necessitation is also exemplified in a language (in 
Carnap’s sense which applies the title td all symbol systans to 
which transformation rules are applicable)^ so long as this is 
regarded purely formally (again in Carnap’s sense); for here again 
there are discrete factors so constructed as to be capable of 
given syntheses.
Kant’s approach to the subject, however, though in some 
respects, most particularly in regard to terminology, different 
from that of Leibniz, certainly does not provide a refutation of 
the latter’s presuppositions, but rather the reverse. Kant, 
admittedly applies the term ’necessity’ where Leibniz would refuse 
to do so. Yet so far from decrying the concept which the term 
represents for the latter (a concept whose exemplification Kant 
explicitly admits under the title of ’analytic necessity^ or the
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proper subject of ’analytic* judgments)^ or ousting it from the 
primacy Leibniz (in common with other rationalists) had ascribed 
to it, Kant could derive the certainty he demands from synthetic 
necessity only by assuming the synthesis to rest on a condition 
with which it is connected with absolute or intrinsic necessity,
For although it is true that, given a certain synthesis, its 
elements must necessarily be such and sudi; yet before it is 
possible to say that those elements must be so on that account, 
they must be known to be its elements. Thus, if a given pile 
of cards is a complete standard pack^ it must contain four suits 
each consisting of ace, king, queen, etc.; but I cannot know, on 
this ground, that there are four such suits in a given pile of 
cards unless I am first assured that it constitutes a standard pack,
I may know that a given pile of cards is a standard pack because 
I have previously examined its contents and have no reason to 
suppose it to have been disturbed since© But clearly I cannot 
claim to have examined all phenomenal events past, present, and 
future, nor could Kant; nor indeed did he do so,^ his use of the 
notion of ’synthetic necessity* was indeed aimed explicitly at 
remedying this defect© To have been justified in inferring 
conclusions about phenomena on the ground of their constituting a 
certain type of synthesis (as he claimed to be)^he would have had 
to be assured that their forming such a synthesis was entailed by 
an actually existent condition. That Kant in fact assumed 
precisely that absolute necessity demanded by his conception of 
* synthetic necessity* as the guarantor of the certainty of scientific
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prediction^seems indubitable, although he does not appear to 
have fully realised the nature and significance of his basio 
premise. For in effect he assumes that the character of our 
experience, or rather of the * universe’ with which it presents 
us, is entailed by the nature of our perception©
Thus it is clear that Kant, in turning to ’synthetic 
necessity* for the solution of the inductive problem^showed not 
more insight than Leibniz, but less©
From what has gone before it should be apparent, as was indeed 
explicitly suggested at the outset^ (7S) that in the pre-established 
harmony Leibniz is affirming nothing else but Kant’s ’synthetic 
necessity’. His treatment of the position has been seen to differ 
from Kant’s in three respects© In the first place Leibniz regards 
'synthetic necessity* as governing^not only phenomena^but also 
monads or noumena; whereas for Kant it is applicable, or at least 
can be asserted to be so, only in the phenomenal sphere. Secondly, 
Kant is interested only in arguing that our experience must exhibit 
a given type of synthesis, he is not interested in the question as 
to whether there might not have been any percipients of whose 
experience this is necessarily true. To Leibniz, on the other 
hand, it is important to insist that the synthesis governing 
monads (and hence phenomena) rests on a condition (namely divine 
concurrence) which might not have occurred© Lastly, while Kant 
postulates no intrinsic connections where he postulates ’causal* 
and other relations determined by ’synthetic necessity’; Leibniz^ 
on the other hand^ conceives such determination as entailing the
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co-existence of continuants which are such that the changes 
intrinsic to the mture of each synchronise with those intrinsic 
to the natures of all the rest.
Similarly, despite fundamental differences between their
theories, such as the postulation of but one ’substance* on the
one hand and that of an infinite number on the other, there are
parallels b etween Spinoza’s approach to ’causal’ notions and that
of Leibniz. Thus, for instance, the theories of both exclude
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transeunt causation^ir this is regarded as an intrinsic relation 
between really distinct existants. And at the same time, despite 
thus contradicting ocxnmonsense, each accounts for apparent phenom­
enal interaction in terms consistent with the predictions of both 
science and commonsense.
Leibniz’ treatment of the question of ’synthetic necessity* 
and apparent phenomenal interaction^ is of great interest. It 
foreshadows, and indeed goes further than, Hume’s conclusions in 
denying^not only the possibility of discovering intrinsic 
connections between phenomenal events, but also the existence of 
any such connection between them. And at the same time it 
reveals the inadequacy of the Kantian hypothesis,regarded as an 
answer to Hume which does not reject the letter’s premises.
Leibniz* postulation of the twin principles of contradiction 
and sufficient reason (76) is a significant phenomenon to find at 
the end of the century of the rationalist. For it constitutes an 
explicit rejection of the increasing tendency to align all 
explanation with that proper to mathematics. it is, in effect, a
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réaffirmâtion of the oommonsense and Aristotelian belief that^ 
while some things depend on ’causes’ which entail them, others 
are dependent merely on conditions which render them possible 
but not inevitable. The wheel has thus gone full circle.
Descartes accepted the commonsense and Aristotelian distinction 
between entailing and non-entailing ’causes’, but at the same 
time did more than anyone else to make current the attitude of mind 
which tended to exclude it. Spinoza explicitly denied it; and 
finally Leibniz is found reaffirming it almost as though it were 
a new discovery.
324o
NOTES.
le Newton refused to postulate the law of gravitation as obtaining 
universally, allowing that there might be conditions hindering 
its operation in distant parts of space where we could not verify 
it.
2. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modem science (Kegan paul, Trench, 
Trubner & Co.Ltd.1925) Ch.11 (c) p*35 (Cf*ppo31-4)
3. Ibid. ch. Ill (E) p.89.
4. CfoEtudes sur Leonard da Vinci Troisième Series; Lea Précurseurs 
parisiens de Galilee
5. Quoted in Etudes Galiléennes (Hermann & Cie 1939) 1. A 1^  Aube de 
la Science classique pp.18-27, 28-39, & 40.
6. Cf. Burtt; The Metaphysical Foundations of Modem Science
Ch. 11 (c) pp.31-2; and Koyré; Etudes Galileennes; 11 La Loi de 
la Chute des Corps pp.lo6-7.
7. Ch. 111 p.257
8. cf.Recherche de la Vérité Bk. Vl Pt. 11 Ch 3 T.Taylor*s tr.1700
p. 56 (referred to by Hume; Treatise Bk 1 pt 111 Sect 14 pl58
(Selby-Bigge Edition 1946) Eclairissement ppl71 <& 2.
9. Ch. 11 pp.252-3
IQ. principles pt. 1 prin. XXVlH (Rose & Haldane trans.1931) p231
11. Meditation 111 pp.162-3
;
12. ch. 111 pp255“6
13. Ibid. pp. 255-7
14. Ibid. p, 256
15. p. 276
lé. Surama Théologie»
325.
17. Cf. Chclo pp108-9 ; Ch.11 iii (e) p. 222
13. Ch. 8
19c il (&) p.266
20. Cf.principles pt.ll prins XL- XLll. XLV, XLYl, XLVll 
XLVlll XLlX,L,Ll, Lll, Llll, LlX, LX.
21. Cf. principles 11 prin. XX7
22. Cf.Principles pt.ll prin. XXVl, XL, XLl, XLll, XLlll, XLVl,
XLVll, avili, aix, l , l i , l u , l u i , l v i , l v x i, l i x , l x , lxi
23. Etudes Galiléennes: 11 lA Loi de la Chute des Corps-Descartes
et Galilée pplo2-7.
24* Cf.Principles pt 11 prin. XXV
25. cf. Dialogues Concerning Two New sciences (Crew and De Salvo tr; 
Macmillan 1914) Fourth Day (296) corollary p.276.
26. 1. p264
27. Med. 11 (Kemp Smith tr. Macmillan 1952) p.2o8
28. of. Phys. Vlll iQ. 266b 27-267a 21.
29. cf. Surama Theologicapt.il (1st pt. ) Q 85 A. 5 Rep. Obj.l.
30c Cf. Duhem Etudes sur Leonard de Vinci Troisième Series; Les
précurseurs parisiens de Galilee.
31. Ch. 1 (Iv) p.147
32. Ethic pt.ll prop vil Demon Corol & Schol.
33. Ibid. pt.l prop. XXlX Deraonst.
34. II. PT.l prop. XVlll Demons t.
35. Ib. pt.l prop. XXVlll Deraonst.
36. Ib. pt.l. prop. XXV
37. De l'infinito Dial. 1.
326.
38. oh.Ill pp.250-1.
39. The philosophy of Leibniz (Allen & Unwin 1949) Gh.l Sect. 6. p.5.
40. 1.pp.261-3
41. Ibid.
42. Monadology (Latta tr. clarendon press I8 9 8) 2 p.217 
43- CfoLatta: Introduction to the Monadology Pt.ll pp.27-30
4 4 . of.Lettre a Amauld (1687 (c.ll 97); Répliqué aux Reflexions
de Bayle 1702 (E-186 b; G.lv.561): Monadology 2; principles of 
Nature and of Grace 1 (Latta tr.pp.4o6-7).
45. Monadology 7 p.22o.
46. Ibid. 36-43 pp.237-41.
4 7. Ibid. 56, 57, P.2 4 8, 62 p.2 5 3, GII 71 (Quoted by Russell in The 
philosophy of Leibniz: Appendix %1 pp26o-l); G.1.383-(Quoted by 
Russell; ibid; Appendix XI p.259).
4 8. Monadology 48-9 pp.244-5.
4 9. Ibid. 60 p.250.
50. Ibid. 57 P248.
51. Of.letter quoted by Guhrauer; G-W.P* von Leibniz, eine 
Biographic, vol.l. Anmerkungen, p.32. quoted in Latta*s intro­
duction to the Monadology pp.38-9: Nouveaux Essais p.376 
(Latta trans.);GV-286 (quoted by Russell; Appendix IX p.223)
52. Monadology 52 p. 246.
53. G.Vo359 (Quoted by Russell in The philosophy of Leibniz; Appendix 
VIII p. 240-1; G U I  623 (Quoted by Russell ibid; Appendix Xl p.255.)
54. Cf.GII 261 ; GII 517 (Quoted by Russell in Tbe philosophy of 
Leibniz; Appendix IX p.249^
327.
55o Monadology 49, 50 p.245.
56. of. Monadology 49, 50, 51, pp.245-7; and 5 6 , 57 p.248.
57o Monadology 57, 58 pp. 248-9
58. G Vll 531 (cited by Russell: The philosophy of Leibniz Ch.XIII
p. 155) Monadology 21 pp.230-1.
59. Monadology 20, 21, 23 pp. 230, 231
60. Monadology 19 p.23o
61. Monadology 83-6 pp. 266-8
6 2. cf.Identification of ’contingent truth* with ’truth of fact’. 
Monadology 33, 36 pp. 235-6, 237* 0*111 400 (Quoted by Russell 
in The philosophy of Leibniz* App. III. p.20^
63. Summa Theologioa pt. 1. Q. XlX A. 3.
64. Ch. 8
65. G. 11 46 (Quoted by Russell; The philosophy of Leibniz ch.Ill 
p. 27} Monadology 22 p. 231; 60 p.250; 0.111 400 (Quoted by
Russell; The philosophy of Leibniz; Appendix V p.224*
6 6 . Ch. 1 1 .  V . p p .232-8.
67. O.III 400 (Quoted by Russell in The philosophy of Leibniz ; 
Appendix V p.223) 438(Russell; App.Ill p.2l0^
68. Surama Theologioa pt.l. Q.XlX A.3,
69. Monadology 41. p.240; 55. p248;
70. Ibid. 41# p.240*
71. Monadology 53-5 pp.247-8
72. cf.Monadology 36-9 pp. 237-9; and 46 pp. 242-3
73. Ch. l.ii. (a) pp.115-7
74* Cf. Summa Theologioa Q XlX A. 3,8,10; Summa Contra Gentises 
pt. 1. Chs. XXlll & LXXXl.
75. p .  310 ff.
76. Monadology 31, 32 p.235; OVll 309: Oil 49, OVII 199,
(Quoted by Russell in The philosophy of Leibniz; Appendix m
pp. 209-10, 210, 211).
328.
CHAPTER V.
BERKELEY’S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OP CAUSAL THEORY.
Berkeley* s contribution to causal theory is somewhat over­
shadowed by the fundamental revolution in that of his successor,
Hume. Hume’s philosophy, though not the logical outcome of that 
of Berkeley, was its natural heir so that one might regard the 
existence of a Berkeley not followed by that of a Hume as very un­
likely. Yet had this improbability been realised, Berkeley would 
have appeared to posterity as a striking revolutionary in his treat­
ment of ’causality’ (1).
It is true that he was not a revolutionary in the fundamental 
sense in which this is true of Hume; he did not challenge the 
generally accepted claim to postulate some intrinsic connection 
between any ’cause’ and * effect’^ properly so-called; nor the belief 
thaÿ we can justly apply the titles ’cause’ and ’effect’, so defined, 
to actual existentso Nor did he institute the lesser revolution of 
an Aristotle or a Descartes^ in introducing a conception of ’causal 
determination foreign to contemporary thought. He neither 
introduced teleology to an age in which ’efficient causes’ were the 
accepted explanations of physical phenomena, nor affirmed mechanism 
in an age accustomed to think in terms of teleology. Although he 
maintained teleology at a time when mechanism was fashionable, this 
was hardly revolutionary since the idea had not yet been forgotten.
He was taking a side in an argument which was still alive, and was 
no more revolutionary than a man defending liberalism (in the 
specialised political sense) in modem England. An English
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philosopher upholding teleology a century later would have had 
a far juster title to be called revolutionary on this score.
The f o m  of ’causal’ influence postulated in Berkeley’s 
writings^ is that of a mind producing ideas and affecting other minds. 
Thinking and willing are the activities by which it does this.
There was nothing revolutionary in this; it was a form of influence 
recognised by Scholastics, cartesians, and, indeed, most thinkers. 
Even Locke the father of English Arnpiricisra^and Leibniz who 
explicitly denied all interaction, yet treated mind as a transeunt 
’cause’ (though for Leibniz only Gk)d was such a ’cause’).
Yet Berkeley’s doctrine was indeed revolutionary^ and can truly 
be said to have laid the foundations of the phenomenalist, account 
of ’causality*. The basis of the Berkeleian revolution was the 
denial of matter^ with the consequent reinterpretation of experience. 
This denial involved a denial of physical interaction^since Berkeley 
maintained that when we suppose ourselves to be experiencing the 
physical universe we are in fact experiencing only passive ideas 
which could not interact even should it be possible to foicmblate a 
theory of their interaction w h i A  ahouM be consistent with the 
facts thus interpreted. it is not simply his denial of physical 
interaction which laid the foundations of phenomenalism. Leibniz 
denied physical interaction in denying interaction in general, yet 
there was nothing in his account of experience to suggest 
phenomenalism. It is the character of the account of the uniformity 
of experience and the expectation of future uniformity, which he 
offers^ that made Berkeley the father of phenomenalism. Berkeley’s
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philosophy is essentially a criticism of Locke. The latter 
in developing the doctrine of representative ideas^wqs led 
inevitably to postulate on the one hand matter - unknown and 
unknowable, and on the other *âdeas* - the content of sensible 
experience (i.e. sensa or sense data, as they would generally be 
called today). Very reasonably Berkeley rejected the notion of 
an unknown and unknowable somewhat^ as useless and unintelligible.
This left him with only collocations of sense data, and amounted 
to a denial of the physical world in the cartesian sense of the 
term. it was for this reason that his philosophy was so s hocking 
to his contemporaries who ha.d come to accept the cartesian universe, 
one might almost say to take it for granted. (His contention that 
the ’material universe’ exists solely as the content of some 
perception is, of course, equally startling to commonsense).
Thus Berkeley is in complete agreement with the phenomenalist 
as to the content and object of sensible experience, and, as will 
be seen, in regard to its practical interpretation also. He himself 
is not a phenomenalist^ since he does not regard sense c^ta as the 
sole existents. His interpretation of experience depends on the 
conviction that the existence of ’ideas’ (i.e. sense data) pre­
supposes that of a ]#nd which experiences them. Hence his universe 
contains minds regarded^not as collocations or ’bundles’ of 
experiences^but as continuants possessing conscious perception.
Further he regards its existence as presupposing that of a supreme 
mind (i.e. God), as necessary to account for the continuity and un­
iformity of sensible experience, and its independence of human volition.
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conceptions which no phenomenalist would admit* It is perhaps 
ironical that the interpretation of experience which seemed to 
Berkeley to argue most strongly the existence of the suprasensible, 
an interpretation v/hich he developed for this very purpose, should 
have carried the opposite conviction for his successors. Berkeley 
says no more to elucidate the ’causality* of the mind than his 
predecessors. Indeed he says considerably leas than Aristotle and 
the Scholastics since he is far less precise in analysing the twin 
functions of understanding and volition which, with them, he regards 
as the activities of mind* His apportioning of activity and 
passivity to mind and ideas respectively, prevents him from acknowledg­
ing the passive element in perception, although he implicitly admits 
it in recognising that sensation is involuntary*
Again, he ignores the part v/hich volition must have played in 
the construction of the ideal universe in the mind of God. Since 
the ideas are distinct from God, yet dependent upon Him, presumably 
their relation to Him must be analogous to that of any idea to the 
mind v/hich produced it. When a man regards himself as responsible 
for an idea, he supposes it is dependent on his will; he supposes 
he can either entertain it or not as he chooses. Moreover, in­
ability to choose or control anything in his experience is regarded - \ 
as weakness or impotence. Berkeley clearly held these views; he 
also held God to be omnipotent and independent. it would, therefore, 
h%ve been contradiotoiy for him to suppose God intertained ideas 
which were not dependent on his will. Yet from what he says, one '
might suppose Berkeley to have regarded the continuum of ideas which 
we call the external world, as God’s dream - a view to which he could
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never bave subscribed explicitly. The failure to appreciate
this, doubtless dn the failure to distinguish the active and
passive elements in perception. For him perception means activity,
"fo r A
and activity means responsibility^* hence^to say God perceives is to 
ascribe independence and responsibility to Him. Yet Berkeley’s 
own admission of the independence of sense-data,together with his 
view that in them we are perceiving reflections, as it were, of
ideas in the mind of God, is completely contrary to the notion that
perception is wholly active. To say that my perception is dependent 
on something outside myself and is in effect receptive, is to say that 
it contains a passive element. Therefore Berkeley does not 
sufficiently account for God’s ’causality* in producing ideas, by 
calling it perception; he should have distinguished between the 
perception which is wholly active and that which contains a passive 
element, if he was to have made his conception of God’s causality 
at all explicit. From this it is clear that Berkeley made.no 
positive contribution towards the definition of ’causal connection’.
His contribution lies entirely in his account of the uniformities 
of experience and the expectation of future uniformity, in other words 
his account of ’causal laws’ as these are ordinarily understood.
When I speak here of his account of experience I mean, of course, not
his ultimate explanation of it in terras of divine id#as,but his
analysis of its immediate content and man’s reaction to it.
As has been seen, for Berkeley what we call the ’external world’,
the object of sensible experience, consists entirely of what he calls
’ideas’, that is to say sense data variously correlated. Since it
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is one of the two basic constituents in his universe, it is 
unfortunate that Berkeley does not define ’idea’ more precisely.
He applies the same term ’idea indifferently to both objective 
sense experience and the contents dreams imaginings and illusions, 
although he himself recognises the distinction between objective 
perceptions and chimeras (2). He makes no use of the distinction 
between simple and complex ideas, adopted by both Locke and Hume. 
Again, although ostensibly applying the term 'ideas’ to everything 
in the mind, his discussion of abstract ideas suggests that, like 
Hobbes, he uses the term, ’idea’ as synonymous with ’image’.
Clearly he cannot identify ’idea’ with all elements of the mind’s 
content indifferently since we understand v/hat is meant by being 
possessed of three sides independently of understanding what is 
meant by being isosceles scalene or equilateral, otherwise
we should not attribute that character to all these figures 
indifferently. Indeed his introduction of the term ’notion’ is 
a tacit admission of the inadequacy of ’idea’ to its appointed task. 
Berkeley insists (3) that we have a ’notion* of God and the soul 
although we possess an idea of neither; in other words, he admits 
that there is, among the contents of the mind, something which does
d
not come within his definition of ’idea*. This is^very serious 
admission since it completely overthrows his system; indeed it is 
very surprising that he did not find it more disturbing.
The first and third of these ambiguities need not be pursued 
further here; they are relevant to the present discussion only as
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they illustrate the vagueness of Berkeley’s use of the term ’idea*. 
For whatever the demerits of Berkeley’s definition of ’idea’ if this 
is required to apply to ail the contents of the mind, there is no 
doubt as to what he means when he maintains that the ’external 
world’ consists solely of ideas. This quite evidently means that 
the object of sensible experience is nothing but sense data in 
various collocations. The second of the ambiguities listed above, 
however, greatly detracts from the clarity of his account of the 
’external world’. For that with which the senses present us is a 
complex of simple constituents. We perceive simple sense data (4) 
a red patch,heat, etc., but we never perceive them singly; they are 
always combined in some highly complicated manner. It is therefore 
seriously misleading to apply a single terra to the objects of 
sensation in general, without qualification. For these complexes 
and their simple constituents may equally be meant by it; and clearly 
propositions which apply to the one, will not always apply to the 
other (an obvious example is ; The objects of sensation are simple). 
Sometimes the context might make it clear to which the writer was 
referring; but if he were discussing a controversial issue, which 
would be just the occasion on which it would be most essential to 
be sure as to what he meant, it might be extremely difficult to tell 
to which he was referring and hence what he was really trying to say. 
So in speaking simply of ’ideas’ as the content of experience, 
Berkeley is making his views unnecessarily obscure^ and forcing those 
who endeavour to interpret his theory, to apply the distinction to it 
as well as they can.
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The first paragraph of the ’Principles of Human Knowledge» 
makes it clear that Berkeley does recognise this distinction.
Here he enumerates sense data (colours, scents, taste, heat, hardness, 
sounds), which he describes as ’ideas’ which a re the objects of 
sense; he then proceeds to explain how^ine xperience^we find them 
associated in complexes e.g, apples, stones, trees, books (5).
Since he here refers to the simples as ’ideas’^ and to the complexes 
as collections of ideas’, one might well feel justified in interpreting 
his term ’idea* as applying solely to sense data. In discussing 
’visible* and ’tangible figure, however, he speaks (6) of a tangible 
figure’ as an ’idea’ although it is evident that the dxperienoe of 
’tangible figure’ involves more than one simple sensation.
Elsewhere (in discussing distance) (7) he defines ’idea’ as ’the 
immediate object of sense or understanding’, a definition which 
would seem more applicable to the complexes than to their elements, 
since on the evidence of experience it is the complexes which we 
know directly, their components being distinguished.only after 
subsequent (and sophisticated) analysis (8)
When anyone is discussing whether ’ideas’ can be ’causally’ 
connected, and whether there is any evidence that they are, it is 
clearly important to know whether he is speaking of the simple or 
complex elements in experience. There might be no ground for 
asserting ’causal’ connections between ’simple ideas' or sense data, 
while there might be some for supposing such connections to hold 
between certain complexes of sense data when these happened to be 
formed. That is to say though it might be held that there was no
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causal connection between redness and sweetness, or even between 
the various visual or tactile and kinaesthetic sensations involved 
in eating an apple, it might be supposed that there was such a 
connection between the successive complexes of data which make up 
the complete experience of eating an apple. Thus to deny 'causal* 
connection between 'simple ideas'^  is not necessarily to deny such 
sonnection between 'complex ideas'^ and evidence for or against such 
connection between the formerais not necessarily evidence for or 
against such connection between the latter.
Berkeley frequently insists that, being passive, ’ideas' cannot 
constitute 'efficient causes'; (9) and it is evident that he supposed 
that in so doing he had disproved any 'causal' connection between them^ 
since he finds it necessary to explain scientific law and the common­
sense experience and expectation of natural uniformity in non- 
causal terras, jt has been seen that he does not regard 'efficient 
causation' as the only form of 'causal* connection^since he defends 
teleology. As it is evident that his 'ideas' could not be regarded 
as 'final causes'^ he doubtless thinks it unnecessary to point this 
out. Besides, it is the mechanical interpretation of experience 
current with his contemporaries^ which he is concerned to disprove.
No one of them was likely to attribute any but 'efficient causation* 
to 'ideas'.
His conviction that their passivity disproved their 'efficient 
causality*^ together with his belief that this is sufficient to 
disprove all ' causal* connection between them ^ shows that for him, 
the initiating ' cause* m’jst be active. That is to say he does not
337.
entertain the possibility that an idea, though passive, might be 
such that its existence under given conditions A would entail the 
existence of another under given conditions B; nor does he suppose 
that the existence off one might depend on that of another because 
they were correlated as members of a pattern established certainly, 
but on some other basis than the intrinsic connection of its 
members.
Even had he not so defined ’efficient' or 'mechanical causality’ 
at the same time insisting on the passivity of 'ideas’, Berkeley 
could, with consistency, have ascribed 'causality’ tothêm in none 
of the senses current at that time - neither the necessary connection,
of Cartesian physics, nor the less rigid connection of Aristotelian
and Scholastic natural law, nor even the vaguer and more generalised 
concept of commonsense. He could not have ascribed it to 'simple 
ideas', and this for an obvious reason* All the causal connections 
commonly ascribed to the ^external world’, all those supported by 
any evidence at all, are connections between, not sense data, but 
'physical objects’. There is no need to enter into the controversy 
over the nature of ’physical objects' here. Whether ’physical 
objects' are more than collocations of sense data, or not, the 
distinction between*a sense datum (say a red patch) and a ’physical, 
object (e.g. a pillar box) is evident. We may not be quite sure 
in what that to which we apply the term ’pillar box’ consists; but
we know that we apply it to something in experience which involves
the visual datum red, but also involves more than this.
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Even if the phenomenalist be right in maintaining that there is 
no ground for supposing the existence of anything but sense data, it 
is evident both that there are observable regularities in experience^ 
and that these do not consist in connections between sense data as 
individuals but rather in connections between collocations of sense 
data and their relations one with another. There is, for instance, 
no regular connection betv/een the visual datura red and the tactile 
datum pain. Yet there is such a connection (at least the evidence 
suggests such a connection to have obtained in the past) between 
what we call experiencirg the presence of a fire (i.e. an experience 
involving the visual data red, blacky and orange patches of various 
type^ together with the tactile datum heat^  and auditory data —  
crackling etc.), the experience of moving in a certain direction 
relative to these data (also a complex of data, visual, auditory; 
tactile, and kinaesthetic) and the tactile datum pain. whatever, 
therefore, may be said of the adequacy of the uniformities of 
experience as evidence of 'causal* connection, it is clear that they 
provide no evidence of any 'causal* connection between sense data 
regarded as individuals (lo).
Nor would Berkeley have been justified in regarding than as 
evidence of 'causal connections between complex ideas or collocations 
of complex ideas. The fact that the complexes connected in 
experience are normally composed of data proper to several senses, 
and the great complication of the conreotions observed in experience, 
would render it extremely difficult to attempt to substantiate such 
a view under the most favourable circumstances. Berkeley's
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insistence on the complete distinction between the ideas of 
each sense and those of every other^would forbid such an hypo­
thesis even were all the other difficulties removed. Repeatedly 
he affirms that the objects of each sense are completely disparate, 
Not only are they utterly distinct^ but there is no basis, no 
ground, for any relation between them. Even 'visual figure* is 
completely different from 'tangible figure* (11)
The basis of Berkeley's position is readily understandable, 
even though the conclusion he draws regarding figure seems to be 
in flat contradiction to experience. It is a commonplace that 
it is meaningless to compare a colour with a scent or a sound 
since there is nothing common to them which would serve as a basis 
of comparison. Since Berkeley holds that the external world 
consists of nothing but sensations in various correlations^ he 
cannot consistently hold there to be any similarity or basis of 
comparison between * visual * and * tangible figure*. For then 
* tangible figure* consists in nothing but collocations of tactile 
sensations,while’visual figure’ consists in nothing but a 
collocation of visual sensations. It is necessary only to 
experience both, to realise that there is no more relation b etween 
the sensations involved in 'feeling a square* and those involved 
in ’seeing* one, than there is between a scent and a sound.
The fact that, in spite of this dissimilarity, there still seaas to 
be an elanent common to what we perceive in each of these 
experiences^ should have presented a serious problem for Berkeley; 
but he does not seem to have realised this.
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If (as is evident) there is no basis of comparison between 
the data supplied by different senses, clearly there can be no 
’causal* connection between them in any of the senses familiar 
to Berkeley. Jt has been seen that for both Cartesian and 
Aristotelian, its relation to the "effect* is intrinsic to the 
character of the * cause’, while the same view is implicit in the 
commonsense usage. A 'causal* connection^ according to any of 
theses usages^ clearly could not exist between, completely disparate 
terms. The data proper to the various senses are not totally 
unrelated, however; a visual and a tactile sensation may be 
either simultaneous or successive one to another. They could 
therefore be 'causally' connected in the Kantian sense of forming 
a given temporal pattern in order to constitute human experience. 
But this notion of 'causation* would not have suggested itself 
to Berkeley; for it had not been held at that time^or prior to it; 
and, further, it is a complex method of accounting for experience, 
which would have been unlikely to suggest itself save as an escape 
from the conclusions of a thoroughgoing phenomenalism, (which 
Berkeley himself never approached).
But the regularities obser\/ed inexperience, as has already 
been illustrated by the former example, involve complexes to 
which the data several senses contribute* In the exaipple quoted, 
the tactile datum pain regularly follows a given correlation of 
complex experiences which include visual, auditory, tactile, and 
kinaesthetic, data* And this example is typical. The 
uniformities of experience, therefore, could provide no evidence of
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'causal* connection between complex ideas which Berkeley would 
have been justified in accepting*
Berkeley’s * external world’ is therefore one v/hich has since 
become familiar to British philosophers, and has been accepted by 
many of them; but which before his time had never been' postulated* 
This is an ’external world' composed of elements between which 
there is no intrinsic connection, a 'world* whose uniformities 
are inexplicable in terms of intrinsic connection, a 'world* in 
which a ’causality* which means more than regularity is inadmissible. 
The historic importance of Berkeley in relation to ’causal* theory, 
is thus seen to be immense*(12)«
Like Hume, Berkeley accounts for the conviction that the sense 
data always found together are in fact causally connected, by point­
ing to their constant association. (13) Like Hume he accounts for the 
unshakable conviction that the observed uniformities will continue 
to obtain in the future, in terms of the connection we have attributed 
to sense data through finding them constantly together,(14).
Berkeley himself, of course, supposed the future's constancy ■ 
assured by the divine goodness and immutability, believing the 
ordering of sensations to be, not arbitrary, but ordained by God for 
the purpose of securing human welfare. (15) He thus disagrees 
with his phenomenalist successors and heirs, both in his inter­
pretation of the 'external world* he bequeathed to them, and in his 
estimate of the sources of human knowledge. But in his view of 
the evidence provided by the 'external world* for intrinsic 
connections within that ’v/orld*, and the future constancy of past
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uniformities, he is at one with them* It is necessary only to 
seek the bridge between Berkeley’s world of discrete 'ideas’ and 
his world of spirits^ to find oneself left with nothing but the 
discrete 'ideas’ i.e. his external world. And his 'external 
world* alone^is the phenomenalist's'world'of arbitrary associations 
and uncertain future. Hume had only to adhere rigidly to the 
Berkeleian definition of 'idea*^ together with the tenet made 
explicit by Berkeley (although he did not adhere to it 
consistently himself)— namely that 'ideas' are the sole content 
of experience; to achieve the uncertainty of a world of 
arbitrary connections alone.
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NOTES,
1. It is not necessary here to discuss Berkeley's theory of the 
'external world' in detail. I shall, therefore, do no more than 
state his views except when their discussion is relevant to his 
contribution to 'causal' theory.
2. principles of Human Knowledge (Jessop Edition: Nelson 1945)
33 p45.
3. Ibid. 27 pp. 42-3.
4. Throughout the ensuing pages I shall confine the term 'sense
datum' to the simplest elements in experiences - e.g. colour
patches - as this seems to be the only useful application of the 
termjgr. This is not an universal practice; of. for example, 
price: Perception Oh. V pp.114-6 1950 edition. But if one
applies the term to complexes there is no criterion for deciding 
which C'omplexes shall be called sense data unless he goes beyond 
simple elements of sensible experience. If, as in price’s 
example, one speaks of sensing a single black and white sense 
datum when *looing at a black and white cat', if he is not to 
define his usage in terras of, or with reference to, physical 
objects, why should he not go further and say that his sense
datum is black, white, green, brown, cream, and red, when he
is at the same time 'seeing, cat, rug, chair, fireplace, wall, 
and books' of these colours'. And although it may be possible 
to make significant assertions about physical objects in terras 
of sense data, the use of sense data language is clearly useless 
if 'sense datum' cannot be defined independently of 'physical 
object'. Nor is it of any value if it does not enable us to 
differentiate the elements in a complex sense field.
5. Principles 1 p27
6. An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (Dent Everyman
Edition 1946) CXXVH p. 71
7. Ibid. XLV p.33
8. Were this not witnessed sufficiently by experience, the fact that 
until the seventeenth century no philosopher thought of 
describing the 'external world' in terms of anything but physical 
objects' - i.e. complexes - would sufficiently confirm it.
9* principles 25 pp.41-2; lo2 pp. 88-9: 107 p*91
lo. For a full discussion of the inadequacy of simple sense data to
construct even the 'causally' connected 'external world' of
commonsense cf. price; Hume's Theory of the External World, 
particularly Chs. 11 & 111.
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11. New Theory of Vision fîXXVll pp.71-2, XXXVl pp. 27-8
12. It is true that Locke^ in effect, suggested this view in 
denying any apparent intrinsic connection between the pheno­
menal properties of physical objects (Essay Bk I v  Ch. Vl. 
par* 5-l0)> especially in denying any such connection between 
specifically 'causal*, properties (i.e. solubility in aqua 
regia and malleability)and others. For if we can discover no 
intrinsic connections between the 'causal' properties of 
physical objects and any other phenomenal characteristic by 
which we may distinguish them, neither can we assert intrinsic 
'causal' connection between such objects. But Locke cannot 
properly be called the father of this view of 'causation* since 
he did not take his premises to their logical conclusion in 
this respect, instead still maintaining intrinsic 'causal* 
connection between 'physical objects’ to be attested by 
experience. (Essay Bk 11 Gh* XXl par. 1)
13. principles 30. p. 44
14. Ibid. 31, p.44; 59 p.6l
15. Ibid. 32 pp.44-5> 62-6 pp.63-7; 107 pp. 91-2
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CHAPTER yl.
HlfllE’S TREATMKHT OP ’CAUSATION* AKD 'CAUSÆ' IHPEREHCB.
(1) INTRODUCTION.
The traditional interpretation of Hume’s discussions concerning 
’the understanding’^ treats their outcome as purely negative, Hume 
is regarded as taking premises about experience and its relation to 
knowledge (which he shares with Locke and Berkeley) to their logical 
conelusion - namely scepticism* He is thus held to have shown, by 
remorseless logic^ that one must reject either at least one of these 
premises^ or else beliefs integral to everyday life; and since the 
latter alternative is a practical impossibility, his analysis is 
thus held to reveal that one at least of his premises if false.
Hume himself is regarded rather as a modem Moses leading the way 
to a promised land which he may not enter, since he is held to cling 
doggedly to both the fatal premises and the self-destructive 
scepticism to which they lead*
Reid and Beattie first gave currency to this type of inter­
pretation. (1) They were concerned primarily with Hume^s discussion 
of belief in persistent minds and physical objects, regarding him 
as taking the doctrine of ideas to its logical conclusion by doubting 
the existence of both mind and the external world. And since his 
Hume - inspired vindication of ’causation’ rests on a view of the 
relation bet^^een knowledge and experience which he regards as 
revolutionary, (2) and he took great trouble to attain just this, 
it seems clear that Kant similarly regards Hume’s treatment of 
’causation*, though accepting^in essence^ the doctrine of ideas.
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This mode of interpretation is rejected by N.K.Smith, (3) who 
holds Hume’s treatment of these questions to have a positive as 
well as a negative aspect. The denial of any rational justifica­
tion for belief in the existence of persistent entities, and in the 
reliability of causal inference, he cannot deny; and, indeed, he 
has no wish to do so. His view is that this is the beginning and 
not, as is generally supposed, the end of Hume’s approach to the 
matter* For he contends that while Hume maintains these beliefs 
to have no rational justification, he held also that neither can 
they be shaken since they rest on ’feeling’ or ’sentiment’, and 
are a reaction as integral to human nature as coughing or sneezing. 
There is thus no question of rejecting them, or committing himself 
to the position of a sceptic with regard to them. Indeed N.K.Smith 
affirms that Hume is anxious to emphasise the Lockean premises from 
which he deduces the inadequacy of reason to account for these 
beliefs, precisely in order that he may be free to insist on their 
complete dependence on feeling* (4) He holds that in this Hume 
is the disciple of Hutcheson, and is, in effect, extending the 
essence of the letter’s conception of moral sense,(5)#
y/hatever interpretation of this section of Hume’s teaching is 
given, however, and whatever view is taken of its justification, 
it is generally agreed that his denial of the possibility of a 
rational basis for either ’causal’ inference or belief in universal 
’causality®, is a necessary deduction from his premises.
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Most of Hume’s successors disagre^^^dth him in maintaining 
that there is a rational justification at least for regarding 
’causal’ inference as leading to probable conclusions. The 
commonest divergence of view on his teaching concerns whether or 
not he was justified in denying that the existence of one event 
can ever be known to be entiled by that of another. The follov/ing 
sections are devoted to my account of Hume’s discussion of 
’causation* and ’causal’ inference, and my assessment of it. I 
shall not, therefore, discuss these views here. I enumerate them 
merely because it will be useful to bear them in mind with reference 
to what follows. I shall only remark that I hope to show both 
the traditional interpretation and that of N.K*Smithy to attribute 
too dogmatic an attitude to Hume. This may sound paradoxical, 
but is not really so. The traditional view regards Hume as 
doggedly maintaining scepticism; N.K.Smith thinks him convinced 
that he has a radically new theory which renders all arguments 
leading to scepticism abortive - a theory which regards our belief 
in ’the external world’ and the validity of ’causal’ inference,0s 
unshakable because resting on a sentiment or instinct integral to 
human nature. I hope to show that while it is true both that 
Hume denies the rational justification of ’causal’ inference and 
maintains that our confidence in it rests on feeling, he neither 
explicitly rejects such inference^ nor has the attitude of the 
triumphant discoverer of a new theory which sets sceptical doubts 
to flight. For it seems to me that Hume’s attitude is that of a 
man who has discovered a problem to which he honestly cannot find
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any solution.
In conclusion I will make only two observations concerning 
the rival interpretations considered above. The traditional 
view labours under a grave disadvantage in that while attributing 
acUke logical insight to Hume^ it supposes him blind to an 
implication of his own philosophy which is obvious to his critics 
(6) On the other hand, he has clearly no right to the position 
which N.K*Smith attributes to him* For if he is correct he has 
no rational justification for postulating so much as a constant 
conjunction when this is regarded as a generalisation and does not 
refer merely to his own past experience* He has th«Si in fact no 
rational justification for prophecying that human sentiment v/ill in 
the future be of the same nature as in the past, let alone that a 
certain type of sentiment will continue to occur under the same 
type of circumstances and be accompanied by similar propensities*
He is therefore entitled to no confidence in the constancy of any 
type of belief^ either on the ground that it consists in the 
conjunction of conditions, sentiment and propensities of certain 
specified types which he has always found conjoined in the past, 
or because he has in the past always found it in a given relation 
to such a conjunction* Nor is^of any use to say that Hume has 
shown the possibility of dispensing with rational justification 
in such circumstances, for such dispensation must itself be 
rationally justifiable if it is to be acceptable*
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(ii’i) The Origin of Ideas,
Hume’s approach to ’causation# rests on his view of the 
origin of ideas. Therefore, although the latter is made explicit 
in sections of the Treatise and Enquiries (7) other than those 
devoted to ’causation’, it will be well to summarise it here.
The accounts of the origin of ideas appearing in the Treat is e 
and the Enquiries are essentially the same; and in each work the 
subject is accorded a priority appropriate to its fundamental 
position in Hume’s philosophy, (though this latter is made explicit 
in the Enquities only)* (8) Thus the opening section of the 
Treatise is devoted to it, while in the Enquiries it is placed 
second only to an introductory account of contemporary views of 
philosophy and Hume’s own conception of the latter* s proper role, 
Hume* s account of the origin of ideas opens with an analysis 
of experience; or rather with a statement of the result of such 
an analysis, a result which Hume evidently sees no need to cdefend, 
Tlie contents of experience are said to be of two types; namely 
’impressions’ and ’ideas’, Qf the title ’impression’ Hume writes 
(9) ’under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions 
and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul’.
He continues ’By ’’ideas” I mean the faint images of these in 
thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the 
perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those 
which arise from sight and touch, and excepting the immediate 
pleasure or uneasiness it occasions, prom this, and from his 
subsequent illustrations and usage, it is clear that by
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’impressions* Hume means what would ordinarily he called ’real’ 
or ’genuine* sensations and emotions^ as opposed to their counter­
parts in memory and imagination, the latter clearly being Hume’s 
^ideas’.
The only criterion he offers for distinguishing ’impressions’ 
from their images,is the greater ’force and liveliness with vhich 
(the former) strike the mind’. (lo) But, as Hume himself admits^
(11) this criterion is not infallible; for in sleep, delirium, 
drunkennes, and hallucination, that which would at other times 
generally be redognised as purely imaginary, has (or seems to have) 
the vividness of real sensation and emotion, and is, at the time 
it is experienced, mistaken for such* Moreover, our conviction, 
once conscious, that it was imaginary, does not rest on the 
realisation that in fact it lacked the required vividness; indeed, 
we often remark that our dreams seemed as vivid as ’real experience*. 
If, for instance, I wake inland after dreaming I was at sea, I 
conclude the supposed experience of seafaring to be imaginary 
because I suppose I could not have been transferred from sea to 
an inland situation without having any memory, or even any evidence 
of the dhange, and because^ my suddently taking boat is inconsistent 
with what I believe to be reliable memories of my past actions and 
intentions. (12) It is strange that Hume should have adopted
a criterion so plainly inadequate, overlooking completely the 
persistent coherence of ’real experience * as ordinarily distinguish­
ed^  which renders his definition inconsistent with the usage of 
plain men and philosophers alike. It is probable that Hume was
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unduly influenced in favour of regarding liveliness as the 
distinguishing mark of impressions^ because this supposition 
enabled him to frame a conception of belief which did not pre­
suppose the existence of anything beside impressions and ideas. 
In saying this i do not mean that he dishonestly adopted 
definitions which would favour his own theories, but merely that 
the general trend of his thought made him prone to notice some 
factors rather than others.
Hume applies the terms 'impression* and 'idea* both to 
complexes and their elements, distinguishing the one from the 
other by the addition of the adjectives ’complex* and ’simple# 
respectively. By a simple impression' he evidently means a 
sensation or feeling uniform in type, such as a given simple 
sound, or a patch of colour of a given shade and shape. Thus 
he cites an apple (to be precise he should rather have written 
’one of the complex experiences which verify the sentence "Here 
is an apple"or words to this effect), as in instance of a 
’complex impression*; its colour, taste and smelly as some of the 
* simple impressions’ of which this complex is formed. (13) 
Clearly his simple impressions must be quantitatively complex; 
for we can experience only that which has duration, and indeed 
we can touch and see only that which has spatial extension as 
well. There is, however, no evidence as to whether Hume would 
donsider a simple^uniformly coloured patch of complex shape, 
e.g. the visual appearance of a clover leaf, as a simple or 
complex impression.
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prom these basic materials, Hume constructs his account of 
the origin of ideas. This may be stated briefly and simply as 
follov/s. Any given type of simple idea exists only if there 
exists^or has existed,a similar simple impression* There may, 
and indeed do, exist many complex ideas of a type to which no 
impression corresponds; but the simple ideas v^hich constitute 
these complexes are all similar in type to impressions previously 
experienced. (14) He does not make it explicit that an idea need 
not exist contemporaneously with the impression^, or impressions, 
from which it derives. But he evidently supposes so; for he 
holds ideas to be used in reasoning, and clearly impressions to 
which they are relevant need not be, and often are not, experienced 
in the course of reasoning.
He further fails to distinguish the two questions as to 
whether a simple idea can exist unless a similar impression exists 
or has done so, and whether a simple idea may exist in one 
persons’s experience without the corresponding impression having 
done so. That these are distinct questions should be recognised 
since it is possible that dependence of idea or impression might be 
true only in the mofe general sense, and clarity demands that 
whether this is so or not should be made explicit. Again, Hume’s 
view, though not explicitly stated, is evident from what he writes; 
for, in defence of his doctrine of the dependence of ideas on 
impressions^ he cites the impossibility of a blind man’s imagining 
colour or of a deaf man’s imagining sounds. (15)
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In the Treatise the conclusion that ideas depend on 
impressions^is reached by means of tvfo stages. Hume maintains 
first that to every type of simple idea in existence there 
corresponds a similar simple impression^and vice versa; (l6) 
and then he proceeds to argue that every simple idea depends 
on, and derives from, a similar impression. (17) in the Enquiry, 
(18) however, he argues in favour of the latter contention with­
out previous reference to the former. This is an improvement.
For it is the second contention alone which states an account 
of the origin of ideas; and moreover this both conprehends that 
in the first which is relevant to it, and may be stated and 
defended without previous separate reference to this latter.
Hume urges three arguments in defence of his contention 
that ideas depend for existence on impressions. He points out
that whenever anyone wishes to give a child an idea of a colour 
or a taste, he tries to enable him to experience the appropriate 
impression, whereas no one supposes he can evoke the impression 
by exciting the idea, (19) Again he recalls that if, through 
an organic defect such as blindness, a person is unable to 
experience certain * impressions*, neither does he experience the 
corresponding ’ideas*. (2o) And he further urges that analysis 
of any of our ideas,will reveal it to be resolvable into simple 
ones to which impressions correspond. And he evidently bases 
his confidence in this latter assertion on the fact that he has 
not discovered any idea which he could not so resolve to his own 
satisfaction; for he challenges anyone who rejects his conclusion,
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to produce one ’idea to which there corresponds no ’impression’. 
$he first of these three arguments occurs only in the Treatise; 
the second in both Treatise and Enquiries; while the third is to 
be found only in the Enquiries (21) as a defence of the viev^  that 
ideas depend on impressions, but appears in the Treatise (22) 
urging similarity between simple ideas and impressions. In the 
Treatise however, this latter argument is treated more modestly 
than in the Enquiries where it is styled a proof; (23) for in 
the Treatise Hume says that he has satisfied himself regarding 
it, though his point cannot be proved since every idea cannot be 
enumerated; and then offers his challenge (24).
It cannot be denied that none of Hume’s arguments renders 
th# dependence of ideas on impressions more than probable^ in 
that they all leave it open to disproof by the appearance of an 
idea not so dependent. Nevertheless, he seems to have unshakable 
donviction in the universality of this dependence* Thus, for 
instance, in examining the idea of ’causal connection’ he never 
even considers the possibility of its not deriving from an 
impression,instead persisting in his search for an appropriate 
impression even in the face of apparent defeat. (25) And, 
indeed, in the Enquiries he makes it explicit that he regards 
as meaningless any term which cannot be shown to apply to an 
impression, on the ground that unless it does so it applies to 
no idea either. (26) For this confidence he offers no 
justification. Indeed he does not even offer any argument to
show that it is at least more reasonable than not,to assume such 
dependence*
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In both the Treatiese and the Enquiries (27) Hume admits
one exception to his general rule; namely'that it might well be
possible to imagine a shade of colour one had never seen^ if one 
saw every other shade of that colour in order. But he says that
’this instance is so singular that it is scarcely worth our
observing and does not merit that for it alone we should alter 
our present raaximi (28) Sudh arbitrary dismissal is clearly 
unjustified since Hume’s ’instance’ in fact refutes his ’maxim’, 
insofar as this affirms that no idea exists within one person’s 
experience unless within that experience has also existed an 
impression,or impressions, qualitatively indistinguishable from it^  
or its elements. And that Hume should have dismissed it so, is 
the more surprising since he might have modified his ’maxim’ 
consistently with this ’instance’ without sacrificing the former’s 
importance as a basis of empiricism. For in this ’instance’ the 
’idea’ obtained independently of a completely similar impression, 
yet closely resembles ’impressions’ experienced contemporaneously 
with it. If, therefore, this were the only exception to Hume’s 
original generalisation, he could have asserted with justice that 
no simple ’idea* exists unless there exists or has existed, an 
’impression’ which either completely, àr very closely, resembles 
it,
Hume’s view of the nature and origin.of ’ideas’^ combined 
with his retention of the customary identification of ’having 
an idea of with ’ understanding ’, provided him with both a 
criterion of meaningfulness and a directive as to how to achieve 
understanding.
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For, given these premises, a term is ’meaningful* only 
if it can he shown to have application to an * impression* which 
either exists or has existed; and to understand a term is to 
realise to what ’impression’ it is applicable. These 
conclusions are drawn explicitly in the Enquiry. Thus he 
writes: (2 9) *^ Ahen we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that 
a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea 
(as is but too frequent) we need but enquire, from what 
impression is that supposed idea derived.* And again: (30)
* It seems a proposition, which v/ill not admit of much dispute, 
that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, 
or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think gf 
anything which we have not antecedently felt, either by our
external or internal senses. .......... «. Complex ideas
may perhaps be knovm by..................an enumeration of those
parts or simple ideas which compose them* But when we have 
pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas and find still 
some ambiguity and obscurity; v/hat resource are we then 
possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon those 
ideas, and render them altogether precise and determinate to our 
intellectual view? produce the impressions or original senti­
ments from which the ideas are copied’. This explains why, in 
both Treatise and Enquiries Hume treats the examination of the 
idea of * causal connection* as essentially a search for an 
impression whence it arises.
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No one, I think, would contest Hume’s assertion that 
there is no image which neither resembles an ’impression’ nor 
is composed of elements which do so* But, given his definitions 
at their face value, his contention that ’impressions’ and their 
images constitute the sole constituents of experience^seems to 
me clearly false. For, not only do we experience sensations 
and feelings, and their images, but (as, Hume both assumes 
throughout his philosophical works and asserts explicitly}^ (31) 
we also recognise their distinctive characters, compare them, 
and recognise their differences and resemblances. And this 
comparison and recognition is neither image, sensation, nor 
feeling,in the accepted sense of these terms,(32). Indeed, 
even when we have names for the experiences we recognise and 
compare, these processes are not ordinarily so much as accompanied 
by the auditory images of words, as is so much mental activity.
For instance, when I recognise a sensation as ’seeing something
blue’, and compare this with others, I do not normally’ say to
myself’; ’This is blue and, in this, is like that and unlike 
the other’, or words to this effect.
It might be argued that H ^ e  intended to apply the term
’impression’ to comparison and recognition^since he meant it to , 
apply to every ’real’ experience; and that he failed to nake 
this clear by not explaining that he does not adopt the ordinary 
definition of one or more of the terms ’sensation, ’feeling’ and 
’emotion’. But if this was his intention^he uses no terms to 
differentiate 'impressions’ of the type of sensations and feelings^ 
from those of the type of comparison and recognition# And an
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usage which fails to distinguish experiences as different as 
these^ is J:o inadequate as to be misleading.
Even though it be granted that, given a wide enough 
connotation of ’impression*, Hume’s contention that experience 
consists in ’impressions’ and ’ideas’ alone, is true (though 
misleading unless further qualified); his view of ’meaning’ is 
yet not justified. For he is mistaken in supposing that 
’understanding’ a tern is necessarily to have an image to which 
it is applicable. That entertaining such an image is not 
essential to understanding a terra is,indeed, intrinsic to Hume’s 
denial of the possibility of forming an image of paris; though 
he fails to notice this. He writes: ( 3 3 ) have seen Paris, but 
shall I affirm that I can form such an idea of the city as will 
perfectly represent all its streets and houses in all their just 
proportions’; thus revealing that he well understands to what 
the term paris is ordinarily applied, though he admits he can 
form no image of this. But if entertaining an image of that 
to which it is^or would be^ applicable is not necessary to under­
standing a term, neither is the letter’s applicability to an 
impression, or group of impressions (whether actually ever con­
joined or not). Hume’s own discussion of ’causal connection’ 
bears wdtness to this. He argues that we cannot know; whether 
there is a necessary connection between any ’cause* and its 
’effect’^ sirce we have no impression of any such. (34) But 
unless he already understood in vhat such a necessary connection 
consisted^ he would not be in a position to deny our having an
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impression of any. To point out that he found elsewhere an
impression from which he was assured that the idea of necessary
connection derived^(35) is not to contradict the foregoing.
For the impression to which Hume traced the idea of necessary
connedtion attributed to ’cause’ and ’effect’^ is not a connection
of the type^ an impression of whose obtaining between ’cause’
and ’effect* he denies. 'Ahat he denies is that any necessary
connection in virtue of which the existence of one is deducible
from' that of another, is discoverable between objects or events
in their histories, by examination of impressions or images of
them; while the impression which he finally postulates as the
of
source of our idea^ such a connection^is an experienced tendency 
or compulsion to pass from an idea of a certain type to one of 
another given kind.
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(ill) The Discussion of ’Causation’ and 
’Causal’ Inference in the Treatise.
(a) The plan of the Discussion.
Hume’8 discussion of ’causation’ and ’causal’ inference appears 
in that part of the Treatise (36) entitled ’Of Knowledge and 
Probability’. This latter opens with a brief account of knov/ledge^  
in which the essence and basis of what one may call the negative 
aspect of his view of ’causation’^ is already made explicit. The 
remainder of this lengthy part is devoted to ’cqusation*, ’causal’ 
inference, and questions whose discussion is introduced in order to 
throv/ light on these former. Thus although explicitly devoted to 
’knowledge’ as well as ’probability’, this portion of the Treatise is 
practically all concerned with a relation which^from the outset^ Hume 
insists to be incapable of being an object of knowledge, and with 
beliefs resting upon its postulation*
It might seem surprising that he should give to a belieft which 
cannot be certain, and to its object, so very much more attention than 
he bestows on knowledge and its object. There seem to be two 
reasons for his doing so. In the first place^ the lack of amplifica­
tion and justification in his account of knowledge, together with the 
confident assertion of its adequacy, (37) indicate hime to suppose 
himself to be expressing therein a contention both familiar and 
indisputable to his contemporaries. Secondly^ he recognises ’causal* 
relations to be the only ground for inferring the existence or activity 
of one thing,from that of another. (it is true that he first (38) 
distinguishes ’causal’ relations as alone among those w^hich are not
561*
knowable, in constituting grounds for such inference; but later, 
(39) in defending their unique claim to this role, he argues that 
resemblance (to him a knowable relation) cannot fulfil it, idiich 
shows him to regard ’causal’, as distinguished from all other 
relations, in this respect). Since on such inference depend so 
many beliefs and actions integral to everyday life, in addition to 
many beliefs formed by philosophers and scientists in their 
specialised capacities, its examination and that of its grounds are 
clearly of the utmost importance.
At a surprisingly late stage in his discussion,(40) Hume 
explains that while he bowed to tradition in entitling this part 
of the Treatise ’ Of Knowledge and probability*^ this is misleading 
in that it suggests all beliefs which are not knov/ledge, to be 
analogous. He insists that, while beliefs resting on ’causal’ 
inference lack the certainty of knowledge properly so called; it is 
plainly ridiculous to suppose them no différant from the expectation 
of a dice falling v/ith six u^ >|?ermost, when six is inscribed on four 
of its six sides, and the like. He points out that, in practice, 
we never doubt beliefs resting on ’causal* inferencejwhereas we 
think the other type of expectation, though more reasonable than not 
to entertain, may well be disappointed. He therefore suggests,as 
more consistent with common usage, the classification of inference 
as being from knowledge, proofs, or probabilities, as it rests 
respectively on deduction and intuition, the postulation of ’causal’ 
connections, or on grounds on which no one supposes it possible to 
base infallible predictions. Hume, indeed, except where he is
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directly asserting its lack of rational justification, assumes it 
reasonable to accept the conclusions of ’causal* inference,although 
he offers no justification for doing soj, and in fact in directly 
discussing such inference adopts an use of the tern ’reasonable# 
which would forbid its being applied to these conclusions.
The discussion of ’causation’ and ’causal’ inference is 
complex. It is liable to be confusing since it is not prefaced 
by an outline of its structure; and moreover the central 
discussion is intercepted by several subsidiary ones whose 
insertion Hume considers necessary.
The avowed aim of the discussion^as a whole, is to discover 
an impression whence the idea of ’ causal’ connection derfj^ es^ .(41) 
Hume starts a direct search for such an impression, only to be 
quickly brought to a standstill. (42). He therefore deserts it 
in favour of discussions which he expects to help its final 
satisfactory conclusion. (43) These subsidiary discussions concern 
why we suppose everything having a beginning to have a ’cause’, and 
why we suppose a given particular ’cause* to have a specified 
’effect*, respectively. Even here his path is not straightforward. 
Having discussed the first of these questions until brought to the 
conclusion that belief in universal causation can be neither 
deduced nor intuited, but roust be derived in some other manner 
from experience, (44) he does not then ask (as might be expected) 
how it is derived. Instead he avers that the answer to this 
wdll be best revealed by discussing the second subsidiary question, 
namely why we suppose a given type of * cause’ must have a ’given
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type of 'effect*. (45). Discussion of this question, in its 
turn, proves^ complex,’since for Hume it involves examination of 
the causes, nature and influence of belief,(46) besides arguments 
in support of the view that the only relation on whose basis we 
infer the existence or activity of one object from thqt of another, 
is that between 'cause* and ’effect*. (47) Furthermore, since 
Hume holds understanding probability inference (in the sense in 
which he distinguishes it from ’causal’ reasoning) essential 
to comprehension of belief, a discussion of the former is included 
inthat of the latter. (48).
After considering all these subsidiary questions, Hume at last 
(49) feels equipped to complete his original search, to which he 
returns accordingly.
(b) The Nature of Knowledge.
Hume’s account of knowledge rests on a conjunction of the 
rationalist conception with his analysis of mental processes 
terms of impressions and their images alone. He frames it by 
enumerating types of relation which may be known indubitably to 
exist, under given conditions; together with brief arguments to 
show^  these to be the only t}q)es of which this is true.
He starts by listing seven types of relation whose existence 
we assert; namely, * resemblance, identity, relations of time and 
place, pix>portions in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, 
and causation*. (5o) Of these, he says, only four - namely those 
of quality, quantity, contrariety and resemblance - ’can be the
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objects of knowledge and certainty’. (51). And he affirms 
this to be so because these alone ’depend entirely on the ideas 
which we compare together’. (5 2) He shows his indebtedness to 
the mathematical conception of knowledge, (though himself no 
mathematician) by citing as an example the equality between the 
three interior angles of a trinagle and two right angles—  
discoverable, he avers from the idea of a triangle, alone and 
unchanged so long as that idea remains the same.(53) As an 
example, this is, perhaps,not the happiest choice since the 
discovery of this relation is inevitably somewhat complex. 
Furthermore, Hume’s description is inadequate. To be precise, 
the equality between the interior angles of a triangle and two 
right angles, is deduced from the ideas of both sets of angles.
It is true that both these ideas are comprehended in that of a 
triangle, which is conceived in terms of interior angles and 
straight lines; but the conclusion in question is derived from 
these ideas, not as conjoined in the idea of a triangle, but as 
distinct* Therefore although it is true to say that their 
equality is derivable from the idea of a triangle, insofar as by 
this is meant that they are derivable from ideas comprehended 
wâthin that idea, that this is what is meant should be made clear 
if ambiguity is to be avoided. And when this equality is being 
cited as an example illustrating what is essential to a relation 
being object of knowledge, such precision is clearly demanded*
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To say that we can knov/ relations only v/hen they depend on ideas 
may seem, at first sight, contradictory. For in ordinary usage 
’mere idea’ is opposed to ’objective fact’, as something which apes 
a reality it does not possess; while to say of anything that it 
depends entirely on ideas,is to call it illusory or im ginary. There 
is, however, no evidence that Hume in describing a relation as 
dependent solely on ’ideas’, intends to call it illusory, but rather 
the reverse. There is nothing to suggest that this is his meaning 
in the context in which he introduces the phrase» - he speaks of 
knowing mathematical relations, and those of resemblance, quality 
and contrariety^ as though he supposes these to be anything but 
illusory. Moreover had he understood by ’a relation depending
I
entirely on ideas, something illusory, at the same time maintaining
that only such can be Icnown; he would hardly have failed to draw
the obvious conclusion that ’knowledge* is a logical impossibility, 
and have added this to the arguments he marshals in favour of 
scepticism. In fact, no such argument appears among them. He 
contends that the scope of our knowledge is much more limited than 
had generally been supposed by his predecessors, and that the ever 
present danger of invàlid reasoning throws doubt even on the 
conclusions we suppose ourselves to have reached by mathematical 
reasoning; but he never argues the existence of knowledge to be 
self-contradictory. Indeed, as has been seen, he says relations 
of resemblance, quality, and contrariety, may be known, often
intuitively and hence indubitably. (54).
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Nor can Hume’s assertion that only relations dependent 
solely on ideas may be known, be regarded as affirming knowledge 
to be possible only in abstract calculations, resting on man-made 
conventions. For^ having just opposed ’ideas’ to ’objects’^ (55) he 
proceeds to assert that we can often know resemblances and differences 
between objects, immediately^(56) And^again^hs argues thèt a 
’causal* relation cannot be known^by urging that ’the power by which 
one object produces another is never discoverable-merely from their 
idea’, (57) Had he supposed knowledge inapplicable to concrete 
objects as such, he need have said sigply that ’causal' relations 
may not be known because they would relate^not the concepts or 
symbols of an abstract system, but objects of everyday experience.
This he says neither here nor in his fuller discussionbf ’causation’.
It is true that he proceeds (58) to make explicit his denial 
that causal relations may be known^by concluding that they can be 
derived not from abstract reasoning but from experience. But 
this reveals merely the conviction that knowledge cannot be derived 
from experience, not that it can have no application to its content.
Hume’s usage indicates that his phrase ’depend entirely bn the 
ideas’^ in this context, derives from the ordinary use of the term 
’âdea’^ in the phrase ’to have an idea of’, which treats ’to have 
an ide% of X ’ and ’to understand X ’ as synonymous. For there seems 
no doubt, from the types of relations he asserts as Imowable, his 
examples, and the general tone of his discussion of knowledge, that 
by a relation dependent ’ entirely on the ideas which w e  compare’^ he 
means a relation such that to understand the natures of any two
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existants so related is to know this relation to obtain between 
them. Today many philosophers hold that to ’understand’ a 
geometrical conclusion to be entailed is simply to recognise an 
implication of a set of purely formal linguistic rules# But this 
view is of recent origin; to Hume’s contemporaries,'understanding' 
that the definitions of Euclidean geometry entail equality between 
the three interior angles of a triangle and two right angles meant 
understanding that if any existants (or parts of an existent) may, 
consistently with the definitions of that geometry^be described as 
the three interior angles of a triangle, they will be such that 
they cannot fail to equal^ in respect of the number of degress they 
contain, any existants which (consistently with those same 
definitions) might be described as two right angles* And Hume 
shows no evidence of differing from his contemporaries in this 
respect* Furthermore, his brief accounts of types of relation 
which he regards as capable qnd incapable, respectively, of being 
knoivn^  support the above view of Hume’s criterion for the 
know^ability of a relation* Thus, of resemblance - a relation which, 
he affirms, may be known - he writes : ’When any two objects
resemble each other, the resemblance will at first strike the eye, 
or rather the mind; and seldom requires a second examination*. (59)
In other words, one has but to apprehend the characters of two 
resembling objects^ to recognise that they are similar. On the 
other hand he has observed of ’relations of ’contiguity and 
distance’ which, he avers, cannot be known, that they ’may be 
changed merely by an alteration of their place, without any change 
in the objects themselves*^ (6o) which is to say Ikhàtno matter
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how adequate one’s understanding of the nature of objects so 
related, it cannot suffice for the discovery of that relation.
To say so much and no more is, hov/ever, inadequate to make 
Hume’s conception of knowledge^ and the criterion of Icnowability, 
explicit. For my statement of his criterion would be interpreted 
differently by various philosphers# To many ’understanding’ or
X
’having an idea o f m e a n s  knowing w^ hat would be the distinctive 
characters possessed by a given type of existent, in the sense 
of an ability to use correctly a linguistic rule directing that 
a certain name should be applied to anything possessing those 
characteristics* This is Hume’s opinion, but he differs from 
most of those holding it since, owing to his identification of 
’idea’ and ’image’, he supposes understanding the the nature of 
A to involve entertaining its image* Thus, when he asserts a 
relation’s obtaining to be known only by its derivation from ’the 
ideas compared', he is asserting knowledge of relations to involve 
having images so related. It might be thought that^when Hume 
asserts that resemblance between objects immediately ’strikes the 
eye or rather the mind’, he is affirming this relation to be 
discoverable directly from objects without the intervention of any 
images. But this, I think, cannot have been his intention* For 
it is evident that a resemblance between two objects would not be 
discoverable by inspection unless this were accompanied^ or 
immediately followed by, an understanding of the nature of those 
characteristics in which they were similar* And for Hume, as has 
been seen, understanding A ’s nature involves having an image of A,
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unfortunately^ Hume offers no account of the process by means 
of which we derive knowledge from ideas* presumably he supposed 
the processes of intuition and deduction sufficiently familiar 
without further explication. Yet surely an account of knowledge 
based on these, and more especially an argument maintaining that 
there is no knowledge which does not rest on one or the other, is 
incomplete without a brief account of them. Moreover when^ a 
philosopher is maintaining a vie'/sr of ideas, which he admits^ is 
not the common one, it is surely inounbent on him to explain these 
processes consistently wdth it; the more so when no previous attempt 
has been made to do this.
$here are two cogent objections to the supposition that one 
cannot knov,^  A  and D to be related -without entertaining an image 
of either. Firstly, it is possible to reac^ such knowledge without 
possessing the corresponding images. Thus I may, and frequently 
do, make a valid mathematical calculation wdthout the use of any 
images to which the symbols used are applicable; and, moreover,
I do this whether my calculations are purely theoretical or are 
thought directly relevant to some particular numerable phenomena.
I aay, for instance, discover,with certainty, a relation of equality 
between 15+17 and 32^without forming images of groups of fifteen, 
seventeen, and thirty-two^objects respectively; and this is true 
even though my calculation be designed to discover, for instance, 
whether the contents of two boxes are equal in number^it being 
known that one contains thirty two oranges, and the other seventeen 
apples and fifteen pears. Even were it admitted that we originally
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discover the applicability of the results of arithmetical 
calculation to objects such as apples, oranges, and pears, by 
means of such images, the possibility of obtaining knowledge of 
arithmetical relations, both in abstraction and as exemplified in 
given phenomena, without using them cannot be denied* Hume, 
indeed, argues in one place (6l) that it is never possible to be 
certain of knowing arithmetical relations because of an ever 
present danger of mistaken calculation* I think, hov/ever, that 
consideration of arithmetic reveals that,though a mistake is 
always possible in the simplest calculation, arithmetical 
relations may be seen to be entailed*
In the second place, it is clearly contradictory to maintain 
a conclusion entailed by that in which they are alike to be dis­
coverable from an exact copy of A or ABj but not from A or AB 
itself*
Kume*s account of knowledge has been seen to be devoted 
entirely to the discovery of relations* This is to identify 
knowledge with the acceptance of justifiable assertions* For^ as 
has been noted^(62) every statement capable of being understood by 
more than one person asserts a relation of resemblance, by using 
terms applicable in the same sense to more than one actual or 
possible existent* In this indentifioation Hume is not alone; 
many philosphers would dismiss as ridiculous the suggestion that 
anything incapable of linguistic expression could be knov/n* But 
it is misleading when what professes to be an account of knowledge 
takes this identification for granted as does that in the Treatise.
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por^  as has been observed, (6 3) our rules for using many 
sentences presuppose awareness of phenomenal characteristics 
independently of the use of language. And since^ in other 
circumstances awareness is called ’knowledge», the title might, 
on this ground, be regarded as applicable to the consciousness 
of a phenomenon’s character as distinct from the recognition of 
its similarity to that of others. nnd, indeed, the way in which 
what is described as » Icnowing the character of » a phenomenon,» 
know'ing in what it consists^ and similar phrases including the 
term ’knowing» in a like context, are regarded as a ground for 
deducing further conclusions concerning it, which are not simply 
assertions of similarity between it and others, shows this 
application to be accepted^ at least implicitly^ by many. 
Therefore, in making explicit a usage which excludes this, it is 
necessary to mention both its possibility and- its rejection. 
Moreover, it is surely desirable for a philosopher adopting one 
of two possible alternative usages, of vhich the other is very 
commong, to offer some justification of his choice.
Although it is in some respects less clear than might have 
been wished, and in one of its crucial tenets patently mistaken,
Hume’s account of t*is explicit on that point on which his
denial of the knowability of » causal»relations rests. For, as 
has been seen, he makes it clear that,in his view^ to know a 
relation to obtain between A and 3 is to recognise them to be 
such that they cannot fail to be so related. And it is precisely 
because he is convinced that no such entailment of a ’causal'
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relation between any two existants is discoverable, that he 
denies that the existence of such a relation is an object of 
knowledge.
It is, indeed rather surprising to find ’causation* already 
cited as a type of relation which cannot be knoTO to obtain. For* 
that ’causal’ relations can never be asserted with certainty is 
a contention one would naturally expect to find among the con­
clusions of an examination of ’causation’ rather than in its 
introduction. And Hume is here, in fact, anticipating the con­
clusion of a future discussion. Since his contention is one 
which is disputed, it would have been preferable not to have 
introduced it as indubitable until it could conveniently have been 
defended as fully as possiblej. And such postponement would have 
been permissible in the Treatise since an account of the nature 
of knowledge does not demand an enumeration of all the types of 
relation which cannot be k n o w n o n e  example of these being 
sufficient to illustrate the contrast between them and those which 
are knowable. It is true that Hume offers a brief defence of his 
contention on its first appearance, and that this defence is 
essentially that which he offers subsequently at greater length.
But it is merely stated bluntly, being neither amplified nor 
justified, as would be necessary to render it at all adequate. 
Nevertheless^ the appearance of this contention in his account of 
knowledge, if somewhat premature, does at least serve to emphasise 
the relation between his view of ’causation* and his conception of 
knowledge^ in Hume’s thought.
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(c) Hume’s use of the term » cause*
Hume’s language^in opening his search for an impression 
whence derives the idea of ’causal connection* is misleading# For
having affirmed the necessity of such a search, he continues:
’Let us therefore cast our eye on any two objects which we call 
cause and effect, and turn them on all sides, in order to find that 
impression, which produces an idea of such prodigious consequence. 
(6 4 ) This reads as though his discussion is meant to concern any­
thing to which one or other of the titles ’cause’ or ’effect* is 
ordinarily applied# So understood^ Hume’s analysis is clearly 
inadequate. For he writes that he can find nothing common to, and 
characteristic of^  ’causes’ save contilaguity and temporal priority 
to their ’effects’^ (6 5 ) And it is easy enough to point to 
phenomena commonly called ’causes’ which are both contemporary with, 
and spatially distant from, the ’effects’ ascribed to them# Thus, 
to take but one instance, it has been seen (66) how, under certain 
circumstances, the title ’cause of a traffic jam* is (in accordance 
with a common usage) applied to an animal coexistent with, and 
distant from, this ’effect*#
It seems clear, however, that when Hume asks his reader to 
consider any two objects called ’cause’ and ’effect’, he does not 
literally intend him to consider any two objects of which one is 
said to be ’cause’ of the other but only pairs so described 
according to an usage which excludes some common applications of 
the term: and this for three reasons# In the first place it is
highly improbable that he should have overlooked those usages
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inconsistent with his analysis^ had he intended to consider 
literally anything to which the terra ’cause* is applied#
Secondly, in defending the contiguity and temporal priority of 
’cause* to ’effect’ (6 7 ) he never argues that nothing is called 
the ’cause’ of anything else unless it is both contiguous, and 
temporally prior, to this. And lastly, in defending the temporal 
priority of ’cause’ to ’effect’, he allows (68) that some suppose 
they may be simultaneous, which is to say that he recognises his 
account of ’causal connection’ to be inconsistent with an accepted 
use of the term ’cause’.
Almost at the outset Hume declares (6 9) the idea of ’causation’^ 
whose source he is seeking^ to be that of a necessary connection 
between ’cause* and ’effect’; and enters upon a lengthy discussion 
solely to reveal the source of this idea. Moreover, as has been 
seen, a large proportion of this discussion is devoted to the 
question why from a given type of ’ cause’ we expect one specific 
type of ’effect*. There seems, therefore^ no doubt that throughout 
these discussions he is thinking solely in terms of the usage v/hich 
became commons among philosophers with the progress of modem 
science^; namely that confining the title ’ cause’ to phenomena of 
a type there is good reason to suppose to have stood always in 
one specific relation with those of another given type (certain 
conditions having been fulfilled).
Unlike Kant, and most subsequent philosophers adopting this 
usage, Hume does not explicitly confine the term ’cause* to events; 
indeed^he generally refers to a ’cause* as an ’object’, (70) It
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is true that an event may be regarded as an object of experience, 
but Hume (though explicitly identifying ’object* and ’impression* 
(71) which might suggest a different usage) ordinarily treats the 
unqualified terra ’object* as applicable in contexts where plain 
men use terms like shoe, hat, etc? doing so^indeed^even where (72) 
he explicitly identifies ’impression* and object’. It has been 
seen,(73) however, that for one defining * causation in terras of 
’law’ however conceived, this usage is far less convenient than 
one confining the title ’cause* to events. Tot ake Hume’s 
example, there is evidence of a far simpler correlation b etween 
A ’s approaching fire and his feeling heat, than can be postulated 
between the bare experienced existence of fire and the sensation 
of heat# Thus it seems reasonable to hold that whenever an event 
describable as a normal person approaching a fire occurs, a few 
simply specifiable conditions obtaining-such as his remaining 
conscious, that describable as his feeling a sensation of heat will 
follow; whereas many sets of conditions are possible, given which 
’a fire’s existence’ may be experienced without heat being felt 
e#g# if I am standing in the snow looking through a window, I may 
’see a fire’ without feeling any warmth at all# Thps the subject 
of Hume’s ’causal’ analysis (as well as his basically phenomenalist 
account of experience^which directs attention particularly to its 
transitory elements) suggests the common modem usage.
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(d) The First part of the Direct Search for an Impression 
whence Defiveis the Ideq, of ’Causal Connection. ’
Once it is established that the ’idea of causal connection’ 
whose origin Hume is seeking is that of a necessary correlation 
between types, and that when he speaks of a ’cause’ and its 
’effect’ he is referring to phenomena of types there is good 
reason to believe to have been always similarly correlated; 
an adequate account and assessment of his discussions of ’causal 
connection* and ’causal’ inference becomes possible*
The first part of Hume’s direct search for the source of the 
idea of ’causation’ is short, since^in his view, this search is 
early brought to a standstill, and must then be implemented by 
his discussion of ’causal’ inference.
He starts by arguing that the required impression is no 
quality of ’cause’ or ’effect’ ’since, whichever of these 
qualities I pitch on, I find some object, that is not possessed 
of it, and yet falls under the denomination of ’cause or effect ; ’, 
(74) Given his usage^this is to say that the idea of a necessary 
correlation between types as ’cause’ and ’effect* cannot be 
derived from, or asserted in virtue of, any quality or qualities 
observable in them, since no one quality is found common to all 
types of phenomena there is good reason to suppose regularly 
correlated as ’cause’ and ’effect’. He adds: (75)* indeed there 
is nothing existent either externally or internally, which is not 
to be considered either as a cause or an effect: tho’ tis plain
there is no one quality, which universally belongs to all beings 
and gives them a title to that denomination’. This latter is
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important^ not merely as a defence of the conclusion under review, 
but also as evidence of Hume’s belief that every phenomenon 
is regularly correlated with another as its ’cause* or ’effect’.
It is generally agreed that no. characteristic (apart from 
their mutual relations) can be observed common to all phenomena 
reasonably to be supposed regularly correlated as ’cause’ and 
’effect’, to those among them called ’causes’, or to those 
called ’effects’. And many philosophers would deny any 
characteristic^ other than regular temporal correlation with its 
’cause’ or ’effectto be common to ’effects’ and ’causes’ 
respectively. That all ’causes’ have a productive quality is 
either explicit or implicit in some philosophers’ writing.
And that all ’effects’ share a quality of dependence has been 
seen to be commonly assumed (whether with consistency or not).
But not even those who have, with consistency, assumed such a 
view of ’causes’^ or ’effects’^ or both, have supposed such 
qualities to be observable. For when, in defending their 
positions, they have in effect supported this view they have 
done so by arguing it to be justly inferrible, not by maintaining 
a quality of productivity or dependence to be observable* For 
instance, an intrinsic quality of dependence in ’effects’ has 
been argued, on the ground of their non-existence in the absence 
of given conditions, (or one of a limited number of alternative 
sets of conditions).
For Hume, as has been seen, (7 6) to assert a quality to be 
unobservable is to say there is no justification for postulating
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its existence. It has also been seen that his attitude to un­
observables rests on his conception of understanding in its 
relation to images, and that this latter is unjustified. If 
therefore the postulation, or assumption, of qualities of 
productivity and dependence in ’causes* and ’effects’^ respectively, 
is to be justly condemned, its rejection must rest on other 
grounds than those which served to convince him.
Hume’s belief that he has shown the idea of ’causal’ 
connection to derive from no quality of ’causes’ or ’effects*^ by 
arguing that neither exhibit a characteristic quality, rests on 
his view that an idea is derived from an impression solely as its 
copy. It has been seen, (77) however, that it is possible ’to 
have an idea of X* in the sense of ’understanding’ it, without 
entertaining its image. There is, therefore, nothing to prevent 
the derivation of an ’idea’ in the sense of ’understanding 
independently of copying an impression; and indeed, in denying 
the possibility of discovering necessary connection between 
’cause’ and ’effect*^ Hume has been seen (78) to ’have an idea’, 
in this sense,whose derivation from an impression as its copy he 
emphatically denies (though he does not admit this). The idea 
of ’causation’ might, therefore, be derived from a quality of a 
phenomenon, could this be shown to entail its being ’cause’ or 
’effect’ (as the case might be), even though that idea could not 
be regarded as a copy of the quality in question. To justify 
Hume’s denial, therefore, it would be necessary to show the ideq 
of ’causal’ connection to derive from no quality of phenomena, 
whether as its copy or not.
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Home’s restricted view of the derivation of ideas accounts
for his belief that in contending that ’causal* connection
ought not to be inferred from any quality of phenomena, he is
denying its being in fact so derived. For if an idea can be
derived from an impression only as its copy, then it is not
merely illegitimate but impossible to derive one from an
* J
impression resembling neither it nor its elements*
Once «eject Hume’s conception of the origin of ideas, however, 
and one must regard the question of an idea’s source, and that 
of the justice of its derivation therefrom, as distinct* For 
it is not impossible, and sometimes not evend ifficult, to be 
mistaken concerning the implications of possessing a given 
quality* Indeed, a quality may well be wrongly attributed*
It is, therefore, possible that the idea of ’causal’, in the 
sense of necessary, connection^ might be derived mistakenly from 
a quality justly attributed to a postulated ’cause’ or ’effect’, 
or with logical precision from a quality wrongly attributed to 
either.
Having denied the derivation of the idea of ’causal’ 
connection from any quality of ’cause’ or ’effect’, Hume proceeds 
to examine their mutual relations in order to reveal whether its 
source is to be found there. He treats this question similarly 
to the last, regarding it as asking whether or not any relation 
can be found obtaining between all ’causes’ and ’effects’ in his 
sense of the term.
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As has been already remarked^(79) he argues that two 
relations always obtain between a ’cause* and its ’effect’; 
that a ’cause* ia always contiguous with its ’effect’, and that 
it always precedes the latter in time. I shall discuss the 
postulation of these relations in the order in which he enumerates 
them.
A. The Contiguity of ’cause* and ’effect*.
Hume thinks the contiguity of ’cause’ and ’effect’ both 
self-evident and ’universally acknowledged’. He therefore regards 
its assertion as requiring no further defence than the remark;
’Tho’ distant objects may sometimes seem productive of one another 
they are commonly found upon examination to be linked by a chain 
of causes, which are contiguous among themselves, and to the 
distant objects; and when in any particular instance we cannot 
discover this connection we still presume it to exist |\(8o)
Before discussing Hume’s contention,it may be well to make 
his definition of ’contiguity’ explicit since the term is not 
always used in his sense. It is generally agreed that to assert 
A and B to be contiguous is to deny their being continuous one 
with another. And Hume is no exception to this general rule, since 
his conceptions of time and space preclude his ascribing either 
temporal or spatial continuity to existants. But beyond this, 
agreement is not so complete. Broad (81) for instance, uses the 
term in a sense in which to say A and B are contiguous is to say 
that no existent intervenes between them though they may be 
divided by an interval. For he asserts it to be possible to
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assume physical straight lines to be composed of ’contiguous 
points very close together*. (How an interval between points 
could escape being spatial and so containing points, he does not 
explain). Hume, however, leaves no room for supposing that he 
uses the terra in this sense: at the outset he enlarges his
contention that a ’cause’ is always contiguous with its ’effect’, 
with the words ’nothing can operate in a time or place which is . 
ever so little removed from those of its existence.’ It is thus 
clear that for him, to say A and B are contiguous^ is to say that 
though they are not continuous there is no interval between them. 
Since it is Hume’s contention I am discussing, in what follows I 
shall naturally use the term as he does.
Hume supposes a ’cause’ and its ’effect’ to be always 
temporally related, but is prepared to postulate ’causal connection’ 
between existents which could not be spatially related (e.g. flame 
and the sensation of heat). His contention that there can be no 
spatial or temporal interval between a ’cause’ and its ’effect’^ 
therefore, amounts to saying that there is no temporal interval 
between any ’cause’ and its ’effectwhile whenever a ’cause’ and 
its ’effect are spatially related there is no spatial interval 
between them either.
Hume’s attribution of temporal (and,where appropriate, 
spatieJ^ contiguity to ’cause* and ’effect’ is demanded by two 
of his convictions, namely; a) that there is no interval between 
a ’cause’ and its ’effect’; and b) that time and space consist of 
contiguous non-extended units.
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His attribution of spatial contiguity to spatially related 
’causes* and ’effects’ has received very little notice from 
subsequent philosophers. There are two reasons for this. In 
the first place, they, like Hume himself, have been prepared to 
apply the titles ’cause’ and ’effect’ toexistents between which 
there is no spatial relation; and so have regarded spatial 
relations as not integral to ’causal connection’, and therefore 
unimportant to its discussion. Secondly ’causal laws’(^relating 
to the motion of planets and other heavenly bodies^ inconsistent 
with Hume’s dictum, have, since his time, been universally 
accepted. It has therefore appeared so obviously false to 
his successors as to need, and indeed be worthy of, no comment. 
Broad, however, writes^hat: ’For a person who was so convinced 
of the value of Hewton’s law of gravitation as to wish to 
introduce something like it into the mental world the statement 
of contiguity with regard to space seems an odd one’.
Since^ for moxt of Hume’s successors (in Britain at any 
rate) temporal relations are integral to ’causal connection’, 
his assertion of temporal contiguity between ’cause’ and ’effect’ 
has, on the other hand, received more attention. This also is 
generally denied today because the conception of time on which 
it rests is rejected. Indeed, regarding it, Broad thinks it 
sufficient to remark (83) that it is to be rejected because 
inconsistent with the continuity of time. Russell and Kneale 
both suppose the dismissal of Hume’s doctrine to need further 
implementation. But the argument’s of both (84) rest on the
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view of time as continuous w M ’ch Hume rejects. Russell and Kneale 
were probably justified in supposing this view needed no justify­
ing to the modem reader; and^each was concerned with 
doctrine only as it is relevant to presenting a definition of 
’causal connection’ as acceptable to the modem reader, they were 
justified in acting thus. But in a discussion intended to throw 
light on what Hume wrote, and why he wrote it, such summary dismissal 
would be inadmissible*
Hume’s conviction that time and space are composed of 
contiguous indivisible units rests on the Leibnizian principle* 
that only the completely simple can truly be said to exist?., a 
compound or aggregate existing solely in virtue of the existence 
of the simples of which it is composed. (85) One does not need 
to be a Leibniz, however, to see Hume’s conclusion to be inadmissible. 
For clearly whatever is extended is composed of extended parts, 
and whatever has duration has parts also possessing it; since it 
is self-evident that the addition of something unextended to something 
unextended cannot constitute anything extended,and similarly that 
the addition of the durâtionless to the durâtionless cannot form 
anything having duration. But to have duration,or to be spatially 
extended,is to be divisible in that respect; hence whatever has 
duration or spatial extension is,in that respect, infinitely 
divisible. From Leibniz’s premise, therefore, Hume would have been 
justified only in drawing, with regard to both duration and spatial 
extension, the conclusion whidi Leibniz drew with regard to the 
latter; namely that it is not properly attributable to anything real#
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Hume offers an additional argument against the infinite 
divisibility of time; ’Tis a property inseparable from time, and 
which in a manner constitutes its essence, that each of its parts 
succeeds another and that none of them, however contiguous, can
ever be coexistent*   if in time we could never arrive
at an end of division, and if each moment, as it succeeds another, 
were not perfectly single and indivisible there would be an infinite 
number of coexistent moments or parts of time/, (8tf) This argument 
evidently rests on the belief that if a complex is successive each 
of its components must be successive with all the others* But the 
infinite divisibility of time entails no coexistence of its parts, 
beyond the impossibility of its having any section* some of which 
does not coincide with part of another* The falsity of Hume’s 
premise is sufficiently evident* ' That every component of a compound 
is successive with every other,is not entailed by each of its com­
ponents being successive with some others so that the whole con­
stitutes a succession* And indeed there are many successions some 
of whose members are not successive with all the others* A piece 
of music, for instance, is essentially a succession of notes, yet 
most pieces of music contain many notes completely contemporary with 
others* And there are many successions parts of which a re not 
successive with certain others because contained in, or containing, 
them* For instance, the experience of reading a poem is a succession 
of experiences of reading verses, each in its turn divisible into 
successive experiences of reading words, so that not all the 
experiences of reading words which it contains are successive with
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all those of reading its verses.
Indeed, were Hume’s view of succession correct, none could 
contain more than two parts, even though these were indivisible.
For whatever is divisible into more than two successive parts 
contains at least one composed of two lesser sections. Hume’s 
view is thus plainly refuted by experience, in 'which, as has been 
seen, there are many successions containing more than two members. 
And it is equally inconsistent with his o'wn conception of time as 
a large number indivisible units. Indeed, it is inconsistent 
with any conception of time compatible with ordinary usage, for 
the term is commonly applied to a succession divisible into many 
parts, so that it is generally agreed, for instance, that ’today* and 
• this afternoon’ are both parts of time which are not mutually 
successive because the latter is contained in the former.
Since duration and spatial extension are both infinitely 
divisible, the only temporal or spatial indivisibles which can be 
postulated are limits of duration and extension respectively (and 
these are clearly abstractions). And, again owing to the 
infinite divisibility of duration and spatial extension, there are 
no two limits of duration,and no two limits of spatial extension, 
between which there is not another.
Nor can anything having duration be temporally, nor anything 
hav#?^spatial extension be spatially, contiguous with another#
For since whatever endures or is spatially extended is, in that 
respect,infinitely divisible; nothing so extended contains a 
part which can properly be called ’next to’ anything beside it
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in time or space respectively.
Both Russell and Kneal point out that neither the"temporally 
indivisible, nor the "temporally divisible, can be contiguous. (87)
Clearly none but limits of time, durations, and existants 
having duration, can be temporally related, and none but limits 
of spatial extension, spatial extensions, and existants having 
spatial extension can b e spatially related. Hence if nothing of 
any of the first three types can be temporally contiguous with 
anything, and nothing of any of the last three can be spatially 
so; no two existants can be contiguous one with the other.
Hume’s position is thus unjustified since he adopts a definition 
in accordance with which a ’cause’ is always at least temporally 
contiguous with its ’effect, while at the same time supposing there 
are existants to which the titles ’cause* and ’effect’, so defined, 
are applicable.
Hume’s contention that nothing, not even an interval, can 
intervene between a ’cause* and its ’effect’, seems to be an 
heritage from the Aristotelian belief that an ’efficient cause’ 
never achieves its ’effect’ save by contact with that which it 
affects. Hume’s conclusion that there is no objective connection 
between a ’cause’ and its ’effect’ save a relation of succession 
which* it is reasonable to suppose to have always obtained betwen 
phenomena similar in type, however, not only does not entail this 
conclusion, but (if true) renders it unjustifiable. For there is 
no contradiction in supposing two types of phenomena to succeed 
each other regularly, other phenomena intervening between than.
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Moreover, there is good evidence that some such regular successions 
have at least occurred constantly in the past. For instance, 
there is good evidence that whenever a fuse of a given length 
attached to a bomb has been lit (certain other conditions having 
been fulfilled), an explosion has followed after a time interval 
the length of which has been constant in each instance. And, 
indeed, if Hume is correct in supposing experience to consist in 
a series of impressions and ideas, each of which follows its 
predecessors in accordance with a rule observed and repeatedly 
exemplified throughout the series, there must exist numerous 
regular successions of this type. Most people -whether 
philosophers or not^ would, I think, reject the suggestion that 
between two successive existants there might be a time interval 
in which nothing existed. But since Hume supposes that we have 
no rational justification in supposing any one experience 
dependent on its predecessor, and hence for him there is no 
essential difference between one thing coming into existence after 
another and something beginning to exist after an interval, he has 
no justification for joining in this general rejection. The 
existence of things separatedby empty space does not present the 
difficulty raised by the suggestion of existents separated by 
empty time, for it does not involve something coming into existence 
’from nothing*. It is, indeed, at least possible that there is 
empty space between the planets and other heavenly bodies (or at 
least between them or any gases immediately surrounding or 
adjacent to any of them) ; and that this is so has been given no
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little probability by the failure of repeated attempts to disprove 
it.
It is probable that Hume maintained the inseparability of 
•cause* and ’effect* in sp$te of its inconsistency with his 
account of * causal connection’, because he supposed it implicit 
in the soientifico-rationalist usage; since he intended his 
discussion of ’ causation’ to be concerned with the interpretation 
of the term as used in accordance with this. The assertion would 
then,in effect,constitute part of the definition of the usage 
with whose interpretation he is concerned, and so be legitimate 
to him. That an ardent exponent of Newton* s theory of gravitation 
should have supposed the inseparability of ’cause* and "effect* 
integral to scientifico-rationalist usage, may at first sight 
seem a surprising suggestion. But it will seem much less so 
when it is remembered that Newton himself found the notion of 
action at a distance hard to accept, (88) and that for two 
centuries after the publication of his principia* scientists 
were trying to discover a material medium connecting the planets 
and other heavenly bodies one with another.
(b ) The priority of ’cause* to ’effect*.
Hume regards his contention that a ’cause* is always prior 
to its ’effect’ as lacking the ’universal acknowledgment’ (89) he 
attributes to the assertion of contiguity between ’cause* and 
’effect’. He therefore thinks it more in need of defence than 
the latter, and accordingly attempts its vindication*
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presumably it was because he supposed the contiguity of 
'cause* to ’effect* generally admitted, but not the priority of 
the former to the latter, that he postulated the relations in this 
order* For it is neither the more convenient nor the more 
reasonable, since one must know he thinks a ’cause* always prior to 
its ’effect*, before understanding precisely what he is asserting in 
affirming their contiguity* Indeed, since only those accepting 
Hume’s doctrine of the priority of ’cause* to ’effect’ are justified 
in asserting their contiguity, in his sense of the term, the order 
he adopts could not be justified even by the policy of putting less 
controversial points first*
Hume bases his defence of the priority of ’cause’ to ’effect’ 
on what he describes as ’an established maxim both in natural and 
moral philosphy’ ; namely ’that an object which exists for any time 
in its full perfection without producing another, is not its sole 
cause; but is assisted by sc«ne other principle which pushes it from 
its state of inactivity, and makes it exert that energy of which it 
was secretly possestl. I9 0)
Hume’s couching his account of this maxim in language 
appropriate to the activity view of ’causation’ alone is, to say
(9O
the least, surprising: and,as Broad remarks, is hardly
justified in view of his final account of ’causal’ connection* 
Although, in this, however, his choice of language is unfortunate 
it cannot, I think, be regarded as a major inconsistency. For it 
seems evident that in this instance, he has, for convenience, used 
the language his contemporaries would have used in a similar context.
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without any intention of committing himself to the account of 
’causation’ which it ordinarily suggests* His description of 
’causes’ as ’operating* and ’productive*, in postulating the 
contiguity of ’cause* and ’effect’, (9 2) is doubtless similarly 
explicable. Such use of common terms cannot be condemned out­
right since it would often be very inconvenient for philosphers 
to avoid it. It would, for instance, involve needless trouble 
if a phenomenalist could never use the term ’physical object* ; 
but had instead to replace it-either by a specification of the 
types of collocations of sensa, or possibilities of sensation, 
which may be postulated when the term is used correctly according 
to the ordinary conventions?., or by some other term invented or 
coined in order to denote this. Hume’s wording of his maxim, 
cannot be justified on the basis of convenience, however, since 
he could, with very little trouble^ (indeed more simply), have 
expressed it consistently with his account of ’causation’.
Even when not stated in terms proper to the activity view 
of ’causation’ alone, the tenet that a ’cause* cannot exist for 
any period of time without its ’effect’^ is inconsistent, not 
simply with Hume’s final account of ’causal connection* , but with 
one of his most fundamental premises.
It has been seen (93) that basic to Hume’s philosophical 
position in general, and to his discussion of ’causation’ in 
particular, is the conviction that we can conceive^ only that 
which, or whose component parts, we have already experienced; 
and that, in consequence, we are not justified in postulating the
391.
existence of anything not fulfilling these conditions* But it 
has also been remarked (94) that there is good ground for thinking 
we can experience nothing lacking duration, which is to say it is 
reasonable to suppose that no human being has experienced the 
momentary existence of one thing in the absence of another followed 
by their coexistence, which is the relation Hume’s maxim asserts 
as holding between every ’cause* and its ’effect’.
Nor is there any inherent contradiction in the notion of a 
constant correlation such that whenever an A has existed for a given 
period of time (certain conditions having been fulfilled) a B has 
come into existence. There is, indeed, evidence that correlations 
of this type have existed; for instance there is evidence for 
supposing that whenever a time bomb has existed unchanged for a 
given period, certain conditions having been fulfilled, (a ’time bomb’ 
being here treated as distinct from its fuse), an explosion has 
occurred.
There is, however, equally good evidence for thinking that 
whenever such correlations have occurred, changes constant in type 
have taken place throughout the interval, and have been regularly 
related to that which followed. If, therefore, like Hume one admit 
the postulation of momentary states, one must think it probable that 
there is no regular succession not reducible to a constant sequence 
of such states. But this conclusion could not justly be thought 
certain,given the regularity view of ’causation’; since it could 
rightly be so regarded,only if the necessary dependence of any 
change on something preceding it could be supposed certain. And
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it is the essence of the regularity view to deny the existence 
of any adequate ground for such a supposition. Therefore, had 
Hume maintained his final account of ’causation* without his 
theory of conception, he might with consistency have regarded 
this modification of his ’maxim* as probably true. But since 
he would not have been justified in thinking its truth more than 
probable, he could not justly have treated it as a ground for 
attributing certainty to any other conclusion.
probably Hume’s denial that a ’cause* can exist for any time 
without its ’effect* amounts (as I have suggested his statement 
of their contiguity to do) to part of the definition of the usage 
he is discussing. If this is so, his argument against the 
possibility of simultaneous * causation’ is, in effect^simply a 
demonstration of the inconsistency of its assertion with that 
usage. But as his own account of * causal’ connection is
ieqiHwafriiV
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conflict with what he regarded as demanded by this, or the 
arguments he used to prove this to be so.
Even were Hume justified in denying that a ’ cause’ can exist 
for any time without its ’effect,* the argument by which he 
deduces from this that all * causation is successive would stand 
condemned.
He frames his argument thus: ’if any oé^e be perfectly
co-temporary with its effect, ’tis certain according to this 
maxim (i.e. that no ’cause* can exist for any length of time 
with out its ’effect*) that they must all of them be so; since
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any one of them which retards its operation for a single moment,
exerts not itself at that very individual time in which it might
have operated; and therefore is no proper cause. The 
consequence of this would be no less than the destruction of 
that succession of causes which we observe in the world; and 
indeed, the utter annihilation of time. For if one cause were 
CO-temporary with its effect, and this effect with its effect, 
and so on, *tis plain there would be no such thing as succession, 
and all objects must be co-existent*. (95)
As Broad points out,(9 6) this argument is not only formally
invalid, but also involves an assumption inconsistent with Hume’s 
position.
It contains the inference that all causes are simultaneous 
from the premises ’No cause exists for any length of time without 
its effect also existing’, and ’Some causes are contemporary with 
their effect!; premises from which no conclusion concerning ’all 
causes’ can legitimately be drawn.
Moreover, it implies that from Hume’s maxim that no ’cause’ 
exists for any length of time without its ’effect’ existing also, 
may be inferred that if A is contemporary with B, B ’s effect’ 
must be contemporary with A# But this conclusion may be 
legitimately inferred from that maxim,only if it is also held 
that one existent cannot succeed another unless that other 
exists for some length of time. And this latter belief is 
clearly inconsistent with the view which Hume so paradoxically 
supposes himself to be defending - namely that a ’cause’, while
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never existing for any length of time without its effect, always 
precedes that effect.
Aginst Hume’s assumption that his maxim involves the 
simultaneity of an ’effect’ with anything contemporary with its 
ëcause’, Broad urges simply its inconsistency with his conception 
of time as composed of contiguous moments. This inconsistency is 
evident^ and is indeed implicit in the inconsistency of that 
assumption with Hume’s conception of ’causation’. It is, 
however, not only more convenient, but also necessary to point 
rather to the latter inconsistency.
It is more convenient since, as Hume nowhere explicitly 
asserts the indivisible components of time,which he postulates, 
to be durationless, the only certain evidence that this was his 
view being his conviction that a ’cause’ may precede its ’effect’ 
without existing for any length of time without it;, Hume’s 
assumptions irroonsistency with his view of time can thus be 
demonstrated only by reference to that in his view of ’causation’ 
which it contradicts. Broad,indeed, nowhere defends the contention 
that the time units Hume postulates are moments. presumably he 
thinks that Hume’s supposing them to be indivisible amounts to his 
thinking them durât ionless, since it is obvious that whatever has 
duration is divisible. But this supposition has no justification. 
For it is equally obvious that the parts of a duration must them­
selves have duration, yet Hume’s explicit assertions concerning 
time are inconsistent with the truth of both these obvious tenets, 
and, as has been seen, his view of ’causation’ is inconsistent
395.
with the second.
And it is essential to show this assumption to be in­
consistent with that view of * causation* which it is used to 
defend. For if a philosopher* s defence of a given conclusion 
is inconsistent with some tenet he has maintained concerning time 
(or anything else), which is irrelevant to that conclusion, it is 
always possible that that tenet is indefensible^and the argument 
inconsistent with it, sound. Whereas an argument involving the 
falsity of the very conclusion it is intended to demonstrate is 
intrinsically indefensible.
The only defence of his contention that a * cause* is always 
prior to its ’effect*, which Hume offers, is thus untenable on 
two grounds.
It is, of course, possible that Hume’s contention might be 
true although he failed to establish this. One is not, therefore, 
entitled to reject it in rejecting his defence of it; I shall, 
accordingly, discuss it on its own merits before leaving the 
subject. I shall naturally discuss Hume’s contention as he 
understood it; that is to say I shall confine myself to asking 
whether there would have been any contradicition in his supposing 
experience consistent with the truth of laws connecting con­
temporaries, and whether he might be supposed to have had any 
adequate grounds for thinking it so. Hume denies both the 
existence of any objective connection between existents save 
correlation consistently with a rule,in the sense of a pattern 
there is reason to suppose constantly exemplified in the past; 
and the possibility of rational justification for prediction.
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My questions amount, therefore, to asking whether there is any 
contradiction in supposing a constant correlation,such as the 
simultaneous existence of an A whenever a B has existed, to have 
occurred in the past; and whether there are any adequate grounds 
for supposing any such correlation to have in fact obtained.
From the conjunction of Hume’s maxim with the principle that 
if A succeeds B the latter must exist without A for a length of 
time however small, Lotze argues (97) correctly that all 
’causation’ must be, not successive,but simultaneous. But,like 
Hume, he supposes the existence of simultaneous ’causation’
would preclude succession. He examines the possibility of two 
contemporary series, to every member in e%ch corresponding one 
and only one in the other, each member of one being ’caused’ 
simultaneously by the corresponding member of the other. But he 
thinks such a combination of simultaneous ’causation’ with 
succession to be impossible. For he supposes that because it 
would involve a fixed order in that succession, it would also entail 
the dependence of one momentary state on that next preceding it; 
and since he holds time to be continuous he cannot admit adjacent 
moments. it was seen, however, that there was no contradiction in 
postulating constant correlation between separated existents, but 
rather that there is good evidence for supposing,at least, that such 
correlations have existed in the past. (98) Lotze’s argument may 
therefore be rejected in the present context for the reason which 
leads Broad to reject it; (99) namely, the untenability of the 
principle of the inseparability of ’cause* and ’effect’ on which it
397.
rests*
There is, indeed, no intrinsic contradiction in postulating 
a constant correlation such as the existence of an A whenever a 
B has existed* For there is nothing in the nature of existence 
to exclude simultaneity, and sv nothing in the nature of either 
constancy or correlation entailing their restriction to successive 
existents alone* indeed, there is good evidence for postulating 
the existence of many such correlations* There is, for instance, 
good ground for supposing that whenever the characteristic of 
being a ruminant is discoverable in an animal, that of being cloven­
footed is also; and that whenever whter is boiling where the air 
pressure is that normal at sea level and there is a centigrade 
thermometer in good condition standing in it, the latter registers 
a hundred degrees* Only the second of these two correlations 
would be normally called ’causal*, though there is no reason for 
refusing the title to the first unless ’causation’ is not defined 
in terras of correlation alone*
AS Broad points out, (lOO) it is never absolutely certain that 
the apparently simultaneous are really contemporary, since it is 
always possible that they may be separated by a time intefval too 
small for us to perceive* That they are so separated is, however, 
highly improbable in most instances where simultaneity is commonly 
postulated* It is, for example, improbable that when we think we 
observe water boiling and a thermometer registering a hundred 
degrees, what in fact occurs is a rapid succession of changes in 
water and thermometer so that the boiling condition in the one,
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and the registering a hundred in the other are in fact always 
successive. The only evidence which could support the assertion 
of such a succession, namely its observation, is, from t he nature 
of the case, unobtainable. Moreover, the only evidence which would 
support the view that water ever boils where there is ordinary sea- 
level air-pressure when a centigrade thermometer in it does not 
register a hundred degrees, or that such a thermometer ever 
registers this temperature when in water which is not boiling where 
that air-pressure is found;, is the observation of such a conjunction. 
And all the available evidence indicates this to be precisely what has 
never been observed. As it is clearly unreasonable to postulate 
something for which there is no evidence, one should,therefore, 
affirm the existence of the constant correlation of contemporaries, 
not indeed as certain, but as an hypothesis which it is more 
reasonable to accept than to reject.
Since, however, Hume intended his discussion of ’causation* 
to be an examination of the interpretation of that term as used 
by the scientific rationalist, he would have been justified in 
insisting on defining it so as to exclude simultaneous ’causation’ 
had he been able to show this definition to be either implicit in, 
or more reasonable than not, given^ the basic premises of the 
scientific rationalist. But this he does not attempt to prove, 
nor could he have done so.
It will be seen below (iQl) that if anything having a be­
ginning is ’caused’ in the determinist sense of being inevitable, 
at least one factor contributing to its entailraent must exist
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before it. To show therefore that a definition excluding 
simultaneous ’causation* is demanded by the scientific- 
rationalist position, which regards many ph^mena having a 
beginning as ’caused’ in the determinist sense, it would be 
necessary to prove either that a determinist could consistently 
call only an entailing factor preceding it ’ cause’ of anything, 
or that he would be most reasonable in so restricting his 
application of the term.
Hume himself has been seen to admit, or at least to i#ply
(102) that determinists do not all take this /^iew; nor could
this justly be disputed. The determinist would, for instance
call its temperature where there is a given air-pressure, the
cause of water boiling, rather than its being placed on fire or
stove in kettle or pot; though he would hold both that its
boiling never followed this event save necessarily, anS)??Sere 
are many occasions when its occurrence is indispensable to
water boiling. And clearly this usage is the most convenient
for any one wishing to regard a connection between ’cause* and
’effect’ as a basis of inference, as the scientific rationalist
evidently does. Certainly it is as reasonable to suppose that
(under given conditions) placing a kettle of water on a stove has
been regularly followed by the water’s boiling, as it is to hold
that water has always boiled at a specified temperature where
there is a given air-pressure. Eut a law specifying the former
would be far more complex than one stating the latter, since there
are many conditions given which placing a kettle of water on a
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stove is not followed by the water’s boiling. Furthermore, 
the correlation between its temperature and the air-pressure 
present to it, is the one factor which has been found common 
to all instances of water boiling.
From this it is clear that circumstances are conceivable 
under which it would be reasonable to apply the title ’cause of 
A* to a simultaneous factor contributing to its entailment. And 
it is further evident that if there is any justification for 
supposing the existence of many phenomena to entail that of 
others (or to do so in conjunction with other conditions)^ there 
is equal justification for postulating the existence of an 
entailing factor simultaneous with that which it helps to entail. 
For there is reason to suppose a constant correlation to have 
always obtained between its having a given temperature where there 
is a specified air pressur^water’s boiling; which is the only 
ground we have for postulating entailment between many phenomena 
which the scientific rationalist thinks so related. He should 
hold, therefore, not only that one of two simultaneous existents 
might be called ’cause’ of the other, but also that there are 
simultaneous existents one of which may reasonably be called 
’cause’ of the other.
Before closing this section,! shall briefly discuss the 
doctrine that ’causation’ is always successive,in terras of other 
definitions of ’cause’.
In the first place, it is clear that nothing can exist prior 
to anything without a beginning. Therefore to be consistent.
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anyone maintaining ’causation’ to be always successive should 
also either (a) adopt and adhere to a definition in accordance 
with which only that having a beginning could be said to be 
’caused*; or (b) while adopting another definition,hold there 
is at least good ground for denying the existence of anything 
without a beginning which can properly be said to be ’caused’.
Again, it is obvious^ that if one holds the title^ ’cause’ 
to be applicable only to continuants, supposing at the s ame time 
that an ’effect’ begins to exist in virtue of its ’cause’s’ 
activity as a work of art is ordinarily thought to do, then one 
should hold that a ’cause’ must exist before its ’effect*. For 
this view amounts to the belief that a ’cause’ must act, and 
therefore exist, before its ’effect’ can come into existence.
Or if, like Berkeley, one thinks only conscious purpose can 
properly be called a ’cause’, holding an ’effect’ to be 
deliberately brought about in order to fulfil a purpose, one must 
equally suppose all ’causation’ successive. For clearly (given 
the ordinary sense of the terms) no one can deliberately set 
about fulfilling a purpose without first entertaining it.
On the other hand the contention that ’causation’ must always 
be successive is inconsistent with the view that,though a ’cause’ 
is always indispensable to the existence of its ’effect’, there 
are ’causes’ which do not, under any circumstances, entail some 
of the ’effects dependent on them. For this view allows some 
’causes’ to entail their ’effects’ (or at least to do so under 
certain conditions); and as has been seen, it may be reasonable
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to apply the title ’cause* to an entailing factor simultaneous 
with that which it entails or helps to entail. And similarly, 
since, as has been seen, if it is reasonable to call many 
phenomena ’cause* in the entailment sense, it is reasonable to 
call some existents ’cause* of others simultaneous with them; 
one holding this view, like one holding the entailment view, must 
either suppose we cannot know the terra ’cause’ to be applicable 
to many phenomena or else believe that there are simultaneous 
existents one of which may reasonably be called ’cause» of the 
other. And those holding the ’indispensability view* (if I may 
so term it), like those holding the entailment view, do not usually 
wish to regard the term ’cause’ inapplicable to any particular 
phenomenon,
I think no one has maintained both that a ’ cause’ is always 
indispensable to its ’effect’, and that no ’cause’ entails (or 
helps to entail) its ’effect’. Certainly no one prepared to 
regard many given phenomena as ’causes’, in the sense of being 
indispensable to others, could consistently maintain that no 
’cause’ entails its ’effect’. For whether one regard any 
phenomenon as an entailing ’cause’ or as one which is indispensable 
to its ’effect’ without entailing^'one is postulating an entailment 
between phenomena. Therefore precisely the same type of evidence 
would justify one in regarding any phenomenon as ’cause* in either 
of these senses. And the only evidence we have for many of the 
dependences ordinarily postulated between phenomena^ is that for 
the non-occurrence of the postulated ’effect’ in the absence of
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that regarded as its * cause’♦
If, however, anyone did suppose ’causes'always indispensable 
to, but never to entail, their ’effects’, he could have neither a 
priori, nor empirical, justification for thinking ’causation* 
always successive. He could have no a priori ground for doing so, 
since being an indispensable non-entailing conditions of A does not 
imply existing prior to Ao Ther$ is,for example, no contradiction 
in supposing certain simultaneous conditions to be indispensable to 
an electron’s moving in a given way without entailing its doing so.
And should anyone be so inconsistent as to take constant con­
junction as evidence of a phenomenon’s being an indispensable, but 
not of its being an entailing, ’cause’; then he would have to admit 
the existence of indispensable conditions (e.g. the temperature 
of water at boiling point) which are simultaneous with the ’effects’ 
dependent on them.
Aristotle thought there was a sense in which each of his 
’four causes’ could be said to precede its ’effect’. Doubtless 
this was due to his regarding chiselling, or casting,statue or bowl 
as the type of ’causation’. For clearly when anything is chisellei., 
or cast, from stone or metal respectively, what Aristotle would call 
its ’efficient’ and ’material causes’ exist before it. Further, he 
supposed that anyone making a statue or bowl, be. does so delibei^ 
ately; and, as has been seen, if this is so, his ’end’, in the 
sense of conscious purpose, must exist before he starts fulfilling 
it. Again, in order to have a conscious purpose to make anything, 
one must at least understand its nature either before, or
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concomitantly with, forming that purpose. Indeed the 
supposition that forming such a purpose is accompanied, or 
preceded, by the entertainment of an ina ge of that which it is 
purposed to make, is not unsupported by evidence. Certainly 
many claim to have such an image when having the experience 
ordinarily described as consciously intending to make something.
It has been seen, (103) however, that,in the sense consistent 
with Aristotle's explicit definition and most common usage, a 
•formal cause*, as such, is inseparable from its ’effect*.
It should hardly be necessary to add that since Kurae is 
prepared to apply the terra ’cause’ to ’objects' such as flames, 
chairs, and tables, his contention that ’causation’ is always 
successive can be regarded as asserting only that a tcause’ always 
exists prior to its ’effect’, and not as denying their ever being 
co-existent.
(c) Conclusion of the first part of the direct search.
Hume declares no relations, save contiguity and priority to 
their ’effects’, to be found common to all ’causes’; the only 
relations discoverable as coooraon to ’effects’ being, therefore, 
contiguity and succession to their ’causes’*
He rejects the definition of ’causation’ in terms of 
’production’ as tautologous. Its being so or not, of course, 
depends on how ’production’ is defined; Hume seems to be justified, 
however, in supposing the two terms commonly treated as synonymous 
by those holding the activity view of ’causation’.
He refuses to define ’causation’ in terms of succession and 
contiguity alone, because he recognises that; ’An object may be
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contiguous and prior to another without being considered as its 
cause*. (104) He is here referring to simple succession, not 
regular sequence, so this assertion is not a denial of the 
’regularity view of causation*, as the context in which Kemp Smith 
quotes it (l05) seems to suggest (though admittedly he hs-s 
previously said that for Hume ’causation is more than sequence, 
and more also than regular sequence).
Hume’s account of ’causal’ connection, as will be seen, is 
not simply that known as the regularity view, which confines itself 
to an account of the relations holding between ’cause* and ’effect*. 
For Hume finds his aim of discovering the source of the idea of 
’causal’ connection demands analysis of the psychological factors 
present whenever ’causal’ connection is asserted. But his account 
of our knowledge of that connection supports the regularity view; 
and nothing which he says about the psychological factors involved 
contradicts it. He differs from exponents of the regularity view 
in one important respect, however. To these latter, the scientific 
rationalist’s assertion of necessary connection between ’cause’ and 
’effect’ is important merely as something to be discredited. Thus 
to many, their arguments appear preposterous in that they urge 
discarding beliefs (such as the necessary succession of death on 
the taking of arsenic under certain conditions) which seem 
psychologically inescapable. Hume, on the other hand, is concerned 
primarily, not with criticising the scientific rationalist 
conception, but with discovering its source; and is, moreover, more 
than ready to regard it as intrinsic to human thought. Accordingly
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he announces his intention of turning from the examination of 
particular ’causes’ and their ’effects’^ precisely because this 
does not reveal the required impression of necessary connection.
He concludes this section, therefore, by asserting that he will 
examine certain beliefs about ’causation’ in order, by this means, 
to show at length where such an impression is to be found. (1q 6)
(e) Can we be certain that whatever has a beginning must have a
’cause’?
(a ) Possible interpretations of the question#
As has been seen, the first subsidiary question which Hume 
introduces concerns why whatever has a beginning is held to have 
a ’cause’. This supposition Hume describes (l07) as ’a general 
maxim of philosophy^ a description of which he seems particularly 
fond.
My calling this question subsidiary may seem startling, since 
it forms the subject of so large a proportion of discussions on 
’causation’. In so describing it, however, I intend to deny 
neither its importance, nor its being fundamental (at least on one 
possible interpretation) to a great deal of philosophy. I am 
merely describing its function in Hume’s discussion, the main object 
of which is to discover what the scientific rationalist is (or 
ought, to be) talking about when he uses the terra ’cause’. And, 
indeed, it is not difficult to see Hume’s central query to be 
the more fundamental of the two; for clearly one cannot hope to 
discuss intelligibly whether everything having a beginning has a 
’cause’^ until one has defined the latter terra*
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The belief that everything is explicable, in the sense that 
there is something indispensable to its existence, has been 
observed (1q 8) to be both very common,and fundamental to much that 
philosophers have maintained; its consistent denial having been 
seen to be very difficult. It is a corollary of this principle 
that if .anything has a beginning so that its existence cannot be 
intrinsically necessary, that existence must depend on something 
external to itself. One who both defines ’cause of A* as ’that 
on wj^ich A depends’^ and affirms universal explicability, must 
therefore, if he is to be consistent, assert everything having a 
beginning to have a ’cause’.
The picture of the universe as a system the existence of each 
of whose members is entailed by a condition, or conditions, 
Indispensable to it, was seen to grow in favour with the growth 
of modem physics. And this was seen to have nurtured the 
conception of a ’cause’ as essentially entailing its effect’.
When the term ’cause’ is so defined, Hume’s maxim asserts everything 
having a beginning to be entailed; it is in this sense that it 
has generally been discussed by his successors.
It might be objected that Hume was in no position to discuss 
the maxim adequately until he had completed his own definition of 
the term ’cause’. I^ is true that he could have discussed it with 
far less danger of confusion after completing that definition.
And it is no less true that it would be patently unjustifiable to 
attempt a demonstration of the maxim’s truth before completing 
one’s definition of the term ’cause’. For,clearly, some of the
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as yet unrecognised, or at least unspecified, conditions which 
its completion would involve one in asserting as essential to 
an existent*8 constituting a 'cause*, might be inconsistent with 
this conclusion#
It is, however, equally true that B m e  has already said 
sufficient concerning his definition of the term,to allow the 
possibility of his showing the maxim's truth incapable of certain 
proof#
He has explicitly affinned his determination to call only 
something temporally prior, and contiguous,to an existent its 
'cause*. And he has further confirmed that his discussion is 
concerned with the term solely as used by the scientific rationalist, 
by maintaining its necessary connection with its 'effect’ to be 
essential to the idea of 'cause* whose source he is seeking.(109) 
From this is is clear that he could not consistently call A ’cause 
of B*, unless he thought himself to have good reason to suppose 
phenomena of the former’s type to have been constantly correlated 
with others like the latter.
This is to say that he has,in effect, defined two relations 
in which everything he is prepared to call ’cause’ stands to its 
’effect’^  as well as a further relational characteristic common 
to everything he is prepared to call ’ cause’. To show the 
impossibility of proving that to everything having a beginning 
there stands in these relations something with that additional
I
characteristic, is to show that, given Hume’s definition of ’cause’ 
(no matter what else as yet unspecified it may include), it is
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impossible to prove certainly that whatever has a beginning must 
have a ’cause*. And it is precisely the impossibility of 
proving the maxim’s truth which Hume endeavours to show in the 
section under consideration.
Hume does not make it clear whether he is here concerned with 
the maxim as interpreted by the scientific rationalist^ or solely 
on the basis of what he has already specified of his own 
definition. This might be a serious omission. For since the 
disproof of the maxim’s demonstrability in terms of the ’regular 
sequence* definition entnils its disproof given the scientific 
rationalist interpretation, while the disproof of its demonstrabil­
ity on the latter interpretation does not necessarily involve its 
disproof on the former;, it is often essential to correct 
evaluation of a philosopher’s arguments and conclusions on the 
subject, to know to which interpretation of the maxim they are 
meant to refer.
In the present instance the omission is not serious, however, 
since (as will be seen) (llo) Hume’s arguments disprove the maxim’s 
demonstrability either on both^or neither, of these interpretations.
His care to reinforce the conclusion of this discussion after 
completing his definition, by urging (111) the maxim’s evident 
inderaonstrability, not only on the basis of his fullesifc*definition, 
but also given the more limited one in terras of ’regular sequence’, 
might well suggest that he regarded his former discussion as 
refuting the maxim’s demonstrability only on the scientific 
rationalist interpretation. For him to have so far misunderstood 
the implication of his own arguments would indeed seem surprising.
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and it is possible that he only feared his readers doing so.
Hume’s asserting contiguity between ’cause’ and ’effect’ has 
been seen to be unjustifiable,(112) and rejected by most 
philosophers. These, therefore, ^muld deny the maxim as 
interpreted consistently with his conception of either the 
scientific rationalist, or regular sequence, definition of ’cause*. 
Leaving aside this difference, which is of minor importance to 
the points here at issue, it is evident that neither ’Whatever 
has a beginning is preceded continuously with something entailing 
(or contributing to the entailment of) its existence’ or 
’Whatever has a beginning is preceded continuously by something 
on which it follows consistently with an universally exemplified 
rule’, can be regarded as a ’general maxim of philosophy’ in the 
sense of a tenet accepted by all philosophers. It is, for instance, 
rejected, at least implicitly, by all who suppose free volitions 
may occur.
The first of these assertions (and hence the second, ^ which 
it includes,*) is, however, ordinarily accepted by the scientific 
rationalist. When he admits the continuity of tim^its acceptance 
is, indeed, intrinsic to the letter’s conception 6f the universe as 
exhibiting necessary correlations throughout, and containing no 
member whose existence is not inevitable. It is true that the 
existence of any one of a number of completely simultaneous things 
might be entailed by that of the others; but unless that of all 
but one of these was entailed by something existing previously, it 
is possible that none of them might have existed at all.
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Since, therefore, Hume’s discussion of ’causation’ is 
confined to an examination of their use of the term, his 
attribution of the maxim^ to philosophers in general might be 
regarded as intending to attribute its acceptance^on one of the 
two above interpretations, to scientific rationalists alone; and 
thus as true, though misleadingly phrased.
On the other hand, it is possible that, in ascribing the maxim 
to philoa%)hers in general, Hume was thinking of its widespread 
acceptance on the minimum interpretation common to plain men, 
scientific rationalists, Aristotelians, and (probably) others;
namely the less restricted contention that whatever has a beginning 
is dependent for its existence on something external to itself*
If this was his intention, he certainly had no right to express it 
by affirming the general acceptance of the maxim* P®r it would 
have been inconsistent with both his explicit assertions and his 
general usage to have adopted, even at this stage, »o wide an 
interpretation of the term * cause’*
(b) The aim of Hume’s discussion
Before embarking on a detailed examination of Hume’s
discussion of ’universal causation’, it will be well to attack a
\
common misunderstanding* It is widely held that Hhrae’s intention 
here is to deny the existence of ’universal causation*, or at 
least its necessity* This for instance, seems to h a w  prompted 
Laird’s remark that ’Hume contradicted himself when he said that 
the impression of necessity was itself caused’, (113) (Though 
elsewhere (114) he acknowledges that Hume never meant to deny the
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maxim). But Hume is explicit in stating his intention to be 
simply that of showing we have no rational ground for affirming 
the maxim’s certain truth. And clearly to argue, or assert, that 
something cannot be known to be certainly true is not to maintain 
it to be certainly false.
Hume, indeed, affirms repeatedly tha.t he is concerned with 
whether we can know the maxim to be certainly true. At the outset, 
after saying that its truth is commonly held to be intuitively 
certain, he maintains that ’if we examine this maxim by the idea 
of knowledge above explained we shall discover in it no mark of 
any such intuitive certainty’. (115) And, having argued this point, 
he then proffers a further argument which, he claims, will prove it 
to be ’neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain’, (ll6)
Then, having defended his contention directly^to his own satisfaction, 
he further supports it by criticising current arguments purporting 
to prove the maxim’s certain truth. (117) He closes the section 
by reiterating his denial that its truth is either intuitively or 
demonstratively certaih^ and expressing the hope that this is 
sufficiently proved by his arguments,(118).
Thus, when,nearly twenty years after publishing the Treatise,
Hume denies ever having ’asserted so absurd a proposition as that 
any thing might arise without a cause’, (119) he is not recanting 
a more revolutionary opinion of his youth.
It could certainly be objected that he cannot justly call the 
proposition, here repudiated, absurd^ without recanting the views 
expressed in the Treatise, For if it cannot be certainly known
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that everything having a beginning must have a ’cause’, to postulate 
that this is not so is clearly not nonsensical, though it may be 
unreasonable in the sense of asserting something highly improbable. 
Nevertheless, it must be admitted in Hume’s defence, that (as will 
be seen below) it is intrinsic to the account of ’causation* in 
the Treatise that we are in fact quite unable to discard the belief 
in ’universal causation’; and by calling its denial absurd he might 
well mean to say no more than this, for certainly the denial of an 
opinion which we cannot discard seems absurd even though we are 
unable to defend the latter*
Again, it might be objected that although Hume’s earlier 
conclusion leaves open the possibility that ’universal causation’ 
obtains in fact, it excludes that of its obtaining necessarily*
This objection rests on confusing a thing necessarily being true 
with knowing that this is so* In order to show it to be un­
justifiable to assert sorre thing as necessarily true, one need only 
prove it to be neither self-evident nor capable of certain proof*
But this is inadequate to justify a categorical denial of its 
necessity* It is possible, for instance, that the necessity of 
everything with a beginning having also a ’cause’ is real, but 
unknowable to us because dependent on some factor, or factors, to us 
undiscoverable* To justify its categorical denial a philosopher 
would have to show it to be either self-contradictory or inconsistent 
with incontestable evidence*
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(fi) Critical Analysis of Hume’s Discussion#
Hume starts his discussion of the maxim by pointing out that 
none of the four relations he has asserted to be the sole objects 
of certain knowledge is postulated in saying that whatever has a 
beginning must have a ’cause’. He therefore concludes that this 
cannot be known with intuitive certainty* (12o) He mighty indeed^ 
have argued that this excludes its being known certainly at all^  
since he thinks these four relations the sole objects of all certain 
knowledge*
This argument has obvious disadvantages* In the first place 
it will convince only those who have already accepted Hume’s view 
of knowledge* Furthermore, although it is possible that one 
might be able to know the causal maxim to be true, without having 
certain loiowledge of any ’causal connection’; yet a large nunber 
of those accepting the axiom hold some ’causal’ relations certainly 
knowable. And this number includes contemporaries of Hume.
Hence many of those to whom Hume’s defence of his conclusion should 
have been directed would have been left completely unconvinced by 
this argument*
Hume was evidently aware of this latter defect. For, after 
challenging his oppememts to produce amotkr poesible object of 
knowledge which might justify their certainty of the axiom’s truth, 
(121) he promptly proffers another defence which, though dependent 
on an element in his theory of knowledge, would, if acceptable, 
prove his conclusion correct independently of any other tenet 
doncerning ’causation’*
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He begins this second argument by pointing out, truly, that 
to prove everything having a beginning to have a ’cause’ is to 
show that nothing can come into existence without one* This 
latter he affirms to be utterly incapable of proof since the ideas 
of ’cause’ and ’effect’, being distinct, are separable and therefore 
the types of impression or object to whichthey correspond are 
equally so. (122)
This argutiient clearly rests on Hume’s identification of 
’image’ and ’concept’. Given that to form an image of anything 
is to conceive or ’understand’ it, the possibility of forming an 
image of some tiling coming into existence without a ’cause’ means 
that this latter is conceivable. It is true that formerly, in 
discussing the relation of ’image’ to ’understanding’, Hume has 
insisted primarily on the impossibility of ’understanding’ anything 
without possessing its image (a contention in which he was seen to 
be mistaken). Since, however, he constantly^uses the term ’idea’ 
as synonymous with both ’concept* and ’image’, there seems no doubt 
that he intended to identify them throughout.
It is certainly true that whatever is imaginable is conceivable. 
But to treat an image as a concept, without qualification, is, to say 
the least, misleading. For since, as has been seen, Hume was mistaken^ 
in supposing that nothing can be understood without its image being 
entertained, it is at least possible that there are some things, 
all the information needed for the comprehension of which can be 
represented by no image however complex. It might, therefore, 
be possible to form an image of something coming into
.1
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existence without having a ’ c a u s e ncH-tld-“hrq fnTmW., but only 
because such an image inevitably fails to represent a factor 
intrinsic to coming into existence* Hume’s argument is thus 
insufficient to prove his point. Tt needs supplementation, or 
at least confirmation, by information gained from an analysis of 
the nature of coming into existence which is^^onfined to the 
formation of images - that is to say, by understanding what is 
meant by coming into existence in the ordinary sense of the term 
’understand’. clearly, if one has to appeal to ’urd erstanding’ 
in this sense any way, it is simpler and more convenient to do so 
in the first place* Moreover, since the formation of images is 
relevant to the conclusion only insofar as it contributes to 
’understanding’ in this sense, any additional appeal to their 
formation is superfluous*
This^ of course, is not to say that anything’s coming into 
existence without a ’cause' is inconceivable; it is merely to 
assert Hume’s argument inadequate to disprove this*
Ti^ ven did Hume’s second argument suffice to prove anything’s 
coming into existence ’uncaused* conceivable, it would fail to 
justify his claim to prove the maxim affirming ’universal causation’ 
to be ’neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain’. (123)
By showing its contradictory to be conceivable he would certainly 
have disproved the maxim’s intuitive certainty, but this is all.
For, as has been seen,(124) that which is intrinsically conceivable, 
and so possible, considered in itself, may still be necessarily 
impossible in virtue of the existence of something precluding
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it* Thus, for instance, taken by itself there is no intrinsic 
contradicition in ray being at Hampton Court at 2 p.m. on June 5th 
1954; but given that I cannot be in two places at once and that 
I am in the Louvre at 2 p.m. on June 5th 1954, my being then at 
Hampton Court is thereby rendered necessarily impossible* As 
has already been noted in passing (125) and willb e discussed 
more fully below, (126) it was precisely the possibility of this 
extrinsic type of entailment which formed the basis of Kant’s 
answer to Hume*
Having, to his mind, satisfactorily disproved the maxim’s 
certain truth, Hume reinforces this conclusion by criticising four 
arguments used currently in defence of its certainty. These, 
used variously by Hobbes, Clarke, Locke, and others, (127) all 
agree in begging the questionTFhe first three contendtm^; that 
whatever has a beginning must have a ’cause’ because, otherwise,
(a) there would be nothing to determine when and where it should 
exist, and hence it would not exist at all; (b) it would ’cause’ 
itself and so exist bedore coming into existence; (c) it would 
be produced by nothingWhile the fourth (in Hume’s view the most 
’frivolous* of the lot) consists in maintaining that every ’effect’ 
must have a ’cause* because this is implicit in the idea of an 
’effect’* Hume has no difficulty in disposing of these arguments, 
pointing out that (a) if anything’s coming into existence ’uncaused* 
is conceivable there is no absurdity in supposing the time and 
place of its doing so to be also undetermined; (b) to call A 
uncaused is to deny its being ’caused’ either by itself or by 
nothing; (c) to define ’effect’ as a relative term is not to assert
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it applicable either to everything or to everything having a 
beginning.
It has been seen (128) that Hume’s discussion ought to have 
been, and probably was, intended to concern either the assertion 
that whatever has a b eginning is preceded by something on vhich it 
follows necessarily (given certain conditions), the assertion that 
everything having a beginning has an antecedent which it follows 
consistently with a law of regular correlation which there is good 
reason to suppose to 'have been exemplified in the past), or else 
both assertions in turn.
Clearly if we could be shown incapable of knowing certainly 
that whatever has a beginning is preceded by something which it 
follows consistently with a rule of regular correlation exemplified 
in the past, this would disprove any claim to knowing certainly 
that everything having a beginning has an antecedent which it 
follows necessarily. If, therefore, Hume had succeeded in his 
aim of showing it to be conceivable for something to come into 
existence irrespective of its antecedents, or lack of them, he 
would have disproved our certain knowledge of the truth of both 
assertions. It is relevant to ask what would be required to 
achieve this.
If it could be shown possible, intrinsically and extrinsically, 
for anything having no antecedent to come into existence, clearly 
this would show both assertions incapable of certain proof.. Hume 
could not consistently have defended his thesis on this ground 
however. For since we suppose the histories of humanity and of
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the universe to have extended long before our own lives, and 
Hume and his contemporaries did so also^ (though they made a 
more modest estimate of that prior history’s extent), an# event’s 
coming into existence preceded by nothing is to us (and was to 
them) unimaginable, and thus is, on Hume’s view inconceivable.
Hume has, however, been seen to have been mistaken in identifying 
the unimaginable with the inconceivable* it is certainly quite 
possible to understand what is meant by the assertion that something 
came into existence nothing having existed before.±t And the 
occurrence of such an event can be known to be possible if the 
existence of something inexplicable can be shown to be so.
If the existence of something inexplicable is not held to be 
possible, or if it is held to be impossible on other grounds for 
something without an antecedent to come into existence, then it 
is impossible to completely exclude the possibility of knowing 
that v/hatever has a beginning must have a ’ cause’ on either the 
scientific rationalist or regular sequence interpretation of that 
maxim. For if an existent has an antecedent, then unless both it 
and its antecedent can be known to be completely simple and 
independent (which is in practice impossible, and normally would 
indeed be highly unreasonable) the possibility always remains that 
though the antecedent consistent with the laws which experience 
has led us to formulate is lacking, there is some circumstance 
present, given which^another antecedent (or antecedents) postulated, 
or discovered, would invariably be followed by that existent*
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At the same time,I can discover no certain proof of the truth 
of Hume’s maxim on either the scientific rationalist or regular 
sequence interpretation. Moreover, the evidence conflicts with 
its truth when so interpreted, for there are psychological 
phenomena which we have as yet been unable to show consistent with 
any law of regular sequence whose postulation is justified by 
experience. This in itself is not inconsistent with the maxim’s 
truth on either of the above interpretations, nor need it 
constitute any stidnbling block to our certainty of its truth so 
interpreted,could this be proved demonstratively. But in the 
absence of demonstrative and intuitive certainty, conflicting 
inductive evidence excludes its only other effective defence.
Therefore although I cannot regard Hume’s arguments as 
fulfilling their claims to refute the maximls certainty on either 
of these interpretations, neither can I accept the view of those 
claiming to be certain of its truth when so interpreted. J am 
thus forced to take a less dogmatic stand than either Hume or 
these of his opponents* in this matter.
It has been seen (129) that though the principle giving 
conviction to all the interpretations of the maxim - namely that 
nothing existent is inexplicable - is not itself intuitively or 
demonstratively certain, its refutation is extremely difficult to 
maintain with consistency: the principle itself being fundamental
to the greater proportion of the contentions of both philosophers 
and plain raen^and its denial psychologically repugnant to us.
And hence the denial of the wider interpretation of the maxim^ which
421,
Hume was not entitled to adopt, namely the assertion that 
whatever has a beginning is dependent on something external 
to itself, is equally difficult to sustain.
(f) Causal Inference.
(a ) An Outline of Hume’s Discussion.
The answer to the second of Hume’s subsidiary questions;^ 
namely why we suppose given ’causes’ must necessarily have certain 
specific ’effects’, was of fundamental importance to his analysis 
of the nôtion of ’cause’«
For this reason he devotes a great deal of spa’ce to the former; 
indeed he devotes to it nearly twice as much as to all the rest 
of his discussion of ’causation’ put together. As remarked 
above,(13o) one reason for the length of his discussion of 
’causal inference’ is its involving an account of belief; 
another lying in the close kinship of his view of probability 
inference to his account of inference from ’cause* to ’effect’ 
properly so-called, which renders discussion of the former 
inference very relevant to his account of the latter. Neverthe­
less, as testified by Hume’s recapitulation of his argument in 
the Enquiry, his position may be stated much more briefly than 
it is in the Treatise.
I shall endeavour, here, simply to outline Hume’s discussion 
with a few brief comments in passing, reserving treatment of 
anything requiring more than brief remark (e.g. Hume’s rejection 
of the entailment view of ’causation’, and his doctrine of
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belief) until later.
Hume’s account of causal inference rests on three basic 
contentions, which he introduces in the following order.
1. Every inference from ’cause* to ’effect’^ properly so-called 
(i.e. capable of being so described consistently with scientific- 
rationalist usage)^ is prompted by a present impression or memory; 
any inference not so prompted failing to carry the conviction 
characteristic of ’causal inference*. (Hume refers to memories 
sometimes as ’impressions’, and sometimes as ’ideas’; he allows 
that they may become so faint as to sink to the level of mere 
’ideas’^ (131) but holds the forceful memory, that of whose 
veracity one has no doubt, to have the status of an impression.
To avoid confusion,I shall confine the term ’impression’ to the 
present lively experience so described by Hume’ , using the term 
’memory* in the usual way). 2. We can never learn, from 
considering their respective characters, that the existence of 
one thing entails that of another. 3*Whenever we properly call 
one thing ’cause’ of another,we have previously experienced 
several phenomena like the former having observed none which was 
not followed by one like the latter.
Hume postulates two elements in ’causal inference’;
(a) the passage of thought from a present memory or impression 
to an idea resembling impressions found to have'constantly 
followed those of the type exemplified in the initial memory or 
impression; (b) belief that the customary correlation holds in 
the present instance,(132)
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Clearly this could not constitute an adequate account of 
•causal inference*, since it poses, but leaves unanswered, the 
crucial question: * Why, when we postulate a ’causal connection*,
do we believe a customary correlation to be exemplified in a 
present instance?’. Hume is well aware of this and accordingly 
proceeds to answer the latter question.
He contends (133) in the first place, in an argument similar 
in principle to two he has already used, that this belief cannot 
rest on rationally justifiable certainty since a change in the 
course of nature is quite conceivable.
He next considers (134) the possibility of the belief’s 
resting on a probability inference. Reason, he argues, cannot 
even justify our supposing the belief’s confirmation probable 
since every probability inference assumesjh This latter contention 
he defends by arguing that whenever anyone infers a probable 
conclusion he argues from the observed to the unobserved and hence 
must assume universal ’causality’»
To conclude his discussion of the possibility of the belief’s 
dependence on reason, Hume examines an argument which has been 
urged in defence of its rationality; (135) namely, that if phenomena 
of a given type A, have always been found to ’cause* those of 
another given type an A must have the power of producing a B, 
while the possession of this power in its turn entails that every
$
A produces a Hume points out that he has already argued both
that the terms ’production’ and ’causation’ are synonymous, and 
that there is nothing whose existence we can certainly know to
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entail a productive power in anything else* But, he says, 
he will not appeal to these conclusions in order to refute the 
argument at present under discussion lest he should unnecessarily 
weaken his position by making one part of it dependent on 
another where this is avoidable* Therefore he points out that 
even though ’causation* be allowed to imply the presence in the 
’cause* of productive power which in its turn entails its ’effect’s’ 
existence, since no such power is discoverable among any object’s 
sensible qualities, its existence can only be inferred from the 
fact of A ’s having always been followed by B’s in the past. He 
has but now argued the impossibility of a rational justification 
for any inference thus assuming the uniformity of nature, and he 
here reiterates this denial.
If it is incorrect to describe our belief in the uniformity 
of nature as resting on reason, the most adequate account of 
’causal inference’ / which pre-supposes this belief) can do no 
more than offer a description of the latter and of the conditions 
under which it arises. Hume, therefore, turns his attention to 
this.
His account of belief throughout presupposes his conviction 
that comprehension consists solely in the entertainment of images(i^é)
He holds (136) that in believing anything (e.g. that A will 
soon die), and in simply conceiving it, we entertain precisely the 
same images; the former experience being differentiated from the 
latter solely in the manner of its impact on the experient.
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Hume never succeeds in giving an adequate account of this 
characteristic mode of impact distinguishing belief. That he 
was quickly dissatisfied with the account he offered in the 
Treatise is, indeed, sufficiently attested by a section of the 
Appendix in which he seeks to qualify and expland this. (137)
In both the body of the Treatise and the Appendix, that which 
distinguishes belief from simple comprehension is described as 
the manner in which the relevant ideas are conceived, (138) This, 
by itself, could be taken to mean that the distinction lies in 
the mind's action upon images rather than their impact on the 
mind. It is clear, however, from his attempts to amplify this 
contention in both contexts,that he regarded the latter as the 
distinguishing factor in belief.
In the body of the Treatise he describes it (139) as a 
superior force or vivacity, acknowledging afterwards in the 
Appendix (140) that these terms provide^at best, an inadequate 
definition. He does not, however, proclaim the inadequacy of 
his first definition in order to replace it with one more precise, 
admitting instead (141) the impossibility of doing more than 
approximate towards this. Here he states simply that nothing can 
be said of the nature of belief^without qualification, save that 
to believe anything 'feels different* from merely conceiving it, 
and that his former use of the terras 'superior f o r c e 'liveliness 
etc., is but an attempt to express this difference. It thus 
appears evident that Laird's assessment (142) of the modification 
found in the Appendix is right^ and that of Tfhitehead (143) wrong;
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for both the original account and the paragraph modifying it^  
agree fundamentally in each defining belief as the entertainment 
of an image plus its having a distinctive manner of striking 
the experient. And that it was Hume’s intention to adhere t© 
this contention is confirmed by its reiteration in the Enquiry, 
(144)
The account of the origin of belief which follows, reveals 
Hume’s view of its role in ’causal inference*. It further shows 
the importance^ to his doctrine of belief^ of his analysis of 
experience. For he regards the force or peculiar feeling 
distinguishing the believed idea, as not only similar to, but 
also as derfted from, that which he considers characteristic of 
an impression.(145) He has already said (146) that the mind 
generally passes from impression or idea to an idea similar to 
an impression resembling^ contiguous to,or causally connected with^ 
one like the original impression or idea. In defining belief he 
contends that, in the course of such a transition from an 
impression or strong memory, some of the vivacity, assurance, or 
distinctive feeling,proper to the former passes to the associated 
idea.(147) This view he defends and amplifies: contending, in
the first place, that a forceful, or otherwise emphatic,mental 
disposition or feeling flavours anything experienced concurrently; 
and secondly that the ease with which the mind passes from an 
impression or memory to an associated idea prevents the change 
altering (or altering much) the disposition or special feeling 
originating in its experience of the impression or memory. (148)
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This account of the matter is, he avers, entailed by ’the 
nature of relation and that facility of transition which is 
essential to it*. (149) unfortunately, however, he fails to 
offer any ground for accepting the contention basic to the 
effectiveness of this demonstration - namely that facility of 
transition is integral to relation, neither attempting to prove 
it nor declaring it to be intuitively certain (a claim which 
would not have been justified anyway). But even had he 
vindicated his demonstration he would not have been entitled to 
appeal to it, since the categorical denial that we can know any 
phenomenon to entail another is fundamental to the position he 
is maintaining. •
Perhaps because he recognises the weakness of his appeal 
to demonstration in the matter, Hume hastens to add (150) that 
he places his ’confidence in experience to prove so material a 
principle*, and cites examples (151) in support of his theory. 
His choice of instances for this purpose is rather surprising. 
It includes an absent friend’s being brought vividly to mind at 
sight of his portrait, the stimulation of devotion by religious 
ceremonies, ideas connected with a place being enlivened by its 
proximity, and stimulation of devotion at sight of objects used 
by a saint* None of these would ordinarily be described as an 
instance of the birth or increase of belief. T bus an absent
friend’s portrait would be said to bring him to mind,but not 
normally to provoke or strengthen any belief concerning him.
We believe, for instance, in his existence whether we see his
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picture or not. Sight of the portrait would certainly provoke 
the belief that an artist had existed and painted it, but so 
would^any other picture; and in Hume’s view such a belief 
would consist in a vivid image of an artist painting the picture 
in question, not in one of its original. A saint's relics, in 
stimulating devotion, give rise to no new belief concerning him, 
and so on. Indeed, these examples serve to show the inconsistency 
of Hume's definition of 'belief* with customary usage; for if 
'belief* is defined as in some way a strengthening or reinforcing 
of an idea or its impact, then assuredly the foregoing must be 
accepted as examples of it. And yet Hume gives no explicit
indication that his use of the term differs from that customary, nor
indeed does he appear to suppose this.
Having admitted resemblance and contiguity, as well as 
causality, as initiating belief, Hume lays himself open to the 
objection that he has refuted his view of 'causal connection* as 
our sole source of belief in unobserved matters of fact.
In order to counter this objection he first reaffirms (152) 
that memories as well as impressions together with everything 
known to be 'causally connected* with either (whether immediately 
or through the intermediacy of other 'causes* and * effects'), when 
conceived, strike the mind with the assurance of reaility. It 
is, he contends (153) only resemblance and contiguity between 
these * realities* which leads to the associative process
initiating belief. In other words, he explains that in his view
'causal inference*^ - belief in a given relevant 'causal
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connection* - alv/ays precedes an associative process, or 
belief, resting on resemblance or contiguity; and hence 'causal 
connection* is the sine qua non of belief in unobserved matters 
of fact.
He then proceeds to explain the superior force or assurance 
accompanying * causal inference* by affirming that while the 
mind's passage from an impression to the idea of its 'effect*
(or from the memory or idea of the former to the latter) is 
involuntary and invariable, resemblance and contiguity alone do 
not ensure such passage,but merely facilitate it while leaving 
it subject to voluntary control. (154) He does not further 
amplify this explanation (probably he thinks it unnecessary) ; 
but clearly its force rests on his previous account of the transfer 
of vivacity or assurance from impression or memory to associated 
idea. Consistently with this account,hhe lack of spontaneity 
and invariability in association resting on resemblance or 
contiguity renders'mental transition resting on either of these 
less easy than the spontaneous passage from 'cause* to 'effect*, 
the lack of ease in transitions of the former type considerabli^ 
dissipating the assurance or vivacity attaching to the initial 
impression or memory, whereas the ease of the transition from 
* cause* to 'effect* preserves it#
Having argued thus, Hume maintains that, so far from 
constituting an objection to his theory, the role of resemblance 
and contiguity in prompting and fortifying belief, serves to 
support it by confirming the basic contention that 'belief is 
nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression*. (155)
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He follows up this remark by producing yet further examples 
of the role of resemblance and contiguity in initiating and 
stimulating belief, in order to support this basic contention. 
(156). This procedure is rather surprising. Certainly, in 
the absence of any instance of belief which could not be 
described simply as a * lively idea related to a present 
impression* , every belief which could be so described would be 
additional evidence in favour of this basic contention of Hume's. 
But two or three additional examples cannot add much weight to it 
by sheer force of numbers, as he evidently supposes. Indeed, 
unless good ground is offered for holding there are no instances 
of belief which do not conform to his definition, citing examples 
which do^ cannot justify his regarding that definition's 
adequacy as even sufficiently probable to justify its adoption; 
and Hume offers no such ground. He does, indeed, maintain that 
only those ideas resembling impressions can be entertained with 
the vivacity of belief, offering one example in defence of this 
contention.(157) But even if this is true (which Hume can hardly 
be said to have shown) it does not prove his point; for it might 
well be true that every belief consisted in the entertainment of 
an idea resembling an impression, without its also being true 
that no belief consists in anything more than a firm (or otherwise 
strikingly experienced) idea related to an impression, let alone 
that all belief originates as Hume supposes. His view of 
resemblance as essential to belief is, indeed, very surprising; 
for either it is nothing but a reiteration of one of his earliest
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statements, or else it is false. For, as has been seen^ (158) 
the contention that there are no ideas which do not resemble 
impressions (or their elements) at least in their constituent 
parts i6 fundamental to his position. If, therefore, he is 
saying anything fresh in asserting resemblance essential to 
belief, he must be contending that every belief consists in the 
entertainment of an idea which, if complex, resembles a complex 
impression: and this is clearly untrue. If it were not, then
no one who had not seen paris could belief in its existence.
Hume's postulation of resemblance and * causation' as bases 
of association (and therefore, of belief) seems unjustifiable to 
Kemp Smith.
Writing of resemblance, the latter objects that while that
bringing an idea to mind often resembles it 'H u m e    does not
give any reason for holding that it is owing to this resemblance* 
that whatever thus brings an idea has 'this power of recall*, (15^) 
And, indeed, he urges, since impressions or ideas resembling the 
two terms of such an association may never have been experienced 
together in the past, the comparison revealing the resemblance 
may not occur before the association^ which is supposed to rest 
on it,(l6o) This objection is itself clearly open to criticism. 
For it assumes Hume to be unjustified in asserting resemblance 
to initiate association unless he can also show that the former 
entails, and is capable of being known to entail, the latter so 
the correlation of the one with the other may be seen to be 
'reasonable' in the classical sense. This assumption is clearly
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unjustified since it is the essence of Hume's position that 
association is not a 'rational* process in this sense, and 
cannot be rationally justified or explained; it would be 
inconsistent in him to say more on the subject than that there 
is reqson to suppose certain conditions, or one or another of 
them, to have occurred whenever association has taken place* 
Indeed, it has often been objected that Hume^ inconsistently, 
neglected to remain within these limits.
Aginst Hume's postulating 'causation' as a distinct basis 
of association, Kemp Smith argues (l6l) that if, as Hume says, 
contiguity is an associative relation then^since in his view a 
'cause* is always contiguous to its 'effect'^he need postulate 
nothing beyond this contiguity as a basis of our associating 
’cause* with 'effect*. This objection overlooks Hume's 
insistence that 'causation' is not simply one among the bases of 
similar associative processes^ but is instead the basis of one 
distinguished by its invariability and spontaneity, causal 
connection being unique among other associative relations in 
its constancy.
It might, perhaps, also be objected that, having intmDdxiced 
his account of mental association in order to h&lp explain 
'causal' inference, Hume promptly begs the question by postulating 
'causal' connection as an associative relation* This objection, 
however, is no more justified than are the former* For it 
seems clear that Hume intends to account for 'causal* inference 
by showing it to be an associative process similar in principle
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to others, its distinctive features betokening a difference only 
in the conditions under which those principles are exemplified.
The most that can be urged in Hume's criticism in this matter is 
that he is not sufficiently explicit to avoid the possibility of 
this misunderstanding.
Hume concludes his account of the origins of belief by 
remarking (162) that the mere repetition of an idea, as in 
education, may initiate belief in it; an idea constantly 
repeated coming to mind easily and with a certain force. But, 
he says, as beliefs so induced often contradict one another
and 'are frequently contrary to reason’ (163) (by which, 
presumably, he ne ans that they contradict beliefs resting on 
'causal connection* since, inconsistently, he ordinarily 
distinguishes these latter beliefs from others as 'reasonable* 
from 'unreasonable*), they are disregarded by philosophers.
To complete his treatment of 'belief*, Hume devotes a few pages 
(1 6 4) to its influence on behaviour, the passions, and the imagination. 
They may be summarised as follows. Impressions and ideas move 
to appropriate action insofar as they appear either pleasant or 
painful to us; and it is only impressions and those ideas having 
the force of reality (i.e. 'the ideas of those objects which 
which we believe either are or will b e existent') (I6 5) which do 
so. ibid similarly it is only impressions and forceful'ideas 
which stimulate passion. Here, however, there may be a 
reciprocal transfer of force; namely its passage first from the 
believed idea to the passion this stimulates, and thence back to
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that idea thus finally reinforcing the original belief. (Hume 
is here thinking of such phenomena as the fearful person's 
greater readiness than others to belieéfe in the presence or 
prospect of danger). And the same principle is exanplified in 
our attitude to the imaginary; we accept and enjoy a fiction 
only if its elements resemble realities in having some of the 
latter's force and conviction* Madness can also be described 
in terms of this conception of beliefip being an abnormal state 
in which the force of reality attaches to ideas haphazard whether 
or no there is any 'causal connection' between impressions 
corresponding to those ideas and known realities*
This section is relevant to Hume's account of 'causation' in 
two respects* 1* It is an attempt to reinforce it by trying to 
show the conception of belief underlying it to be consistent with 
phenomena additional to those already examined. 2* It introduces 
the notion of transfer from feeling to idea which, in a slightly 
different form, is fundamental to Hume's account of 'causation*.
Having completed his account of belief Hume turns to an 
examination of those inferences which do not provoke complete 
assurance, in order to show all matter of fact inference to 
exhibit the same basic principles as that from 'cause' to 'effect'.
It is his desire to examine 'probability inferencein this 
sense,which forces Hume to admit (l66) the inadequacy, on his 
analysis, of the traditional twofold distinction between 
knowledge and probability*
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'probability* as opposed to 'causal' inference in failing 
to carry complete conviction, Hume thinks of two main types 
which he describes respectively as 'that which is founded on 
chance, and that which arises from causes*j (I6 7) but he also 
discusses what he calls 'unphilosophical probability' (I6 8) —  
namely conditions affecting confidence in a. conclusion though 
philosophers regard their doing so unjustifiable.
Under the heading 'Of the probability of Chances* Hume , 
discusses (I6 9 ) such inference as estimating the likelihood 
of a dice falling with a given number uppermost. Under the 
title 'Of the probability of Causes' he examines (170) inference 
leading to some, though incomplete, confidence in the existence 
of a 'causal* connection betv^een phenomena. In distinguishing 
these two types of inference Hume showed mère insight than some 
of his successors.
Hume's theory of the * probability of chances* rests on the 
assumption of equiprobable chances. (Hume^ in effect^ denies the 
existence of chance in any sense but that in which it rests on 
a limitation of knowledge). (171). When, as we say, we are 
estimating the relative likelihood of chances, we have already 
found any one of a number of alternative events occurring under 
given circumstances. Because of this, the mind passes from 
the impression, memory, or idea of those circumstances, not to 
a single idea as in causal inference, but to the idea of each 
alternative in turn; any force attending the original idea or 
impression being thus divided between them. This is to say
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that we have no more confidence in the occurrence of any one 
of these alternatives rather than another. If, therefore, they 
all differ in type^each, as it were, cancels out the influence 
of the other. If however, two or more such alternatives are 
similar, our confidence in the occurrence of an event like them 
is relative to their nuiher. And thus it is that we have most 
confidence in, or regard as most probable, the occurrence of an 
event of the type exonplified in the greatest number of such 
alternatives. This is why, for instance, we think that with a 
dice four of whose six sides show six pips, two of them showing 
four, anyone would be more likely to throw six than four.
Hume distinguishes 'probabilities of causes' into three 
kinds which, he says, arise respectively from 'an imperfect 
experience*, 'contrary causes', and 'analogy'.
The first type occurs when phenomena of a given kind, have 
been found to be followed constantly by those of another;, but 
not many instances have been observed^and we lack the complete 
assurance in their future conjunction which we should have if we 
regarded their connection as * causal*. No adult experiences 
this type of inference. For, by the time we reach maturity we 
have become convinced of so many 'causal connections* that we 
suppose every phenomenon 'causally connected* with some others; 
and hence, in the absence of contrary evidence^any experienced 
constancy of types suffices to evoke in us that assurance in its 
invariability distinguishing a belief that a connection is 
'causal', (172).
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The probability arising from 'contrary causes* resembles 
'the probability of chances' insofar as it rests on our having 
observed different types of event occurring under apparently 
similar conditions, any force or assurance deriving from those 
conditions, or an idea or memory of them, being thus divided 
between these alternatives* This inference differs from that 
concerning 'the probability of chances', however; for in the 
latter our confidence in the occurrence of a given type of event 
derives from, and corresponds to, the number of the possible 
alternatives in which it is exemplified; whereas in the former 
such confidence increases with the repetition of events of a 
given type under the appropriate circumstances^(173) It might 
perhaps be argued that what Hume calls 'the probability of 
chances' of an event's occurrence either is, or equals, its 
frequency^ and that therefore he is mistaken in postulating 
probability resting on 'contrary causes' as a type of inference 
distinct from this. Neither the equality of 'probability of 
chances*and frequency, however, nor their identity, could justly 
be regarded as a ground for rejecting Hume's distinction in "this 
matter. For, as is generally recognised by both exponents and 
opponents of the frequency theory of probability, any frequency 
may occur in a finite series. And the basis of Hume's 
probability inference from 'contrary causes' is simply the 
frequency of a given type of event within a finite experience. 
Certainly it is true that Hume fails to give a rational account 
of probability inference in failing to e xplain why our division
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of confidence between possible alternatives is relative sometimes 
to the distribution of types among them and sometimes to the 
frequency of given types in our experience of them. Indeed^ not 
only does Hume fail to give a rational explanation of this, but 
his account excludes its possibility. This is sufficient to 
refute it^  if this difference must have a rational explanation.
But since, as has been said repeatedly, Hume's account of feoth 
'causal' and 'probable* inference in general rests on a denial of 
its rationality, he would have been inconsistent had he offered 
a rational explanation of that difference; while no one who 
rejected his account of probability because of the lack of such 
explanation could consistently accept any part of Hume's theory 
of inference. Nevertheless it may justly be objected that Hume 
fails to give an adequate account of probability inference in 
failing to remark that when we infer 'the probability of chances' 
we in fact assume ourselves to know conditions determining the 
likelihood of the events considered^whereas in inferring from 
'contrary causes' we make no sucjy assumption. For this is a 
subjective condition regularly correlated with the difference 
Hume recognises, whether or not that difference is dependent on 
it. It should perhaps be remarked in conclusion that, as in 
discussing 'the probability of chances'^ Hume insists that the 
lack of uniformity experienced is due to failure to observe some 
difference in the correlated conditions which is regularly 
correlated with the difference in their 'effects'.
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Hume's last type of inference from 'the probability of 
causes', consists in the passage of thought to an idea in which 
partial confidence is reposed, there being only partial 
resemblance between the instances whence the inference derives 
and that to which it is applied. Here confidence is relative 
to the extent of this resemblance* Hume is thinking of 
inference such as concluding lobster to be probably indigestible 
because it is a creature somewhat like a crab which latter has 
been found so.(174).
Hume discusses three basic types of 'unphilosophical 
probability': namely^the mind's passage to an idea accepted with
partial confidence relative to the temporal proximity of the 
impression or memory provoking this, passage to an idea accepted 
with partial confidence relative to the length of the reasoning 
with which it is reached, and passage to an idea accepted with 
donfidence resting on generalisation based on too limited an 
experience. (Hume actually enumerates four tÿpes since he 
distinguishes that correlated with the distance of a simple 
memory from that correlated with the memory of an experiment, 
but as both exemplify the same basic principle this distinction 
is superfluous).
Having discussed belief and probability inference, Hume at
last feels himself in a position to complete his account of
u
'causation'.. Before doing so, however, he briefly recapitlates 
(175) the conclusions he has already reached on the subject - 
a necessary precaution after his long digression. This may be
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summarised as follows. (1) The notion of necessary connection 
integral to the idea of 'causation' must derive from an 
impression. (2) Examination of single instances of 'causal* 
connection reveals only two common characteristics, namely the 
relations of contiguity and succession. (3) Repetition of 
instances of any given 'cause' or 'effect' reveals the relations 
of succession and contiguity between them to be constant;
(4) mere constancy through repeated instances can reveal nothing 
in any individual not discoverable from its examination alone*
Having recapitulated these previous findings, Hume continues 
from this point. Closer examination, he says, reveals that 
after frequent repetition of a conjunction (in the absence of 
evidence that one of its terms has ever existed without the other), 
a new impression arises, namely a feeling of being determined or 
necessitated to pass from one of the connected impressions, its 
memory or idea, to the idea of the other. Jt is from this new 
impression that the idea of necessary connection der^es^(176)
Hume offers to justify neither of these contentions. It is 
true that, subsequently, he defends them indirectly in endeavouring 
to counter objections; but though he criticises other views of 
'causation', he never directly defends his own account of the 
source of the idea of necessary connection. presumably he
supposed such defence unnecessary; regarding the origin of the
impression of being determined as discoverable by any looking 
for it properly;^ and supposing that impression's being the
source of the idea of necessary connection^ to be evident to
anyone comparing them*
However, although regarding his account of the origin of 
the idea of necessary connection as needing no direct justification 
other than the injunction 'look for yourself, Hume is not 
content with merely stating it* For he wishes both to emphasise 
its revolutionary nature, and to defend it against possible 
objections. Ho therefore first reminds the reader that he has 
been discussing 'one of the most sublime questions in philosophy 
viz: that concerning the power and efficacy of causes, (177)
and then proceeds to criticise opposing theories*
He begins this criticism by insisting (178) that the terms 
efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, and productive quality, 
are all synonymous, and hence the definition of one of them in terms 
of any other, or others, is tautologous* it willb e remembered 
that he has already said this of the two terms 'causation* and 
'production*•
Hume now turns to what he describes as 'the most general and 
most popular explication of the matter^,(179) According to this 
account we obtain the idea of causal power by experiencing new 
phenomena coming into existence and inferring that some power 
must produce them* To refute this, Hume appeals to two 
conclusions which he has previously defended, namely: (a) that
no idea can arise from reason alone; and (b) that reason alone 
can never make us suppose that every beginning of existence has 
a 'cause'* Unfortunately this argument, stated thus baldly,
can have little persuasive power in its present context. For
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clearly anyone who, understanding what he is saying, at this 
stage of Hume's enquiry still maintains the view this argument 
is countering, must have been left unconvinced by the earlier 
defence of its premises* Nevertheless, Hume's pointing out 
that these earlier arguments, if accepted, provide a refutation 
of the view in question, is certainly in the interest of clarity* 
Having re-erphasised that the idea of 'causal efficacy» 
must derive from an impression, Hume next briefly reconsiders the 
possibility of finding this impression among the qualities of 
'causes*. This time he approaches the question differently 
recalling first those theories attributing 'causal power* to 
forms, accidents, qualities or virtues* H© argues that since 
none of these latter are observable, the numberous appeals to 
them to explain 'causation* but attest the impossibility of 
discovering 'causal efficacy' among observable qualities* This 
then provides additional confirmation of his contention that 
the required impression is not to be found among the qualities 
of 'causes*, (l8o) (it has been seen that Aristotle calls 
observable qualities-such as roundness—'forms*, that Hume's 
account of thought is mistaken, and that the notion of 'causal 
entailment' may be derived indirectly from some qualities of 
objects in conjunction with the assumption of certain 
uniformities in nature* But Hume, of course, denies the 
possibility of the latter, while by 'forms' he evidently means 
characters presupposing the occult powers of the later
I y
Scholastics, or the Baconian forms whose causal efficacy is
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equally unobservable).
From the later Scholastics, Hume turns to the 
Occasionalists. These, holding both that we can fully 
comprehend the nature of matter and that this latter is 
essentially passive, ascribe all agency to God. For Hume, 
however, this is no solution. For, as he holds every idea, 
at least in its elements, to have some counterpart among 
impressions, he thinks there can be nothing in any idea of 
God to which something in an impression does not correspond. 
Hence, he contends, the idea of God as agent itself presupposes 
the existence of an impression of agency,(181).
In yet further support of his view, Hume appeals to this 
theory of abstract ideas. He argues that since he has shown 
every abstract idea to be simply an individual one 'taken in 
a certain l i g h t (182) we can form no abstract idea of vhich 
a particular instance cannot be conceived^ (i.e. on his view, 
imaged)^and we can conceive no particular instance of causal 
power. And, indeed, it should perhaps be remarked that even 
though Hume's account of abstract ideqs be rejected, no one 
could be truly said to possess a general idea whose particular 
exemplification he was completely unable to conceive in the 
broadest sense of of 'understand'.
After framing these arguments Hume feels in a much 
stronger position in affirming the required impression to be 
the feeling of being determined to pass in thought from A to B 
arising after repeated experience of their constant succession.
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He is painfully aware that nothing will seem more 
paradoxical to his readers than his contending necessity or 
'causal efficacy* to be found only in the mind. He therefore 
seeks to overcome this natural prejudice.
First he points out that our inclination to ascribe 
necessity or agency to the 'causes' themselves is by no means 
inconsistent with his &heory. On his view this tendency 
merely exemplifies a common psychological phenomenon, namely 
the association of an impression and that with which it is 
normally found to coexist. Thus he is in effect aligning 
the ordinary ascription of agency to 'causes', with our 
habitual ascription of scents to objects which they constantly 
accompany in experience. (18.3)
And, in further vindication of his paradox, Hume contends 
those who regard his view as absurd to be in no better position 
than a blind man holding it ridiculous to deny any difference 
between scarlet and the sound of a trumpet. For, he argues, 
since we have no idea of agency as exhibited in 'causes', we are 
in no position to postulate it, let alone affirm the impossibility 
of denying it. He admits that there might be unknown 
qualities of 'causes', one of which might be called (power* or 
'efficacy*; but points out that our supposing this to be so 
cannot alter the position. He contends, however, that we 
simply involve ourselves in confusion when, as usually happens, 
we ascribe the idea of a subjective experience to external 
objects. (1 8 4)
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He concludes by pointing out (l85) ttet the process of 
» causal inference’ which he has described may itself be 
referred to in terms of 'cause* and 'effect*, the original 
impression being called * cause' of the associated idea which 
it brings to mind® His noting this amounts to a positive 
denial of the inconsistency which later writers have seen in 
his giving what is^in effectua 'causal' account of the idea of 
'causation'. And, indeed, there seems no reason to regard 
him as inconsistent in this. For he is saying simply: (A) 
when we postulate a 'causal connection' we are never justified 
in affirming more than that two phenomena form a sequence 
consistently v/ith a rule exemplified throughout past experience; 
and (b) our attributing necessary connection to such phenomena 
is itself the latter term of such a sequence. Clearly there 
is no contradiction here. On the other hand it must be 
admitted that Hume does not always seem to be aware that he 
ought to be saying this and no more. Possibly however, his 
using the language of the activity view has led his readers to 
do him less than justice on this score.
Hume completes his discussion by first (186) framing two 
definitions of 'cause' consistent with its findings, and ^he# 
(1 8 7) enumerating four corollaries of these.
A 'cause' he says may be defined either as 'an object 
precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects 
resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of 
precedence to those objects, that resemble the latter'; or as
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*an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united 
with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form 
the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form 
a more lively idea of the other*. The charge of circularity 
may be brought against the second of these definitions; for 
this latter is at least verbally tautologous given the 
ordinary usage of the term 'determine*. But this is but 
another expression of the source of objection just discussed, 
so that it is hardly necessary to repeat that here Hume may well 
be blameworthy for no more than an unfortunate mode of saying 
something in itself unobjectionable.
The first of Hume's four corollaries is that his view 
excludes any basis for a distinction b etween 'efficient* and 
other 'causes'jsince our only evidence of 'efficiency* is 
constant conjunction in the absence of which we have no ground 
for asserting 'causal’connection,(188) Here Hume is indubit­
ably guilty of circularity since it is clear, from the outset, 
that it is 'efficient causality' alone which he is discussing.
His second corollary is the denial of a distinction between 
physical and moral necessity since his account allows for only 
one type of necessity in which there can be no degrees. And, 
he adds, it also excludes the distinction between power and 
its exercise.(18 9)«
Thirdly, he maintains his denial of any rational basis of 
the supposition that whatever has a beginning has a 'cause», 
to be an evident corollary of either of his definitions^(190)
447.
Finally, he notes that his view excludes the possibility 
of our believing in the existence of anything of which we can 
form no idea. For, he points out, all our beliefs in 
existence rise from 'causal inference' in which we entertain an 
idea of that whose existence is inferred. (191) Clearly 
unless, using^idea* in his accustomed way as synonymous with image, 
Hume allows the existence or a type of comprehension v/hich does 
not use images, his fourth corollary is self-evident. Thus, 
unless he is abandoning a principle basic to his whole discussion, 
Hume's deducing this, as the corollary of anything else, is 
superfluous.
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iv. Comparison of the Arguments in the Treatise 
and Enquiries.
Until Kemp Smith's condemnation of the habit (192) it was 
customary to dispa.rage Hume's Enquiries, Indeed some 
philosophers still do so. Thus Russell, in his History of 
Western philosophy (published five years after Kemp Si^ ith' s major 
study of Hume) , writes that in the Enquiry into Human Understanding 
Hume left out 'the best parts' of the Treatise 'and most of the 
reasons for his conclusions', (193) Kemp Smith's more favourable 
view is, I think, the juster, particularly with regard to the 
discussion of 'causation'.
Certainly Hume omits the discussion of the belief in 'universal 
causation' regarded by many as one of the most important sections 
of the Treatise, which is, indeed inevitably of great interest.
It has been seen,(194) however^ that even in the Treatise this 
discussion is meant to be subsidiary to the main consideration of 
'causation*. Indeed, it has further been seen that it was not 
only inessential to Hume's purpose there,but would most conveniently 
and appropriately have been discussed after that purpose had been 
fulfilled, (195) Its omission from the main discussion of 
'causation* in the Enquiry, therefore, so far from constituting 
a retreat from the position maintained in the Treatise^witnesses 
to the Enquiry's greater consistency with, and préciser estima te 
of, that position,
V/hile admitting this, it might still be urged, however, that 
belief in 'universal causation* (on any interpretation) is so
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evidently important that failure to discuss the possibility of
its justification altogether is inexcusable, particulai^ in one
who has already recognised its significance. This, I think,
would be mistaken. For from Hume's own point of view the
possibility of the maxim's justification is both practically
unimportant^ and theoretically irrelevant. It is practically
unimportant to him because he supposes that every one believes
the maxim^ and therefore behaviour resting on its assumption will
ja s  Hfi'aAfc.
occur whether or not this is ,4Uotiable, And it is, to him, 
irrelevant since he regards belief in the m  xim as an automatic 
non-rational factor like feeling hungry. It is possible to seek 
and discover circumstances given which the sensation of hunger 
normally occurs; it is equally reasonable to ask whether that 
sensation's occurrence urd er these conditions is of practical 
value; but it would be clearly ridiculous to ask whether my 
feeling hungry at any given time was rationally justifiable; and, 
on the view made explicit in the Treatise (and implicit in the 
Enquiry)^ so it is with belief in ' universal causation*.
Nor was Hume's discussion of this belief demanded by its place 
in contemporary controversy^ save insofar as (on Hume's inter­
pretation of the maxim in terms of universal laws) it conflicts 
with the doctrine of free-will. And this aspect of the matter he 
does discuss in the Enquiry^ at some length*(I9 6).
There is one important difference between the discussions of 
'causation* occurring in the Treatise and Enquiry, It has been 
seen that although the Treatise offers an account of 'causation*
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most conveniently described in tersm of relations between events, 
Hume there habitually refers to 'causes* and 'effects* as 'objects' 
or impressions, ordinarily applidng the terms where the title 
'physical object* would generally be thought applicable, none of 
the examples of 'causes' or 'effects* he offers being events.
By the time he wrote the Enquiries, however, Hume had evidently 
begun to realise the implications of his teaching in this respect^ 
since although he sometimes still speaks of objects as 'causes' 
and 'effedts' and even refers to a 'cause' as an 'object' in his 
formal definitions of the term, yet both in his opening discussion 
of 'causation'^ (197) and his final examination of 'necessary 
connection'^ (I98) he refers explicitly and quite naturally to 
events as 'causes* and 'effects'. Moreover^ some of the examples 
of 'causes' and 'effects' offers in the Enquiry (eeg. volitions 
and bodily movements) are unambiguously events.
There are no other important differences between the discussions 
of 'causation' in the Treatise and Enquiry; indeed most of the 
differences between them may be summarised as the greater compact­
ness^ and orderliness of that in the latter.
It may, perhaps^ be well to summarise the minor differences 
between them.
(a) In the Enquiry Hume does not introduce the denial that
'causal' connection may be known with certainty until he is
« '
prepared to defend it.(199).
(b)The defence of this denial in the Enquiry is far fuller 
than that in the Treatise. While not differing from the latter
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in principle, it shows more awareness that the denial is likely 
to be questioned, and is better calculated to prompt Hume's un­
thinking opponent to examine his own position more carefully.
One of the most useful parts of this defence, I think, is Hume's 
pointing out (2o q ) that physical 'effects' may be deduced 
mathematically^ only when the existence of certain uniformities 
is already assumed. Some modem readers may think this too 
obvious to be reasonably doubted; but the utility of Hume's 
emphasising it^  is apparent when one remembers that the possibility 
of verifying such deduction had not only made 'the entailment view 
of causation' acceptable to many philosophers and scientists^but 
had actually led many to overlook precisely that obvious truth 
which he is pointing out* Even today it has been maintained 
that physics can attain the status of a geometry from whose axioms 
alone knowledge concerning the physical universe may be deduced. 
(2ol) Indeed Mace's contribution to the Aristotelian Society; 
symposium on mechanical and teleological causation (202) reveals 
that even a distinguished philosopher^ familiar wit]^  modem 
critical discussions of * causation', can mistake the evident 
necessity of certain 'causal' connection given the assumption of 
specific uniformities, for the evident necessity of those 
connections without qualification. Since the mistake can be made 
so easily today, there can be little doubt of the need for Hume's 
warning against it two centuries ago, before the subject had been 
given the critical scrutiny it has since received.
(c) There are twe serious oiim is ions 6n the account of 'causation'
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given in the Enquiry. (i) No reference is made in the body of 
the discussion to the priority of 'cause' to 'effect', although 
the final definition of 'cause* offered is in terms of this 
succession. The omission of the fallacious argument in favour 
of this contention, however, is an evident improvement.
(ii) there is no mention of the view,maintained in the Treatise, 
that 'cause' and 'effect' are contiguous. This is more serious 
as the omission is not rectified in the final definition so that 
Hume's maturer views on the subject are left uncertain.
(d) In discussing 'causal' inference Hume is again more 
aware of the need of convincing his readers in the Enquiry. He 
adds two arguments to those offered in the Treatise, (i) If 
'causal' inference rested on reason it could derive from one 
instance of 'causal' connection alone, whereas it only arises 
after the conjunction has been repeated.(2o5) (This ignores 
the conviction which may arise from a single crucial experiment), 
(ii) (a much more effective argument) as infants and animals 
are capable of 'causal' inference this could rest only on the 
simplest reasoning which would be readily discoverable, whereas 
in fact no such reasoning is easily discoverable,(204) (A form 
of this argument, referring to animals alone, appears in the 
Treatise after the main discussion of 'causation' (205).
(e) The positive account of 'causal' inference which follows is 
much briefer than its counterpart in the Treatise. Its order 
differs for the worse from that of the latter, since the Enquiry 
does not mention until the end that 'causal* inference originates
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from a present impression or memory, and then it comes as an 
aft enatbought. (2q6)
(f) The greater clarity of the Enquiry’s account of the 
stimulative roles of resemblance and contiguity, in r elation to 
that of 'causality*, excludes the suggestion that all equally 
stimulate belief, and thus avoids the need of answering this 
objection. The additional account of the stimulative effects
of resemblance qnd contiguity, and consideration of the influence 
of belief, are also completely omitted, the remainder of the 
discussion of belief being much shortened.
(g) Discussion of causal inference in the Enquiry concludes 
with arguments of a type not found in the Treatise - arguments 
appealing to the notions of 'final causation' and 'the ordinary 
wisdom of nature', (2o7) These are regarded by its critics as 
evidence of the essential dishonesty of the Enquiry; but this,
I think, is unjustified. The Enquiry leaves no ground for 
doubting the inacceptability of these arguments to Hume himself. 
It seems wholly unreasonable to expect a philosopher, all of 
whose views were scandalous to his contemporaries, to refrain 
from defending any of them on grounds acceptable to those con­
temporaries but not to himself.
(h) The Enquiry's treatment of the 'Probability of chances' 
differs from that in the Treatise, only in its greater brevity.
In discussing the 'probability of causes', (2o8) howeverp Hume 
confines himself to inferences described in the Treatise as 
rising from contrary causes - a readily justifiable restriction.
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Dis eussion of 'unphilosophical probability' is omitted 
completely - also with justice,since this is not normally 
described as probability inference at all.
(i) In the Enquiry Hume is able to avoid recapitulating 
earlier conclusions concerning necessary connection, because 
omits all mention of it until prepared for its final discussion.
His earlier discussions have merely denied the possibility of 
reason either telling us two existants are 'causally' connected, 
or justifying our inferring from the observed to the unobserved, 
without indicating anything beyond a rule of constant conjunction 
to be involved in 'causal' connection.
(j) Again Hume shows himself more aware of the need to 
convince his readers, systematically examining the various 
suggested sources of the idea of necessary connections (i.e. 
physical 'causes' and 'effects', and the Experiences of voluntary 
movement and thought control), arguing forcefully that in each 
instance we lack the insight requisite for knowing a necessary 
connection to obtain. Thus, for instance, he points out that 
we can leam the immediate 'effects' of a volition to move a limb, 
only from a study of anatomy, (2o9) and can leam only from 
experience the extent of voluntary control. (21o). These arguments 
had been used by Occasionalists, (211) who yet maintained it 
rationally justifiable to assert 'causal' connection between 
divine volition and physical 'effects'. So, as in the Treatise, 
Hume turns next to criticising their position, repeating the 
argument used in the Treatise and adding (evidently from purely
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polemical motives)^ »pwo others.(212).
(k) The Enquiry omits all direct discussion of what the 
Treatise describes as 'the most general and popular explication' 
of the origin of the idea of necessary connection - namely that 
having experienced change we conclude that there must somewhere 
be a power capable of producing it. But since the opening 
remarks of this section of the Enquiry (213) in effect exclude 
the legitimacy of this account, its separate discussion would 
have been superfluous.
(1) Hume now feels in a position to offer his ovm account of 
the origin of the idea of necessary connection, v/hich, in 
contradistinction to his policy in the Treatise, he introduces 
at this point for the first time. He defends his conclusion 
by stating it to be irresistible once the opposing hypotheses 
have been refuted, adding that it is even free from the attacks 
of sceptical doubt since it asserts merely a limitation of the 
scope of reasoning and the irrationality of most of our actions 
and conclusions. (214)
(m) As in the treatise, Hume concludes his exposition of his 
position by offering two definitions of 'cause' consistent with 
it.(215) As has been remarked, (216) they differ from those 
in the Treatise by omitting any reference to contiguity. Further 
the definition referring to the psychological factors involved 
omits the objectionable 'determining'. certainly it uses the 
term 'convey' in a context in which it could be taken to denote 
'causality*,' but, as with the term 'determine' in the earlier
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definition, such interpretation is unnecessary.
(n) The Enquiry's discussion of 'necessary connection ends 
with q brief recapitulation, (217) the superfluous corollaries 
of the Treatise being omitted.
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v> General Criticism of Hume's Treatment of Çausality.
I am not offering here a complete assessment of Hume's view 
of 'causation'^ since T am deferring discussion of the relative 
claims of the 'entailment' and 'regularity' views until I 
consider contemporary discussions. Here T shall confine myself 
to asking whether Hume's account of 'causation can be regarded 
as adequate if his rejection of the entailment view is accepted.
It is clear that the answer to this is 'no*, for the simple 
reason that Hume completely ignores the complexity of the 'causal 
laws' postulated by both science and commonsense. It has been 
seen (218) that vben the scientist or the plain man affirms a 
'causal lav;* , he has no intention of asserting unconditional 
constant conjunction between types of actual experience. i^hen, 
for instance, he asserts a 'causal connection* between taking 
arsenic and dying,he does not mean to affirm that whoever sees 
a person taking arsenic (without seeing him shortly take an emetic) 
will see him die. And, indeed, it will be generally agreed that 
this conjunction very rarely occurs in one person's experience. 
Moreover, both scientist and plain man suppose that some of the 
'causal connections» they assert occur whether either of the 
connected terms is observed or not. They suppose, for instance, 
that in affirming constant correlation between air-pressure 
and the position of mercury in a barometer, they are postulating 
a conjunction which occurs whether or not anyone is observing 
barometers^or meaning airpressure in their vicinty in any other 
way. Nor, indeed are there any two types of experience of 
which a constant conjunction can be asserted unconditionally.
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For, as has been pointed out by more than one of Hume's critics 
(219) it is alvays possible that anyone may fall asleep, faint, 
or die^before an experience's customary successor has had time 
to occur*and no universal unconditional correlation is discover­
able between actual e xperiences attributable to different 
persons*
Clearly then, if any law exemplified in experience asserts 
a constant and unconditional conjunction between impressions 
regarded as sense data^unsensed sense data must exist* 'Causal 
laws' , however, are so interpreted neither by the plain man nor 
by most scientists and philosophers. There is^therefore^ no need 
to treat them thus unless one is committed to doing so by one's 
own premises or conclusions.
From the foregoing paragraphs it is evident that no simple 
account of 'causal laws' is possible^whether one regard them as 
asserting conjunctions between objective events independent of 
experience or solely as statements about possible experiences.
If one adopts the first of these interpretations one must defend 
one's postulation of objective events^ showing that in doing so 
one is asserting something other than possibilities of experience'^ 
and what this means. And if one adopts the phenomenalist 
position, one is ccmamitted to regarding 'causal laws' as extremdy 
complex,and must therefore give an account of their intricacy.
Hume, however, completely overlooked these problems. And 
this is the more serious since he offers what is,in effect, a 
phenoraenalist account of experience, and is thus committed to
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the postulation of highly complex 'causal laws*.
His critics have, indeed, usually assumed that Hume has 
made the serious mistake of postulating unconditional constant 
conjunction between actual experiences.
This is suggested by his speaking of impressions as 
'causes' and 'effects', and more especially by his account of 
'causal inference* which asserts the belief ifl 'causal 
connection' to rise from the experienced constant conjunction 
of impressions. There is, % think, no need to suppose Hume 
guilty of this obvious mistake. For he ordinarily treats 
the terms 'impression* and 'object* as synonymous^ while using 
object'where the term 'physical object' would ordinarily be 
thought applicable. It therefore seems quite probable that, in ' 
speaking of impressions as 'causes', he was intending to refer 
to the complex hypothetical assertions affirmed in the 
postulation of physical object; while in speaking of experienced 
constant conjunction of impressions he probably meant,by the 
latter, experiences of 'material objects' insofar as these must 
be understood in terras of the truth of such hypotheses. Further, 
as has been seen, though he more often than not refers to 
'causes' as objects, not only is his account of 'causation* 
most readily applicable to relations between events, but in the 
Enquiry he sometimes writes as though he is fully aware of this. 
It seems therefore that when Hÿme writes of objects as 'causes' 
or 'effects', he is referring to objects considered at the time
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at which events are actually occurring in their histories; 
which is to say that whenever he postulates a 'cause* or 
(effect* he intends to affirm the truth 6f the complex 
assertion concerning phenomena,which is implied whenever 
we assert the occurrence of one objective event correlated 
with another consistently with an universal rule*
So to defend Hume against the charge of the blatant error 
is, of course, in no way to justify his imprecision. That 
he should have made the charge possible is a serious enough 
criticism.
While the seriousness of this defect cannot be over­
emphasised however, Hume cannot be denied credit for seeing 
the need to analyse experience and our assumptions about it
uoo^ssors or contemporaries. 
If the analyses and solutions he offered are open to criticism, 
this is due, in some measure at least, to the fact that^having 
asked more questions than had occurred to any of his contem­
poraries or most of his predecessors, (2$^) he was forced to 
break entirely new ground in discussing them.
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CHAPTER VII 
KANT'S TREATMENT OP CAUSATION.
(i) general introductory Remarks.
Since it contains both the most original,and the most 
fundamental^part of his teaching concerning * causation*, constituting 
moreoever his considered answer to Hume, I shall devote moot --of the 
space I am giving to the discussion of Kant, to the Kritik of Pure 
Reason. The interpretation, dating, and assessment, of this work 
all involve problems difficult of solution,and have,in consequence, 
provoked much disagreement among subsequent philosophers. Since 
adequate discussion of anyone of these factors^therefore,demands 
far more space than is here at qy disposal, the ensuing pages can 
scarcely fail to sound dogmatic.
Many have held the first edition of the first Kritik to be an 
agglomeration of manuscripts written at widely separated times, and 
representing different positions. Notable among the exponents of 
this viewr are Adi ekes, yaihinger, and Kemp Smith. There is however 
far from unanimity among these^ as to the actual order of composition, 
This is not surprising as there is very little external evidence on 
this point. Nor can it be assumed that the prolegomena and 
additions and calterations occurring in the second edition always 
represent a view approximating to that found in the latest sections 
of the first edition. Por it is clearly possible to change or 
modify one's views after reflection, and then, on further considera­
tion, to revert to one's earlier opinion. Indeed yaihinger and, 
following his example, Kemp Smith (1) maintain the second edition 
to contain a retraction of the latest addition to the first*
468.
It is indeed probable (as is admitted even by paton (2) 
a critic of the patchwork theory) that the first edition contains 
many passages differing in date from their neighbours. That the 
second edition does so is indubitable. Moreover, the recognition 
of the need for revising and modifying earlier statements, and the 
willingness to carry out such revi.sion^w hich is evidenced by the 
alterations found in the second edition and the ’Prolegomena, 
together with the time which Kant devoted to writing the first 
edition, render it more than likely that the finished product 
contained many emendations added throughout the period of 
composition. Moreover, it is to be expected that the Transcendental 
Deduction (in which Kant's patchwork ne thod is held to be most 
evident) (3) should have been the subject of the most constant 
revision. For this section of the Kritik contains the most 
original and startling,as well as what was, in Kant's eyes, the 
most important, part of his doctrine. Nevertheless, paton seems 
justified in protesting (4) against the assumption that the first 
edition is an arbitrary patchwork in which contradictory statements 
have been flung side by side. For it hardly makes sense to 
suppose Kant to have been content with this, after devoting so much 
time to achieving its final form. It seems quite preposterous to 
think he did not re-read the immediate context into vbich he was 
inserting an emendation as has been suggested by some interpretations, 
(5)* On the other hand, since it is unreasonable to suppose he re­
read the entire work every time he made an emendation, the habit of
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constant revision would explain the appearance of inconsistencies 
between more or less widely separated passages.
Again v/ith paton, (6) I think the discrepancies within the
first edition far less blatant and fundamental than has often been 
supposed. (7)* The text seems to reveal not so much a hedge 
podge of contradictions as a struggle (attended with varying 
success) towards a characteristic and basically unitary theory.
T think, therefore, that it is significant to speak in general 
terms of Kant's position or point of view. And this contention
wall, I hope be further justified by the ensuing pages.
470,
(il) Some Basic Elements in Kant*s Answer to Hunie.
Kant had no doubt that he was saving rationalism from the 
imx>asse revealed by Hume, in the only way possible; namely by 
a fundamentally revolutionary approach to the problem of knowledge* 
Clearly one must understand the basic principles of this approach 
in order to offer an adequate criticism^or account^of his arguments* 
And the recognition of that in which he agrees with his contempor­
aries and predecessors is as essential to this understanding as the 
realisation of that in which they differ* Indeed greater care and 
explicitness seems required in discussing the likenesses than in 
examining the differences, since it is easy to suppose Kant's 
revolution more far reaching that it is*
To Kant, Hume's failure to discover intrinsic connection 
between events is the beginning, not the end, of an adequate account 
of our knowledge of them; since for him it me ans^not the impossibility 
of any certain knowledge concerning their connection, but merely that 
the possibility of that knowledge is to be found by some method other 
than analysing the character of events or their mutual relations*
For^to him,the importance of Hume's denial that we can justly regard 
a sentence as both analytic and as asserting connection between 
events, lies in its forcing us to recognise that a sentence which is 
not analytic may yet assert something necessarily true*
The importance K&nt attaches to the distinction between 
necessary analytic, and necessary synthetic,propositions or judgments 
in itself presupposes one piece of common ground between Kant and 
the traditional rationalist; namely the conviction that there is a
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non-verbalentailment. (3) For although, as has been seen, (9) 
verbal connections, insofar as they rest on arbitrary conventions, 
rest on synthesis, yet if necessity is properly attributable only 
to the outcome of verbal implication, all necessity rests on 
definition* On the other hand, if there can be a 'must* 
independently of linguistic rules, there seems no contradiction in 
supposing this need not be so* For example, granted the 
possibility of non-verbal entailment, there is no contradiction in 
postulating tv/o simultaneous sequences aB and CD, A being such as 
to entail the simultaneous existence of C and the subsequent 
existence of B,while B is such as to entail the simultaneous 
existence of D/, there being no intrinsic connectionb etween C and D; 
but this is to postulate, in CD,a sequence necessary in the sense 
that it cannot but occur although this is entailed neither by the 
character (and hence the definition) of that sequence as a whole, 
nor by that of any of its members taken singly.
That Kant supposed necessary synthetic propositions might 
assert non-verbal entailment is plain from his claim to achieve 
by their means certainty concerning principles governing the 
behaviour of ships, houses, etc., and not merely conclusions about 
our manner of talking of them.
Kant ordinarily confines the terms ^ analytic’ and 'synthetic' 
necessity to judgments. To avoid confusion^1 shall follow his 
example in this, applying the terms * intrinsic' and 'extrinsic* 
to the necessities or entailments he supposes asserted by 'analytic' 
and 'synthetic* judgements respectively.
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The notion of necessity extrinsic to that to which it is 
asoribable has been seen (lo) to be no innovation on Kant's part, 
being indeed recognised both by plain men and earlier philosophers. 
And the supposition that it can save inductive inference,by 
avoiding the latter's appeal to intrinsic necessity, has been seen 
to be in vain. (11)
Kant,indeed, does not think analytic logic irrelevant to the 
demonstration of synthetic necessity, but he supposes it capable 
of serving the merely subsidiary function of clarifying the 
concepts used. (12) He further insists that the recognition of 
synthetic necessity is revolutionary in its effect: thus, for
instance, after having defined the role of analysis in metaphysical 
enquiry as purely subsidiary, he affirms the intention of applying 
»a method entirely different from any hitherto employed*. (15)
This at least suggests that in extrinsic necessity he recognises 
a 'must' completely different from that demonstrated by means of 
analytic logic.
Since Kant has so evident a regard for traditional logic, 
this probably was not his intention. vVhether it were or not, 
however, the suggestion remains and is, I think, disastrously 
misleading^both in itself^and in relation to the interpretation 
of Kant. For, it seems to obscure the essential difference 
between the two types of necessity discussed by Kant, no less 
than their likeness. in practice, Kant treats analysis as an 
integral factor in the demonstration of extrinsic necessity; the 
difference between the demonstration of intrinsic necessity, as
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he describes it^  and that of extrinsic necessity as he practises 
(or attempts to practise) it, lying not in analysis being 
essential to the one and incidental to the other^but in the 
subject of the analysis whicli^integral to e ach process. Kant 
is explicit in affirming intrinsic necessity to be demonstrated 
by analysis of the character of that of which it is proved. And, 
whatever he may^ or may not, say about extrinsic necessity, the 
Kritik of pure Reason has been seen (14) to be,in effect, devoted 
to the demonstration of extrinsic necessities by analysis of 
something other than that of which it claims to prove them; 
since it seeks to demonstrate extrinsic necessities in the objects 
of knowledge by analysing the character of experience in general, 
and those of specific types of experience. Thus Kant's practice 
(like that of the plain man and earlier philosophers when employing 
the notion of extrinsic necessity, either explicitly or implicitl^) 
presupposes that just as non-verbal intrinsic necessity is 
entailed by the character of that of which it can truly be 
asserted, so extrinsic necessity is entailed by the character of 
something other than this.
The fact that extrinsic necessity, ivhen postulated, is, and 
must be, assumed to be entailed thus indirectly, reveals Kant's 
justification for calling its assertion a synthetic judgment and 
regarding synthesis^essential to extrinsic necessity, its 
comprehension, and demonstration. per clearly, to say that A 
has no intrinsic connection with B, is to say that the character 
of A could not be supposed to entail anything concerning B save
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in virtue of some relation between them. And in order to 
understand or demonstrate such entailment it would be necessary to 
be aware of that relation, v/hich would be to synthesise distinct 
notions or ideas; as well as to analyse both the relation and 
at least one of its terras. Synthesis and analysis are thus 
inextricably intemvoven in the comprehension a nd demonstration of 
extrinsic necessity (if there be any such to be comprehended and 
demonstrated), intrinsic entailment and synthesis being equally 
inseparable in the exemplification of extrinsic necessity if this 
ever occurs*
There is one important feature of Kant's account of extrinsic 
necessities, in which it differs from the analyses typical of 
Leibnizean rationalism* He claims to base his conclusions^not 
on the intrinsic character which any experience must have, but on 
that of human experience as he has found it. Indeed he admits 
the possibility of other types of experience which would not fulfil 
all the conditions of human experience* (15) That is to say^  the 
subject of the analysis on which his conclusions rest is not a 
purely abstract concept^but the nature of something actually given.
This I think is what originally prompted his description of 
Leibnizean rationalism as 'dogmatic' in a derogatory sense, 
although in fact he sotie tine s uses 'dogmatic* simply as synonjmious 
with analytic' (as, for instance, when he asserts the impossibility 
of proving dogmatically the truth of the proposition that there is 
a permanent in all appearances, on the ground that it is synthetic).(l6)
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The role of intrinsic necessity, and that of synthesis, as 
condition of extrinsic necessity, has each an important 
consequence.
In the first place, since non-verbal intrinsic necessity 
is an essential condition of extrinsic necessity, clearly the 
notion of the latter cannot serve to d efend the postulation of 
non-verbal necessity from any valid objection in principle against 
that of the former. On the other hand, if defensible in principle, 
the nôfbion of extrinsic necessity has the advantage claimed for 
it by Kant, namely of being capable of rendering necessity 
demonstrable where, (either on a ccount'of its absence or of our 
inability to prove its presence) we are unable to demonstrate 
intrinsic necessity*
Secondly, owing to the dependence of extrinsic necessity on 
synthesis, the notion of such necessity, if acceptable, gives 
importance to the relational judgment in providing it with an 
indispensable function in its own right. Surprisingly, this does 
not seem to have been fully realised by Kant^ since he continues to 
regard as sacrosanct the traditional logic to which the proposition 
or judgment is ali^ nays, properly speaking, attributive.
The argunent of the Transcendental Aesthetic and Analytic, 
in which Kant seeks to demonstrate extrinsic necessities in the 
objects of knowledge, may be briefly summarised as follows*
It is impossible to know anything about things as they are in 
themselves independently of experience^since clearly we can know
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something only as it is presented to our experience^(17) This, 
however, so far from limiting our knowledge, renders certainty 
possible where it would not otherwise be so* For example, Hume 
has shown the impossibility of obtaining by analysis of either the 
events, their relation, or bothf^ knowledge which is necessarily 
true concerning the occurrence of events; since, however, we can 
know nothing save as it appears in our experience, the analysis of 
that experience can reveal conditions to which any event, insofar 
as it is an object of knowledge for us, must conform,(18) There 
are two main types of conditions to which all objects of our 
experience must conform, namely sensible and logical. There are 
two sensible conditions^space and time. All the objects of our 
experience must stand in temporal relations one to another; and 
though all objects of our experiences are not spatial^it is clearly 
integral to our experience as such that some should be, (1 9)
These sensible conditions are not necessary prerequisites of any 
experience, it is possible that there might be other sensible 
conditions to which other t\fpes of experience might conform* (2o)
To the logical conditions^on the other hand, any object of non- 
intuitive understanding must conform,(21) These latter are ways in 
which we cannot but think of anything if it is to be an object of 
knowledge for us at all* They are twelve, corresponding to the 
twelve types of judgment differentiated by the traditional logic* 
Kant is thus seen both to regard the traditional twelvefold class­
ification of judgments adequate, and to think each of the t^ rpes it * 
specifies an expression of one of the ways in which we must' think 
of objects of knowledge*
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Kant reveals his respect for the traditional logic yet further by 
referring to these logical conditions as categories. Since these 
latter are conditions of thinking of an object of any sensible 
experience, their application to our own particular type of 
experience must be further specified. Indeed we can fully understand 
a logical condition of experience only by seeing how it determines a 
given type of experience,(22) As all the objects of our experience 
are temporally related, to say that we must think of any object of 
our experience in terms of the categories is to say we must think of 
it in terms of the categories as these condition the temporah^xi)
categories so regarded Kant describes as schematised. Of these 
the three most relevant both to this thesis,and to Kant's answer to 
Hume are substance, causality, and reciprocity; Kant’s postulating 
their validity constitutéSi^ the assertion that v/e must think of every 
object of experience as having a permanent substratum, as being an 
element in a system in which every event is preceded by another on 
which it follows necessarily, and as being coexistent with other 
objects between which and itself there is interdependence. (24)
In the latter part of the Kritik,Kant also states that we use 
terms which, as we define and use them, are applicable to no possible 
object of our experience, our use of them amounting to the assertion 
of principles which regulate our pursuit of knov/ledge. In effect, they 
prevent our regarding any empirical findings as giving a complete or 
unconditioned picture. Kant himself, of course, does not simply 
write of our using words in this v.ray, he says we have ideas 
constituting such regulative principle s. (îi^fo discuss what he ne ant
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by 'idea* in this context, and whether he was justified in 
using the term so, would however, involve a longer discussion 
than is warranted here.
It has been held (e.g. by yemp Smith) (26) that the Fritik 
reveals two conflicting views : (a) a subjectivism regarding all 
phenomena as merely the content of individual experiences; and 
(b) a phenomenalism which postulates objective existants which 
are both distinct from things in themselves and independent of 
individual eDependences*
This theory does not recommend itself directly* It seems 
prima facie improbable that a philosopher of Kant's ability should 
be unaware of a glaring inconsistency in his writings. certaihly 
he is vigo:i*ous in stating apparent contradictions, as in the 
Ahtinomies, but he does so only in order to reveal the inadequacy 
of the positions involving them, in this and in his general 
attitude shelving himself enough of a rationalist not to wish to 
publish blatant inconsistency*
At the same time Kemp Smith* s view is by no i® ans unfounded* 
There are numerous passages in v/hich Kant asserts our knowledge 
to be limited to what is given in individual experiences, things 
as they are independently of our experiencing them being unknowable, 
(27) which seems a clear enough statement of subjectivism* And, 
on the other hand, he insists on the possibility of distinguishing 
subjective and objective v/ithin our experience, actually basing 
his proofs of causality and reciprocity on our recognition of this 
distinction,, and speaking of ships, houses, and the phenomenal
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world in general as though they had an existence independently 
of our experiencing. (28) There are, however, two ways in which 
Kant could have combined these apparently conflicting viev/s^without 
contradiction.
In the first place he could have maintained a Berkeleian 
position, holding that, although there exists nothing but things 
as they are in themselves (which we cannot Imov/) and our own 
subjective experiencesthe plain man^ in differentiating 
* objective* and * subjective* is recognising a real distinction 
within those experiences. He could then have proceeded to 
analyse the two aspects of experience thus distinguished, finding 
that whenever we normally assert objectivity a certain system is 
to be found^which is absent when we refuse to do so* And he 
could further have discovered one distinctive type of systématisa­
tion wherever we assert 'objective sequence*^ and enother wherever 
we assert * objective coexistence*. He could, for convenience, have 
decided to use the terms 'objective* and 'subjective* to describe 
the presence and absence^ respectively, of systématisation in 
experience; further using the terms 'objective sequence* and 
'objective coexistence* to differentiate the tv/o principle types 
of systématisation discoverable there. He might then have dravm 
conclusions from the recognition of this systématisation. For 
instance, he might have defended the postulation of 'causation*, 
in the sense of a specific type of correlation within experience, 
by saying that this is what we assert, and all we are entitled to 
assert, in postulating objective sequence - our distinguishing
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objective sequencesjpresupposing the truth of its assertion*
Alternatively, he could have maintained things in themselves 
to stimulate our objective experience just as electrons and 
protons (regarded as imperceptible continuants) are commonly 
held to doI, the phenomenal world being thus constituted by these 
as they appear to us just as my reflection in a distorting mirror 
is ordinarily regarded as me as T appear through that medium. In 
other words, he could suppose, for instance that wiien we truly say 
we perceive a chair, a thing in itself is impinging on our 
consciousness but that, owing to our manner of experiencing, this 
can affect us only as though it were a spatio-temporal object 
having a given size, shape, weight, colour, degree of penetrability, 
duration and spatio-temporal position or set of positions; 
although it need not always appear to have the same. (it might, 
for instance, affect us on one occasion as though it were an 
object having four legs, and on another as though having only 
three). The phenomenal world can thus be regarded as possessing 
objectivity in the sense of independence of particular acts 
of perceiving { just as my reflection in a distorting mirror may 
be seen by anyone looking in it while I am reflected there')^  while 
at the same time dependent on a mode of experiencing as well as 
being describable and knowable to us only in terms of the content 
of particular experiences. (it should be noted that if we 
cannot know the characters of things as they are in themselves, we 
are no more entitled to deny than to assert their likeness to the 
characters of things as they appear to us).
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The first of these two points of view clearly presents the 
fevest difficulties* For once one asserts the complete un- 
knowability of things in themselves, restricting all knowledge 
and significant assertion on our part to the realm of appearance, 
it is difficult to see how the postulation of anything outside 
that sphere can be justified at all, let alone the assertion of 
any relation betv/een such an one and experience. And, in 
addition to its inconsistency m t h  the restriction of our 
knowledge to objects of experience, the supposition that phenomena 
are in any way dependent on things in themselves seems in 
blatant contradiction to Kant's naming 'causality* as a category 
(2 9) and at the same time insisting (3o) that the categories can 
be significantly applied only to actual or possible objects of 
experience* indeed, the very postulation of things in themselves 
might provoke a like objection since 'reality is one of Kant's 
categories. (31)
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties ^bich the second 
position involves, j think it is that adopted by Kant, Nor do 
T think this is necessarily to ascribe contradiction to him.
There are several reasons for supposing Kant held the second 
of the views that J have outlined, rather than the first.
In the first place the purely subjectivist view is virtually 
the position of Berkeley,which Kant explicitly and forcefully 
condemns*
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Secondly, on this view, to call a perception sequence 
objective is simply to call it necessary in the sense of 
irreversible, and hence to assert all objective sequence to be 
necessary, i.e. 'causally determined' in Kant's use of the tenns^ 
is to give no information save concerning words. And it seems 
clear that Kant in vindicating the Second Analogy supposed 
himself to be, not formulating definitions, but justifying the 
belief that a certain type of order has been, and will continue 
to be, discoverable mthin e:rperience.
Again, though it may be a convenient shorthand to use the 
term objective in the customary way, though supposing it to refer 
to nothing but actual and cessible experiences, it is clearly 
misleading to intend this unusual interpretation without mentioning 
the fact. presumably Kant, in recording his views^vdshed to 
communicate them; it seeras^  therefore, unreasonable to suppose 
him to use, without explanation, phrases which will naturally be 
interpreted in ohe sense, while in fact intending them in another.
Lastly, and most convincing of all, though there are passages 
which could be interpreted in terw^  of the Berkeleian view (the 
proof of the Second Analogy added in the second edition^(32) and 
the fifth occurring the first, (33) being perhaps two of the most 
important) there are many statements wholly inconsistent with it, 
(since I am mainly concerned with the Second Analogy^I shall confine 
myself to examples found in its discussion).
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Thus,in the definition of objectivity introducing the 
discussion in the first edition, Kant v/rites* »in spite also of 
the fact that their represenf ation in apprehension is always 
successive, I have to show what sort of a connection in time 
belongs to the manifold in the appearances themselves*, (34) 
Clearly, if to talk of appearances is merely to speak of a 
certain regularity, actual and possible, among experiences, one 
could not speak of connections in appearances ad distinct from 
those found among experiences. The insistence on this 
distinction appears again at the end of the paragraph when Kanh 
formulates conditions necessarn^ in order^that appearance, in 
contradistinction to the representations of apprehension,can be 
represented as an object distinct from them4 , And midway between 
the two explicit assertions of this distinction, Kant instances 
our refusal to attribute to *the parts of a h o u s e t h e  succession 
in the experiences of perceiving them;, not in order to condemn 
or explain away this differentiation, but as something which his 
theory must accept and account for if it is to prove adequate.
Again in the first proof of the Analogy in the first
edition, he says that in perceiving objective succession *v/e must
derive the subjective succession of apprehension f rom the
objective succession of appearances*; and a little later supports
his claim to a criterion of objectivity other than the succession
itself
of experiences by arguing; 'Since the subjective succession^^is 
altogether arbitrary, it does not by itself prove anything as to 
the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object'^ (35)
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But there would be no other succession whence the subjective 
could be derived, nor any other connection to be proved, were 
the Berkeleian viev/ correct.
Similarly in the second first edition proof, he writes;
'Let us supDOse that there is nothing antecedent to an event open 
which it must follow according to rule. All succession of 
perception would then be only in the apprehension,.......
T could not then assert that two states follow upon one another 
in the appearance, but only that one apprehension follovTs upon 
the other*. (36)
And in the fourth first edition proof we find: »A series
of appearances thus arises which, with the aid of the understanding 
produces and makes necessary the^order and continuous connection 
in the series of possible perceptions as is met v/ith a priori 
in tinieJL, (37)
Thus there appears again and again an insistence on two 
distinguishable sequences, which is completely irreconcilable 
wdth the suggestion that Kant is writing of nothing but actual 
and possible experiences.
Certainly this distinction might be maintained consistently 
were objective sequences supposed to consist in sense data which 
may both be perceived and persist unperceived. J think no one 
has ascribed this view to Kant. There is no indication that he 
held it 5 nor could he have done so consistently with his assertion 
that our manner of experiencing determines the character of the 
objects of experience. For this would mean we have no right to
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suppose unperceived sense data to resemble those experienced.
.And it would be a contradiction in terms to say that a sense 
datum persisted unperceived but, for all we knew, appeared to 
us different from its natural self, since there is no criterion 
for attributing persistence to a sense datum apart from 
persistence of its characteristics.
The view j am attributing to Kant has some affinity with 
the * phenomena list ’ position v/hich Kemp Smith professes to find 
in some passages. Thus, speaking of the objects apprehended, as 
they are regarded on this view, he says.* 'They are part of an 
independent order which in the form laiown to us is a phenomenalist
transcript of a deeper reality............  Its (the phenomenal
world's) function vhether as directly experiended through sense 
perception or as conceptually reconstructed through scientific 
hypothesis, is to stand as the representative in human consciousness 
of that nouraenal world in which all existence is ultimately rooted'. (38)
Here, as in my interpretation, the dependence of phenomena 
on noumena is affirmed; but the two interpretations differ in 
the greater degree of independence of experience attributed to 
phenomena on Kemp Smith's 'phenomenalist* view* indeed Kemp 
Smith writes as though, on this view, the characteristics of 
phenomena were determined^not by our manner of experiencing,but 
by things in themselves. Thus he writes; *lf the causal 
relation is analogous to anything outside itself, it is an 
analogon or interpretation of dynamical powers exercised by things 
in themselves', though he adds, in a footnote, that Kant
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recognised the impossibility of asserting this positively on 
critical principles. (39) And a little earlier he describes 
* the fixed order in which concrete events are presented to sense 
perceptions' as 'due to noumenal conditions', (4o) This is surely 
completely contradictory to Kant's repeated insistence that the 
character of phenomena, as things as they apr^ear to us, is wholly 
determined by our manner of experiencing and thus, and thus only, 
discoverable by us*
Complementary to the postulation of an objectivism in Kant 
which asserts an intermediary between thing in itself and 
particular experiences, independent of our experiencing; is his 
attribution to Kant of a subjectivism in which the postulation of 
any intermediary between them is out of place.
In the extreme character of either of these interpretations 
lies the explanation of Kemp Smith's attributing two conflicting 
views to Kant* For the existence of a phenomenal world 
independent of our manner of experiencing is plainly inconsistent 
with the truth of rnahy of Kant's statements; while a subjectivism 
allov/ing of no intermediary between perceptions and thing in 
itself is obviously inconsistent with Kant’s postulation of an 
objectivity which is not merely the exemplification of a rule of 
correlation among particular perceptions.
Earlier pages should have made clear ray rejection of Kemp 
Smith's position* I have no room for a detailed destructive 
criticism of his thesis, but will briefly discuss his treatment 
of one passage to bring out what appear to me as confusions
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underlying and weaknesses in his exposition in terms of it.
In discussing a 29-30 (41) Kerap Smith instances as an example
of the phenomenalist standpoint the earlier paragraph which 
distinguishes taste a.nd colour as 'subjective*, from space (or 
spatial relations) as 'objective': while he treats the succeeding
paragraph, in which Kant insists that space is a character of 
experience only and not of things in themselves, as exemplifying 
the subjective tendency. It has already been argued that even 
granted that the appearance of inconsistencies in a work the length 
of the Kritik is not improbable, blatant contradiction between two 
adjacent paragraphs would show their author to be a very different 
person from that revealed by Kant's writings.(42).
And it seems quite clear to me tliat, when Kant distinguishes 
subjective from objective as he does in a29 and in vindicating the 
Analogies, he is intending to refer to a distinction within 
appearances in his sense of the term, that is to say within the 
conditions under which our actual experience occurs; whereas in 
A30 he is intending to emphasise that this is so, that the objective 
of which he has just written is so only relatively and is not 
'objective' in the sense of existing in complete independence of our 
mode of experiencing. That this interpretation is correct seems 
to me borne out, not only by the wording of the paragraphs in 
question,but also by that of the one preceding themj(A28) For it 
is immediately after insisting in a28 that space is nothing at all 
unless regarded as a characteristic or condition of possible 
experience, that he proceeds to differentiate it from secondary
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qualities* indeed, he starts to assert the difference, 
(immediately after discussing space so that the opening ’this* 
clearly refers to the latter as indeed it obviously does from 
the sense of the sentence) by v/ri ting: * This subjective condition 
of outer appearances cannot, therefore, be compared to any otheri 
y%ile the paragraph which r eplaces this in the second edition 
opens with the assertion*: ’With the sole exception of space
there is no subjective representation, referring to something 
outer which could be entitled objective and a priori*, (43)
(The underlining in each quotation is mine) From this it seems 
clear that,not only at the time of the final formulation of the 
first edition,but also when he v/rote the second, Kant regarded 
space as subjective in an absolute sense- although within the 
subjective content of experience he recognised a relative sense 
invhich it could be regarded as 'objective* in contradistinction 
to other elements in that experience. To overlook the relative 
character of ♦ objectivity* as used thus by Kant seems to me a 
confusion as serious in its consequences as in its extent*
Sinee,indeed, it is the essence of Kant’s 'revolution’ that 
knowledge of objects is relative to experience, and the bulk of 
the Kritik is devoted to showing this to be so, it would be 
surprising to find intentional denials of this v/ithin the Kritik 
itself. Kemp Smith himself admits (44) that what he calls the 
subjectivist point of view (which,insofar as it affirms the 
dependence of phenomena on our mode of experiencing them,resembles 
that I am attributing to Kant) is that most frequently met in the
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Kritik^and that, therefore,if this work is to be regarded as 
presenting a consistent body of doctrine this can only be 
subjectivism. And again, in discussing the Second Analogy 
he admits that ^the* phenomenalist view of the causal relation 
receives no quite definite formulation* anyv/here in the Kritik. (45)
Although he follows Kemp Smith so far as to speak of 
'subjectivist* and 'phenomenalist* or 'more objective* views within 
the Kritik,(46) '^ing seems to intend to express something of that 
asserted above-as he imites that the physical 'can only be 
understood as a mental image which is, however, public not private 
property*. (47) Ewing's language here is unfortunate, since in 
the ordinary sense of the term an 'image' (particularly when 
described as 'mental') is essentially private. But Ev/ing is 
evidently trying to maintain, as j have done, that while the 
phenomenal 'objects' of which Kant speaks can be described and 
conceived only in terms ofprivate experiences, they are still 
something which anyone may experience under the appropriate 
conditions.
The attribution of some form of 'causality' to things in 
themselves seems to present the greatest difficulty in my inter­
pretation of Kant. whatever criticism of the view I have 
attributed to him it may provoke,however, it cannot be regarded 
as an adequate reason for refusing to attribute this vie^w to K^nt. 
For despiteéâÜ he says about restricting the categories to objects 
of experience, his solution of the problem of free-will (to him a 
most important element in his philosophy, and hence, presumably,
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well-con si de red) lies in attributing freedom to a thing in itself 
underlying the phenomenal self,(4 8 ). But if Kant is not averse 
to regarding the phenomenal as in some sense dependent on things 
in themselves, can he escape the charge of inconsistency in this?
I think he can.
In the first place it seems clear that when Kant^in discussing 
free will, asserts phenomena to depend on things in themselves, he 
is not intending to apply the categoi?/ of causation. For the 
categories, as he conceives them, are not characteristics of things, 
but T/ays in which we must conceive anything if we are to regard it 
as an object of knowledge. But clearly Kant cannot justify the, 
to him all-important, belief in free-will by appeal to the 
'causality* of things in themselves, if by this latter he means 
simply one of the ways in which we must conceive them. If his 
argument is to be effective he must be saying something about, not 
the way his mind works, but things in themselves. And there seems 
no doubt that he intended to make the latter type of assertion in 
postulating 'causality*, in the shape of free-will. Nor indeed 
would he be talking about things in themselves at all were he 
talking of how he must conceive them, since,in his terminology, 
a thing in itself is a thing as it is independently of our manner 
of experiencing, conceiving, and knowing. (The charge that in 
saying things in themselves exist, Kant is applying the category 
of 'reality' to them, could be similarly answered).
Furthermore, Kant's defence of the Second Analogy, the 
principle underlying the schematised category of causation, leaves
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no doubt that by this category he means the inability to conceive 
any object of knowledge as uncaused; that is to say that to apply 
it to anything is to regard this as an 'effect*. Indeed he 
insists that the category does not by itself enable us to say this 
is the 'cause* of that.(49) But when he speaks of 'causation* in 
relation to things in themselves^in discussing free-will, he is 
asserting them to be 'causes* not 'effects'; and I am supposing 
him to be doing the same in ascribing 'causality* to them in his 
view of objective experience.
Kant, therefore, invites a charge of inconsistency in regarding 
things in themselves as 'causes'^ only if he asseits or implies 
either that we know absolutely nothing outside the realm of 
experience or that the term 'cause* can be significantly used only 
when the category is applied.
As to the former Kant could have evaded a charge of inconsistency 
by admitting to one of carelessness; namely by affirming that in 
asserting the restriction of our knowledge to the sphere of 
experience he meant only that there is a reality underlying 
objective experience,of which we can know nothing save its existing 
and stimulating that experience. And, indeed, since Kant is 
W t h  unequivocal in asserting the existence of things in themselves; 
ascribes causality to them in the, to him all-important, sphere 
of moral responsibility; affirms them to be the ultimate source 
of sensation; and, as I have just argued, treats objectivity in 
a manner consistent only v/ith their being the ultimate sourde of 
stimulus of objective experience; it seems but reasonable and
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just to suppose him to have intended the more qualified 
definition.
That the term 'cause* can he significantly used only v/hen
we can apply the categories is nowhere stated explicitly by Kant,
Nevertheless, his repeated insistence that for us thought is empty
unless understood in terms of the sensible, might well seem to
amply that we can say nothing significant concerning things in
themsèlveso But here again he could (and probably would^if
challenged) have avoided inconsistency by maintaining a qualified
form of his restricting statement. Thus he could have said that
thought not understood in terms of the sensible, though
intelligible in a restricted sense, was empty of information we
usually expect to derive from it ; maintaining further that his
intention iX insisting on this emptiness was^not to deny the
modicum of intelligibility involved,but to safeguard against
false pretensions to knowledge in supposing the customary
information or its equivalent to be implied where this is absent,
For instance, he might have said, if I assert the existence of a
chair, J am giving information about possible experiences and
postulating an existent of a given sort defined in terras of those
experiences; whereas if T assertthe existence of a tiling in
itself I am saying nothing about possible experiences but am
of
merely positing a something of whose nature, and^the implications 
of whose existence, T know nothing. Similarly, he could have 
said, whereas if J assert a causal connection between a man's 
taking a given quantity of arsenic and his subsequent death, I
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am saying something about possible experiences^ and arn asserting 
a precisely specifiable relation, namely necessary connection 
between two events whose character and connection I conceive in 
terms of those experiences; in calling a thing in itself 'cause' 
of phenomena I am saying nothing about possible experience^and 
hence have nothing from which I can derdve any precise idea of 
either the relation involved or the nature of one of its terns— 
namely the unknown thing in itself. Our 'understanding' that 
phenomena derive from things in themselves is thus akin to the 
child’s 'understanding' that if he presses a switch the room 
wdll be lit though he has no idea hovr or v/hy this should be so; 
and Kant's w/aming about the emptiness of thought not understood 
in terms of the sensiblej^directed against confusing this latter 
type of ' understa.nding* with that involving knowledge of some 
precise implications of a statement.
To maintain, as I have done, that Kant could have held the 
viev/ of objective experience here attributed to him^without 
inconsistency, is not of course to say that he was justified in 
holding it. To justify it would indeed be difficult. Kant 
himself, though he devotes much energy to defending the relativity 
of phenomenal knowledge and the impossibility of our knowing 
the nature of things as they are in themselves, seems quite 
unaware of any need to defend his postulation of the latter or 
their affecting our experience. This % think is due to two 
main influences, those of the Leibnizean conception of phenomena 
as the inadequate appearance to us of underlying realities, and of
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the subjectivist view of secondary qualities(stimulated by modern 
physics). The familiarity of both these notions of a reaility 
underlying^ and utterly unlike^its appearance to us would naturally 
tend to conceal the need for defending his postulation of the thing 
in itself.
Were he pressed^ he would phobably have argued that unless what 
we call 'objective experience* were the appearance to us of things 
in themselves independent of our experiencing, v/e should be unable 
to distinguish it^as we do,from 'purely subjective experience* • 
mo this it could be objected that siio e the experiences we 
call 'objective* have a certain distinctive orderliness in their 
mutual relations, we could thereby distinguish them from those we 
call 'subjective* without appeal to anything else. Kant could have 
answered this effectively, only if he could have shown that this 
orderliness cannot be discovered from actual experiences alone-r* past 
as well as present, and those of others as well as one's ov/n^but can 
be asserted only if 'objective experience' is the appearance to us 
of entities independent of us, the nature of whose effect on us is 
nevertheless determined by our mode of experiencing. And in order 
to justify his position he would have needed further to show not 
only that he could consistently admit the possibility of speaking 
significantly of things in themselves and their causality, but 
also that it is indeed possible to speak significantly of the 
dependence of phenomena on things in themselves while ignorant of 
both the nature of things in themselves and the precise character 
of the relation asserted* This indeed is the point on which he
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would meet the greatest criticism*
That the source of objective experience is reality, 
independent of our experiencing, does not of course entail a 
plurality of existants thus independent, much less that there is 
one such corresponding to every existent justly postulated by 
commonsensco Nevertheless it must be admitted that Kant’s
persistent reference to this reality as a plurality i.e. as 
things in themselves, together with his treatment of free-will^ 
sug^^est that he held each phenomenal 'object* to be the 
appearance of a distinct non-phenomena1 reality.
It should be needless to insist that to define objective 
experience in terms of the appearance to us of things in themselves 
is not to attribute to things as they are in themselves any of the 
characteristics they appear to us to possess. To say that to a 
jaundiced person everything appears yellow is to say nothing of 
the objects of his experience beyond his manner of experiencing 
them. Similarly, to say that in observing objective sequence 
we perceive things (in themselves independent of our experiencing) 
appearing to us as though exhibiting a serious of events, is not 
to say that those things as they are in themselves actually exhibit 
such a series. On this view the objective is so, in the sense of 
being public rather than private, only in that anyone of our 
manner of experiencing would make the same 'world* out of our data. 
Since the 'making* involved lies in our manner of experiencing as 
such, A# ’given’ and ’data’ are not here being used in the
sense in which they are ordinarily applied to something presented
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to consciousness. Things in t h e m s e l v e s t h e  Kantian view as 
I interpret it, as has been suggested,(5o)% are data in the 
sense in which electrons and protons,as commonly regarded, would 
be : namely as something we so deàl with,in experiencing it,as to
represent it to ourselves as though it had characteristics we 
have no ground for ascribing to it* (in the case of a world of 
electrons, of course, one has positive grounds for not ascribing 
to it the character of the universe of everyday experience). And 
when v/e properly apply the categories we are conceiving in terms 
of them, not things in themselves, but what we make of data supplied 
by them in this sense. We could not regard experience as 
objective in this way unless it was both so stimulated by things 
in themselves and so conceived in terms of the categories by us; 
Kant,I think, explicitly insists only on the latter condition 
because he takes the former for granted.
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(iii) The second Analogy.
Kant postulates twelve 'principles of the Understanding’ (51) 
v/hich he describes as 'rules for the objective employment of* the 
categories; that is to say they are the principles underlying the 
schematised categories, rules exemplified in our manner of thinking 
or conceiving the temporal. Three of these principles he calls 
Analogies of experience; this title appears to have been adopted 
because Kant supposes that they enable us to make assertions such 
as that as A is related to p so is C to a fourth term not given 
i.e. to assert the existence of one relation analogous to another 
even though v/e can discover only one term of the former. Re also 
speaks of them as analogies of the purely logical principles under­
lying the categories taken in abstraction; T incline to Kemp 
Smith's opinion, (52) however, (though not wholly for the same 
reason) that this is urged as an additional defence of the title 
rather than constituting Kant’s actual ground for applying it*
The purely polemical nature of this interpretation of the term 
seems clear to me from the fact that Kant cannot, properly speaking, 
regard any of his 'principles of the Understanding' as analogous 
to the principles underlying the pure categories,since the former 
in fact consist in the latter subject only to certain conditions.'
The Analogies of Experience consist in the principle of 
permanent substance, that of causality in the sense of necessary 
sequence, and that of reciprocity in the sense of the interdependence 
of the coexistent* The second of these is the most relevant to my 
purpose, not only because it concerns Kent's use of the term
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'cause', but also because it constitutes the specific answer to 
Hunie's criticism of the concept of ' ca.usality, and is Kant's most 
significant contribution to the history of that concept*
Kant's defence of * causality', in vindicating ef the second 
analogy is generally held to consist in six separate proofs, five 
of which are regarded as rnerely varying formulations of the same 
argument. (53) This multiplicity of proofs, particularly when 
regarded as mainly repetitious, has been urged in favour of the 
composite origin of the discussion. (54) Paton, however, is as 
usual critical of the general view, (55) holding not only that 
the discussion may be regarded as a continuous whole^but also 
that v/hat is usually thought the one different proof is far from 
alien to the general trend of the argument.
That the discussion is repetitious cannot be denied, but 
this characteristic is equally consistent vdth either its compo­
site or'gin a desire on Kant's rart merely to emphasise its 
salient points and make them explicit. Moreover, I think the 
argument's ncaning and validity may be discussed -without reference 
to its mode of composition. I shall not, therefore, discuss this 
latter, whose adequate treatment demands more space than is here 
warranted.
Whatever viev/ of its method of composition may be held, 4 
I think paton right in refusing to regard the five proofs 
generally classed together, as mere variations of the same theme, 
and in supposing Kant finally intended the six proofs to form 
together a continuous argument; I hope to justify this view in
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the course of what follows.
Five of these proofs (including that usually regarded as 
unique) appear in the first edition, the sixth being prefaced 
to these in the second.
(a) The First ^irst Edition proof
\A) The Prefatory Discussion of Objectivity.
The first proof in the first edition is prefaced by a 
definition of objectivity. (5&)# This is very necessary since, 
as has already been remarked, (57) while Kant's defence of 
•causality' rests on our distinguishing 'objective' from 
'subjective' within experience, his view of the phenomenal world 
constitutes a denial of the adequacy of the then commonly 
accepted concept of objectivity. I have already outlined ray 
view of Kant's solution of the dilemma. The passage at present 
under review is by no means as explicit as the commentator might 
■wish, as is witnessed by the conflicting assessments and inters 
prêtâtions it has been given; (58) yet I think^not only that it 
is consistent -with the interpretation T have put forxrard, but also 
that only on that interpretation can it be regarded as either 
self-consistent,or consistent with Kant's teaching in general 
and the discussion it prefaces in particular.
I will first outline the argument of the passage as it 
stands, and then enlarge upon it in terms of my interpretation, 
endeavouring to justify the latter.
Kant starts by making explicit his rejection of the accepted 
conception of objectivity on the ground tliat we can know only
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'appearances*. He recognises that we yet undeniably distinguish 
'objective' from 'subjective sequence*; we see 'the different 
■parts of e house' successively,but we assert 'the parts of a 
house' to be coe}!stent; and he addresses himself to account for 
this distinction in critical terms as follows; qiven that all we
can know is mere appearance, the undeniable distinction commonly 
described as being beb'veen ' subjective' and ' objective' can only 
be between the contents of particular experiences and 'appearance' 
which, though nothing apart from t he sun of such experiences, is 
yet distinguishable from them as that given in them and their 
object. This distinction is only recognisable if 'appearance' 
is regarded as exemplifying a rule which both distinguishes it 
from any other factor wmthin experience and entails the order of 
particular experiences* 'appearance in contradistinction to the 
representations of apprehension, can be represented as an object 
distinct from them only if it stands under a rule which 
distinguishes it from every other apprehension and necessitates 
some particular mode of connection of the manifold. The object 
is that in the appearance which contains the condition of this 
necessary rule of apprehension*,',
Prichard regards this passage as identifying 'appearance* 
with actual experiences * related in a certain necessary w/ay'.
The passage, he soys reveals the impasse to which Kant is reduced 
by refusing to recognise the true nature of apprehension a s 
essentially awareness of reality. Now^  he finds himself faced 
with the necessity of supplying the object of apprehension which
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his teaching excludes^ and so is forced to offer the totally 
inadequate substitute of ideas, with the sole proviso that they 
are perceptions related in a certain v/ay. To this, says 
Prichard, there are two fatal objections; in the first place, 
perceptions are essentially subjective, a complex of them no 
less than a single one; and secondly, on this view^ perceptions 
may be related both by sequence as subjective,and by coexistence 
as objective. pricliard therefore concludes that Kant *is unable 
to justify the very distinction the implications of which it is 
his aim to discover*- (59)
Prom what has been said above it v/illbe inferred that J 
reject Prichard’s interpretation of the passage in question; 
moreover, I think that even were it sound, his criticisms would 
still be open to objection. I shall discuss first his criticisms^ 
and then his theory.
The fundamental postulate of prichard* s criticism, as he 
interprets it, involves a confusion; and his two fatal objections 
can be understood as such, only if a plainly contradictory view of 
objectivity is attributed to Kant without supporting evidence.
The basic confusion seems pretty evident. prichard is
assuming that to define apprehension as awareness of an object 
(as Kant and most other people do, at least implicitljr) ^ is to 
define it as awareness of something as existing independently of
I
being experienced, and as it thus exists. This is surely fase. 
For ther is no contradiction in asserting awareness of a mental 
content or subjective state. And, indeed, that we can be aware
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of subjective states cannot be denied by anyone adopting the 
commong interpretation of 'awareness'^ and supposing us directly 
aivare of anything. For, whatever view of sensory perception is 
adopted and whatever we may be said to be aware of in 'observing 
a physical object', it is impossible to assert such 'awareness 
of a physical object' justly without being bound to assert also 
awareness of certain experiences; for example, if I am thus 
aware of a blue sky, I am aware of experiencing a blue sense-datum, 
And, if we can thus be said to be aware of anything, there are 
occasions when it is true to say that one is av/are of the purely 
subjective: for instance, when he has a toothache which, though
it may be supposed ^ caused'by something existing independently of 
his experiencing, does not exist anywhere outside his experience; 
or when one 'sees double*.
As to the first of the specific 'fatal objections', this is 
an effective criticism of the indentification of the objective 
with experiences correlated in a certain my, only if objectivity 
is not defined in terms of the correlation experiences. For this 
identification implies some mysterious transformation^only if the 
objective is something more than correlated experience.
The second objection presupposes the mi sunderstanding under­
lying the first. For to hold Kant's definition of objectivity 
to imply that representations or experiences may at the same time 
be related by sequence as subjective^and by coexistence as 
objective, is to suppose that for him the^objective consists in 
experiences which are at the same time mysteriously something
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else; whidi is precisely what Kant i.vould be denying were he 
maintaining the view ascribed to him by prichard. were he indeed 
defining the objective in terms of correlated experiences, he 
would have to say that what is ordinarily regarded as the 
assertion of objective sequence,or coexistence,is to be distinguish­
ed from statements such as; 'Experience a is followed by 
experience B’ ? not as ha^'dng reference to anything but the 
subjective, but as giving, in a form of shorthand, a quantity of 
complex information about subjective correlations*
Even were Prichard's objections sound, however, they would, 
to my mind, be harmless to Kant since I do not believe him to 
hold the view they c4àim to assail*
It is true that, in the passage under discussion, Kant says 
'appearance' 'is nothing but the sum of these representations’
(i.e*experiences), but a moment's reflection should reveal that 
if he is regarded as writing something significant here he cannot 
be supposed to have intended this sentence literally* For 
assertions concerning 'appearance* such as those used by Kant 
e.g. his statements about ships and houses, cannot be regarded 
as referring only to actual experiences; nor can 'appearance' be 
described as 'an aggregate of possible and actual experiences' 
donsistently v/itji ordinary usage, since the term 'possible 
experience' is not commonly used as a name of an existent as are 
'chair* and 'table*. To say that sentences containing the term 
'appearance* refer to nothing (apart from words and their use) 
save actual and possible experiences (while using 'appearance*
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as Kant does^and at the same time sajdng something significant), 
is to affirm only that (apart from anything they may assert 
concerning words) such sentences express merely statements either 
about actual experiences or about the possibility of experiences.
It is thus clear that Kant's statement that 'appearance’ is 
'nothing but the sum of these representations', if not regarded 
as nonsensical, must be supposed the careless expression of oee 
of the two following assertions: a) that 'appearance', though 
distinct from individual experiences, is describable and conceivable 
only in terms of them; b) that statements about 'appearance* are 
simply assertions about either actual experiences or the possibility 
of experience* That Kant indeed intended to assert something 
other than the simple identification of 'appearance' v/ith a sura of 
experiences is evidenced by his proceeding immediately to show how 
'appearance in contradistinction to the representations of 
apprehension, can be represented as an object distinct from them',(60) 
Of the two assertions either of which Kant can be supposed to 
be making significantly, T think (a) must be regarded as that he 
intended. For not only is the defence of causality,to which this 
passage is introductory, clearly designed as a proof of necessary 
sequence in events as distinct from successions of particular 
experiences, but it also contains the insistence (6l) that v/ere 
there no sequence other than that of experiences, we should have no 
criterion for distinguishing 'objective' from 'subjective succession' 
as we do. This latter contention alone seems a clear enough 
rejection of the view that 'statements about the objective' are
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simply assertions about actual and possible experiences.
But if (a) must be regarded as the most justifiable inter­
pretation of Kant's words, he is affirming precisely that view of 
objectivity I have ascribed to him above. For only if 'appearance' 
means things (in themselves independent of our experiencing), as 
they appear to us, is it true to say both tliat 'appearance' is 
nothing apart from the sum of particular experiences, and that it is 
false to identify it either with such an aggregate or with truths 
conceiving actual and possible experiences. clearly an object, 
as it appears to us, is describable and conceivable only in terms 
of actual and possible experiences, (the latter being corr eivable 
to us only in terms of elements in experience that are, or have 
been, actual). Yet at the same time, although it is possible to 
deny that experiences may be accounted for, wholly or partly, in 
terms of independent objects as they appear to us, it is a contra­
diction in terms to say that such an object as it appears to us 
is either simply an aggregate of experiences or a set of facts 
concerning actual and possible experience. But if one denies 
either the objective reference or the subjective nature of 
appearance, then one of the two assertions Kant must be supposed to 
be making is rejected.
Nor is this interpretation inconsistent v^ith the assertions 
made in the rest of the passage.
For instance, if 'appearance' is so understood, and can properly 
be regarded as an existent's name; then it may, and indeed must, 
be said both to be given in or through particular experiences and
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to be their object, as Kant describes it in this passage. For 
to call anything 'appearance*^ in this sense, is shnply to say that 
v/e become acquainted with it by ne ans of particular experiences, 
which latter may be said to be 'of* it as we are coraraohly said to 
have sight 'of* a hill or a house as something distinct from the 
experiencing v/ith which we are brought in contact in the latter.
The final statements in the passage cannot be disposed of so 
briefly. Commentators have differed as to the 'rule' of vhich 
Kant here v/rites. paton identifies it with the Analogies, (62) 
v/hile Kemp smith contends (65) that Kant does not make clear which 
of the two following senses of 'rule' he is meaning, namely: a)
a general principle that all appearance must exemplify; and 
b) the regularities exhibited in appearances.
Both paton and Kemp Smith seem to me mistaken concerning this 
passage in indicating that if Kant is referring to a general rule 
this is the Analogies, Kemp Smith indeed confining it to the Second, 
(64). This is surely unjustifiable. For as Kant thinks 
exemplification of all the schematised categories a necessary 
condition of the 'objective' writh which he identifies 'appearance', 
if he speaks of the latter as being distinguished by exemplifying 
a general rule this can be no less than exemplification of all the 
schematised categories.
I think Kant referring to the general principle, and this 
for tv/o reasons, (a) The Transcendental Analytic, as a v/hole, is 
devoted to showing its exemplifying the categories to be a 
necessary condition of our recognisinp- the objective as. such.
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(b) This interpretation explains his asserting *the object is 
that in the appearance which contains the condition of this 
necessary rule»; since if we can recognise anything as an object 
only if it exemplifies the schematised categories, A ’s being an 
object for us, entails its exemplifying them within our 
experience. That Kant writes here of 'the object* as the 
condition of 'this necessary rule' indicates him to be referring 
to the 'rule' with which the previous statement is concerned.^6$^
He might well, therefore, have thought it needless to make 
explicit that he is writing of the general principle in both 
sentences; the nK>re so since he asserts that the 'rule' 
exemplified in 'appearance* 'necessitates some one particular 
mode of connection of the manifold^ thus clearly differentiating 
'rule* in Kemp Smith's second sense from that which he so names 
here#
There is no inconsistency between the conception of 
'appearance' I have ascribed to Kant^ and the assertion that 
* appearance' is distinguishable as such only if it exemplifies 
the categories - its objectivity thus entailing its exemplification 
of them#
jVhen Kant writes that appearance is distinguishable from the 
subjective element in experience only if it exemplifies the 
categories, he may mean literally that exemplifying than is one, 
but possibly not the sole, condition of its being so distinguished. 
Or he may mean that this is the only necessary condition of that 
distinction#
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Even if he intends to assert the latter, he can do so 
consistently with the conception of 'appearance' I have 
attributed to him. For since he asserts their application to 
objects to be demanded by our specific mode of experiencing, it
is clearly of objectivity to us;, i.e. being recognisable or
conceivable as objective by us, that Kant asserts the schematised 
categories to be conditions# And its dependence on a thing in
itself may be a condition of the objectivity of 'appearance' in
the sense of its actual distinction from, and independence of, 
particular experiences, without precluding that objectivity's 
being recognisable, or conceivable, by us only through its 
exemplification of the categories#
If, however, Kant intends to assert exemplifying the 
schematised categories to be the sole condition of our recognising 
'appearance' as objective, he is entitled to defend his 
postulation of the thing in itself only by showing it to be a 
necessary condition, not of our recognising objectivity, but of 
there being anything for us to recognise as objective given the 
appropriate conditions# This latter is more difficult to 
demonstrate than a condition of our recognising objectivity alone, 
and moreover would demand the 'dogmatic' type of proof which Kant 
distrusts*
There is certainly no contradiction in supposing exemplifying 
the schematised categories a condition of our recognising, as 
objective, 'appearance* in the sense I have supposed Kant to 
conceive it# It could, for instance, be consistently held that
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we can properly conceive as objects of our e]Q)erience only things 
(in thonselves independent of our experiencing) appearing to us 
as though having specific characteristics exemplifying the 
schematised categories* And this i think most probably Kant's 
view*
Indeed Kant could claim to distinguish e xperiences as 
stimulated by things in themselves, only on the basis of some 
modicum of system or rule which these, as they appear to us, seem 
to exemplify* For since, by definition, the character of such 
appearance is wholly determined by our manner of experiencing, 
particular sense data (either singly or in groups) could not be 
said to be distinguishable as objective by any characteristic 
effect of the thing in itself stimulating them* Nor is there 
any reason why they should be intrinsically distinct owing to a 
characteristic manner of perceiving them (That there is in 
fact no intrinsic difference between our 'objective' sense date 
and what we call purely subjective e3qperienoe has already been 
remarked)^ (6$) Nor could experience of such 'appearance' be 
distinguished by its persistence, or its adequacy to that 
perceived* For though we may interpret objective experience in 
terms of things in themselves which, on account of our manner of 
experiencing, appear to us as though having the characteristics 
'coramonsense” ascribes to phenomenal objects, yet we cannot claim 
direct experience of such appearances during much of the time when, 
on this view, we must suppose they exist (i.e. for as long as the 
thing in itself is 'there' to appear to us under appropriate
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conditions). But if we could distinguish certain experiences 
as of things (in themselves independent of our experiencing) 
as they appear to us, only if they can be regarded as appearing 
to us as though exemplifying a certain rule or rules, then the 
possibility of interpreting experiences as so stimulated by 
things appearing to exemplify such rules, would enable us to 
distinguish them from the purely subjective. And it must be 
admitted that our objective experiences can be so interpreted.
Kemp Smith seems to suppose that when he uses the term 
'object* at the end of the passage in question, Kant means to 
refer to the transcendental object in the sense of thing in 
itself. For he says that if by rule Kant means the specific 
regularities eodiibited, the final sentence asserting the condition 
of the rule to lie in the object means 'that the prescribed order 
of the concrete events is due to the transcendental object'. (6 7) 
The preceding paragraphs will have shown that I disagree with 
Kemp Smith in this# Nor do I see how Kant can be supposed to 
be referring to anything but the phenomenal object by the term 
throughout the passage^ since it is his avowed and obvious aim 
there to give an account of the 'objects' which we meet in 
experience. And since,further, in this final sentence he refers 
to the 'object' as 'that in the appearance', it seems plainly 
nonsensical to suppose this 'object* a thing in itself#
Kemp Smith seems to suppose that his interpretation of the 
passage amounts to treating it as a reformulation of the assertion 
in A l i o  that 'all appearances, in so far as through them objects
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are to given to us, must stsind under those a priori rules of 
synthetical unity whereby the interrelating of these appearances 
in empirical intuition is alone possible^ For he states Kant 
to be writing 'in terms of his earlier doctrine of the trans­
cendental object,' continuing; • To contrast an object with the 
representations through which we apprehend it is only possible 
if these representations stand under a rule vhich renders 
necessary their combination in some one particular way, and so 
distinguishes this one particular mode of representation as the 
only true mode from all others! (68) If this is so he seems 
clearly mistaken. For a109 concludes with the explicit statement 
that the transcendental object is an unknowable x, while A l l O  
itself states that because we can have no determinate intuition 
of the transcendental object,we can refer our experiences to it, 
or conceive them in terms of it, only if its appearance to us 
exemplifies a priori rules* And as he insists repeatedly that 
we can ascribe a priori rules to experience only if our manner 
of perceiving can be said to be such that that experience must 
exhibit them, (6 9) there seems no doubt that by this he means to 
assert that we can refer our experiences to a transcendental 
object only if our manner of perceiving is such that perception 
stimulated by such an object must exemplify certain rules 
rendering possible their interrelation* But this is quite the 
reverse of stating the transcendental object to entail specific 
phenomenal correlations directly, (it is of course possible to 
criticise the transcendental object terminology, and to suppose
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Kant came to discard it as misleading, without either ascribing 
contradiction to the passages containing it or supposing Kant 
to have subsequently retracted them).
presumably it is because he supposes Kant regards 
'appearance* or phenomena as thus noumenally determined, that 
Kemp Smith affirms 'there can be no such middle term between 
subjective representations and the thing in itself, (id)Otherwise 
his denial is inexplicable, since it is precisely the doctrine 
of the unknowable thing in itself which demands postulation of 
such an intermediary. For unless Kant can regard some 
particular experiences as explicable only as being stimulated 
by things in themselves which must appear to us as though 
having certain types of characteristic (this mode of appearing 
being determined by our manner of experiencing), he has no 
justification for postulating an unknowable thing in itself at 
all.
(B) The proof.
As has been seen, ^%^) all Kant's proofs of the validity 
of the second Analogy have the same aim* starting from the 
premise that we distinguish sequences as objective and subjective 
he claims to show this to be possible only because objective 
events always occur in necessary succession.
The first proof in the first edition^ (71) the most familiar 
part of the discussion, may be divided into three sections. o f  
these, the first argues that experiences constituting perception 
of objective succession, always occur in an irreversible order.
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and that they are thus distinguished from those we regard as purely 
subjective* The second contends that they can be so distinguished 
only if the order of our experience is derived from that of the 
events perceived whenever we 'perceive objective sequence'.
Finally Kant argues that the order of events can thus render 
necessary that of our perceptions of than, only if the succession 
of events is itself necessary*
The first of these sections (72) constitutes a discussion of 
'perceiving an event’. An event, (as generally conceived) is 
essentially something existing at a given time^previous to which 
it was not* To perceive an event, so as to recognise it at such, 
is therefore to perceive its non-existence at one time followed by 
its existence at another* But, argues Kant, since we cannot 
perceive empty time, so neither can we perceive anything coming 
into existence after an empty time; I can,therefore, never perceive 
A so as to recognise it as an event,unless my perception of it is 
preceded by another experience. (73) But, says Kant, their 
successiveness does not enable us to distinguish experience as 
perceptions of events for, as he has already remarked in discussing 
objectivity, we may have successive perceptions of parts of a house 
which we regard as objectively coexistent* One distinctive feature, 
however, is discoverable in all perception of objective or event 
sequence, namely its exhibiting an irreversable order*
This section is bristling with difficulties which are the more 
serious since the rest of the proof depends on it*
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In the first place Kant does not make his meaning sufficiently 
explicit* This is serious enoUgh since on its interpretation 
depend both the passages intended role in the argument, and its 
ability to fill this* But even more serious is its inability to 
justify the desired conclusion on any of the possible interpretations* 
The words with which Kant opens the argument contending 
experience of objective sequence to be irreversible; *l also,note, 
in an appearance which contains a happening ' (74) suggest that he
is simply reporting what he has observed in experiences of objective 
sequence. Yet he proceeds to state that (a) perception of 
objective sequence 'can be apprehended in one order only; and (b^
'it is impossible’ for their order to be other than it is. AJii he 
concludes with the assertion; 'in the perception of an event there 
is always a rule that makes the order in which the perceptions (in 
the apprehension of this appearance) follow upon one another, a 
necessary order’* (75)
Kant might therefore be taken to mean either; (a) examination 
of experiences of objective sequence reveals these to be always 
distinguishable by their irreversible order; (b) the possibility of 
like experience presupposes its exhibiting such an order; (c) we are 
prepared to apply the title ’perception of objective sequence* to 
those experience series only, which we can suppose irreversible; or, 
(d) we can conceive experiences as constituting perception of 
objective sequence only if we can suppose their order irreversible.
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Were the passage given the first ot third of these intei^ 
prêtâtions, Kant could not justly suppose it capable of leading 
to the type of conclusion he thinks it instrumental in proving.
Were he regarding it as merely a generalisation from 
experience he could not justly think it asserting a necessary 
conclusion, since later in his discussion of the analogy he makes 
explicit his conviction that necessity is not empirically discover­
able. (7 6 ) But not only does much of the passage (including its 
closing sentence, quoted above) indicate that Kant supposed himself 
there to be maintaining a necessary conclusion, but it can fulfil 
tîne role intended for it in the proof only if so regarded. For 
clearly one cannot conclude that there must be a necessary succession 
of events because we have experiences which derive from such a 
sequence, unless he holds those experiences must derive from such 
a sequence* And similarly with the conclusion that our manner 
of conceiving certain experiences presupposes our regarding them 
as so derived*
Again,were he supposing it an assertion about how we are 
prepared to apply the title * perception of objective sequence’, he 
could justly regard it as stating no more than the use of that term 
and the character of anything to which we may consistently apply it* 
yet he clearly supposes himself vindicating an assertion about all 
experiences of a given type; and it has been seen that if the 
passage is to play the role he intends for it, he must,moreover, be 
vindicating one which ascribes necessity to existants*
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I think, therefore, that this, together with the wording of 
most of the passage, indicates that Kant gave it either the second 
or fourth of the three interpretations listed above. (That he was 
not claiming to infer objectivity from irreversibility has, i think, 
been made sufficiently clear by Kemp Smith, gwing, and Baton), (77) 
The second of the possible interpretations cited, though 
rendering the passage capable of leading to the type of conclusion 
Kant is trying to prove, cannot enable it to fulfil the role he 
intended* For its irreversibility can justly be held a pre­
supposition of experience of objective sequence - in any sense other 
than that of simple conventional definition - only if that experience 
is distinct from the series of events of which it is called the 
perception, and the order of the former is derived from that of the 
latter* Thus, if A and B are other than, and independent of, my 
acts of perceiving, and A is followed by B; then if I can truly 
be said to observe that succession my perception of A must be 
followed, and cannot be preceded, by my perception of B. But if 
an experience sequence has no such relation to any independent 
series, then, even though it be in fact irreversible, I have^ground 
for supposing it must be* And Kant does not defend this premise 
until the second step of the proof, to which he supposes the first 
to lead* He cannot, therefore, assume it in the latter without 
invalidating the argument as a whole*
In the later proofs, as will be seen, Kant argues explicitly, 
that we must conceive perceptions as eadiibiting an irreversible 
order if we are to regard them as constituting experience of
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objective sequence. (The objection that this is no more than an 
analysis of the way we are prepared to use the term, will be 
answered below in discussing the later proofs). This is the line 
of argument most adequate to proving the type of conclusion Kant 
claims to be demonstrating; for the categories, whose application 
to experience he is trying to prove, are, for him,essentially ways 
in which we must conceive objects of knowledge. This, together 
with the inadequacy of the argument given any of the other possible 
interpretations, and the fact that given the fourth of the 
interpretations instanced above, the argument of the first proof 
is brought into line with that of the later ones, strongly support 
the view that the fourth interpretation is that intended by Kant.
On the other hcLnd, while the wording of most of the passage 
suggests the second interpretation; the fourth, though possible, 
is nowhere definitely suggested. And, indeed, if as Konp Smith 
suggests, this is the earliest of Kant’s proofs of the Second 
Analogy, their chronological order corresponding in general to a 
development in his thought, (78) it is not improbable that it should 
represent an inadequate line of argument later discarded - as it 
were an experimental effort to reach the desired goal - which helped 
to suggest a more fruitful line of approach. I hesitate, therefore, 
to say with certainty whether Kant intended the second or fourth 
int erpretat ion.
In addition to the problem of interpretation, the passage 
provokes several difficulties, which are the more unfortunate in that 
they are irrelevant to its central argument.
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The most serious of these is the reiteration of Kant's con­
tention that experience is always successive (79) (understood in 
the sense of merely successive, since he treats it as a denial that 
we experience coexistence). Ewing has criticised this view very 
fully, (8 0 ) pointing out its inconsistency witjr both the results of 
introspection and the possibility of perceiving spatial relations 
(a possibility undeniably fulfilled). As Ewing and paton remark, 
(81) this mistaken notion is quite irrelevant to Kant’s argument.
All he needs to show in contending that irreversibility, and not 
succession, is the criterion by which we distinguish experience of 
objective sequence, is that objective sequence and coexistence are 
not asserted on the ground of sequence and coexistence, respectively, 
in our perceptions. And indeed, this latter is all that Kant’s 
sole defence of his view (namely our postulating successive 
perceptions of the objectively coexistent) can prove.
On the other hand, while in attributing mere succession to our 
experience Kant is, in this respect, postulating more than his 
argument requires, in another respect he is asserting less than 
this. And similarly, he actually proves less than he should*
For his argument treats irreversibility as the sole distinguishing 
mark of perception of objective sequence. But he says absolutely 
nothing to disprove the assertion that perception of objective 
sequence is distinguished by irreversibility together with something 
else (other than succession vhich is presupposed in irreversibility). 
Doubtless he supposed this needless because he regarded this 
assertion as obviously false, but he should at least have stated
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this much tn justifying his position*
As has been seen, Kant proceeds - in the second step of this 
proof - to argue that the irreversibility he holds presupposed in 
experience of objective sequence, is capable of being asserted with 
certainty only if its order is derived from that of objective events.
I have already instanced this paragraph as apparently treating 
'the series of events perceived* as distinct from 'our perceptions 
of them* (82). And later, (83)^ in discussing the first section of 
this proof, I argued that unless this distinction is maintained, the 
derivation of the order of perceptions from that of events perceived 
being asserted in terms of it, the irreversibility #f of the former 
cannot justly be held necessarily true. And certainly, given the 
ordinary use of 'derive*, one cannot talk of*deriving the order of 
A from that of B* unless A and B are distinct. If A and B are 
merely different names for the same thing then, if one adopts the 
common usage, one must sqy rather that the orders of A and B are 
identical.
It might be argued that in order to speak legitimately (according 
to ordinary usage) of deriving the order of perceptions from that 
of their objects, it is necessary to distinguish these only as act 
and content of perception without reference to anything but the 
experience involved. I do not think so. For if the object of 
a perception is nothing apart from its content, then it would seem 
clearly contradictory to speak of deriving the order of perceiving 
from that of its objects; since insofar as these are distinguishable, 
on this view, the latter could not be said to have an order
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separable from that of the former*
Kant must, therefore, I think (as I indicated above), be 
regarded as arguing here that ’experience of objective sequence* 
is distinguishable^ only because its order derives from that of 
another independent of it* And since he denies that experience 
can inform us of the nature of things as they are in themselves 
independently of our experiencing them, he can only suppose this 
independent order to be that in which things in themselves must 
impinge on any human experience under given circumstances, the 
manner and order of that impingement being determined by the 
character of human experiencing* In other words, in my view^ 
detailed consideration of this paragraph but confirms the opinion, 
expressed above, that it presupposes the conception of objectivity 
I have ascribed to Kant*
The above interpretation is supported, as has been indicated,
(84) by the statement, appearing later in the second section, that
subjective succession  .... * does not by itself prove anything
as to the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object**
(8 5) For according to ordinary usage, to deny that the order of A
indicates that of B, is to igply a distinction between A and B.
An original usage is indeed possible making the manner in which the
»
manifold is connected in the object synonymous with *an 
irreversible experience series*, a usage according to which the 
sentence quoted asserts that AB*s irreversibility cannot be 
inferred from the mere fact of its being an experience series* But 
it is reasonable to suppose that if Kant intended so uncommon an
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usage he would have been at pains to make this clear* Instead 
he never suggests it.
To suppose that he did intend such an usage is indeed to 
ascribe to him an indefensible position. The preceding pages 
should have revealed that if objective sequence is merely 
irreversible experience series, we have no basis for discovering 
an experience sequencers irreversibility. To deny perception's 
irreversibility to be inferrible frcxn its successiveness can then 
justify only an admission of ignorance,not a positive conviction 
such as belief in universal causation*..as Kant supposes*
AS has been indicated above, (86) I think the argument of the 
second section sound, but that as Kant offers no independent ground 
for holding that experience of objective sequence either must be, 
or must be conceived, irreversible, he has not adequately justified 
the role ascribed to it in the proof*
The third and last section of the proof consists, as has been 
seen, in inferring from the necessary succession of perceptions of 
objective sequence (regarded as established in the first stage), that 
of the events whence the second stage argued the order of those 
perceptions to be derived. This final step is, to my mind both 
justifiable and important, only if the view of objectivity J have 
attributed to Kant is adopted. For it is difficult to see how 
ab's derivation from AB can be regarded as justifying ascription of 
necessity to the latter,, unless either ab is such that it cannot but 
derive from a necessary succession AB or else we cannot conceive 
ab,as such, unless we can regard it as derived from sudi a necessary
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succession. As has been seen, on this view of objectivity, to 
say that experiences can oaiy be irreversible and hence constitute 
what we ordinarily call perception of objective sequence,^if their 
order derives from that of events, is to say that to be such the 
order of experiences must derive from that in 'which our 
perceptions stimulated by things in themselves must occur in 
virtue of our manner of perceiving*
Ewing,^ (not with reference to this proof in particular) 
endeavours to defend the leap from irreversible experiences to 
irreversible events on a realist view)f.
He argues that if naive realism were true and sense data 
parts of objedts independent of the percipient, one could not 
-ascribe irreversibility to experience without also attributing 
it to that in such objects of which one thought it the perception
(87)
If, on the other hand, he continues, a realist representative 
theory of perception is true, then this means that when an event 
occurs a percipient must have experiences stimulated by it^if 
certain conditions are fulfilled), while one can experience an
event only if there is in fact an event independent of his
experiencing which produces it. But, argues Ewing, on this view 
if the perception of A entails that of B (A and B being objective 
events) than A must entail B; for then A (under given conditions) 
entails the perception of A, this in turn entailing perception of
B which itself entails B. (88).
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Neither of these arguments could justify a realist in 
inferring the necessary sequence of events from that of 
perceptions* For, as Ewing’s account implies, the realist 
supposes the perception of B never follows that of A unless B 
follows A# And if perception of B necessarily follows that of 
A only when A is followed by B, the perception of A may occur 
without being followed by that of B should A occur without being 
followed by B, Nor would this be altered by the identification 
of object and content of experience* For instance, the fact 
that the sounds i hear were themselves events independent of 
my hearing them would not preclude my experience necessarily 
containing them in a certain order simply because this was the 
order in which they entered it, though they did not do so 
necessarily* It would be analogous with the passage of a nimber 
of billiard balls in succession over the s ame piece of table* 
given that they are travelling in a certain order they must 
necessarily pass over any part of that piece 6n that order, Aether 
their travelling thus at all is itself necessary or not*
Even were the realist entitled to use Ewing's argument it 
would not entitle him to assert that one event is always 
necessarily followed^&nother, but only that this is so under the 
conditions given which its perception is possible (these 
including the existence of a percipient in a position to have such 
a perception). Nor can Swirg's specifying these conditions in 
formulating his proof alter this*
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paton supposes the last step of Kant’s argument defensible 
only if a succession of events is identified with the experience 
of such a series. Thus he writes: ’Kant appears to be arguing 
that since the event A and the Event B are, on critical principles, 
only the content of sense perceptions a and b, the attribution 
of necessary succession to a and b (on the ground of the 
objectivity of the succession a b ) is ipso facto sun attribution of 
necessary succession to A and B; and the necessary succession is 
in both cases identified with succession in accordance with a rule’.
(89).
But if a b is identical with ab, then to say B must follow A 
because b must follow a, if not mere tautology, is simply to make 
explicit a claim to two alternative methods of saying the s ame 
thing, together with the assertion that any adequate description of 
a series must affrim the same relations between its manbers.
Moreover, both in the sentence quoted and a little earlier, (90) 
Paton affirms that for Kant the perception of B must follow that of 
A in virtue of the succession of B on A, and it has already been 
seen that if one knows only that b necessarily follows a because 
B follows Ag then one cannot infer the necessary succession of 
B on A from that of b on a.
To sum up, four points emerge from examination of the first 
first edition proof of the Second Analogy.
(a) Kant does not make the nature of its first step clear.
I think he must be supposed to be contending either that perception 
of objective sequence is essentially irreversible, or else that we
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cannot conceive experiences as perceptions of objective events 
unless we can suppose the former irreversible. And, though I 
hesitate to say with certainty which of these interpretations Kant 
intended, I think he could maintain only the latter consistently.
(b) whatever his interpretation of the first step, he offers 
no justification of it - giving no indication as to "whether it can 
be proved independently of the second, and thus leaving this and 
the third unsupported.
(o) The second step taken by itself is sound, though as has 
been seen it cannot play the role Kant intended for it because the 
first has not been shown to be independently defensible*
(d) The last step - namely inferring the necessary succession 
of events from that of perceptions - is justifiable only if the 
conception of objectivity I have attributed to Kant is so.
Thus the proof as a whole can be shown to justify its
conclusion only if the two following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) that the essential irreversibility of experience of objective 
sequence (or rather our manner of conceiving it as such) can be 
shown to be demonstrable independently of the deriviation of the 
order of such perceptions from events; and that (2) the conception 
of objectivity I have attributed to Kant be shown to be adequate.
Schopenhauer has criticised this proof on the ground that ’the
subjective sequences’ it considers are no less objective that 
’the objective sequences’ from which they are distinguished* For, 
he argues, not only is the order of our perceptions of the 
coexistent determined as much as that of our experience of the
526.
successive, but the former like the latter is determined by the 
motion of a body - the only difference being that in perceiving 
the co-existent it is the percipient (or part of him) that moves(91) 
Against this criticism Ewing urges this latter difference to 
be precisely that on which Kant’s distinction rests, maintaining 
him to be saying we ascribe the order of our perceptions to an 
object when, and because, we suppose them determined by this.
Thus, he argues we do not suppose ’the order in which we perdeive 
the different parts of a house’ objective as we do not suppose it 
determined by that house, though were we ’observing not the house 
but our own movement s,,^ we should their assign objectivity to the 
latter - but in either case objectivity implies a necessary 
succession in our perceptions of vhat we call the object (92)
Kemp Smith argues (95) that Kant invites Schopenhauer’s 
charge insofar as he describes the distinction he is drawing 
simply as that between ’ subjective’ and ’ objective’ respectively, 
thus suggesting that he is contrasting the objective with the 
purely subjective. por ’if inner and outer experience are to be 
contrasted as two kinds of experience, there is, as Schopenhauer 
rightly insists, no sufficient ground for regarding changes due 
to movements of the eye as being subjective and those that are due 
to movements of a ship as being objective’. But he contends that 
though Kant thus invites this criticism it is ineffective against 
him save as showing the inadequacy of his terminology, since he 
cannot be supposed intending to regard perception of the coexistent 
as purely subjective. This supposition is unnecessary for the
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purpose of the argument where the distinction between subjective 
and objective sequence is used’only to make clear the fairly 
obvious fact that while in certain cases the order of our 
perceptions is subjectively initiated, in other cases we apprehend 
the subjective order of our experiences as corresponding to, and 
explicable only through, the objective sequence of events. ’ (94) 
Moreover Kant’s ’Critical principles definitely commit him to the 
view that even sensations and desires are integral parts of the 
unitary system of^ law’, (95)
K«np Smith is clearly justified in denying that Kant can be 
supposed to be asserting perception of the coexistent to be purely 
subjective. This indeed is patent fran the fact that he is 
avowedly distinguishing perception of objective sequence from that 
of objective coexistence, and is further indicated by the ensuing 
discussion - in vindicating the third analogy - of the conditions 
of postulating objective coexistence.
And it is equally true that Kant, in common with most people, 
regards experience of objective sequence as distinguishable from 
that of the coexistent in that the former’s order is derived from 
that of the events of which it is the perception# But this alone 
does not suffice to defend Kant against Schopenhauer# Eor, as has 
been seen, the whole proof falls to the ground unless irreversibility 
can be regarded a criterion of perception of objective sequence 
independently of the latter’s derivation from the events perceived#
To answer Schopenhauer, therefore, it is necessary to show Kant 
to be right in ascribing irreversibility to perception of
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objective sequence in a sense in which it is not ascribable to 
perception of coexistence, irrespective of the source of the order 
of the perceptions concerned*
This I think possible, whether Kant’s argument as a whole be 
regarded as justifiable or not* For whereas whenever we say we 
perceive a sequence of events we think the order of our perceptions 
must correspond to the order of events of which we suppose them the 
experience, we suppose we can observe the coexistent in a variety 
of different orders# It may be true that in any given instance 
we must perceive the latter in a given order if we move our eyes 
in a certain direction, but the crucial point is that on another 
occasion if we move our eyes differently we shall see them in a 
different order, and we should cease to say we were perceiving the 
coexistent if this prophecy was unfmlfilled;> whereas we agree 
that no movement on our part can affect the order in which we 
observe events,if we perceive them at all, that the most it can 
do is to prevent our perceiving them# And that this distinction 
must hold, or at least must be conceived thus, for us to 
differentiate objective and subjective sequence as we do, is just 
the point which Kant is making in the first section of his proof#
It might be objected that on the view of objectivity I have 
attributed to Kant, the second step of the proof is unjustified^ 
on the ground that it is impossible to conceive objective sequence 
other than in terms of ordered perceptions if the latter* s order is 
not supposed determined by anything independent of the percipient# 
This seems to be suggested by K«ap Smith’s view that Kant’s position
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is ’subjectivist* except on rare occasions when he went so far in 
the opposite direction as to regard the order of perceptions as 
determined by things in themselves# But this is not so. For 
clearly) if I am so constituted that things in themselves must 
appear to me as though composed of, or exhibiting, events having 
a determinate order; then the order of my perceptions, though not 
determined by anything independent of me,is yet determined in 
virtue of their relation to such, and thus distinguishes them from 
a set of perceptions which either just happen to have a given order 
or are determined to a certain order in virtue of their relation 
to the percipient alone.
(b) The Remaining proofs#
The second first edition proof (9 6) reverses the process of 
the first# Wliile the latter argues from our distinguishing 
objective and subjective sequence, to the necessary succession 
of events; the former, starting from the hypothesis that there is
no necessary succession of events, argues that were this so it would
be impossible for us to distinguish objective sequence*
That we do in fact make this distinction is assumed in the
second proof, and this I think supports Baton’s contention that, 
whatever the date of the various proofs, in their final combination 
they are meant to form a continuous argument. For if the second 
proof were simply an independent addition flung into a group of 
distinct proofs, it is reasonable to suppose that having argued that 
were there no necessary succession of events we could not distinguish
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objective from subjective sequence, Kant would have proceeded 
to urge that we do in fact make this distinctionand therefore 
the denial of a necessary succession of events is false. The 
omission of this last step indicates that the second proof, like 
the remainder of the first, is intended to follow, and rest on, 
the first step of the latter - the second proof being as it were 
a rider to the first.
If this is so, it also explains and justifies Kant’s using 
the terms ’event* and ’object’ in the second proof without any 
attempt to make their meanirg clear, and his framing the whole 
proof in terms which leave its meaning doubtful if it is taken by 
itself. For if the second proof is meant as a rider to the first, 
then clearly the definition of objectivity preceding this is 
intended to do service for both.
Nor, assuming both to be adequate, is the second simply 
superfluous to the first. For since if our distinguishing 
objective from subjective sequence entails the necessary succession 
of events absence of the latter entails that of the former, 
danonstrating the latter entailment helps to support assertion of 
the former. The second proof is thus a useful confirmation of 
the first; if both are adequate. Indeed it is natural, polemically, 
to offer such confirmation.
If the second proof is interpreted in terms of the view of 
objectivity I have attributed to Kant, its argument runs as follows : 
If there is no necessary succession of events then we are aware 
only of the succession in which our perceptions occur; and can never
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say the objects of our perceptions have any order in their own 
right, so to speak, since there would be nothing in the way things 
appear to us to determine our perceiving them in a certain order.
Again the argument seems inexplicable and unjustifiable unless 
Kant holds the view of objectivity I have attributed to him. For 
if we can perceive things as they are in themselves, and that the 
events we observe occur in their histories, then (as has been seen) 
the fact that we were perceiving them, in the sense involving 
recognition of this fact (evidently the sense of ’perceive* intended 
by Kant), would be sufficient to enable us to ascribe order to the 
objects of our perception, if on the other hand, as I have 
supposed Kant to mean, the only possible objects of our perception 
are things, not as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us; 
then unless our manner of perceiving determines the order of 
perceptions stimulated by things in themselves,we have no ground for 
distinguishing these from perceptions ordered subjectively.
Kant’s writing in this proof that only if events necessarily 
succeed each other can we ’determine objectively which perceptions 
are those that really precede and which are those that follow’ (97) 
might seem to suggest that he is here identifying events with actual 
perceptions. But this interpretation is hard to reconcile with 
the sentence immediately succeeding: ’We should then have only a
play of representations, relating to no object; that is to say it 
would not be possible through our perception to distinguish one 
appearance from another as regards relations of time»^’, It would 
certainly seem unreasonable to write of ’ referring perceptions to
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an object* if there were no object distinct from them. And 
although it might be contended that ’appearance is here a 
synonym of * perception’ , if this were so it would seem con­
tradictory to speak of distinguishing ’one appearance from one 
another as regards relations of time’ in any sense not applicable 
to perceptions solely as mental states. Identification of events 
with actual perceptions is equally inconsistent with the statement, 
later in the proof that if ’we experience that something happens, 
we in so doing always presuppose that something precedes it, on 
which it follows according to a rule# Otherwise I should not say 
of the object that it follows. For mere succession in my 
apprehension, if there be no rule determining the succession in 
relation to something that precedes, does not justify me in 
assuming any succession in the object’. (98) In the first 
sentence the ’it’ which we suppose preceded by something on which 
it follows necessarily, is clearly the ’something’ happening which 
we experience; and since our experience always has a beginning, and 
Kant can hardly be supposed to be asserting anything so widely at 
variance with the facts as that his every perception of an event 
must have been preceded by another, the succession referred to 
cannot be composed of actual perceptions# If it were, Kant’s 
assertion would imply that we never experience an event, which is 
certainly not his intention# For the same reason the ’something’ 
that precedes’; in relation to -which the objective perception 
succession is said to be determined in the third sentence, cannot 
itself be an actual perception#
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And if it be urged that Kant, while not identifying events 
with perceptions, is treating assertions concerning events merely 
as statements about the possibility and actual occurrence of 
perceptions, then the language of this passage can no longer be 
adduced as most readily suggesting one's view# For dearly the 
phrase 'perceptions that really precede' no more naturally 
suggests a complex assertion concerning the possibility and 
occurrence of perceptions than it does the phrase 'objects of 
perception having an order independent of that of actual 
perceptions'* Ahd, indeed, since the term 'perception' is 
sometimes loosely applied to an object of perception regarded as 
distinct from the perceiving, and 'real* is often intended to 
distinguish what is so regarded from that having no existence 
apart from particular experiences, it suggests the latter phrase 
far more readily than it does the former#
The view that the first and second first edition proofs are 
to be taken together as complementary, is supported by their being 
followed (99) by general remarks vindicating Kant's method of 
proof and making explicit his claim to reconcile (a) the postulation 
of causation in the sense of necessary connection; (b) the 
Empiricist assertion that we derive all significant conceptions 
from experience; and (c) the Humean denial of the possibility of 
observing necessary connections# These remarks open by noting 
the apparent inconsistency of Kant's proofs with the ctxnmon view 
that we derive the concept of causality inductively# This is 
followed by a reiteration of Hume's contention that this method 
could never justly lead to the conception of necessity integral
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to the common notion of cause* We must, Kant avers, put 
necessity into experience before we can discover it there* But,
he adds, this does not mean we could formulate the concept of 
causality adequately independently of experience*
The two latter assertions may at first sight seem contradictory; 
on the view of objectivity I have attributed to Kant, however, not 
only are they mutually reconcilable, but the first cannot b e true 
unless the second is. For if the 'putting into experience' is 
extrinsic to experience as we know it, being the human reaction 
to stimulation by things in themselves, transforming thera( as it 
were) in the act of impinging; our consciousness of what we thus 
automatically contribute to experience can be discovered only by 
analysing experience itself (not merely with regard to its content 
as in induction, but in respect of its basic diaracter and pre­
suppositions)*
Consideration of the demand for an empirical defence of 
causality naturally suggests to Kant the attempt to offer empirical 
support for his position, his avowed intention in the third proof 
( l oo) which follows immediately* Continuity is thus still 
preserved* Moreover, if my account of the first two proofs is 
correct, and the avowed intention of the third sincere, Kant 
certainly did not intend the latter as a restatement of either 
of the former which I supposed him to base, not merely on the 
results of observation, but on the presuppositions of our 
experience of objective sequence# Naturally, since he is 
intending to offer empirical confirmation of conclusions he has
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previously argued deductively, he again discusses our oriterian 
of objectivity in general, before proceeding to examine our 
postulation of objective sequence in particular#
Just as in the first step of the first proof, where he must 
be supposed to be examining the logical presuppositions of 
experieiD e, Kant confuses the issue by using language suggesting 
psychological generalisation; so now, when his argument is 
avowedly empirical, he introduces deductive grounds for its 
conclusions. (There is, of course, no inconsistency in 
intwcidcing deduction into an inductive argument to clarify the 
implications of a generalisation, so as to be able to test it more 
adequately, is hardly precise to apply the terra induction
to such a process as a whole - but this is not -vrtiat Kant is doiig 
here). Thus he argues "Objective meaning cannot consists in the 
relation* (of a representation) t^o another representation (of 
that which we desire to entitle object), for in that case the 
question again arises, how this latter representation goes out 
beyond itself, acquiring objective meaning in a ddition to the 
subjective meaning', (lol) He repeats the argument that 
objective succession cannot be inferred from subjective since 
all experience is successive, and argues that to recognise X 
as an event is to recognise its having a definite position in 
time, that latter being possible only if an event follows 
necessarily on something.(102).
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Yet it would be unjust to say that, having explicitly stated 
the intention of offering empirical confirmation of his conclusions, 
Kant proceeded to frame purely deductive arguments. For more 
than once in the course of this proof he writes as though 
attesting empirical fact* For instance, in discussing the 
criterion of objectivity in general, having dismissed with a 
deductive aipgument the view that this lies in the relation of one 
representation to another^ he proceeds to ask 'what new character 
relation to an object confers upon our representations.....I and 
concludes that we find........that only insofar as our represent­
ations are necessitated in a certain order as regards their time 
relations do they acquire objective meaning'. (103) And again he 
asserts as though merely stating observed fact 'the manifold of 
representations is always successive'; and *iranediately I 
perceive or assume that in this succession there is a r elation to 
the preceding state, from which the representation follows in
conformity with a rule, I represent something as an event.......
that is to say I apprehend an object to which I must ascribe a 
certain determinate position in time - a position which in view 
of the proceeding state cannot be otherwise assigned!. (loÇ.)
This latter statement is immediately followed by the deductive 
argument, mentioned above^  that it must be true; but there is no 
indication that its truth is regarded as resting solely on this, 
rather does the manner of its statement suggest the reverse*
I think, therefore, the introduction of deductive arguments into 
this proof is most probably due to a misguided zeal which
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prevented Kant from being content merely to state what he judged 
to be empirical evidence without weeking to confirm it 
deductively in its turn, regardless of the fact that this^was^^c^ 
only irrelevant to, but obscured the whole point of, this proof,
paton (105) thinks the third proof adds nothing to is 
predecessors; and the view that it is no more than a restatement 
of what has gone before is shared by Kamp Smithy (lo6) though the 
latter regards it as improving on some of this, describing its 
final paragraph as 'a much clearer statement’ of the argument of
A192-3=B238-9.
It has been seen that the proof was not intended so. Nor 
do I think its deductive accretions can be so regarded. It is 
true that both its concluding paragraph and the previous proofs 
argue,in effect^that perception of an existent having an objective 
temporal position presupposes universal causality among events; 
but Kant reaches this conclusion by two different methods in the 
course of his discussion. In the first proof he has been seen to 
argue that in distinguishing experiences as perceptions of events 
we recognise them to be irreversible^which latter presupposes the 
universal causation of events. But in the third proof he argues 
directly (l07) that for us to recognise something as having 
temporal position is to recognise its following necessarily on 
another. And since the closing paragraph of the third proof 
urges explicitly that we can recognise a’s having a definite 
temporal position^only by recognising it to be preceded by something 
on which it follows necessarily, (lo8) it would seem more correct
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to regard this as a prestatement of what is to come rather than 
a restatement of that which precedes.
The third proof cannot be regarded as an independent 
vindication of the analogy. Insofar as it consists in attesting 
empirical evidence it can confer only probability whereas Kant 
thinks the analogy's validity certain. And, as has been seen, 
the passage preceding this proof makes it clear that Kant himself 
does not suppose empirical evidence alone capable of vindicating 
the Analogy. Nor can the deductive addition be regarded as an 
independent proof, as the premise on which it rests^ that 'only 
by reference to what precedes does the appearance acquire its 
time relation - is not defended as it is in^succeeding proof.
This seems to confirm the view that;in its present form, this 
proof was intended solely as part of the larger discussion 
const it u&ps^  the whole section on the analogy. And that its place 
in that section is not fortuitous seems suggested by its closing 
lines' reading like a précis of the succeeding proof; thus giving 
it the appearance introducing this.
The fourth first edition proof (l09) i s  generally regarded 
as completely different from the others. The above remarks will
have shown that I do not share this view.
(MO)
Ewing argues^that though it differs from them, in contending 
that all events must have temporal position it implies the 
irreversibility of our perceptions of them which forms the basis 
of the other proofs. (l have just pointed out that it does not 
form the basis of the third whose argument^ insofar as it is
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deductive; is more akin to that of the fourth in its method).
paton suggests (in a footnote) (111) that the fourth 
proof might possibly be regarded as an elaboration of the view 
'that the passage of appearance in time is always in one 
direction*, which is implicit in A194=B239 and Al99=B244#
This latter view is, indeed, implicit in the whole section, as it 
is in Kant's treatment of time in general; and clearly if all 
the proofs are consistent with his conception of time, experience, 
and objectivity) they must have much in common - particularly as 
they are designed to defend the same conclusion. But this
does not prevent any one of them taking a different course from 
its fellows. Indeed, I have but now noted an important difference 
between the first and fourth proofs. And there is a yet more 
important distinction between them. The first takes for granted 
our perception of events as something undeniably given in 
experience, and is content merely to consider the distinctive 
character of such perception and its presuppositions. The 
fourth, on the other hand, opens with a deductive argument 
designed to prove that we must experience events. certainly 
this in its turn rests on the analysis of experience and its 
presuppositions (i.e. on the given); but it does take the argument 
a step further back, revealirg Kant’s view of the relation of 
perceiving events to the general diaracter of experience. This 
latter is a very important point which is neither nade expjiicit 
nor even suggested in the first proof.
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In the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant had already contended 
that time is an essential condition of phenomena by which he 
evidently meant that things can appear to us only as though 
occurring in an absolute time composed of continuously successive 
times. *Por neither coexistence nor succession would come within 
our perception (as, he assumes, they evidently do) if the 
representation of time were not presupposed as underlying them a 
priori. Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to 
ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time 
(simultaneously) or at different times (successively).
Time is a necessary representation that underlies all 
intuitions. We cannot, in respect of appearances in general, 
remove time itself, though we can quite well think time as void 
of appearances.’ (112) He opens the fourth first edition proof
of the analogy by arguing (113) that since all appearance must 
exist in such a time ^ this must be composed of a succession of 
events analogous to the succession of times.
Ewing (114) criticises the fourth proof on the ground that 
it consists in inferring the causal determination of an event by 
a predecessor from the analogy of events with successive times, 
which latter, he points out, could not serve to prove universal 
causation among events for the simple reason that the relation of 
one time to its successor is not that which Kant ascribes to cause 
and effect. There are,he points out, two senses in which a time 
can be said to determine its successor: (a) as that standing in
an assymetrical relation to it^  and thus delimiting the relation in
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which that successor can and must stand to it; and (b) in 
helping to characterise that successor in respect of its temporal 
relations. Neither of these senses of 'determine* is analagous 
with that in which a 'cause' as such is said to 'determine' its 
'effect', for a 'cause* does not merely precede its 'effect* 
but is an event of a kind which must be followed by one of 
another given type under specific conditions. He further 
supports his denial of identity between ' causal* and temporal 
determination by pointing out that so far as time relations alone 
are concerned the future may be said to 'determine* the past in 
exactly the same way as the past may be said to ' determine* the 
future, whereas an 'effect' cannot be said to 'determine' its 
* cause' in the sense in which a 'cause', as such*determines* its 
'effect *.
Ewing's criticism is sound if his interpretation of the 
argument is correct. For Kant normally treats 'dausation* as 
necessarily regular succession, and it is in this sense that he 
is intending to prove its universality among events. Nor, indeed, 
have 'causation* and 'succession* ever been regarded as synonyms 
either by plain men or philosophers. And Ewing's additional 
argument should have equal force for Kant, who does not suppose
(H0
'cause* and 'effect* determine each other in the same sense^^as 
Russell has suggested (ll6) they may be said to do.
But I do not think Kant intends the fourth proof to treat
I
' causal and temporal succession as analogous. Rather do i think 
him to be arguing: (a) since appearance must exist in time it
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must consist in events in temporal succession, as are different 
times; and (b) we can recognise an event as existing thus at a 
given tirae^  only if we can recognise it as being preceded by 
something on which it follows necessarily (For Kant, to speak 
of an appearance as having a given temporal position is 
synonymous witfcr saying we can recognise it as having one, since 
appearance is essentially how things seem to us).
Certainly the first paragraph argues that because appearance 
must represent the time series, earlier appearances must deteimine 
later ones as times do their successors, an event being possible 
only because preceded by another on which it follows necessarily. 
But this need not be taken to imply the identification of causal 
and temporal determination, since on my interpretation it is still 
legitimate to state the universal c ausation of events as a conse­
quence of the analogy between events and times. That he is in­
tending thus to state it as a consequence of that analogy, without 
suggesting causation to be itself analogous with succession,is 
indicated by his explicitly distinguishing the ascription of 
universal causality to events from the assertion that the earlier 
determine the later as earlier times determine their successors;
♦it is also an indispensable law of empirical representation of the 
time series that the appearances of past time determine all 
existences in the succeeding time, and that these latter, as events, 
can take place only in so far as the appearances of past time 
determine their existence in time, that is deteimine them 
according to a rule*. (117) Had he been intending argue on the
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basis of an analogy between 'causation* and succession, he would
surely have introduced the final contention that there is
therefore universal causation among events with a 'that is to say*,
'in other words', or some similar phrase, rather than a conjunction
effectively differentiating it from what has gone b efore*
Similarly when Kant writes in the second paragraph (118)
that the understanding carries the time order into appearances, 
ho tacJ)
assigning;^as a consequent ' through relation to the preceding 
appearances, a position determined a priori in he cannot
be supposed to be identifying causal and temporal determination; 
for he proceeds immediately to argue that since 'this determination 
of position* cannot be established by comparing events with 
absolute time,it must be discovered from the^causai determination 
of each event by an antecedent*
Although I do not think the fourth proof so blatantly open 
to objection as does Ewing, I still think it incapable of 
justifying its conclusion* For,like the first and second, it 
supposes ' causality* a necessary condition where it is not* The 
first proof has been seen to rest on the, to my mind, mistaken 
view that only if there is universal c ausation of events can we 
distinguish perception sequences, as we do, as irreversible and 
hence objective* In the fourth he assîmes that, failing the 
possibility of comparison with absolute time, an event's causal 
detemination by an antecedent to he our only criterion for 
defining it,as we must, as temporally placed* Yet clearly 
temporal position is definable in terms of temporal relations
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to other existants, if sufficient of these are known; and since 
temporal and causal relations are not identical, this means 
there is no need to introduce causation for the purpose* It 
might perhaps be thought that, at this stage of his arg’oraent, Kant 
is assuming the conclusions of the first two proofs, his present 
assertion that recognition of temporal position presupposes the 
universal causation of events being intended to rest on these.
If this were so it would not save his argument, since these proofs 
have been seen incapable of justifying their conclusions. But 
Kant's language indicates that it is not so; were he discussing, 
not a criterion for defining temporal position, but the condition 
of a certain manner of perceiving, the possibility of impossibility 
of comparison with absolute time would be irrelevant.
The paragraph a 200“1 = B245-6 in Kemp Smith's translation
is apparently meant as a bridge between the fourth and fifth
proofs. It opens by stating the results of the two s tages of
the fourth proof from the point of view of experience, and not
its object. 'That something happens is, therefore, a perception
which belongs to possible experience. This experience becomes 
. .
actual when I regard the appearance as determined in its position 
in time, and therefore as an object that can always be found in 
the connection of perceptions in accordance with a rule'. (119)
And the assertion that causality is thus a condition of all 
objective knowledge of succession, in its turn, reads as introductory 
to the fifth proof which proceeds 'The proof of this principle 
rests on the following considerations', (12o) As paton remarks 
(121) the wording of b246=a 201 is unfortunate in tliat 'the
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principle of sufficient reason* is used as a synonym for 
’causation*, since Kant certainly does not think ’causation* 
analogous with * sufficient reason* as this latter is defined by 
Leibniz and generally used by subsequent philosophers* 
presumably Kant thought himself entitled to use the term because 
he liad left no doubt that he supposed * causation* (in his sense 
of the term) the only type of explanation discoverable among 
phenomena.
The fifth p r o o f i k e  the first two, rests on the distinction 
between objective and subjective sequence. it is briefer than 
the first^  and lays more emphasis on the connection Kant asserts 
between the irreversibility of objective perceptions, and their 
being ©f being ’of* causally deteimined event sj whereas the first 
tends rather to obscure this by being broken up into sections.
On the other hand^the fifth proof is less explicit as to the 
distinction between perceptions and events perceived.
Again Kant, this time in defining an event, fails to make 
explicit whether he is simply giving an account of common usage, 
stating an empirical fact, or affriming an intrinsic pre­
supposition of our experiencing an event. The latter inter­
pretation is that required to justify his argument, and^J thinly 
(on the ground of his general attitude) that which he most 
probably intends.
The language of this proof (tiS^ is unfortunate in that it 
asserts ’All empirical knowledge involves the synthesis of the 
manifold by the imagination’(123) which suggests experience to
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be produced by a conscious process, which is clearly a 
contradiction in terms.
This suggestion is again conveyed in the proof added 
in the second edition, (124) which describes 'connection* as 
* the product of a synthetic faculty of imagination* * This proof 
appears to do little more than summarise the conclusions of the 
first, second, and fifth, in the first edition; to conceive an 
objective sequence it is necessary to regard successive states 
as occurring in a necessary order; they can be conceived so 
only in terms of a pure concept, namely that of causation. The 
distinctive role of this proof seems to lie in its prefacing the 
detailed discussion with a concise statement of Kant's position.
(c) General Remarks - Summary.
It has been seen (125) that Kant failed to justify his in­
ferring the necessary succession of events from the irreversibility 
of our perceptions of them. And it has further been observed that 
only definite temporal correlation, and not causation, is 
required for the definition of temporal position. On the other 
hand, J do not think Kant open to the criticism levelled at him by 
Prichard, that he is positing a conscious process to consciousness 
of objective sequence, although his language sometimes suggests 
this* His treatment of experience^ in general seems to make 
it clear that the conditions which he enumerates are, to him, 
presuppositions implicit in it, and not the objects of
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some self-contradictory conscious pre-consciousness. That he 
is not postulating a process to awareness of objectivity^ in 
particular^ seems sufficiently attested by his treating such 
awareness as basic to all experience, the proof of this being 
no less than the aim of the Transcendental Deduction.
Further though I do not think his arguments substantiate 
their conclusions, nor am I aware of any which could show causality 
(in Kant’s sense especially) a necessary presupposition of 
experience; I see no prima facie objection to such a proof.
For Kant seems justified in supposing that universal'causality 
among phenomenal ^ in the sense of experienceable ^ events would be 
vindicated could it be shown a condition of our experiencing any 
such. "Where his arguments fail is in their attempt to show it 
to be such a condition.
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iv» Substance and Reciprocity.
AS Êwing remarks, (126) no discussion of Kant’s treatment of 
causality is complete without some reference to the first and third 
analogies, the principles of permanence in substance and of 
coexistence through reciprocity.
The main proof of the first analogy in both editions resembles 
the fourth first edition proof of the second in that they rest on 
our inability to perceive time, arguing that because of this the 
analogy’s exemplification in experience is presupposed by our 
recognition of temporal relations. with regard to substance or 
permanence (which Kant treats as analogous)^ neither succession nor 
coexistence can be perceived save in relation to the permanent; 
and since time itself cannot be perceived, the permanent in relation 
to which they may be perceived must lie in the appearance which 
exists in time. paton remarks (127) that it ’would be very 
peculiar’ if substance as conceived by Kant could not be perceived 
since it is introduced to supply the permanence we cannot perceive 
in time itself*. I do not think this follows, however. Kant is 
explicit that a category is a manner, not of perceivirg , but of 
conceiving; so there seems no objection to supposing him to be 
arguing that because we cannot recognise temporal relations by 
relating them to time, our doing so is possible only because we 
conceive experience in terms of^permanent existent. (This latter, 
of course, entails that things in themselves must appear to us so 
that the perceptions they stimulate can be conceived as deriving 
from, or being ’of’, a permanent existent).
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Kant’s ’substance* differs from the continuants postulated by 
commonsense in that he regards it as indestructible. Furthermore^ 
it must be one and not many^ since he maintains (128) that no coming 
into existence can be perceived unless conceived as an alteration 
in something persisting through the change;which, if true of all 
change, can only mean that there is a single substance underlying 
it. That this, was Kant’s meaning is indicated by his explicitly 
identifying substance with matter in the second edition^ (12 9) 
evidently regarding matter as homogeneous in its basic element, 
apparently regarding light (13o) and the ether postulated by his 
predecessors and contemporaries (131) as forms, or specially 
rarefied arrangements, of it.
In postulating the indestructivility of substance Kant’s 
picture of the phenomenal universe is akin to that of Aristotle 
who has been seen to hold that while its basic elements are trans­
formed one into the other^ none is ever completely destroyed so that 
nothing that was in it remained. And Kant’s view that we must 
conceive all phenomenal change as occurring in a persistent 
substratum is reminiscent of the Aristotelian contention that 
’matter’ is a presupposition of all ’causation’ and hence of all 
change.
Prichard maintains (132) that having treated the first analogy 
as though it were presupposed by the other two, Kant appears to 
forget this, proceeding to offer independent vindications of the 
latter. This view seems unjustified, however, since to say that
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we can conceive neither objective sequence nor objective 
coexistence save in terms of permanent substance, is not to deny 
that additional and distinct conditions are required for the 
recognition of each so that our distinguishing either may be re­
garded as arguing an additional presupposition of experience.
Prichard also contends (133) that despite his protestations to 
the contrary, Kant’s vindication of the first analogy is ’dogmatic’ 
in that it argues from the nature of change and not from the 
possibility of experiencing it. This seems clearly unjustified.
The second edition addition to the main proof argues that ’all 
change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in 
this substratum, (i.e. substance) and through relation of the 
appearances to it. ’ And sü.though the main first edition proof
contains assertions like ’Without the permanent there is therefore 
no time relation*^ which taken in isolation suggest Kant to be speaking 
of change rather than the conditions of our perceiving it; that this 
i^ot his intention is clear^  both from his repeatedly making it 
explicit in this passage that he is referring to ’appearances’ (e.g. 
in describing permanence as ’the abiding correlate of all existence
(Hi)
of appearances* )^ a^nd from his conviction that time is merely a 
condition of our experiencing so that in discussing temporal 
attributes he must be considering the manner in which we experience. 
While in his argument from alteration alone (135) (which paradoxically 
is that quoted by prichard to substantiate his contention)^ Kant 
contends that because we cannot perceive empty time we can recognise 
coming into existence only by regarding it as a change in an
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existent persisting throughout it*
Kant has been criticised (136) for basing his vindication of 
the first analogy on our experience of temporal^rather than spatial, 
relations, since the substance he is postulating is clearly regarded 
as spatial and,indeed, he explicitly denies a non-spatial permanent 
in the world of appearance - regarding the phenomenal self as a 
mere series of isolated perceptions* And Kant himself seems to 
have felt at one time that space should have played a part in the 
proof* This reaction is natural when the first analogy is con­
sidered in isolation from the other two, especially when taken in 
relation to the rest of the Kritik* But Kant clearly regards it 
as basic to the other two, which latter he treats, and defends, as 
presuppositions of our recognising temporal relations. The 
introduction of space in vindicating the first would thus at best 
have needlessly complicated his argument, at worst destroying its 
continuity. Moreover," it is the temporal element in substance, 
namely its pennanance, with which Kant is primarily concerned.
I have already made it clear (137) that I do not think 
persistence attributable to the spatial alone, pointing out that 
consciousness of temporal sequence argues persistence in that which 
is aware of such sequence. And indeed Kant* s defence of the unity 
of apperception (138) serves to establish the same conclusion.
Kant, however, could not have used such an argument to vindicate 
the first analogy, nor have applied the category of substance to 
the percipient so regarded, since this^for him,is not a possible 
object of experience but merely a presupposition of experience 
whose existence can only be inferred.
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The main vindication of the third analogy is complementary 
to Kant's favourite method of defending the second. Our 
recognising perceptions as experience of objective coexistence^ 
presupposes our regarding them as reversible. We are not justified 
in so regarding them, however, unless their reversibility can be 
supposed necessitated by the objects themselves; and this is to 
attribute interaction to those objects.
It is not clear whether K&nt regards this interaction as con­
sisting merely in the reversibility of my perceptions of A and b 
being determined by the mutual positions of A and B ,j^nbvement of my 
eyes, and the action of light; or whether he is arguing a more 
direct interaction between A and B, such as the fire affecting the 
nearby ice in prichard*s illustration. (139) The former inter­
pretation seems the juater, hov/ever, for two reasons. (a) it is 
made explicit in A 213-4=B26o-l; and (b) it would render the 
argument comparable to the vindication of the second analogy which 
is clearly not meant to argue (as Schopenhauer mistakenly supposed) 
that if AB is an objective sequence A is the cause of B»
paton contends (140) that, as in vindicating the second 
analogy (on his interpretation) Kant is arguing from a necessity 
in our perceptions to one in objects identified with them. He 
apparently supposes Kant’s vindication of the third analogy to 
consist in arguing that our recognising perceptions as of the 
coexistent, and therefore as reversible, presupposes their being 
states of, and hence determined by, coexistent objects. But this 
is not to regard it as analogous to the defence of the second
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analogy which paton attributes to Kant; namely the argument that 
since perceptions of successive events must occur in necessary 
succession, and since these are identified with the events they 
are said to be ’of*, these latter occur in necessary succession*
To be analogous with this the vindication of the third analogy 
should argue that, since perceptions are identified with their 
objects, to assert the former to be necessarily reversible is to 
assert that their objects necessarily exist alternately; which is 
neither Kant’s argument, nor that attributed to him by paton. And, 
clearly, the arguraant i have attributed to Kant - namely that in 
order to regard perceptions as ’of’ the coexistent we must be 
able to regard their reversibility as determined by a network of 
causal connections involving those coexistents - does not require 
the identification of perception and its object, and is in fact 
assumed by the realist holding a representative theory of 
perception.
Kant’s treatment of the third analogy has been criticised 
(Idkl) as confusing coexistence and interaction betv/een objects 
with coexistence and interaction between their states* And 
Schopenhauer has argued (142) both that the third analogy is 
superfluous in that it asserts nothing beyond causality, and that 
it is self-contradictory in asserting reciprocity since this is 
saying that A may be both ’cause* and ’effect’ of B - which is 
to s^y that it may both precede and follow B#
The first and third of these criticism depend on the inter­
pretation of the third analogy which I have rejected. it
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becomes important to distinguish objects and their states in 
defining the analogy, only if it posits the direct interaction 
postulated between adjacent fire and ice. Tf the determination 
involved is merely the complex ordinarily assumed by eighteenth 
century science as integral to perception of the coexistent, it 
may be convenient sometimes .to refer to (phenomenal) objects (as 
in Kant’s example of the earth and moon) and sometimes to their 
states (as in considering the coexistence of heat and cold in two 
basins of water). Again, if my interpretation is adopted there 
is no need to suppose Kant to be regarding; the coexistent as 
’cause’ and ’effect' of each other, but merely as factors in a 
complex of ’causal’ connections. Kant, however, would not have 
been disturbed by Schopenhauer’s criticism since, although defining 
’causation’ in terms of succession, he admitted the possibility of 
simultaneity between ’cause’ and ’effect’, allowing that their 
sequence may be merely logical in the sense that given the ’cause’ 
the ’effect’ occurs while the converse does not hold.(143). H© 
could therefore have regarded one element in A as ’causing’ another 
in B, while yet another in B ’caused’ a further factor in A* He 
could not of course have regarded A as both ’.cause’ and ’effect* in 
the same respect, but this would not necessarily be involved even 
in asserting interaction between coexistent events.
Nor does it seem just, on either interpretation, to regard the 
third analogy as superfluous because the necessity it asserts is 
basically ’causal’. For the assertion that every event has a 
’cause' is distinct from both the statement that no two objects
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(or states) can coexist without interacting directly, and the 
contention that the coexistent can be perceived to be such only 
in virtue of a complex of ’causal* connections-linking them with 
the percipient in a certain manner*
Swing has pointed out (l^ *-4) that if experience is not held 
to be purely successive, objectively determined coexistence in 
perceptions could be regarded a condition of experiencing objective 
coexistence (as , indeed,it generally is). * - ■
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y. Conclusion.
To sum up. Kant supposes we perceive, or at least can claim 
to perceive^no more than^ things, not as they are in themselves, 
but as they must appear to us. This, he maintains, justifies 
us in making assertions which are necessarily true about the 
objects of our experience, since we can say that these must 
conform to any condition demanded to enable anything to be an 
object for us. The principles of substance, causality, and 
reciprocity are defended in this manner. We in fact distinguish 
tke coexistence and succession. This distinction can be derived 
neither from our perceptions taken by themselves, nor by 
reference to absolute time. It must rest therefore on our 
supposing certain experiences to be 'of# things appearing to, 
or impinging on, us as though successive or coexistent respectively, 
We can so conceive perceptions only if we suppose them stimulated 
by something impinging on us as though there were a single 
eternal substratum underlying all the changes and differences 
perceived in or conceivable on the basis of experiences so 
stimulated. W® can conceive perceptions as "of* the successive
<KS
only if we suppose that stimulating them to impinge on us ^though
exhibiting a series of events which is not only irreversible, but
exemplifies certain rules of invariable sequence^ the position of
each event being determined by such a rule. And we can regard
them as 'of* the coexistent only by supposing them stimulated by
CO nslshy\% m
something appearing to us as though^coexistent events, objects 
or their states, so related to each other and to ourselves both
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spatially^ and in terras of laws of invariable sequence, that 
under given conditions we must experience them alternately*
We can, therefore, say with certainty that the world with which 
experience presents us must appear to us as though constituted 
of changes and differences in a single eternal substratum; as 
though it contains irreversible event series analysable in terras 
of invariable sequences, either logical or actual; and as though 
containing coexistent states or dispositions of the basic substance, 
our experience of which is determined as reversible in virtue of 
a complex of invariable^ or causal,sequences*
The most obvious objection to this view is raised by the 
complexity of the conditions postulated as required for the 
recognition of objective temporal relations* We do, certainly, 
at an early age, regard experience of objective sequence and 
coexistence respectively, as determined, in a very simple manner 
by that in objects we suppose ourselves to be experiencing in 
conjunction with our relation to it* The child supposes that he 
sees the train first at A and then at B because: (a) he looks in
a given direction; and (b) the train is really first at A and then 
at B to be seen there* And he further supposes that if two bricks 
are side by side,^and he tttima his head first one way and then 
another, he will see them first in one order and then in another*
But it seems highly improbable that he clearly formulates this 
distinction early enough to be said to recognise objective sequence 
and coexistence only in terms of it. He certainly recognises
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objective coexistence long before %ye capable of postulating 
the complex causal situation which, on any theory of vision, is 
a condition of recognising coexistence given the view I have 
attributed to Kant* To this he would doubtless have replied that 
he was discussing the conditions of recognising temporal relations 
intelligently, that the infant may have some instinctive 
mechanism for making the appropriate distinctions but could never 
come to ’understand* them,as he normally does, unless things 
appeared to him in such a way that they could be supposed to 
determine his perceptions in virtue of their temporal relations*
It has been seen (145) that with regard to * causality* , an 
objective sequence need not itself be supposed necessary in order 
to be consistently regarded as rendering the succession of our 
perceptions so#
The relation of the permanent to change was discussed in 
earlier chapters, (146) where it was seen; (a) that perception 
of temporal sequence presupposes a percipient persisting throughout 
that perception; and (b) that changes supposed external to the 
percipient need be attributed to a continuant persisting throughout 
them,.only if it is held that nothing is inexplicable and that they 
would be inexplicable unless so conceived# In neither instance 
was the perception of change seen to presuppose the postulation 
of a continuant which was either eternal or the single basic 
substratum of all change#
Its failure to recognise that, under certain conditions, 
subjective coexistence is regarded as representing objective
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coexistence certainly constitutes a serious objection to Kant’s 
treatment of the third analogy* In its positive doctrine, however, 
(if my interpretation of this is correct) his discussion of this 
analogy has been seen to be far less open to criticism than that of 
the others* Since to assert any perception to be objectively 
stimulated and conditioned, even within the world of appearances 
which for Kant constitutes the phenomenal, is to suppose it 
determined by a network of ’causal* connections* Kant might,indeed, 
be criticised for introducing postulation of such a ’causal* complex 
as a condition of recognising reciprocity alone, since perception of 
objective sequence must be similarly conditioned* Kant’s failure 
to mention this, how^ ever, need not amount to its denial, as it might 
be due merely to a desire to concentrate on the presupposition of 
such perception considered most important. Indeed,Kant nowhere
claims to have enumerated all the conditions of perceiving objective 
temporal relations - the explicit aim of the vindication of the 
second analogy being, not an exhaustive analysis of perceiving 
objective sequence, but a proof of universal causality among events* 
In facb the only conclusion about causation to be derived from 
considering experience of the objective,as something distinct from 
the percipient, is that to assert such perception is to postulate 
some causal connections and is thus inconsistent with the denial 
that any such connection can justly be asserted*
It has been seen (147) that although Kant does not suceed in 
vindicating universal ’causality’, he is correct in supposing that 
every object of human experience must conform to any condition
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required for constituting such an object*
It was further seen (148) that, whatever its merits in 
its own right, the Kantian interpretation of experience cannot 
justify its claim to answer Hume on his own ground (i.e* while 
accepting his premise that necessity is not discoverable in 
experience). For it was seen that Kant’s conclusion is only 
justifiable if he supposes our experience necessarily conforms 
to certain conditions; and this contention, if it is more than 
a definition - as Kant should (and evidently does) suppose it to 
be - must rest on experience* For an analysis of what would be 
involved in a certain type of experience can justify no conclusion 
concerning actual hpman experience unless examination reveals the 
latter to be of that type*
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CHAPTER Vlll
SOIffl CAUSAL PROBLEMS RAISED IN THE PRESENT CENTURY.
(i) INTROgjCTION.
Prom Kant to the twentieth century may seem rather a wide leap
(though it is considerably less than that from Aristotle to St.Thomas
which was made above). It appears justified, however since, apart
from Bradley's discussion of the problems of continuity and the
possibility of isolating causal systems within the universe (both of
which are sufficiently relevant to the present chapter to merit son»
mention here), the nineteenth century seems to have made no original
contribution to the discussion of 'causation'. Mill, it is true,
in formulating his inductive methods, made explicit the regular
correlation he supposed postulated by causal law - a useful and
necessary service which helped to make discussion of the subject more
precise. But Mill did not penetrate deeply into the problems raised
by the postulation of 'causal* law, and indeed maintained a confidence
in 'universal causality* completely inconsistent with his empiricist
principles* Nor did he even seem aware of any serious difficulty in
their reconciliation*
As has been indicated (1) most modem British philosophers (2)
continue the process, begun in the seventeenth century, of identifying
'causal* connection with the type of uniformity asserted (or thought
to be asserted) by scientific law. Thus they regard an assertion of
* causal* connection between A and B as making or implying a statenent
of the form 'Whenever A then BE* ^ whose truth allows inference from the
existence of A to that of B and justifies prediction either of B or of
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something else. Thus they are committed to offering an analysis 
of such assertions which is both compatible with experience and 
self consistent.
Although there is wellnigh generàl agreement that » causation® 
spells uniformity, there is less unanimity as to whether this is 
all which is to be asserted in postulating a 'causal* law. The 
major subdivision of opinion is between those who assert a 
* causal* law to state a de facto universal correlation^and those 
supposing it to assert entailment of the 'effect* by its * cause'• 
Within both schools of thought further subdivision is possible, 
but it seems to be found only within the second. As Russell 
has pointed out, (3)*^  a de facto regular correlation, justifying 
the inference that B is probable given A, might quite well 
consist in A's generally being followed by B's (i.e. the truth 
of the law; * Whenever A then a B will probably occur*). But, 
as he also observes, the definition of 'causal* law in these 
terms seems to be generally rejected although both physics and 
sociology admit laws asserting regularity of frequency alone.
Those who regard a * cause* as enthaling its 'effect', on the 
other hand, may be divided into those who think all 'causation* 
analogous to voluntary behaviour in involving some conscious 
purpose, and those who do not. Activity in the 'cause* in the 
sense of its determining the change which is, or achieves, b 
se«ns clearly implied by any entailment view, but only because 
in this broad sense it asserts nothing but entailment. I think, 
however, that most of the philosophers who have described
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•causes» as »acting», ’operating» or ’producing», have in effect 
acdepted neither of these definitions, but rather one confining 
the title » cause* to » efficient causes* very much as these are 
conceived by Aristotle. For they evidently regard * causation* 
as essentially a series of events in the history of one continuant, 
which also constitute a process of change in another whose 
culmination is properly to be called the ’effect*. In other 
words they assimilate * causation* to action, not insofar as the 
latter is regarded as intelligent or purposeful, but insofar as 
it may be regarded as A altering B* Those who thus assimilate 
activity and 'causation* generally assume also an intrinsic 
connection between both the members of such event series and 
their conclusion, and between the character of the * cause* 
continuant and the possibility of certain ^ cause’ events occurring 
in its history. They therefore suppose more than bare uniformity 
to be involved in causal connection; but they have often regarded 
voluntary action as involving a non-necessary factor. They have 
held^for instance, that a statue cannot exist in the absence of 
certain events, nor these in the absence of a wlition, and that 
the occurrence of volition and events ( if these latter are 
sufficiently precisely defined) entails the existence of a statue; 
but they have also held that the volition need not have occurred 
in the first instance^ and that its revocation may or may not occur 
at any stage of the process inhibiting the latter. They have 
supposed other factors capable of inhibiting such a process, but 
the peculiar importance of their allowing the possibility of its
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voluntary suspension lies in their supposing this to exhibit 
neither necessity nor uniformity. Thés conception of * causation* 
thus differs in an important feature from that maintained by 
exponents of both the regularity and entailment view as these are 
understood today; it has been seen to be shared by plain men, 
Aristotle, St.Thomas (though these do not confine the title to 
agents so conceived) and Descartes; and Locke’s definition of
* causation* in terms of production seems to have rested on the 
same view (to mention only the more famous names). As, has been 
seen, (4) however, in discussing Hume, a philosophers may use * cause*, 
•operate*, and ’produce», as synonyms without intending any of the above 
definitions.
Most modem protagonists of both the regularity and the 
entailment view seem to assume that either a connection is intrinsic 
or it is not necessary. This means, not only that upholders of 
the entailment view reject the essentiily Kantian conception of
* causation*, but that both they and their opponents ignore the fact 
that particular, and even specific,connections could be necessary 
in virtue of universal de facto regularities alone (e.g. that if 
the laws of dynamics hold universally, whether their doing so is 
intrinsically necessary or not, the behaviour of billiard balls
on impact is entailed thereby) ^ (5) This leads on the one hand to 
a denial of necessity too wholesale to be consistent with the facts, 
and on the other to an unwarranted assumption that pointing to these 
derivative necessities is sufficient to establish natural laws as 
basically or absolutely necessary in the sense defined above (6)
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in discussing Leibniz* (But of this,more hereafter-).
From the character of their discussions it is clear that those 
defining 'causation* in terms of regularity and entailment, res­
pectively, are concerned not merely witji a theoretical question 
as to the type of circumstance in vhich they would be prepared to 
use the term ' cause* should these ever occur, but are convinced 
that we have good ground for postulating actual connections to 
which one of these definitions is applicable while the other is not* 
Since in discussing 'causation* they are concerned with a type of 
connection they suppose justly attributable to existants, they are 
under the further necessity of defining the conditions given which 
this attribution is defensible,and of justifying this definition*
'Discussion of causation* in Britain during the present century 
has thus had three main themes : (a) analysis of the notion of
universal correlations compatible with experience and capable of 
serving as a basis of inference (and especially of prediction);
(b) their interpretation; (c) our grounds for postulating them*
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il* The Analysis of Regular Correlation*
(a) Complexity in Causal Laws*
Both in his early essay 'On the Notion of cause*, (7) and 
in his recent hook on human knowledge, (8) Russell insists that 
no definition of 'causation* in terms of a correlation ■which is 
both simple and constant, is compatible with the usage of either 
plain men or scientists* Since most philosophers suppose that 
in discussing 'causal connection' their reflections are applicable 
to the 'causes' and 'effects' postulated by science and common 
sense, this point should be considered by those offering an 
analysis of * causation*,
It was seen,in discussing Hume, (9) that no simple uniformities 
are discoverable among actual impressions or sense experiences*
And, indeed, it seems elear that the majority of laws postulated 
by science and common sense cannot be regarded as asserting un­
conditionally uniform relations between two types of existent 
considered in relative isolation from their circunstanoes (even 
though those existants be defined in terms of continuants or 
objective events in the traditional sense of the term)* Fire 
warms, but not when it is merely seen throu^ a window; A*s 
faking a generous quantity of arsenic will be followed by his 
death if, and only if, he does not prcanptly take an emetic; a 
body will move in a straight line, unless deflected from its 
path according to the laws of gravitation or impact; etc*
Certainly there is no intrinsic impossibility in a correlation 
being both simple and constant, as there would be in a body being
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both round and square simultaneously; moreover there are grounds 
for supposing some propositions of the form ' 7/he never A then B* to 
express true statements about the physical world, when A and B are 
defined in relatively simple terms* Thus it seems reasonable to
suppose that whenever a bullet enters a man's heart he stops 
breathing. But this appears to be so, only when A and B are both 
essential parts of the same complex and at least one of them in­
separable from it. Thus a bullet entering A* s heart is an 
essential element in the complex event whidi is A*s dying in a 
certain manner, of which his ceasing to breathe is also part ; and 
while his ceasing to breathe may enter into other types of complex, 
the bullet's entering his heart cannot be fully described save in 
terms of the complex which is his dying thus. It might therefore 
be maintained that no unqualified assertion of the form 'Whenever 
A then B* is true of the physical world unless it is tautologous, 
and that therefore no such statement can properly be regarded as 
expressing a physical law* (it should perhaps be remarked that 
though this type of objection would be raised by most contemporary 
philosophers, it would not be felt by all modem scientists, as the 
contention of E.Ao Milne referred to above ( l o )  bears witness).
Often, as in the above illustration, when such an unconditionally 
constant correlation seems to obtain,the occurrence of A will not 
serve as a basis for predicting that of B since they will either be 
simultaneous or have so short a time interval between them that it 
will be impossible to discover the occurrence of A before B has 
taken place. This alone, however, need not disqualify such a
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connection for the title 'causal*, if this is to be applied only 
to those which may form a basis of prediction, since knowledge of 
a constant correlation b etween simultaneous terms may allow me 
to predict, not only sense experiences,but also objective events. 
Thus if I know that a bullet's entry into a man's heart is con­
stantly correlated with the simultaneous, or almost immediate, 
cessation of his breathy the sight of a bullet entering A's heart 
enables me to predict that if J place a mirror before his lips 
I shall see the latter remain clear; and it will also enable me 
to predict that if I fire at B’a heart,and shoot straight, he will 
probably cease breathing. Of course I might faint or die before 
I could inspect the mirror after seeing A shot, and B's heart, like 
that of, the man in Broad's illustration, (11) might be protected 
against my bullet by a metal plate; but I may have reason to 
suppose this improbable, and for so regarding the possibility of the 
bullet's being deflected from its course before reaching its 
target. My prediction can thus have no more than a high degree 
of probability - but as this is all most modem philosophers are 
prepared to attribute to any causal inference, this need prove no 
disqualification for the title. Indeed,both science and common 
sense are prepared to describe postulated constant correlations 
between simultaneous factors as 'causal', and base predictions on 
them. one example, namely the correlation asserted between a 
metal's temperature and its expansion,has already been noted (12); 
others which come readily to mind are those asserted between the 
presence of iodine in an arganism and its development, and that
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between absence of sunshine and the presence of rickets in animals 
living where there is little.
Nevertheless,even though one allow not only that there would 
be no contradiction in supposing an unconditioned constant 
correlation might hold between relatively simple types, but that 
such relations actually occur and may justly be called 'causal'; 
since most of the 'causal' connections asserted by science and 
commonsense are not of this nature, the definition of 'causation' 
in these terms would remain illegitimate to any one intending 
his treatment of the term to be consistent with common usage*
Indeed, even if a philosopher did not demand of his definitions 
consistency with common usage, he would be ill advised ta decide 
to apply the title 'cause' to simple constant correlations alone. 
For he is unlikely to be in a position to be sure that any 
experienced correlation is completely unconditional, while he may 
have very strong grounds for supposing that it holds under certain 
conditions even though he may be uncertain as to whether he can 
specify all that are relevant. The restricted definition would 
thus increase the uncertainty in the postulation of 'causal' laws, 
so reducing the utility of postulating them. Furthermore the 
commonly accepted, and well attested,conditional regularities 
still remain to be fitted into his picture of the physical world.
(b) Continuity.
It has been seen (13) that the conception of 'cause» and 
'effect' as contiguous (in Hume's sense of the term) is inconsistent
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with the natur$ of the temporally and spatially extended. Any 
definition capable of applying to temporal or spatial existents 
must therefore treat 'cause* and * effect' either as continuous 
or as separated by a finite interval. The former alternative 
is that usually adopted today, but the latter was accepted by 
Russell in his essay *0n the Notion of cause*. (14) I shall 
examine each definition in turn, considering it first with 
reference to temporal relations and then with regard to spatial 
ones, since (as has been already suggested)(15) the situation is 
not quite analogous with respect to each#
It has been seen (l6) that there is no intrinsic objection 
to the notion of a regular succession between events separated 
in time either by an interval or by other events# And it was 
further seen (17) both that the assumption of universal causation 
in terms of regular sequence involves the assumption of many such 
regular correlations between events separated one from another 
and that both science and common sense assume many to obtain(as 
for example in the connection they postulate between the lighting 
of a fuse and the explosion of a bomb# connected to it). Russell 
has pointed out (18) that the existence of a time interval^ no matter 
how small, between a postulated 'cause* and its ' effect * introduces 
an element of doubt into all our causal inference, since we can 
never be sure that sous thing might occur in this interval which 
would prevent the accustomed sequence being fulfilled. However, 
we often have good ground for supposing it unlikely that an
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accustomed sequence should be thus inhibited, and most modern 
philosophers think no 'causal* inference can yield more than 
a high degree of probability; there is,therefore,no reason why 
an exponent of the regularity view should not define causation 
as a sequence between events of different types separated by a 
time interval, which always occurs under certain conditions;—  
holding that we are often justified in prediction on the ground 
that we have good reason to expect one or more such sequences to 
occur*
On the other hand, it seems that those who regard a'cause' 
as entailing its * effect * cannot accept such a definition without 
qualification, since it appears impossible to regard the existence 
of A as entailing that of B if there is no temporal link between 
thou. It certainly seems inconceivable that A*s existence 
should entail that of B save in virtue of something continuous, 
or coexistent,with A and B, otherwise in what could the intrinsic 
link between them consist. It seems, therefore, that while 
anyone postulating an intrinsic connectionb etween 'cause' and 
'effect' is at liberty to apply the title to temporally separated 
events (as it is often convenient to do); he must make the proviso 
that these are always * causally' related in virtue, either of 
something coexistent witjn both, or else of a process continuous 
with both.
If, however, a 'cause' is regarded as being such in virtue 
of a series of events in its history, of which the last is regarded 
either as being or achieving the completion of, the 'effect' , then
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clearly «cause* and «effect* are ipso facto regarded as linked 
by a continuous process.
Clearly there is no more intrinsic objection to the notion 
of regular correlation between spatially separated events than 
there is to that of temporally separated ones. Once mere,such 
correlation is both implied by the postulation of * universal 
causation* in terms of uniformity, and assumed by both s cience 
and commonsense. Of this, the common interpretation of
gravitational phenomena is at once the most obvious and most 
hackneyed example. And,again,the assumption of science and 
commonsense is generally acknowledged to have so strong an 
inductive justification as to make its rejection unreasonable.
(l refer here to the rudimentary principle involved, and not, of 
course, to the precise formulation of the law or to its 
interpretation).
And once again the question is less simple for those 
postulating any sort of intrinsic connection between * cause* and 
* effect *. It certainly seems as difficult to conceive intrinsic 
connection between the spatially separated as between factors 
separated in time, if this does not occur in virtue of something 
linking them. Certainly anyone supposing constant correlation 
between spatially distant objects to be entailed by any physical 
connection between them would se©n to be implying a, continuous 
spatial link. If, for instance, he says that one body tends 
towards another because it sees, hears, or smells it, or because 
affected by electricity or radioactivity in that other, he is
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postulating a process linking those bodies in space.
It was seen above,(19) in discussing commonsense, that 
* causal* connection is sometimes postulated between factors 
between which a spatial relation is deemed impossible. And, 
moreover, the commonsense view of psychological phenomena as 
non-spatial seems justified. Russell has maintained (2q ) that 
thoughts and other psychological phenomena are to be regarded as 
located in the experient*s brain; but,as it seems clearly-non­
sensical to speak of a thought or feeling being to the right or 
left of another, this expedient does not serve to give these 
spatial position. For were Russell*s view justified,it would 
be significant to say that my geometrical calculations were to 
the left of my right hand neighbour's auditory image of Beethoven*s 
fifth symphony, and to the right of my left hand neighbour's 
visual image of Mont Blanc. But this cannot be so unless 
geometrical calculations, and auditory and visual images are the 
sort of things which can be conceived as standing in such 
relations one to another. It is significant to say that my nose 
is to the left of Brown*s ears and to the right of Smith's teeth 
precisely because noses, ears and teeth can be seen to be capable 
of standing in such relations irrespective of their attribution 
to this or that person. That this is just what we cannot do with 
regard to psychological phenomena is attested both by our 
experience of these, and by Russell*s need to appeal to something 
other than themselves in his attempt to give them spatial position.
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If, therefore, these psychological factors are regarded either 
as 'causes* or * effects', or as links in a chain connecting 
'cause' with 'effect*, then it must be admitted that not all 
'causes* are linked to their 'effects* by spatial continuity.
But then neither need it be maintained that some * causes' are 
separated from their * effects* by a space in which there is 
nothing helping to link them, since these distinctions do not 
apply at all to factors not describable in spatial terms.
(Anyone postulating * causes * or * effects* to which, like the 
Kantian thing in itself, temporal relations are not applicable, 
is in a similar position in being unable to define 'causation* 
in terms of any temporal relation). It would, however, be 
legitimate to assert that while not all 'causes* and * effects* 
are spatially (or temporally) related, those that are must,
(or cannot, as the case may be), be linked with each other by 
a continuous process.
It remains to aak whether 'cause* and «effect* could 
significantly be regarded as related by such a process.
Bradley maintained (21) it to be contradictory to postulate 
a continuous 'causal* process, on the ground that this amounted 
to regarding a 'cause', properly so called,as unextended and so 
non-existent. Broad has countered this argument by maintaining 
(a) that there is no reason to suppose that every state must 
persist for a finite time,and there are^indeed, grounds for denying 
this since it would involve rejecting the view that the first law 
of motion is immanent ; (22); and (b) that even were this not so.
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it would not exclude the possibility of continuous causality, 
since so long as there were enough states in the universe every 
moment could be the last of some given state so that the total 
condition of the universe was never the same at any two moments(23) 
Both Bradley* s argument and Broad* s reply to it seem to 
assume the assertion of continuity between 'cause* and * effect * 
to mean what Hume intended by the contiguity of * cause* and 
'effect*. For it is the essence of Hume* s position that the 
temporal and spatial are composed of indivisible parts which, 
as such, must be unextended,(24) (Though Hume apparently 
failed to see this latter). Hence temporal and spatial 
continuity (as opposed to Humean contiguity), if they are to mean 
anything at all, surely entail that whatever has temporal 
duration or spatial extension respectively, no matter how small, 
is further divisible temporally or spatially as the case may be#
Nor does a sprocess thus continuous seem incapable of constitut­
ing a 'causal* sequence consistently with either the regularity 
or entai Iment definition of * causation* # Surely the demands 
of the regularity definition are met if it is true of a 'causal* 
process that, however much it is subdivided, no section will be 
found which does not exemplify a law of regular correlation#
The demands of the entailment view#, are more complex, but equally 
amenable. For there seems no contradiction in supposing the 
occurrence of the whole process a B to entail that of BC con­
tinuously with it I, even though different sections of aB were not 
entailed by any antecedent ; thus there seems no contradiction
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involved in the comraonsense assumption that the occurrence of 
a given series of events entails the existence of a statue in 
its completion although none of those events is in itself 
inevitable# On the other hand, if the occurrence of entails 
that of BC, this can only ne an that the occurrence of any part of 
BC (under these circumstances at least) entails that of the 
remainder). The exponent of the entailment view could^therefore^ 
postulate continuous * causal* series, so long as he held that no 
subdivision of an entailed process is discoverable which is not 
entailed by a temporal or spatio-temporal predecessor. I think, 
however, that most exponents of the entailment view would hold this 
to be as true of the * cause* process AB as of the * effect * process BC, 
supposing this to be true of all processes#
Granted that exponents of both the regularity and entailment 
views could postulate continuous 'causal* series with self- 
consistency, it may still be asked whether they could do so 
consistently with the evidence# This can be discussed 
adequately only by one with a far better knowledge of modem 
science than I can claim; but I can hardly avoid venturing an 
opinion on the subject.
It might be thought that the discovery of unpredictability 
in electron jumps constituted positive evidence that many 
supposed 'causal* processes, and certainly all properly described 
as physical, cannot be analysed beyond a certain point without 
the discovery of elements exhibiting no regular correlations, 
and for the postulation of whose entailment there is hence no
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adequate ground# This view^ seems unjustified,since the
analysis of phenomena in terms of quantum physics is
irrelevant to the truth of statements concerning them regarded
as macroscopic. And surely this must be so if quantum physics
is to have any objective application, since its theories are 
of
capable^empirical confirmation only if the truth of certain 
assertions concerning macroscopic phenomena as such (e.g. 
measuîng instruments) is assumed. Thus, if it is possible 
to describe the motion of a billiard ball in terns of the 
ball's quantum analysis, doing so will presumably consist in 
ascribing that motion to a syst«n of quantum reactions, factors, 
or continuants (according to the interpretation of quantum 
physics adopted). And the unpredictability of reactions 
within that system is perfectly consistent with the movement 
of the whole being compatible with the laws of dynamics so that 
there is no section of its progress, however small, which does 
not exemplify these, and hence could be regarded as entailed by 
earlier events in virtue of them without blatant contradiction 
of the facts. The case would appear to be roughly analogous 
with that of a box of marbles carried in a certain direction; 
here it is obvious that the fact of individual marbles rolling 
about at random within the bo;r is perfectly consistent with the 
whole group of them moving at the same time in one given 
direction^and hence as capable of exhibiting a uniformity of 
motion not ascribable to any one of its members in r elation 
to the others.
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Again^ it might be argued that since it is impossible to 
ascribe both position and velocity to quantum phenomena, with 
precision, it is unjustifiable to regard a systemor group of 
quantum phenomena as exemplifying laws which presuppose its 
having a precise position and velocity at any given time while 
moving# If the principle of indeterminacy asserted the 
impossibility of quantum phenomena having a precise position 
and velocity simultaneously, this would indeed follow# But 
the impossibility asserted seans to lie, not in an electron's 
possessing a position and velocity simultaneously, but in our 
measuring both with precision simultaneously because the only 
possible method of measuring either alters the other. (The 
situation is explained very clearly by L.S.Stefciing (25) so 
there is no need to elaborate it here). And clearly it is 
significfiurit to speak of altering A* s position and velocity 
and of unavoidable error in competing them, only if A has a 
definite position and velocity to alter and about which to 
be mistaken. Furthermore, the fact that error in computing 
the one varies inversely with that incomputing the other, in 
neither case reaching zero, seems clearly to indicate that here 
is a definite velocity and position to be altered, more or less, 
by our measuring process. Moreover, quite apart from the 
peculiar difficulties of measuring anything so minute as 
quantum phenomena, it seems inevitable that sufficiently minute 
analysis of any continuous process will reveal a like imprecision#
584.
Thus, for instance, however short the period in •which I examine A>
if A is moving continuously, it will be moving throughout that
period and so ■will not have any one position to be observed.
In large scale phenomena the period of observation may be
sufficiently short for the movement to be so minute, relative to
that moved, as to be unnoticeable ; but if the analysis can be
precise enough, it will become evident, and reveal one's computation
of position and velocity to be no more than an approximation,
hovfever close. The position would be analogous to that
postulated by the special theory of relativity, which regards
neither spatial nor temporal distance as capable of precise
computation, but only the result of their conjunction# Nor
does this mean that one could not speak significantly of position
and velocity in relation to continuous movement. For to speak
of A moving through given positions, not only presupposes that
ho
the positions are there, but also that they are integral bet the 
complete description of A*s movement. Nor need any assertion 
of A*s position be ambiguous. If its movement is continuous 
then it may without contradiction or ambiguity be said to be 
occupying p at time t, if this is understood as shorthand for 
an assertion of the form: ’A was between pi and p2 during the
period tl-t2*. If, however, Zeno's objection that a continuously 
moving body is never anywhere is still felt decisive, movement 
may (consistently with the evidence) be regarded as discontinuous 
unless any a priori ground for denying this is acdepted.
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For, as the cinema bears witness, a *s appearing in closely- 
related positions in rapid succession can give the illusion 
of continuous motion. That which moves could therefore be 
regarded as stopping at various positions, so long as the period 
of these stops was short enough to aaitefe them unnoticeablc in 
either the external observation, or diredt experience, of motion.
Nor is the inevitable approximation in computing position and 
velocity in continuous motion inconsistent with the possibility 
of its exemplifying 'causality* in either the 'regularity or 
entailment sense of the term, or with the possibility of 
apparently precise computation, and consequent correct prediction,, 
relative to macroscopic phenomena such as the behaviour of 
billiard balls and bullets. For there is no contradiction in 
supposing motion to exemplify regular or necessary correlations 
to which the distance occupied within a given duration is integral, 
Furthermore, in the smallest period in which we can observe 
macroscopic movements, the movement involved would be so slight, 
relative to that moved, as to be unnoticeable; and because 
the approximation would bo so close, neither would a prediction 
based on it be noticeably at fault.
Since even the minute analyses of quantum physics, though 
revealing unpredictability in particulars, do not succeed in 
providing positive evidence of discontinuity, the continuity of 
physical processes seems more probable than not.
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(c) simultaneity.
The legitimacy of postulating simultaneous 'causation* in 
terms of either the regularity or entailment definition has been 
fully discussed above.(26) I need, therefore, do little more 
than recapitulate here.
It #as seen that both commonsense and science are prepared 
to admit » causal* connection between factors they regard as 
simultaneous. And it was further seen that if 'causation* is 
defined in terms of either regular correlation or entailment 
then not only is there no intrinsic objection to postulating 
a * cause* simultaneous with its * effect *, but the existence of 
such 'causes* cannot consistently be denied if many commonly 
acknowledged 'causal* connections are regarded as such. With 
regard to this latter point,it was seen that although we can 
never be certain that apparent simultaneity is not infact very 
rapid alternation of the supposedly simultaneous, there are 
many factors whose simultaneity it is more reasonable to postulate 
than not and for whose constant, or necessary, conjunction there 
is as much evidence as for many * causal* successions ordinarily 
recognised by exponents of both the regularity and entailment 
views of 'causation*.
Moreover, it has but just been observed (27) that not only 
may correlation of the simultaneous prove a basis of prediction, 
but it is so regarded by both science and commonsense. If, 
therefore, its justifying prediction be thought a criterion of 
'causal* connection,this need not exclude 'simultaneous causation*
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unless the definition be restricted so that a 'cause» properly 
so called, allows prediction of its 'effect*.
A philosopher who wishes to do so, however, may without 
self-contradiction eschew common usage, defining 'causation', 
not simply in terms of regular correlation or entailment, but 
as regular or necessary sequence. In so doing he should, 
however, both recognise his divergence from common, usage, 
defendHiis adequately on grounds of convenience or simplification, 
and recognise the regularities or entaiIments between the 
simultaneous which he cannot consistently deny - allowing for' 
them within his account of the universe and providing a 
distinctive method of describing them (be it only as 'non-causal* 
regularities or entailments) •
The definition of 'causation* in terms of succession seems 
to be accepted by many philosophers today, but I know of none 
who has adequately defended it. Russell, in his recent study 
of human knowledge, (28) treats it as providing a criterion for 
distinguishing 'cause' and 'effect*. It is not the only 
criterion which has been recognised, however; Kant, as has been 
seen,(29) thought they could be distinguished on the ground that 
given the 'cause* the 'effect' always occurs while the converse 
is not true. This criterion is valid, however, only if 
plurality of 'causes* is accepted; and not only is this doctrine 
generally rejected, but^ has, indeed, been seen (30) to be 
attributable to commonsense, only in virtue of the looseness of 
everyday speech. Moreover, Kant ' s criterion is not one which
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can be adopted by those supposing some * causes' might not have 
produced the 'effects' attributed to them, all the accompanying 
conditions remaining the same. Neither commonsense^nor science, 
has any hesitation in distinguishing simultaneous ' causes' and 
'effects', and it seems indubitable that both are,in effect, 
applying the same criterion in this - namely that of thinking 
a 'cause's' distinctive feature its indispensibility to its 
'effect'. Thus the presence of iodine in the system is called 
the 'cause* of normal growth, and absence of sun the 'cause' 
of rickets, and not vice versa, precisely because normal growth 
and rickets are supposed dependent on presence of iodine and 
absence of sun respectively, while the converse is not held to 
be true. it has been seen (31) that there is as good ground 
for postulating the dependence of many generally acknowledged 
'effects' on their 'causes' as for asserting the regular 
succession of 'effect* on 'cause' in many instances where this 
is thought justifiable by scientist and philosopher qlike.
And a criterion thus independent of specific temporal relations, 
and thus generally applicable, would certainly seem more useful 
than one more limited, particularly as presumably we should still 
wish to distinguish and describe the dependences between . 
simultaneous factors which are commonly assumed.
(d) Practically Separable Causal Systems.
Bradley held that nothing in the universe was independent 
of anything else, and argued that,therefore,there could be no 
valid 'causal* law which did not take account of everything
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happening in the universe# This amounts to the contention that 
we can discover no valid 'causal* law since we are unlikely to 
be able to discover everything relevant to such an one, and are 
even less likely to be able to obtain sufficient data to confirm 
its truth. Further, unless such a law states functional 
correlations exemplified throughout the uni-'/erse at any time, it would 
be useless for inference even supposing a total state of the 
universe could be known so as to form a premise in such inference, 
since it is unlikely that the total state of the universe at 
any time wilH^ e^cur.
Bradley*s denial of separable 'causal* systems, however, 
is defensible neither ©npirioally nor on the ground of its 
consistency with his premises. It has been justly pointed 
out (32) that the progress of science, and indeed of commonsense 
* learning about the world*, is nothing but the discovery that 
many factors may, for practical purposes, be regarded as 
irrelevant to the justice of generalisations a nd hence to the 
reliability of inference based on them. Nor is this inconsistent 
with the .truth of Bradley* s hypothesis that nothing within the 
universe is independent of anything else. Circumstances are 
readily conceivable in vhich A*s dependence on X can be ignored 
in formulating a law of the form * Whenever A then B*. For 
instance, A’s dependence on X may be discounted if the latter is 
equally indispensable both to B and not-B* Thus I cannot produce 
a fàarae by striking a natch unless a match has been made.
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preserved, and passed into ray keeping; but I can ignore these 
conditions in framing generalisations concerning the conditions 
under which I am likely to produce a fMme thus since they 
are equally indispensable to my failing to produce a flame 
when striking a damp match# Comraonsense was seen (33) to 
recognise this in treating many conditions it regards as 
indispensable to an * effect', as irrelevant to its 'causal* 
explanation# V/hether one accept the Bradleian dictum of 
complete interdependence throughout the universe or not, one 
has therefore no justification in denying the possibility that 
limited generalisations may in fact be true#
As with allo^ ving an interval between 'cause* and * effect *, 
however, the postulation of such interdependence effectively 
prevents any 'causal* inference from having more than a high 
degree of probability; for one can never be sure of not having 
ignored a relevant factor which may falsify one's calculations 
in any given instance# As has been observed, (34) however, 
this need not constitute an objection# Moreoever, the 
uncertainty in question is not peculiar to a Bradleian world, 
since even if complete interdependence does not obtain 
throughout the universe it would seem rash to assume we could 
always be certain we had not overlooked a factor which could 
intercept a postulated 'causal* sequence under certain rare 
conditions#
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iili Interpretation#
The current definitions of 'causation* in terms of regularity 
and entailment, in excluding applications of the title 'cause* 
acceptable to commonsense and many philosophers, do not in themselves 
constitute a denial that there are any phenomena properly describable 
as * causal* on other definitions alone# Still less do they amount 
to an assertion that every event is * caused* in the regularity or 
entailment sense of the terra respectively* It seems clear that 
most exponents of these views (and probably all regarding * causation* 
as entailment) assume, or explicitly maintain, * universal causation* 
consistently with their own definitions ; but there are exceptions# 
Thus professor Ayer, after accepting the definition of 'causation* 
in terms of regularity, has stated it to be 'not very probable* that 
every event has a * cause' in this sense. (55) He, (and other 
exponents of the regularity and entailment views) might well differ 
with other philosophers and commonsense as to the pdpobability of a 
given type of event being * caused* in this sense, but this is un­
important for the present purpose^ for which it is sufficient to 
realise that the regularity and entailment analyses of 'causal* law 
may be discussed independently of the question as to whether all 
phenomena, or even all connections conmonly described as 'causal* , 
may be supposed to exemplify such laws# In the following pages i 
shall, accordingly, confine myself to the former question.
Exponents of the regularity view defend their position by 
maintaining necessary connection between 'cause* and 'effect* to be 
neither observable,nor justly inferrible, from empirical data, while
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their opponents deny at least one of these contentions. These 
latter, however, may regard such necessity as inferrible from 
experience simply as a presupposition of induction. The most 
convenient way of discussing both viev/s, therefore, seems to consist 
in examinging the criticisms of the regularity view offered by its 
opponents. Before so considerirg than, however, I shall deal 
briefly with one or two possible sources of confusion#
It has sometimes been assumed that the regularity view is 
condemned simply by pointing out an obvious inadequacy in an over­
simplified account of the correlation between ' cause * and * effect* 
offered by one of its Exponents, For instance, the definition of 
'causation* in terms of regular sequence has been thus condemned 
on the ground that * there are many cases where we admit regular 
sequence and unhesitatingly deny causation*. (36) This line of 
argument seons clearly unjustified as it is possible to be mistaken 
as to the precise nature of the correlation between * cause* and 
*effect* without being wrong in supposing 'causation* involves 
nothing beyond de facto uniformities. Moreover, since exponents 
of the regularity view normally think it applicable to the * causal* 
laws postulated by science and commonsense, it seems clear that 
any such oversimplification is either an oversight or due to 
accidental imprecision in the formulation of their theories.
The argument concerning regular sequence,just cited,exemplifies 
this type of confusion so clearly that it will repay closer con­
sideration, It should, perhaps, be remarked in the first place, 
however, that critics of the regularity view are not wholly to blame
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for its mistaken use. Russell, when maintaining 'causation* to
consist in nothing beyond regularity, (37) himself stated this to
mean that hooters of distant factories both sounding simultaneously
can be equally regarded as «causes* of either set of employees going
to work. Russell's use of this example is very surprising, and
Broad's repeating it, without comment as to its aptness, (38) equally
so; for the relation of hooters to workers in distant towns is
obviously not of the type ordinarily considered ‘causal* by exponents
of the regularity view, it is clear, as I have insisted above, (39)
that they have in mind, not particular regularities, but those ex#
amplifying general laws. They would, for instance, on this ground
refuse to call my walking under a ladder the ‘cause* of my losing my
umbrella, however strong the evidence that whenever I had walked
under ladders I had promptly lost an umbrella. And it is evident
that, although there may be a correlation between the behaviour of
certain groups of workmen and distant hooters, there is no general
0
correlation between the behaviour of workmen and distant hooters. 
There is one week of the year when the factory hooters sound in 
Manchester but no one goes to work at the Glasgow factories, and 
another when the hooters of Glasgow meet with no response from the 
workers in Manchester, Again, hooters sometimes sound at 
different times in different towns; but a hooter sounding in 
Manchester at 7# 25 a,m, does not send Birmingham workers out half 
an hour early if these are not due at their factory till eight, 
nor does one sounding in Binningham at 7# 55 a,m, send a fresh 
influx to the Manchester benches.
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Another favourite example of regular sequence whose terms 
are not ordinarily called * cause* and * effect* is that between 
night and day* This, unlike the former, does serve to show the 
inadequacy of defining ’causation* in terms of general laws of 
regular sequence alone* For although there are variations in 
the succession of day on night, the length of both, and of the 
period of dawn and twilight^ varying (the latter even being non­
existent at the equator), yet there is a regular correlation 
between these variations, the parts of the earth where they occur, 
and the earth's movement^ so that a law of regular sequence between 
night and day consistent with past evidence could be formulated 
so long as it took into account a sufficiently complex set of 
conditions* Yet the succession of night and day lacks a criterion 
of * causal* sequence which, whether made explicit or not, seems to 
be accepted by all exponents of the regularity view - namely that 
of providing a convenient basis of prediction* Certainly, if one 
knows the very complex law involved^ and all the relevant elements 
in a complex situation, one will always be able to predict the 
time and condition of nightfall or daybreak at any time of the 
preceding day or night respectively, but as the justifiable 
prediction for any given period of day or night varies with the 
relation to the sun of the part of the earth in question, clearly 
this latter^ rather than the succession of night and day^  is the key 
factor for such inference. Furthermore, the common practice of 
regarding the earth's position and movement,relative to the sun^  a# 
'causing* the succession of night and day in general, and
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particular variations in these for different parts of the earth 
at varying times of the year as * cause* of variations in this 
succession at different times and places, is consistent with the 
principle (sometimes made explicit in expounding a regularity 
theory of causation (4o) ) of regarding as a relation b etween 
’cause* and ’effect* only those connections which are basic and 
thus allow correlation of a variety of phenomena.
That both these criteria of ’causal* connection^not only 
must be recognised by all adequate expositions of the regularity 
view, but are in fact assumed by most of its exponents, seons 
clear enough. If direct relevance to, and utility for, 
prediction is ignored then, on^ the grounds of regular correlation 
alone, it would be correct to say that if taking arsenic is 
regularly followed by death un>der certain oorditions a thunderclap 
•causes* death when con-oomitant with the taking of arsenic mf 
those conditions are fulfilled, since it is certainly true to 
say that whenever a thunderclap is concanitant with a person* s 
taking arsenic and these conditions are fulfilled, his death 
follows. And not only would such usage be useless, inconvenient, 
and wholly at variance with common practice, but it would be 
rejected out of hand by most exponents of the regularity view,
Again^ the history of modem science consists to a very large extent 
in discarding derivative laws for more ultimate ones under which 
they are subsumed, and even commonsense regards a ’real* or complete 
explanation as one which brings out the basic principles on which 
a postulated ’effect* is thought to depend; while I think most
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exponents of the regularity view would agree in conceiving the 
•cause* of my hearing the nine o’clock news in terms of sound and 
radio waves together with the phsyiological conditions of hearing, 
rather than as my having turned a knob, even though they suppose 
that whenever I turn a knob under certain conditions I shall hear 
the nine o’clock news, (it should perhaps be remarked that the 
tendency to regard the more basic connection, alone,as that between 
•cause* and ’effect* seems to a large extent guided by motives of 
utility and the capacity of the basic conns ction for correlating 
or ’explaining* others; thus at present we are generally content 
to describe ’arsenic as the ’cause* of death rather than looking 
to the chemical, let alone physical, principles involved for our 
’causal* law, presumably because-at the non-scientific level at any 
rate—the general principles would be less useful to us than the 
simple derivative connection, and this mainly because we do not 
knov/ enough of their application to other types of phenomena. Once 
again, it seems, practical utility for prediction, is a guiding 
factor).
There are two major confusions to which exponents of the 
regularity view are liable.
In the first place they sometimes seem to assume their 
position to be stronger than that of their opponents because these 
latter postulate something not given in experience. As Swing 
has pointed out,(41) they are, in general, entitled to claim no 
such advantage since they usually regard the ’causal* connections 
they postulate, not as uniformities exemplified within their own
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past experience alone, or even that of others," but as correlations 
which would occur at any time or place under appropriate 
circumstances whether they are known to have been experienced there 
or not. And this remains true even if, as phenomenalists, they 
interpret a ’causal* law as merely a hypothetical assertion about 
possible sense data, since in effect they still regard such an one 
as stating it to be at least highly probable that given experiences 
would occur under the requisite conditions both in past and present 
circumstances under which they are not knovm to have occurred (e.g. 
they assume that under certain conditions the experience of seeing 
someone swallow arsenic in the Antartic would be followed by seeing 
him die in a certain manner), and in the future. And this 
certainly cannot be said to be given in experience if, as the up^ 
holder of the regularity view maintains, the observed cannot be 
seen to entail the unobserved.
If, however, the exponents of the regularity viav are correct 
in denying a necessaiy connection between any * cause * and its ’effect’ 
to be discoverable by us, they are entitled to a more modified claim. 
For it is then true that they are merely universalising correlations 
which have occurred in experience^ while their opponents postulate a 
hypothetical connection whose like they can justly claim neither to 
have observed nor to have found directly evidenced by any phenomenon. 
Nor is this claim answered by pointing to the non-causal entailments 
exemplified by phenomena which I discussed above.(42). The intrinsic 
connections between the character of a note or shade of colour and 
its relations to others, for instance, can hardly be regarded as
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analogues of the entailment of A*s existence by that of B.
Secondly it soraetine s seems to be assumed that in order to 
disprove the ent ailment view one need only show that we have no 
positive evidence of necessary connection between any ’cause* and 
its postulated ’effect*. This assumption, though understandable, 
seems clearly unwarranted. As has been seen^ (43) and as has been 
pointed out by Swing (44) and Broad^ (45) the fact (if it be a fact) 
of our inability to discover necessary connection between A and B 
does not prove that there is none* since their intrinsic connection 
Tjiight be undisooverable by us under any circumstances, or in the 
present state of our knowledge. (Swing has pointed out (4 6 ) that 
the Egyptian of 3>000 years ago had no direct positive ground for 
supposing, any intrinsic connection between the properties of 
triangles, butj^^e would have been mistaken had he denied its 
existence). Or again, as Broad has pointed out (47) ’causation’ 
may be indefinable apart from regularity, though this latter is no 
more than its sign, simply because it is ’ultimate and unanalysable’
On the other hand the fact that inability to discover of 
necessary ’causal’ connections does not by itself prove their non­
existence, is not sufficient to disprove the regularity view. For 
if there is indeed no positive ground for either asserting or 
denying necessary connection between any ’cause* and its ’effect’, 
the only reasonable course is to recognise that, so far as we can 
judge, either the regularity or entaiIment view of ’causal’ law 
may be correct.
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It is now possible to discuss whether one of these views may 
be regarded as more acceptable than the other, and whether the 
choice of one or the other has any practical importance in dealing 
with ’causal* laws. These two questions are closely linked as it 
has been maintained that our attitude towards these uniformities 
presupposes assumption of the uniformity view whether this is 
recognised or not* (48)
Mace has maintained (49) that necessary connectionb etween 
’cause* and ’effect* is discoverable in the sphere of dynamics^in 
that the result of impact between A and B can be seen to be entailed 
if they are defined precisely enough. Unless A  and B are defined 
(in part at least) in terms of their reactions on impact (in vhich 
case Mace’s*necessary connections’ are expressible by mere 
tautologies such as that whatever rebounds on impact rebounds on 
impact, which is hardly the type of assertion which most philosophers 
and scientists (past or present) would regard as expressing a 
’causal* law)^ then^as has been seen^ (5o) Mace’s contention is true 
only if some uniformities are already assumed so that he is still 
left with the possibility that * causal * connections between 
billiard balls and other movements are reducible to de facto 
regularities*
As has been indicated^(51) this derivative type of entailment 
has been potent in convincing philosophers and plain men of the 
falsity of the regularity view. Nor is this surprising: the
contention that ’causal’ connections consist in mere de facto 
uniformities seems clearly falsified by every m  chine. For it
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appear® obvious enough that a machine must behave in a certain 
manner under given circumstances because of the nature and inter­
relation of its parts. And the fact that it is possible to dis­
cover how to complete a machine,or any other complex piece of 
engineering,by means of mathematical calculations is even more 
convincing evidence of the presence of entailment since mathematical 
conclusions,if true, are necessarily so. Such an example as the 
construction of the Sydney Harbour bridge, whose two havles were 
constructed separately their meeting properly in their final placing 
depending on precise mathematical calculation of the expansion and 
contraction which would occur in the metal, is particularly con­
vincing. Again, given that all macroscopic phenomena are 
analysable into quantum reactions which latter exhibit statistical 
regularities such as to determine the character of the macroscopic 
in any respect, then macroscopic phenomena are clearly necessary 
in that respect.
But, as I have insisted, (52) all this may be true whether or 
no the uniformities on which these entailments rest are themselves 
necessary, since it is the uniformity alone which they presuppose. 
Thus if it is true that macroscopic movements all exhibit certain 
constancies, the behaviour of a machine is entailed by the 
character and interrelation of its parts irrespective of whether 
those constancies are themselves necessary. And the same is clearly 
true of entailment in virtue of constancies in the expansation or 
contraction of metals and statistical regularities exemplified in 
quantum phenomena; just as, given that every third figure in a
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certain pattern is green, A*s having that position entails its
being green. And the existence of an entailment resting on a
de facto uniformity would suffice to explain the repugnance felt 
by Hjwing, (53) in common with the plain man, to such a suggestion 
as that there is no more intrinsic connection between B’s death 
and A*s shooting him (successfully) than between the former and 
an earthquake at the other end of the world. The suggestion 
is shocking because it seems that we are such that we cannot fail 
to die when a bullet passes through heart or brain; but this is 
so only because we assume certain physical and phsysiological 
constancies to obtain, and these once more might be merely de facto. 
And so far as I can see it is quite impossible to tell whether the
basic uniformities assumed (consistently with the evidence) by the
various sciences, are necessary or not.
It seems to me,therefore, that we have no direct evidence that 
physical ’causation* does not ultimately reduce to mere de facto 
uniformities; while at the same time it appears equally undeniable 
that if it does, there are necessary connections between many events 
in virtue of these uniformities,(54). This, while it seems more 
than most exponents of the regularity view are willing to admit, is 
less than most of their opponents intend to assert. For the latter 
generally appear to regard ’causal* connection as ’necessary* in the 
absolute Leibnizean sense defined above.(55).
Both Ewing and Stout have maintained (5&) that necessary 
’causal* connections are discoverable in the psychological sphere. 
Here,despite the denials of our insight into voluntary action
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offered by Hume (57) and Malebranohe, (58) the exponent of the 
entailment view seems to be on much more promising ground. Thus, 
for instance, though I can see no objection to supposing ray prejudice 
against regarding arsenic as irrelevant to dying may rest ultimately 
on a mere de facto uniformity, I cannot think my spontaneously 
dropping an unexpectedly hot plate completely reducible to such an 
one* I can see no objection to supposing it may be so reducible 
insofar as it consists in automatic physical reactions wbose counter­
parts might be reproduced in a mchine. But insofar as it involves 
awareness of a sensation as unpleasant, and a conscious impulse to 
end it, (59) the experience seems clearly to reveal a non-derivative 
intrinsic connection# If any exponent of the regularity view does 
not feel this, then I see no way of convincing him; but it seems 
clear to me that, when I say I wish to end a certain sensation because 
it is unpleasant,I am not merely asserting that whenever a sensation 
is unpleasant I wish to end it. The latter statement, as ordinarily 
understood, simply does not appear to express the situation at all.
If it did, my wishing to end an unpleasant sensation would be 
analogous to the fact of bodies tending towards each other to a 
degree inversely proportional to the squares of their distances, for 
which we can see no inherent necessity (even though we may see this - 
or rather, as Stout puts it, (6o) a law which is practically 
equivalent to this - would be entailed by the correctness of Einstein’s 
conception of the universe). Nor does it seem justifiable to 
regard as tautologous the assertion that I wish to end a sensation 
because it is unpleasant# For the recognition of A as unpleasant,
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and the impulse to end it appear to exemplify two basically 
different types of experience, the distinction between which has 
been recognised by philosophers in their designating them 
•cognitive’ and ’oonative’ respectively. Again, if anyone 
cannot recognise this distinction within his own experience^I have 
no means of convincing him of it; I can only repeat that I am
convinced of its existence because I find it in mine.
Ewing points to a similar type of experience (6l) as an 
instance of intrinsic connection between the occurrence of one 
event and that of another. His example is of greater complexity 
than mine, however, and J think this lessens its force. For he 
instances the connection betv/een a person’s death and his friend’s 
sorrow and, as he himself recognises, it is easy enough to think 
of instances when this connection does not hold. If A  has gone 
mad,or his friendship for B turned to hatred,before the letters 
death, he may well rejoice at this; and even though their friend­
ship remains strong till B’s death, if A  is unselfish and B when
he died was suffering from a painful and incurable disease, or A
believes him to have passed to a happier state of existence, his 
sorrow will be at least considerably tempered. Or again, if A 
is in a state of exhausation at the time of B ’s death, having 
nursed the latter through a long and distressing illness; no 
matter how strong his affection for B> he may be incapable of 
anything but relief when the latter dies. But if one analyse 
the intrinsic connection which one nevertheless seems to see 
between B ’s death and his friend’s sorrow, one sees that it is
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only when we suppose B*s living to give A pleasure that we are 
convinced of an intrinsic connection between the foimer’s death 
and the letter’s sorrow. And,once more, this connection seems 
neither to consist in regularity alone nor to be expressible by 
a tautology. Again we, or I at least, weem to be aware of an 
inherent necessity which appears lacking in other uniformities, 
however well attested* And since the experience of sorrow 
seems clearly distinct from the mere absence of pleasure, it seems 
Indubitable that here is a genuine connection between two distinct 
teriaso Furthermore, the basic intrinsic connection between loss 
of pleasure and sorrow serves to explain both the exceptions to 
Ewing’s example, and our recognising, irrespective of any evidence 
of their occurrence, that they must be exceptions.
Both Ewing^^d stout (6 5) cite a very significant example 
of intrinsic ’causal’ connection, namely that involved in the 
psychological process of inference. This process - namely the 
passage from belief in, or acceptance of, certain premises to 
assent to a given conclusion - is not to be confused with the 
entailment of a conclusion by premises,which clearly is not 
’causal’ in the ordinary sense of the term. That the connection 
between belief in premises and assent to conclusion is distinct 
from that between premises and conclusion in themselves, is 
evident. For while, from the nature of the case, if the premises 
entail the conclusion, they do so invariably; a person may, on 
occasion, fail to infer the latter from the former, particularly 
if their connection is complex and abstract as in the deductions
6o5.
of advanced mathematics.
It might, perhaps, be argued^however, that to regard the 
psychological connection as necessary (if not in plain contradiction 
to the existence of failure to ’follow’ arguments) consists in an 
unwarrantable attribution to this of a characteristic peculiar to 
the connection between premises and conclusions. It might be 
thought, for instance, that the psychological phenomena of inferring 
is adequately accounted for in terms of a de facto uniformity - 
namely that whenever a person believes the truth of certain premises 
to justify a given conclusion, then he does not assent to the one 
without accepting the other (or at least behaving in a manner 
appropriate to this under certain circumstances).
If, however, one accept the account of neaning and entailment 
outlined in the Introduction above, (6 4) then it is evident that when 
given premises entail a certain conclusion, accepting the former with 
understanding entails assenting to the latter. Nor indeed is this 
peculiar to purely deductive inference, since if my account of ne aning 
is true then A does not render B probable unless assenting to A with 
understanding entails accepting B as probable (at least when the 
question of doing so is raised), sîwe one could not be said to fully 
understand A if one failed to realise this connection when considering 
A and B in conjunction. Furthermore it is impossible to give an 
adequate account of inference in other terras. For if the uniformity 
it exemplifies is not to be stated tautologously, it must be possible 
to define ’believing the truth of certain premises to justify the 
acceptance of a given conclusion’ in terms other than ’acceptance of
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the conclusion whenever the premises are assented to*. But this is 
possible only by introducing the notion of ^ understanding’ in the 
sense defined above. And once acknowledgment of the conclusion's 
acceptability is admitted to rest on the meaning attached to 
premises and conclusion,the intrinsic connection is assumed*
The importance of this example, however, lies in the fact that, 
even if this account of inference is not admitted, it is presupposed 
in every assumption that accepting a given conclusion is justifiable. 
For if my inferring is never more than an exemplification of a mere 
de facto regularity, the terms ’justifiable’ and ’unjustifiable’ are 
no more applicable to it than to the outcome of a conditioned reflex. 
If I am to be able to point to premises in vindication of acceptance 
of a conclusion then my assent to the latter must, in that instance 
at least, depend on its being entailed by my acceptance of the 
former in virtue of the meaning I attach to both. Nor is this true 
of purely deductive reasoning alone. For it is only possible to be 
justified in accepting a conclusion as probable^ if one recognises 
both that a certain type of criterion would render it so and that 
this is exemplified in certain premises; in which case acceptance 
of the latter entails assenting to the probability of the former*
Thus no one who maintains that no ’cause* entails its ’effect’ is 
entitled to regard any conclusion as justifiable*
Ewing also points to memory (6f) as an example of the entailment 
of ’effect’ by ’cause’. And it is true enough both that the 
character,at least,of a veridical memory experience, as ordinarily 
conceived, is thought to be entailed by that of the remembered 
situation, and that it seems impossible not to regard it so. I
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think, hov/ever, that ranemic phenomena could be accounted for in terms 
of regularity alone, so that this example is less convincing than the 
others. But this^to my mind, is unimportant since these latter 
suffice to refute the contention that no ’cause* entails its ’effect*.
The existence of such examples, however, does not justify the 
contention that all ’causes’, or even all those definable in the 
modem style in terms of ’law’, entail their ’effects’. Nevertheless 
it does render that assumption more justifiable than it would 
otherwise be, by showing this to consist in postulating relations 
of a type met wi.th in experience.
Ewing (66) and Stout (67) both contend that inference from 
’cause’ to ’effect’ is only justifiable if a ’cause’ entails its 
’effect’ since the premises of a valid argument entail its conclusion. 
To my mind, this argument stands condemned by the fact that^excludes 
the validity of any probability inference, while it seems undeniable 
not only that the possibility of such inference is generally accepted, 
but that it cannot legitimately be denied. Indeed, I cannot really 
believe that Ewing, presented with the dice in Hume’s illustration,
(68) would think it illegitimate to infer himself more likely to 
throw the figure inscribed on four sides merely because his actually 
doing so was not entailed by the available data. As I have suggested, 
every valid argument does indeed involve entailment, but not 
necessarily that of the oertàin truth of the conclusion given that 
of the premises, since that entailed may be merely the legitimacy 
of regarding the conclusion as probable.
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To prove his point, therefore, Ewing would have to show that 
’causai inference^in particular, is justified only if the ’cause’ 
entails its ’effect’* There is no^ a priori ground for supposing 
this* There is no intrinsic impossibility in all A ’s being 
followed by, or simultaneous with, B’s although there is no intrinsic 
connection between them; and if it is possible to discover this, or 
even justifiable to think it probable that this relation holds for 
most A’s, the inference that B is to be expected given A, will be 
justified* (Though of course it will not be legitimate to infer that 
it will necessarily occur)* And, indeed, it has been seen that if 
one assume the basic uniformities postulated by science, then some 
’causes’ not only may, but must, be regarded as entailing their 
’effects’. Since, as Ewing himself admits, (69) these basic uniform­
ities cannot be seen to be necessary, the denial that they can be 
justly postulated if regarded as merely defacto, amounts to the 
contention that we never have ^ægitimate grounds for supposing a 
purely de facto uniformity probable. This,swing discusses (7o) as 
a separate question, maintaining that% in the absence of an intrinsic 
connection between A and B their conjunction is a mere coincidence, 
their conjunction in a large variety of known instances being thus 
extremely improbable, and their universal conjunction fantastically so. 
On this argument, if the conjunction between A and B is ne rely de 
facto^ the more frequently and universally it has been observed in the 
past the less likely it is to recur in the future so that inductive 
evidence has the reverse implication to that normally assumed when it 
is considered in relation to postulated uniformities. This argument,
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however, although useful in pointing out that induction alone cannot 
render a de facto uniformity probable, completely fails in its 
purpose of showing such an uniformity intrinsically improbable.
For surely coincidence is excluded from the conjunction of A and B, 
not only by their intrinsic connection^but also by their de facto 
universal correlation. If all bodies tend towards each other to a 
degree varying inversely with the squares of their distances, and 
this is neither intrinsically necessaiy nor entailed by the character 
of the universe, it is surely an abuse of language to describe the 
earth’s doing so as a ’coincidence*. Ewing’s argument therefore 
assumes what it sets out to prove^ namely that there can be no 
inductive grounds for postulating a de facto uniformity (a much 
wider assumption than the contention that induction alone would not 
suffice to justify this). Induction will be more fully discussed 
in the concluding section of this chapter; so here I shall merely 
remark that since the only inductive evidence for necessary 
connection is that for a regular correlation, it would seem that if 
this justifies the postulation of either, it gives that of the latter 
a higher probability than .that of the former since the one asserts 
less than the other.
It might perhaps be contended that to admit some ’causes’ to 
entail their ’effects’ intrinsically^while allowing that others, if 
entailing theirs, do so only in virtue of a uniformity which may be 
merely de facto, is to exclude any unified account, or definition, 
of ’causation’. But this is not necessarily so. If one confine 
oneself to ’causal laws’ there is, so far as I can see, no objection 
to defining ’causation in terms of regular correlation while at the
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same time allowing that some ’causes’ are not only regularly 
correlated with their ’ effects^ but entail them either intrinsicaJLly 
or in virtue of other correlations which sometimes may well be 
de facto. Or, again, one may adopt the commons ense definition of a 
’cause* as indispensable to its ’effect* , allov/ing that some 
’causes’ are regularly correlated with their ’effects’, some 
entailing theirs either intrinsically or derivatively. The 
experience of commonsense reveals that, in practice, there is no 
difficulty in applying so wide a definition. Furthermore, it has 
the added advantage that it excludes no common use of the term 
’cause’^ whether one regard ’voluntary’ action as entailed or no.
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iv. Our Grounds for postulating 
______Causal Laws*_____________
In the following pages, I mean by inductive evidence 
observational data relative to the truth of a generalisation; 
and I assume it to be obtained by a judicious combination of Mill’s 
methods (with the possible addition of others). I shall not 
consider, here, methods of obtaining such evidence (a technical 
subject which has received a good deal of attention from logicians 
in the past century). Instead I shall confine myself to the 
crucial question as to whether generalisations may be justified 
by numerous and comprehensive observations in which a given’factor 
has never been known to be absent under certain specified 
conditions or to be present under others, and if so under what 
conditions; and whether such evidence is indispensable to their 
justification.
In the first place it is necessary to repeat (71) that the 
direct information supplied by inductive evidence is,relatively 
speaking at least, extremely limited. For, as I have pointed out,
(7 2) at best the available evidence covers only a minute fraction 
of the observations which could have been made in the present and 
past. That a uniformity has occurred constantly up to the present 
is thus as much a matter of inference as its continuing to obtain 
in the future.
It has been seen (73) that the possibility of coincidence 
shows the most extensive evidence of uniformity incapable, by 
itself, of justifying inference to its exemplification in future
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instances. And other circumstances capable of invalidating such 
inference are readily conceivable. For instance, given that a 
relatively small proportion of A*s are B*s, the greater the number 
of A’s which are observed without any failing to be a B, the less 
the probability that the next A observed will also be a B; thus 
given that a well shuffled pack of fifty two cards contains 
thirteen spades, and that the first twelve drawn from it at random 
without being replaced are spades, the probability of the thirteenth 
being a spade is far less than it would have been had no spades been 
drawnr-the probability of the next card being a spade having through­
out the experiment decreased proportionately to the number of these 
drawn. It might be objected that this is an example of induction 
by simple enumeration which can readily be seen to be inadequate in 
most empirical investigation. This objection, however, is 
irrelevant to the point at issue. In the present instance this 
is the only method applicable. Moreoever, although careful and 
comprehensive variation of observational conditions and correlation 
of the results of investigations in slightly different spheres, may 
help to exclude false generalisations, the point at issue is that 
a perfectly true generalisation concerning the past and not merely 
a limited experience by itself fail to justify inference to its 
obtaining in any future instance. (74) It seems clear to me, 
therefore, that at the least,repeated experience of a corresponding 
correlation can only justify inference to its occurrence in a 
future instance if it is assumed; (a) that the past correlations 
have not been coincidences; and (b) that they do not form a small
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proportion of the instances in which the tern forming the basis of 
the inference occurs. This being so the experience of an uniformity 
in the past, however widespread and comprehensive the observations 
attesting it, seems incapable (by itself) of justifying the assumption 
of its universality. Furthermore, as was observed above, (75) even 
though it be assumed that, no A’s which are not B*s having been 
observed, each additional observation of an A that is a b renders it 
more probable that all A’s are B, the known observations thus favouring 
any postulated uniformity are so few in relation to those which might 
have occurred that the probability they can confer on it is 
inf init e s imal.
Moreover, Russell seems justified in contending that on neither 
of its generally accepted definitions is probability capable of 
justifying prediction. As he points out, (76) on the finite frequency 
definition it is possible to estimate only the probability of a past 
observation having had a certain ciiaracteristic, or of a past 
induction observing certain rules having been successful, but to 
assume this to continue to be true of future observations or 
inductions is to pass ’outside the finite frequency theory since we 
are dealing with classes of which the numbers are not knovn’. And 
on the other hand, as he has also remarked^ (77) Reiohenbach’s 
inductive posit resting on the view of probability in terms of 
frequency tending to a limit in an infinite series - namely that a 
frequency observed in a long series is to be assumed to approximate 
to that discoverable however far this is extended - can easily be 
falsified. And indeed, as he has suggested, if probability is
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conceived in terras of frequency in an infinite series, then there 
is no evidence inconsistent with any given probability since in an 
infinite series any frequency occurring in a finite section, however 
long, can be counterbalanced. Moreoever, it is evident that the 
estimates of probability of whose justice we have no doubt (namely 
those concerning throws of dice etc) rest on knowledge of the 
structure of the phenomena concerned (e.g. that the dice has six 
sides each differently marked,and is so constructed that it may 
fall with any one of them uppermost when thrown). Were this not 
so, we should not be convinced of the justice of these estimates 
independently of experiment, as we are; nor would our confidence 
be unaffected by subsequent empirical confirmation, as it is*
In dealing with the indefinite series w&th which the most 
important inductions of commonsense and science are concerned, it 
is clearly impossible to base inference on data analogous to a 
dice’s having six sides equally capable of falling uppermost, or 
the distribution of black and white balls within a set of containers; 
for this is just the type of knowledge which is unobtainable concern­
ing the universe, or its history, as a whole.
There is, however, one type of assumption, and one only, whidi 
seems capable of justifying either generalisation or inference to 
unobserved particulars on the basis of inductive evidence - namely 
that the universe as a whole, or a specific type of phenomenon 
within it, exemplifies certain uniformities. Thus if it is held 
that everything (or everything of a given general type) is 
correlated in a certain manner with something of a type so related
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to all of its kind, then it seems legitimate to infer that if 
careful, v/i de spread, and comprehensive, observations have invariably 
revealed the appropriate relation to hold between A*s and B’s, 
their conjunction constitutes an example of this law so that they 
may reasonably be expected to be so related in the future and 
supposed tô have been so in unobserved instances in the present or 
past (given that any other relevant conditions obtain). Thus if 
it is assumed that there is no event of a type not invariably 
followed (under certain circumstances) by events of another given 
type; then if careful investigation has revealed many A’s, none 
of which have not been followed by a B (given x) ,it is reasonable 
to suppose that B is A’s invariable consequent, and so to expect 
it to follow when A occurs and X obtains. The precise nature of 
the uniformity which must be assumed to justify any given induction 
would seem to depend on the nature of the latter. The inferences 
made by s ci en ce seem to require two, namely; (a) that nothing 
exists of which it is not true that its like does so only under 
certain conditions (or at least one of a finite set of alternative 
circumstances); and (b) that at least every type of physical event 
occurs whenever certain conditions are fulfilled. It was seen above,
(7 8) in discussing commonsense, that these assumptions must be 
distinguished one from the other. That science presupposes both 
seems clear. For instance,the bacteriologist who is satisfied that 
he has traced the ’cause’ of a given disease to a certain microbe, 
generally supposes himself to have discovered,not only conditions 
under which the disease invariably occurs, but also that the
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elimination of which mean the elimination of the disease.
Similarly, the physicist who supposes billiard balls invariably 
behave in a certain manner under given conditions also believes 
they will not behave thus in the absence of those conditions*
Modem philosophers have generally concentrated their attention 
on the former type of regularity, presumably because the laws made 
explicit by science generally postulate these primarily; but the 
latter type are clearly presupposed in all scientific investigation; 
thus the results derived from physical experimert s rest on the 
assumption that measuring instruments,not only behave in a certain 
manner under given conditions, but ttet th»y do not do so when those 
conditions are not fulfilled*
Most modem scientists and philosophers assume that at least 
no physical event occurs in the absence of conditions of a type given 
which one of its kind invariably occurs* This wider assumption, 
however, does not seem to be required to justify any of the specific 
inferences made by scientists, the two I have mentioned being 
sufficient to justify any particular conclusion of the form ’No A 
occurs in the absence of a B, while given B an A invariably occurs* 
if adequate observations have revealed neither an A nor a b 
occurring in the absence of the other. My aim, legitimately enough 
it seems, has been to discover the least which must be assumed 
concerning the universe in order to justify the inductions on which 
science rests both in its formulation of laws and.its reliance on
I A
instruments (and other elements in experiment)*
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Furthermore, given the two assumptions I have postulated, 
the need of repeating observations for the purpose of confirmation 
is reduced, if not excluded, once a limited number of precise and 
comprehensive experiments have been made. And when sufficient 
previously established conclusions are relevant, one such 
observation might carry assurance. The ascription of these 
assumptions to scientists thus serves to explain the relative 
irrelevance which they normally attach to repetition in respect 
to the confirmatory value of observation and experiment# jt also 
explains the conviction they ordinarily have, in effect, (whatever 
the verbal concessions they may make to philosophical criticism) 
that if their data and its analysis has been adequate, their 
conclusions are infallible#
AS I have pointed out above, (79) I can find no ground for 
supposing either of the above mentioned presuppositions of induction  ^
necessarily true* And the foregoing, by showing they must be 
assumed in order to justify induction relative to the universe in 
general,should have made it plain that their probable truth cannot 
be inferred inductively. Nevertheless, as i have already suggested- 
(80) regarding the first of them, the fact that their denial is 
inconsistent with accepting the inductions recognised by both science 
and coraraonsense, seems a sufficient ground for accepting them since, 
in practice at any rate, we are unprepared to reject those inductions* 
For though a philosopher may make a useful contribution to the history 
of thought despite inconsistencies in his system, he can hardly
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claim any right of preference for his views unless he professes 
to respect consistency - which profession would be blatantly un­
justifiable in one maintaining a position fundamentally at variance 
with his ordinary attitudes and assumptions*
Before leaving the subject,it might be well to remark that the 
foregoing is unaffected by Keynes’ argument to show that ’causation’ 
is not a presupposition of probability inference. That it is not 
presupposed in probability arguments which do not constitute 
inference to some ’causal’ uniformity, is clearly no ground for 
supposing this true of those that do. And it is of course undeniable 
that all probability inference not directly concerned with causal 
laws, if regarded as having any empirical application, rests on the 
assumption of such uniformities. Thus^  for instance, probability 
inference applicable to actual dice assumes that these always behave 
in a certain manner under given conditions eg.g, that when thrown 
they fall with one side uppermost and are not transformed into white 
rabbits or spheres.
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CONCLUSION - A SUMMARY.
It was seen in introduction to the general discussion;
(a) that ostensive definition is both possible and indispensable, 
and thus that assertions concerning empirical phencraena are 
possible; (b) that intrinsic connections or entailments are both 
discoverable among such phenomena,and may be so expressed verbally 
that genuine knowledge concerning them may, on occasion, be obtained 
by means of verbal deductions.
In discussing various uses of the terms ’cause’, ’causation*, 
’causality’/ ’causal’, it was found that commonsense, Aristotle,
St.Thomas, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and 
most modem philosophera are agreed in supposing that the ’ cause 
of A* properly so called is that in the absence of which A does 
not occur (under certain conditions at least). Gommonsense, 
Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, and Berkeley, however, were seen to 
differ from the others in holding that the title ’cause of A* may 
be applied to an existent of a type whose exemplifications are not 
invariably correlated with A’s. It was further seen that 
Aristotle aligned ’causation in general with artificial making such 
as casting a statue, and that St.ThomaSjin inheriting this idea aid 
at the same time regarding a creative God as the ’cause’ par 
excellence, helped to foster the conception of a ’cause’ as 
essentially a producer in the sense of a persisting subject directly 
initiating the coming into being of its ’effect’. The application 
of this conception to physical ’causation’ was seen to consist in 
regarding an instance of this as a series of events in the history
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of one continuant as ’cause», which at the same time constitute 
a process of change in another-this latter procession its completion, 
being regarded as the ’effect». The discovery and development of 
the successful application of mathematics to physics, on the other 
hand,was found to promote the conception of the universe as a 
system of necessary entailment, and of the » cause of A ’ as 
essentially that entailing A’s existence® Berkeley was seen to 
challenge this view of the physical world by regarding its un­
iformities as dependent on God’s will alone, while Hume carried 
the process a step further by contending solely that we have no
ground for regarding them as anything but de facto. And Kant 
f0M>Kcl
wasy^ to respond to Hume’s challenge by supposing that while denying 
the possibility of detecting in phenomena any intrinsic entailment, 
it was possible to justify the postulation of necessary ’causal* 
connection between them as a presupposition of experience* And 
modem philosophers were observed to have continued the debate as 
to whether ’causes’ may be said to entail their ’effects’ or not.
With regard to this debate I have maintained that : (a) since
Kant’s conclusions can only be justified by the discovery of an 
intrinsic necessity in experience, his denaùl that this is possible 
invalidates his solution; (b) within the psychological sphere 
certain causes can be seen to entail their ’effects’ , and further 
that unless this is admitted to be so in inferring, regarded as a 
psychological phenomenon, no rational justification can be claimed 
for adherence to any conclusion; (c) if uniformities such as the
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laws of motion,obtain within the universe.then some 'causes' will
I f'
entail their ’effects* in virtue of these, but as we seem to have 
no ground for supposing these basic uniformities necessary, we are 
in no position to deny that phsyical ’causal* connections may be 
ultimately reducible to purely de facto regularitiesJ (d) there
seems no objection to regarding some ’causal* uniformities as thus 
reducible,while supposing others intrinsically necessary.
With regard to the postulation of ’universal causation’, two 
assumptions which (on differing definitions) may be so described^ 
were seen to be presupposed if causal inferences based on empirical 
evidence,which are admitted or assumed by science, are to be 
logically justifiable. These assumptions are; (a) that nothing 
exists of which it is not true that its like does so only under 
certain conditions (or at least one of a finite set of alternative 
circumstances); and (b) that at least every type of phy^cal event 
occurs invariably under certain conditions* por neither of these 
could I find any justification beyond the inconsistency of their 
denial with the ’causal’ inferences we all accept, but this (in the 
absence of any effective argument against them) seemed sufficient 
to justify their acceptance, though adjnittedly incapable of con­
ferring complete certainty on them. And thus conclusions resting 
on them cannot legitimately be regarded as more than highly probable 
in the sense of it being more reasonable than not to accept them.
Finally, with respect to the nature of the correlation between 
’cause’and ’effect’, J maintained that; (a) this must be regarded as 
generally complex; (b) on all definitions of ’causation’ save that
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in terras of succession, the admission of ’causes* simultaneous 
with their ’effects’ is not only legitimate,but desirable; (c) 
’cause' and ’effect’ may, without self-contradiction or 
inconsistency with the evidence, be regarded as either separated 
by a finite interval containing nothing in virtue of which they 
may be linked, or as connected by a continuous process or (in 
time alone) by something coexistent with both, but that they 
cannot be supposed contiguous in a sense inconsistent with the 
continuity of the temporal or spatial; (d) there is no 
contradiction in admitting non-spatial or non-temporal ’causes’ 
or ’effects’, and that to regard psychological phenomena as 
’causes’ or ’effects’ is to postulate non-spatial ’causal’ 
relations*
I have not discussed the general question as to whether 
sentences ’about causes’ and ’causation’ express statements 
concerning anything but words (a question as ambiguous as the 
definitions of ’cause’ are varied). I hope, however, that the 
foregoing specific discussions have made it clear that there are 
many statements ’concerning causes and causation* which (whether 
justifiable or not) are not merely verbal; .and further that there 
is no commonly accepted definition of ’cause’ given which it is 
unreasonable to apply the term to any existent.
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